Lawrence Korb

Still Suffering the Damage: Iraq 10 Years Later

2013-03-19T18:54:17-04:00

As we mark the painful anniversary of what the late Ted Sorensen called the Bush administration's "mindless, needless, senseless" invasion and occupation of Iraq, none of the architects of the war have yet publicly apologized for their dereliction of duty. In fact, many of them have taken the opposite tack.

For example, on December 14, 2005, President Bush admitted that the decision to invade Iraq was based on false intelligence but said that the war was still justified. Really. He justified the war by saying we could not wait until Saddam's smoking gun became a mushroom cloud. But if there were no nuclear weapons, let alone chemical or biological weapons, what was the threat to our security that justified preventive war? Did 4,500 American service members die, 30,000 suffer physical wounds, and hundreds of thousands sustain mental wounds just so Iraq could have an election? Did at least 300,000 Iraqis civilians die and millions more have to leave their homes so we could spread democracy? Was this war worth the $2 trillion and the staggering human toll?

Stephen Hadley, the Deputy National Security Advisor at the time and who moved into the top spot in 2004, recently claimed at a joint Foreign Policy/RAND roundtable that no one in the Bush team ever asked whether Saddam was bluffing about having weapons of mass destruction. They did not question the evidence surrounding WMD, of course, because that would have undermined the case for war, nor did they ask why the UN inspectors said there were no WMD. Hadley is an attorney and was certainly aware of the old law school dictum of never asking a question unless you know the answer. Perhaps that was why, as Colin Powell has noted, Vice President Cheney had his chief of staff construct the case for invasion of Iraq as a lawyer's brief rather than as an intelligence estimate.

At the same meeting, Douglas Feith, the Undersecretary of Defense for Policy, claimed that we should have been more skeptical about the Iraq intelligence. I guess he did not read the classified national intelligence estimate (NIE) that was forwarded to Congress before the October 11, 2002 vote authorizing the use of military force against Iraq. The classified version contains numerous caveats omitted from the unclassified version. Senator Bob Graham (D-FL), Chairman of the Intelligence Committee, who demanded the NIE before the vote, noted that the American people were being told one thing (in the unclassified version) and Congress was being given a completely different assessment (in the unclassified version).

Of the 77 senators who voted in favor of the war, including several past and possibly future Democratic presidential candidates, only a handful read the classified NIE. How can you vote to send America's sons and daughters into harm's way before getting all the facts? Should they not apologize for failing to read the classified NIE before starting a war?

Paul Wolfowitz, then the Deputy Secretary of Defense, claimed that Army Chief of Staff General Eric Shinseki's estimate that several hundred thousand soldiers would be needed for the postwar occupation of Iraq was "wildly off the mark." A Vietnam draft evader saying that a decorated and wounded Vietnam veteran and the Army's ranking general did not know what he was talking about -- really? Should he not apologize to General Shinseki and the American people for not sending enough troops to Iraq to restore order after the fall of Saddam?

Finally, there is General Petraeus, who is best known for leading the surge of troops into Iraq in 2007 which, along with Sunni awakening, helped to stem the violence in Iraq. But what people forget is that this is the same general who helped keep American support for the war from continuing to decline and helped Bush get reelected in 2004 by writing an op-ed in the Washington Post five weeks before the election that claimed that Bush's strategy of training Iraqi forces was on track, that infrastructure was being repaired, and that the Iraqis were performing a wide variety of security missions. If this were true, why did we need to surge two years later? Should he not apologize to us for painting this rosy -- and inaccurate -- picture of the situation?

All of these people have moved on and, like their colleague Condoleezza Rice, who echoes Bush's claim about the smoking gun, are doing quite well professionally. Meanwhile, our nation is still suffering from the damage they caused and will do so for a long time.

Lawrence Korb is a Senior Fellow at the Center for American Progress and served as Assistant Secretary of Defense under President Reagan.

Cutting in All the Wrong Places

2012-11-19T14:01:13-05:00

With the election decided, lawmakers have returned to Washington with just seven weeks to negotiate an agreement to avert sequestration, which would impose about $1 trillion in cuts to Pentagon spending and domestic programs. The crude across-the-board cuts of sequestration are not smart budget policy. But these negotiations present an opportunity for Congress to take a step towards a more efficient national security budget and correct the imbalance in funding between the two pillars of American national security, the Department of State and the Department of Defense.

