Benjamin Loehrke2013-05-23T21:32:58-04:00Benjamin Loehrkehttp://www.huffingtonpost.com/author/index.php?author=benjamin-loehrkeCopyright 2008, HuffingtonPost.com, Inc.HuffingtonPost Blogger Feed for Benjamin LoehrkeGood old fashioned elbow grease.The Half-Trillion Dollar Nuclear Budgettag:www.huffingtonpost.com,2012:/theblog//3.19518922012-10-10T10:15:59-04:002012-12-10T05:12:02-05:00Benjamin Loehrkehttp://www.huffingtonpost.com/benjamin-loehrke/spend approximately $640 billion on nuclear weapons and related programs over the next ten years. This upward trend stands in contrast to the advice of national security experts who say we can cut defense budgets by getting rid of last century's weapons.
Some of these funds go to responsible programs, like continued environmental clean-up of old nuclear weapons sites, or efforts to prevent nuclear proliferation. But much of the spending sustains an unnecessarily large nuclear arsenal at unacceptable costs.
For example, projected spending includes funds for a $10 billion warhead program -- with each bomb costing more than its weight in solid gold. Until recently, DOE had planned to build a $6 billion plutonium lab for the nuclear complex. In what would have been one of the largest construction projects in New Mexico history, the facility would have provided unneeded new capacity to expand our production of bomb cores. The U.S. is also getting ready to replace its entire nuclear-armed submarine fleet, costing more than $350 billion over the lifetime of the new subs.
These programs exceed our security needs. Nuclear weapons are becoming increasingly irrelevant for national security. Yet, instead of scaling back the excessively large arsenal, military planners are putting in place programs to "modernize it," essentially locking the United States into several decades of nuclear build-up. The costs could be staggering. A recent calculation by security foundation Ploughshares Fund finds that the U.S. could spend approximately $640 billion on nuclear weapons and related programs over the next decade.
We have every incentive to reduce the number [of nuclear weapons]. These are expensive. They take away from soldier pay. They take away from [operations and maintenance]. They take away from lots of things. There is no incentive to keep more than you believe you need for the security of the Nation.
The opportunity costs of nuclear weapons grow more serious as the defense budget tightens. Washington is scrambling for ways to reduce defense spending as part of a balanced deficit reduction package. Nuclear weapons programs are now competing for funds with more modern programs that the military needs to address this century's threats. It would be irresponsible to sell the military short on the tools it needs for the future in order to double up on weapons to fight the Cold War.
It does not have to be that way. Instead, nuclear weapons should be the first place to cut. The arsenal is too big already; replacing it will burden defense budgets and take resources away from a true 21st century national security strategy.
The other option is to go ahead with current nuclear plans and leave behind two monuments for future generations: a bloated nuclear arsenal and a harrowing national debt.]]>Defense Hawk Says Cut the Nuclear Arsenaltag:www.huffingtonpost.com,2012:/theblog//3.16952552012-07-24T12:12:35-04:002012-09-23T05:12:09-04:00Benjamin Loehrkehttp://www.huffingtonpost.com/benjamin-loehrke/
Rep. Norman Dicks (D-WA) is a steadfast supporter of national defense. He is the Ranking Member of the House Appropriations Committee and has served on the Subcommittee on Defense for 34 years. He speaks forcefully -- both in style and substance. Last week, he stood on the House floor to oppose a proposal on nuclear weapons.
Republicans in the House offered, and later passed, an amendment to the Defense Appropriations Bill that would block reductions to the nuclear arsenal -- including those agreed to under the New START Treaty. Rep. Dicks opposed the proposal, arguing that New START has clear security benefits and should not be undercut.
But, once on the floor of the House, he opposed more than the proposal. He opposed the idea behind it. He said:
"We simply don't need, and we can't afford to have and continue to produce all of these nuclear weapons that will, more than likely, never be used. They are a good deterrent and they have been an effective deterrent. Thank God for that. But the Cold War is over, and we are in a position today where we must reduce the size of our nuclear weapons force."
Rep. Michael Turner (R-OH), who sponsored the amendment, disagreed. He responded, "While we stand on this floor and speak with the freedoms that we have, our nuclear deterrent keeps us safe. Abandoning our nuclear deterrent would not make us safe."
The two congressmen sparred briefly in a fascinating discussion (full transcript here). Rep. Dicks was given the last word:
"You don't need thousands of these weapons. A couple hundred, frankly, could take out Iran and almost any country you can imagine. So, again, we can't afford to do everything. We are in an era where we're dealing with terrorists, and we need to have special forces that can be utilized. We need to have these very effective drones. We need to look at the threats that are out there today and equip our military accordingly."
