Although the early uprisings in Tunisia and Egypt were markedly secular and free of ideology, it was Islamists in both countries that swept the board in recent parliamentary elections. Where did it go wrong for Arab liberal secularists? How can they reconnect with the masses?
For years, academic papers and symposiums have argued that Arab liberal secularism has failed. Although that may have seemed clear, it has always been the hope of Arab liberals and secularists that the pundits could be mistaken and that a golden age of liberal values and secular ideologies would one day re-emerge.
Liberalism in the Arab world has had its day and fallen along with the unsuccessful ideological experiments of pan-Arab socialism in Egypt, Syria and Iraq. The unfolding of the Arab Spring has underscored this reality and made it glaringly obvious, not only to academics but, to even the most casual observer.
The uprisings in Egypt and Tunisia at the beginning of last year were not initially led by Islamists, but were largely secular and free of ideology. Many liberals had hoped that this symbolized a renaissance of their values. However, Islamist electoral victories in both Tunisia and Egypt have unequivocally dispelled this dream.
Failure to capitalize on the uprisings
Karl Sharro, a commentator on the Middle East, points bitterly to the secularists' lack of self critique and a complete inability to engage with the masses: "This disconnect between the secularist elites and the Arab masses is clearly illustrated in their patronising attitude. They constantly speak of 'education' and 'raising awareness', the preferred tools for social engineering they like to borrow from Western liberal democracies."
Sharro continues by pointing out the rather ineffectual methods they employed to gain support:
Rather than addressing the real political and economic challenges through ambitious programmes that could gain them popular support, they persist in alienating their audiences with superficial initiatives that rarely address the reality of peoples' lives. They continue to pour so much time and energy into insignificant initiatives - like getting Twitter trending topics or hare-brained publicity stunts like flash-mobs in Western capitals - as if this is the culmination of political struggle. They would rather win the battle for victimhood status in Western media rather than connecting with a genuine popular support base at home.
Among Western and Arab liberals, there is a morbid fear of connecting political trends with social realities, as if debating the subject of social class may invalidate their existence. However, the poor in Egypt readily equate liberalism with the social elites and the "outside" West, saying that the values of the mainly rich, English-speaking upper-middle classes do not even seek to represent them, but are simply the self-indulgent games of those who do not have to worry about survival.
This takes on particular poignancy in a country where almost 50 percent live on or below the poverty line, where a marked divide between the peasant and "pasha" has existed for centuries and where political and cultural imperialism are deeply rooted in history.
The rather cruel and exaggerated "scandals" about Mohamed ElBaradei illustrated this mistrust of a Western educated, English-speaking, expat opposition and a growing trend of conservatism inside the country. ElBaradei's campaign was also not helped by his indecisiveness and reluctance to step into the role of the leader of the Tahrir revolutionaries. Despite the fact that his post-revolution plan for transition was one of the most workable, ElBaradei's lack of charisma and distance from the "common man" destroyed his campaign and eventually saw him bow out of the presidential race.
The roots of the Islamic movements' popular support
Although published ten years ago, Carrie Wickham's book Mobilizing Islam clearly explains the existing tension between rich and poor. She explains how Islamic politics has risen out of necessity and is a reaction to the elite's side-lining of the problems of the poor. When secular authoritarianism failed to provide economic growth, social equity or political rights, many turned to Islamic movements, more as a vote against the status quo than as a vote for Islamism.
The increased presence of Islamic opposition movements did not necessarily strip liberal secularists of the chance to reinvent themselves and gain a solid support base amongst the revolutionaries of Tahrir and the Egyptian population at large. But while the liberals have spent the last 30 years disorganized and fractured, torn apart on small details, far removed from any realistic policies, the Islamists have been working hard, recruiting members and establishing themselves as indispensable pillars of society.
The liberal focus on the intellectual writers, artists and journalists (e.g., Hamdeen Sabahi or Bothaina Kamel) contrasts sharply with the Brotherhood's support base, which encompasses a far broader cross-section of society, but has traditionally focused on the poor and marginalized. A lot can be said for the Muslim Brotherhood's provision of practical aid for these people, stepping into a void left by the government, providing hospitals, schools and soup kitchens to those who desperately needed them.
An event in recent history etched upon the memory of Egypt's majority youth population is the large-scale destruction caused by the earthquake that hit Egypt in 1992, destroying most of the poorer areas of Cairo. The Muslim Brotherhood rushed in with medical and housing aid within hours of the earthquake occurring, whereas the government took several days to mobilize a response.
The institutionalization of Islamic movements provided further motivation for support of the Brotherhood; for instance, membership could provide the links one would need to get a good job, an easy way of acquiring wasta (connections or influence), such networking opportunities and social mobility for all classes were not even put on the table by the liberal elites.
New approach needed
If Egypt's liberal secularists are ever to gain a foothold in Egyptian politics, then they must be willing to accept criticism and avoid blaming illiteracy or the ignorance of the lower classes for their failures. They must step away from the limelight of the international media and concentrate on devising practical and realistic social policies, which would then be fully implemented.