As Congress looks for more areas to cut in this time of austerity, lawmakers must remember that the Department of Defense has continued to receive a disproportionate amount of the nation's security funding -- in spite of unprecedented cost overruns and incidents of gross mismanagement -- while the State Department remains chronically underfunded and continually subject to the threat of cuts.

Despite some promising rhetoric from Pentagon officials, rebalancing the international affairs and defense budgets continues to be more of a talking point than a reality. In the last two years, the base -- or non-war budget -- of the Pentagon has shot up to an astounding $553 billion in FY 2012 and now easily eclipses average spending during the Cold War.

In contrast, when the Obama administration and the Congress were forced to make spending reductions to avert default last year, Foggy Bottom was the target for an $8 billion, or 15 percent, cut in FY 2011. While international affairs funding has grown in the decade since 9/11, it has come nowhere close to closing the gap with a military budget that has grown even more exponentially.

Underfunding international affairs programs has a tangible impact that strikes deeply at core diplomatic missions. The State Department has made this known, and in an attempt to stave off the 2011 reduction, Secretary of State Hilary Clinton warned that the deep cuts will "be detrimental to America's national security." And the recent attacks on Benghazi underscore the risks Foreign Service Officers take for their country and our duty to give them the support they need.

The militarization of American foreign policy damages U.S. national security in two ways. First, funding the Department of Defense at a disproportionate level compared to international affairs projects does not adequately prepare the United States for the threats of the 21st century. Today's conflicts revolve around failed states and non-state actors, both of which require the efforts of State and USAID more than that of the Pentagon. This shift requires our military to take on larger roles in missions that would typically be reserved for civilian specialists. The burden on our military is heavy enough due to the strains of performing combat in a foreign theater. By adding development operations to that burden, the Pentagon only takes away from the military's comparative advantage in war fighting.

Solving the underlying causes for conflict through diplomacy and development comes at a fraction of the cost compared to military intervention. The United States is too often caught reacting to a crisis without having made concerted efforts to prevent it in the first place. Expanding foreign aid and diplomatic efforts will help the U.S. mitigate future threats to national security before they disintegrate into situations that require military action, which is too often costly in both blood and treasure.

Perhaps even more worrying than the current situation, however, is the very real possibility that our international affairs capabilities will be reduced even further. Despite taking a significant hit in 2011, House GOP members are looking to put Foggy Bottom back on the chopping block for FY 2013. Chairman of the House Budget Committee Paul Ryan has pushed a proposal known as the "Path to Prosperity" as a potential blueprint for the future of American spending. If you get through the clouded language of "Prosperity," you'll find that over the next four years it requires an $11 billion cut from international affairs, while simultaneously giving another $42 billion to the Pentagon. That's a 20 percent cut and a 7.5 percent increase respectively.

The Department of State and USAID are struggling to maintain an effective global presence because of a budget that is less than a tenth of what their DoD counterparts receive. Considering Foggy Bottom has already been subject to cuts, further reductions would be nothing short of a slap in the face. Cuts to the Pentagon however, are readily apparent, and could help the Pentagon address its recent struggle with mismanagement, fraud, and cost overruns.

Lawrence J. Korb, a Senior Fellow at the Center for American Progress, served as an assistant secretary of defense in the Reagan administration. Taylor Jaszewski is an intern at the Center.

Tailspin or Stall? Challenges Face New USAF Chief But Money Not the Problem

2012-08-16T15:45:55-04:00

Co-written with Robert Ward

Stories about the decline of the Air Force are flooding the media. For example, in AOL Defense Mackenzie Eaglen and Doug Birkey claim that the Air Force is "slowly going out of business" because of budget cuts and won't be able to modernize its fleet, maintain military supremacy or adapt to future challenges. Similarly, Loren Thompson argues in Forbes that the Air Force is far behind the other services in its political influence, and that the new chief of staff will have to reverse the service's "downward spiral" in order to get the money it needs for modernization. But analysis of the budget data over the last decade shows that these doomsday claims are questionable. While it is true that the total defense budget is coming down -- as it must, given the tight fiscal times and the drawdown from two foreign wars -- the data show that the Air Force's share of the defense budget is on the rise and Air Force procurement and R&D are being prioritized. If the Air Force can effectively manage its procurement programs -- something it has failed to do in recent years -- it will be just fine.

The Air Force is Not Losing the Inter-Service Budget Competition

Twelve years ago, when the Bush administration took office, the Air Force budget was $117 billion (in constant FY 2013 dollars), and consumed 28.5 percent of the total $410 billion Pentagon budget. The service's budget grew quickly for the next three years, and in 2003, the Air Force overtook the Navy as the best-funded service, with a budget of $162 billion.