This statement recognizes two realities. First, in order to control the national debt, the defense budget is going to come down. As it does, Congress will need to make smarter investments and cut excessive programs. Second, the U.S. nuclear arsenal has plenty of excess.
Leading experts and military officials agree that the United States would be more secure with fewer nuclear weapons. A new report chaired by Gen. James Cartwright, former Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, argues that the U.S. could reduce its arsenal to 900 total nuclear weapons.
As former Secretary of State Colin Powell said about the U.S. nuclear arsenal, "We have every incentive to reduce the number. These are expensive. They take away from soldier pay." He added, "They take away from lots of things. There is no incentive to keep more than you believe you need for the security of the nation."
Rep. Dicks understands this. To have a capable military on an affordable budget, excessive or outdated programs must be cut. His solution is that nukes should be on the chopping block.
It's strong advice. It would help strengthen the military against today's threats by shedding the nuclear excesses of the Cold War.
And if defense hawks are ready to make this argument, others in Congress are sure to follow.]]>The Avengers' Nuclear Villaintag:www.huffingtonpost.com,2012:/theblog//3.15282562012-05-18T15:18:43-04:002012-07-18T05:12:06-04:00Benjamin Loehrkehttp://www.huffingtonpost.com/benjamin-loehrke/The Avengers puts a new twist on Hollywood's view of nuclear weapons. The nuke in this blockbuster film is both a villain and a hero. This may be very post-modern, but it's an ambivalence the film industry should finally shed.
The Avengers is a hugely entertaining film, and has already grossed over $1 billion in ticket sales. Only in Marvel's universe could it be fun to watch superheroes battle aliens in New York City -- causing an estimated $160 billion in damage. But the nuclear plot is a critical flaw (spoilers ahead).
To recap, in the film, aliens open a space portal, threaten to invade Earth, subjugate its people, and take its resources. Special Agent Nick Fury -- played by Samuel L. Jackson -- assembles an elite group of superheroes: Iron Man, Captain America, Thor, Black Widow, Hawkeye and the Hulk. They team up to save the world from alien takeover in an epic battle that destroys much of New York City.
When the battle looks nearly lost, Nick Fury's superiors -- on the World Security Council -- order a nuclear strike on New York to kill the aliens. A fighter-bomber swoops in, aims at Midtown, and launches a single missile. Iron Man grabs the inbound missile and flies it through the space portal, where it blows up the alien mothership. The world is saved.
Apparently, Hollywood likes to nuke extraterrestrials. Will Smith and Jeff Goldblum knocked out the alien mothership in Independence Day. Drones attempted to in Skyline. Bruce Willis also nuked an asteroid in Armageddon. Now Robert Downey, Jr. as Iron Man brings Earth's nuclear batting average to 3-1.
In other films, nukes have clearly been depicted as the problem, not the solution. The evil Ernst Blofeld blackmailed the world with two stolen NATO nuclear weapons until thwarted by James Bond in Thunderball. John Travolta's mad Major Vic Deakins tried to do the same with two hijacked U.S. nukes until defeated by Christian Slater's heroics in Broken Arrow. In one of the oldest and still best depictions of the global threat nuclear weapons present every minute, Peter Sellers had to respond to imminent nuclear apocalypse caused by a paranoid Brig. Gen. Jack D. Ripper in Dr. Strangelove or: How I Learned to Stop Worrying and Love the Bomb.
The Avengers joins this fine cinematic tradition by first showing an essential truth: the nuclear weapon was a much bigger threat to New York than the aliens.
A Fate Worse than Alien Domination
If the nuclear missile launched in the movie was similar to ones in the U.S. stockpile, it likely had a maximum explosive yield of 150 to 340 thousand tons of TNT. Fired at Midtown Manhattan, the air blast would have collapsed most buildings from City Hall to the Upper East Side, and killed most of Manhattan's 1.6 million residents.
The initial blast would create a circle of death about 5 miles in diameter. Nearly 100 percent of the people within this circle would die instantly, or about half a million people in downtown New York. Mega-firestorms would kill perhaps a million more. The explosion would also produce a cloud of radioactive dust that would drift downwind from the bomb's detonation point. If the bomb exploded at a low altitude, there would be a 6-37 miles long and 2-3 miles wide swath of deadly radiation that would kill all exposed and unprotected people within six hours of exposure. It would have been an unimaginable human catastrophe.