Egypt's liberals need to gain the trust of Egyptians, proving that not only do they care about their everyday difficulties, but also, that they understand them, are working hard to solve them and are delivering results.
Egypt is now in the twenty-first century and it is no longer so easy for the rich to turn a blind eye to the poor, just as it is impossible, with mass communication and media, for the poor not to notice the vast cultural divide that exists in society. Egypt's liberals need to prove that they are Egyptian, not through rhetoric, but by extending a hand to those less fortunate than themselves and making the welfare of the nation as a whole their priority.
Originally published in Qantara.
I do stand by my argument, though, that one of the problems facing Egyptian liberalism and/ or secularism is the disconnect between the representatives of that train of thought and the general population.
You are right though....money plays a massive part in this and as long as the Egyptian economy and political arena is dictated by Saudi/ Gulf and American interests we have no hope!
Even a cursory study of the last 60 years of the Middle East's political history reveals a simple fact--that the Western-style (read: one-party/military dictatorships dressed up to look parliamentarian) and/or Arab socialist governments which emerged in the region were as much concerned with supressing the Islamists as they were with keeping anything that would result in genuinely pluralistic democratic reform in check.
If you followed the developments in both countries, it is indisputable that the protests were not motivated by any specific ideology. Of course this changed with time and some activists feel that the Arab Spring was 'hijacked' by opportunistic but much better organised movements- in this case the Islamic opposition.
(1) The initial protest movements were perhaps not quite as secular as you might like to suppose.
(2) What is the point of equating being 'secular' with being 'free of ideology'? On the contrary, following a liberal-secularist agenda is as fully an ideological undertaking as any other 'ideology'. It is prejudicial to equate the wish to implement democratic pluralism with being ideology-free, and therefore by implication eminently more-than any of the other less-than 'ideologies'.
(3) While it is true that not a few of the more secularly-minded activists might feel that the Islamists have hijacked the movements, at the same time, why should any of them be surprised? And this brings us back to my original posting.....
It is worth noting that the European break was not between the state and “religion,” but with the political authority of the Pope (Sunni Islam has no such authority and operates based on the individual interpretations of scholars who require no “papal blessing”).
And while there is no denying that individual state authorities promote some religious scholars over others for political gain, this is no different from many European kingdoms' promotion of differing Protestant denominations on their march to modernity.
Despite the inflammatory semantics of some Islamists, Muslims accept that God no longer directly speaks to Mankind (following the dictation of the Quran), and that in the absence of the Prophet Mohammad to interpret such revelation, it is humans that now must provide their “best guess” as to solutions to current problems (democracy, the rule of law, legitimate governments, and economies).
Many moderate Islamist parties, deemed unacceptable to the US mainly due to their anti-imperialist policies, advocate this very modernity to the Muslim world within the discourse of Islam.
This is hardly a new phenomenon in Islam: Averroes, who is considered by some to be the founding father of European secularism, was able to do so within the Islamic discourse over 800 years ago.
In some ways, turning towards political Islam is symptomatic of the current economic and political situation in the Middle East. We could even go as far as describing it as a reaction to globalization- something which is taking place across the globe as people turn towards more conservative political parties (note- American Republicanism, British Conservative Party, the growing popularity of local nationalist parties).
I believe that Islamism is an important step along the road to Arab Democracy and one that should not be side-stepped.
Thank you for your kind response. I am truly honored that you would take the time to do so.
In my humble opinion, Islamism is an indigneous path to modernity and democracy for the Islamic world, and as you correctly note, a major part of the fabric of its political landscape.
As I am sure you know, the rich intellectual tradition of Islam encompases many strands of thought (including the rationalism of the Mu'tazilites a thousand years before such a thing as European Liberalism even existed), that provide a well of thought from which to define the future of Islamism.
Considering this rich intellectual history, the pivotal point in time for this nascent and fluid movement, and as a fan of liberal values and ideals myself, I refuse to surrender the language of Islam (or the mantle of Islamism) to the extremists.
What I have wondered is whether that was a calculated decision by the Egyptian government. That is to say, was the government using that situation as an argument to the United States for why financial and political aid should continue to be given to Egpyt.
If the Egyptian government could point at the Islamic movements and say, with a perfectly straight face, that the Western powers needed to support it to prevent the rise of a radical Islamic state, then they would keep getting support.
In fact, it seems so obvious, I am really shocked that political analysts have been "surprised" by the political developments in Egypt post-revolution.
Following Sadat's assassination, Mubarak cracked down on the Islamist parties very heavily. However, I think he realised that these organisations had already established a very solid support base in Egypt (actually fueled by popular sympathies for the perceived under-dog). Mubarak realised that some concessions would have to be made to Islamism if the status quo was to survive- and to his credit, this balancing act survived for 30 years.
As I said in the article, Islamists have been very astute in their organisation and development. I'd go as far as saying that they are the only political actors who actually have any awareness of the needs of the average Egyptian. Until other parties can match them in policies, social programs and strength of rhetoric, they are here to stay.
Moreover, I guess it doesn't really matter which motivations led Mubarak and his government to take it easier on the Islamic movements than on the other movements in the last few decades -- what matters is the affect that decision had.