But this did not last long. As the insurgencies in Iraq and Afghanistan gradually intensified, the United States needed more and more ground troops but few advanced fighter jets, so the Army began receiving the largest share of the budget, peaking at 37.2 percent of the total or $275 billion in 2008. Eaglen and Birkey claim that during this time period, the Air Force's budget was gutted, with its share of the defense budget dropping by one-third, but this is not the case. The Air Force's share only dropped by a fifth, to 23.4 percent -- and, more importantly, its budget actually increased in cash terms to $173 billion, nearly 50% above its 2000 level.

These trends have been reversed as the U.S. has drawn down its involvement in Iraq and Afghanistan. The Army share will drop to 29.8 percent of the total budget, or $185 billion, in 2013; the Air Force share will grow to 24.9 percent, although its actual budget will decrease somewhat. However, while all three services have had their budgets cut between 2008 and 2013, but the Air Force has suffered relatively little. Its budget has dropped by just $18 billion, while the Army's budget has decreased by $90 billion -- five times as much. This is a natural development at the end of two major land wars and following a decade of increasing military budgets.

Under the Obama administration's new defense strategy, the Air Force's position will improve further over the next few years. By 2017, its share of the defense budget will rise to 27.7 percent, just a point and a half below that of the Navy. This share of the overall defense budget is roughly equal to the Air Force's share of the budget just before 9/11, and the service's actual budget of $149 billion will be $32 billion larger than it was in 2000. Although Air Force spending was deemphasized over a decade of war against enemies with no air power of their own, the DoD budget's focus is already shifting back to the Air Force and Navy, and will continue to do so for the next several years.

Modernization Is Already a Budget Priority

Eaglen and Thompson argue that, even with this generous budget, the Air Force will not be able to modernize its equipment satisfactorily. Frankly, the need for a massive modernization program is questionable, given the U.S. Air Force's superiority to that of any other country -- we have, for example, three times as many fourth-generation fighter aircraft as any other country, and the only fifth-generation fighters. But, putting that debate aside, the budget data still does not support their conclusions. Total defense spending is dropping as the country pulls back from the massive military buildup of the Bush administration and tries to address its growing debt, often cited by military leaders as the biggest threat to national security. But Air Force spending on new investments and modernization -- the accounts for procurement and for research, development, testing and education -- is being prioritized within this strategic context.

First, some background. In 2000, the Air Force spent $43 billion or 36.4 percent of its budget on new investments. This spending peaked at $76 billion or 44.3 percent of the service's budget in 2008. Over the last five years, it decreased along with the overall defense budget, and in 2013, the Air Force plans to spend $63 billion, or 40.6 percent of its budget, on investment -- still more than it spent in 2000.

However, Air Force investment spending will rise by $3 billion over the next five years, and it will take up an increasingly large portion of both the Air Force budget and the total defense budget. In 2017, the Air Force will allocate 44.1 percent of its budget to procurement and R&D, an increase of 3.5 points from 2013. Overall, Air Force investment will take up 12.2% of the total defense budget, a 2.1 point increase over 2013 and well above its previous peak of 11.1% in 2005. This is a clear signal that defense planners recognize the importance of Air Force investment and are prioritizing it.

The Service's Future Will Not Be Defined by Its Budget

The Air Force certainly faces challenges in the coming decades, but these challenges have nothing to do with a lack of money. For example, the service must grapple with the ramifications of improving unmanned aerial technology and reckon with vulnerabilities to asymmetric cyber-attacks. On top of that, the Air Force is still reeling from the sex scandals at its entry-level training facilities at Lackland. But when it comes to resources, the Air Force's problem is rooted in poor management of the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter, its largest procurement program. The program is so far over budget and so far behind schedule that Senator John McCain dubbed it a "scandal" and a "tragedy," while Frank Kendall, the Undersecretary of Defense for Acquisition, said the program management represented "acquisition malpractice."

How the Air Force handles these challenges will matter far more to its future than the size of its budget. But even those who believe that modernization is more important to the Air Force than any of these other pressing issues should be encouraged by the actual budget data. The Air Force is not locked in a "downward spiral" but is dealing, like the rest of our military establishment, with a drawdown from war and a tight fiscal situation. And the service is responding to these challenges correctly, by shifting its resources toward procurement, research, and development -- just as its harshest critics want it to.