The aliens, if successful, could have taken over New York. That's not good, but the bomb would have been worse.
As in The Avengers, the United States really does have plans for other countries to use its nuclear bombs. In the film, the World Security Council orders the nuclear strike. In the real world, NATO has a similar arrangement governing the U.S. nuclear weapons in Europe. In war or extreme crisis, the president can shift command of the nuclear bombs to NATO commanders, along with the nuclear operating codes. Host nation pilots in Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, and Belgium can then deliver the nuclear bombs to their targets.
For a period in the late 1950s, under a "use it or lose it" rationale, some military commanders in the field even had authority to use these weapons without Washington's approval. The U.S. at that point had between 1,000 and 4,000 nuclear warheads in Europe. Only 200 U.S. nuclear weapons remain in Europe today, and they are widely regarded as having no military utility. Their use by NATO in the 21st century seems as unlikely as a space portal opening up in Manhattan.
Are Nuclear Weapons Ever Heroes?
The blockbuster problem in The Avengers is the writers' desire to turn a nuclear weapon into a golden bullet that can save the day -- even if this bomb is more likely to ruin it.
Agent Fury understood this truth. That's why he tries to take out the bombers with a bazooka before they took off. When Iron Man flew the nuclear warhead through the space portal, it was more to prevent disaster than to win the fight.
Perhaps the film's writers understood this -- making a nuclear weapon into a threat on par with alien invasion. But they also wanted to end the movie with a bang, having Iron Man shove the nuke down the alien's throat in a satisfying final explosion. With the portal closing, the destruction of the mothership is really secondary, but it means moviegoers are more likely to go home believing that nuclear weapons, at least under some circumstances, can be their ultimate savior.
That perception needs to stop. Hollywood can have a huge influence over public views. While entertaining us, it can help bring the public more in line with current military and strategic thinking -- nuclear weapons are more of a security liability than an asset. As a new study chaired by the recent commander of the U.S. Strategic Command and the former vice chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, retired General James Cartwright, concludes:
The actual existing threats to our two countries [America and Russia] (and the globe) cannot be resolved by using our nuclear arsenals. No sensible argument has been put forward for using nuclear weapons to solve any of the major 21st century problems we face -- threats posed by rogue states, failed states, proliferation, regional conflicts, terrorism, cyber warfare, organized crime, drug trafficking, conflict-driven mass migration of refuges, epidemics, or climate change.
Or alien invasion.
If Earth is to have heroes, they need to be in suits and capes. Not in bombers and silos.]]>Don't Sanction Iran for Sanctions' Saketag:www.huffingtonpost.com,2011:/theblog//3.9301522011-08-18T10:26:38-04:002011-10-18T05:12:01-04:00Benjamin Loehrkehttp://www.huffingtonpost.com/benjamin-loehrke/
The Iran sanctions proposal du jour seems intended to curtail the flow of oil revenue into the Iranian economy, which could limit the regime's resources and stoke public resentment in Iran. Such added pressure, proponents argue, could get Iran to cease its many activities that threaten international security.
"Sanctioning the Central Bank would punish ordinary Iranians, something the Obama administration has said it wants to avoid, and could undermine what had been a growing international consensus against the Iranian nuclear program. It could also jack up oil prices at a time when the global economy is teetering on the verge of a second recession."
The risks of the proposed sanctions -- undercutting multilateral efforts and reliving the human costs of Iraq-style sanctions with Iran -- outweigh the supposed benefits of added pressure. After 30 years of adapting to sanctions, even more sanctions are unlikely to cause the Iranian regime to suddenly collapse or comply with U.S. demands. Instead, the U.S. is more likely to find itself with a fractured coalition against Iran and fewer policy options for keeping the regime from the bomb.
It is smart politics for members of Congress to call for sanctions on Iran simply to tell constituents that they are doing something. Such political bluster, however, will not relieve the basic dilemma of how to manage the Iranian threat. At some point, when all sanctions have failed, constituents will ask, "Now what?" As with Iraq a decade ago, a politically charged Washington could respond by backing itself into a ruinous war with Iran.
Washington needs to check its assumptions about sanctions strategies, starting at square one. What are U.S. objectives with Iran and how do sanctions work to achieve them?
Former National Intelligence Officer Paul Pillar recently noted that advocates for sanctioning Iran often fail to define the overall objective of sanctions. Instead, Pillar argues, much of the sanctions commentary "amounts to saying 'regime X bad--must pressure it.'" A more reasoned debate would state a policy objective and tailor sanctions toward that outcome. Lacking such clarity of purpose, sanctions could result in incoherent or conflicting policy goals.
In an essay in the forthcoming edition of A Global Agenda: Issues Before the United Nations, Joe Cirincione and I argue that sanctions must be part of a comprehensive engagement strategy designed to keep Iran from acquiring nuclear weapons while avoiding war. We note:
"Iran is more politically and economically isolated than ever before, but for sanctions to work they must be part of a balanced strategy with incentives for cooperation. The sanctioned party must also trust that sanctions will be lifted if it cooperates. Current U.S. strategy is heavy on sanctions and light on positive incentives. Lacking this balance, stalemate with Iran persists.
...
The U.S. needs to ease off threats of crippling sanctions and holster counter-productive military threats. These only strengthen the position of Iran's hardliners, who oppose engagement. Instead of adding pressure, negotiators need to communicate a sequence of actions that the Iranian regime can take over time in exchange for the gradual lifting of sanctions."
Sanctions would be more effective if better targeted to influence Tehran's decisions against nuclear weapons. For now, that requires clarifying the goal of U.S. sanctions. Unfortunately, last week's Senate letter did none of the above. The senators proposed sanctions for sanctions sake -- a shortsighted tactic that does more harm than good for U.S. strategy with Iran.]]>Good Times for the Nuclear Weapons Budgettag:www.huffingtonpost.com,2011:/theblog//3.8976412011-07-14T16:12:33-04:002011-09-13T05:12:02-04:00Benjamin Loehrkehttp://www.huffingtonpost.com/benjamin-loehrke/
As Joe Cirincione pointed out at The Atlantic, over the next ten years, the nuclear budget is expected to skyrocket, with $213 billion planned for overhauling the nuclear weapons stockpile and production complex while putting a down payment on new submarines, bombers, and missiles. In addition to this budget hike, the U.S. will spend roughly $20 billion a year just to operate the current nuclear force and $10 billion a year on missile defense programs that have yet to prove their worth.
This stands out against what former Secretary Gates called the "inevitable flattening and eventual decrease of the defense budget." The defense budget is going to shrink. To adapt, the U.S. needs to make some hard choices about what defense programs are necessary to keep America and its allies secure in the 21st century.
No such hard choices are on deck for the nuclear arsenal.
The United States is ramping up programs to remodel and perpetuate the current nuclear force through 2080. The costs have already kicked in. FY 2012 budgets are slated to include:
$1.1 billion for the Ohio-class SSBN replacement program: The Navy is setting out to field 12 new ballistic missile submarines between now and 2040. The total program cost could top $101 billion, as estimated by the Congressional Budget Office.
$197 million for the next generation strategic bomber: The Air Force wants to replace its aging fleet of B52 bombers with a new long-range bomber, potentially including a nuclear mission. The total program cost has been estimated at $55 billion.
$279 million for the B61 Life Extension Program: The National Nuclear Security Administration is looking to extend the service life of and add capabilities to the B61 bomb -- soon to be the only "tactical" nuclear weapon left in the active stockpile. Total program could cost an estimated $5 billion.
These are just highlights of "the Obama nuclear buildup," as Loren Thompson at Forbes labeled it. On the current trajectory, the total nuclear weapons budget is likely to soar past the half-trillion dollar mark over the next decade.
So long as nuclear weapons exist, the U.S. will need a reliable deterrent to provide security for itself and its allies. But this strategic goal can and must be met on a tighter budget. As Secretary Panetta said in his confirmation testimony, "the days of large growth and unlimited defense budgets are over. Our challenge will be to design budgets that eliminate wasteful and duplicative spending while protecting those core elements that we absolutely need for our Nation's defense."
With an arsenal built for Cold War excesses, there is plenty of room for cutting spending on excessive capabilities. This would allow defense planners to narrow the focus on nuclear modernization programs "we absolutely need." Otherwise, budget cutters might have to force the issue.
Policymakers can make these decisions by asking the tough questions:
What number of nuclear weapons does it take to deter nuclear attacks on the United States and its allies? For over two decades, that number has been falling steadily. How low can we go?
Does our deterrent absolutely necessitate the deployment of a nuclear triad of subs, bombers, and ICBMs? If not, can we retire a delivery platform and pocket the savings from not building a new generation of it?
For the weapons we keep, what modernization programs will be necessary to ensure the performance of existing warheads without explosive testing? If smaller in scope, can we right-size the nuclear weapons complex to fit our means to those ends?
These questions are not easy. But answering them could provide the perspective needed for Washington to make the cuts and put the country on a better strategic and fiscal footing.
This post originally appear on The Will and the Wallet, the blog of the Budgeting for Foreign Affairs and Defense program at the Stimson Center.]]>The X-Men Didn't Save Ustag:www.huffingtonpost.com,2011:/theblog//3.8784922011-06-16T16:16:58-04:002011-08-16T05:12:02-04:00Benjamin Loehrkehttp://www.huffingtonpost.com/benjamin-loehrke/X-Men: First Class, gets a lot right about the historic crisis that is central to its plot.
So far, the film has grossed $235 million in 12 days, making it one of the year's blockbuster movies. Over 20 million people have seen the film already. Tens of millions more will view it over the next few weeks. Many of them will pay more attention to this piece of history than they probably have in their lives. It's worth a quick look at what Hollywood is telling us.
Like most comic book movies, this one ends with the superheroes saving the world from imminent destruction. To add realism, X-Men takes place in a year when we actually came close.
In case you forgot your history, the Cuban Missile Crisis was thirteen tense days in October 1962 when the United States and the Soviet Union came to the brink of thermonuclear war. The US discovered that the Soviet Union had secretly placed ballistic missiles in Cuba. President Kennedy ordered a naval quarantine around Cuba and demanded Soviet Premier Nikita Khrushchev remove the missiles.
The standoff is often described, to paraphrase then-Secretary of State Dean Rusk, as the US and Soviet Union coming eyeball-to-eyeball, with the Soviets blinking first -- recalling its ships and removing the missiles from Cuba.
As X-Men history would have it, a malevolent mutant -- played by Kevin Bacon -- secretly engineered the crisis in order to force a war, after which mutants would take over the post-apocalypse world. In the end (spoiler alert), the X-Men swoop into the tense US-Soviet standoff at sea. They stop the Soviet missile ship from crossing the blockade line, keep the US and Soviet navies from battle and prevent World War III.
Of Mutants and Men
What makes the movie so interesting -- aside from the charismatic mutants, smart jokes and multiple explosions -- is the historical setting. The film's creators touch on several underappreciated points about the actual crisis.
First, in October 1962, we did come unbelievably close to thermonuclear war. The chance of the crisis escalating to nuclear war, as President Kennedy said, was "between one out of three and even."
In 1962, the US and Soviet Union had, respectively, 25,540 and 3,322 nuclear bombs -- enough to destroy the world many times over. Before the crisis really started, some 100 Soviet warheads were already in Cuba (something the US would not know until decades later). With one wrong step, the two countries would have tumbled over the nuclear brink.
Second, as the film shows, the crisis actually began in Turkey, not Cuba. In X-Men, Sebastian Shaw (the mutant played by Kevin Bacon) coerces a US general into supporting the deployment of US missiles in Turkey -- and then convinces the Soviets they must counter with missiles in Cuba.
Historically, this sequencing is right (minus the mutants). In the early 1960s, the US deployed 15 Jupiter missiles in Turkey, a NATO ally bordering the Soviet Union. Only then did the Soviet Union respond by secretly deploying similar-ranged nuclear missiles in Cuba. Many histories forget this fact. Similarly, they forget the crisis ended with mutual compromise: Russia withdrew missiles from Cuba and the US quietly withdrew its missiles from Turkey.
Third, there really was a submarine escorting the missile-carrying cargo ships to Cuba. But it was a Soviet sub, not a mutant one. On October 27, US destroyers dropped depth charges on the Soviet submarine, B-59 -- unaware that the sub carried a nuclear-tipped torpedo.
Cut off from communications with Moscow and with charges exploding overhead, the exhausted Soviet captain ordered the torpedo readied for launch. "We're going to blast them now!" he said, "We will die, but we will sink them all." But firing the torpedo required the 3 top officers to all agree. They voted. It went 2-1 with Second Captain Vasili Arkhipov voting against. The order was never given, the sub surfaced and nuclear war was averted.
Then-Defense Secretary Robert McNamara said years later that we escaped annihilation through "sheer luck."
Will We Always Be Lucky?
Today, the US has 8,500 nuclear weapons. Russia has an estimated 11,000. Each side still keeps over 1,000 thermonuclear warheads on hair trigger alert, ready to launch on a moment's notice.
Nuclear war by accident, miscalculation or madness remains a very real risk. And, if it comes, we will not have Magneto's missile shield to protect us.