A Prudent Response to Chinese Military Modernization

2011-12-19T14:13:08-05:00

This post was co-written with Bill French.

The War in Iraq has ended. Osama bin Laden is dead. NATO is looking at a 2014 date for significantly reducing its operations in Afghanistan. A ten-year period of uncontrolled US defense spending has come to an end.

Yet some conservatives are looking to continue the era of massive military spending increases. Among their arguments, the most substantial is that growing Chinese military power must be met by higher US defense expenditures. Most notably, during a major foreign policy speech at the Citadel Military College, Mitt Romney cited the possibility of a future Chinese military superpower going down a "darker path" to help justify increasing defense spending from its current levels to 4 percent of GDP, an increase of over $100 billion. The American Enterprise Institute, among other conservative think tanks, appears to be clearing the ground work for such policies. For example, in July -- when US defense cuts were anticipated but had yet to be decided -- AEI scholar Dan Blumenthal warned Congress that rising Chinese military power threatened to induce American "strategic insolvency" without further "expensive investment" in the DoD.

The United States finds itself at an historical crossroads, faced both with the tasks of reducing military spending in order help alleviate its massive deficits and to address the changing international environment which includes a rising power. To be sure, the buildup of the People's Liberation Army (PLA) does pose a strategic challenge. But analysis of US and Chinese military spending and capabilities shows that the US can successfully address the PLA buildup while simultaneously addressing the current imbalance between military and deficit priorities. Consequently, the United States has more prudent, affordable options. This is good news because the old, unsustainable solution of increasing military spending regardless of the nation's fiscal situation is no longer acceptable in today's budgetary environment.

Budgetary Basics

Those alarmed by rising Chinese military power are quick to point to the rapidly increasing PLA budget. Despite the fact that the US still outspends China by a large margin on defense, this concern cannot be dismissed: at first glance, China seems in recent years to have made considerable progress in closing the military spending gap with the United States. According to data compiled from recent Department of Defense annual reports, Chinese defense spending has increased by 54 percent during 2006-2010. During that same period, US core defense spending rose by 'only' 27 percent, excluding the costs of the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. Thus, in the past half-decade, Chinese military expenditures have increased 27 percentage points more than that of the United States.

While this number certainly warrants concern, increases in the Chinese military budget are less significant than they might appear for a number of critical reasons. Because Chinese increases were made from a much lower base budget, the spending gap between the two militaries has actually widened in favor of the United States. The Department of Defense estimates that Chinese military expenditures were $105 billion in 2006, while the US spent $419 billion on defense, a gap of $314 billion. In 2010, US military spending increased to $533.8 billion while Chinese military spending increased to only $160billion, a gap of $373.8 billion -- nearly $60 billion greater than the gap in 2006.

But not all military spending is of equal use-value. Significant portions of Chinese military increases have been dedicated to maintaining personnel for its all-volunteer force rather than new war fighting capabilities. The 2011 Chinese National Defense White Paper claims that "personnel expenses" -- salaries, living conditions, insurance, improved health care, education, and so on -- are a significant reason for recent budgetary increases. An independent analysis conducted by the Jamestown Foundation finds that these claims are "accurate," noting there were "large pay raises" in 2006, 2008 and 2011, including a 40 percent increase to non-commissioned officer's salary and benefits.

It can be expected that costly increases in PLA personnel expenditure will continue. In order to maintain an all volunteer force, the standard of living within the PLA must keep some pace with the rising standard of living throughout the country. Therefore, expected rises in standard of living may be used as a general indicator of future personnel cost increases in the PLA budget. The IMF projects that Chinese GDP per capita income will increase 40 percent during 2011-2016, as compared to a projected increase of only 15 percent for the US. As Chinese GDP per capita rises, the PLA will be compelled to increase its investment in standard of living at a greater rate than will the US, limiting the availability of funding increases for war fighting capabilities.

Future Constraints

The PLA budget is not appropriated in a vacuum free from constraints. Expensive, non-military Chinese government obligations will increasingly compete with the military for funds, a factor which may limit the size of future increases for the PLA. As argued below, while the Chinese military may continue to enjoy spending spikes, perhaps even this next year to make up for recent low increases, the general trend will likely be towards smaller increases than the largest of those in the recent past.

First, economic growth and urbanization for a developing society such as China necessitate high levels of infrastructure spending. The country currently spends around 9 percent of its GDP on infrastructure projects and in 2008 began a two year $586 billion infrastructure program. This spending has already demonstrated the ability to effect PLA funding. In 2009, the military budget increase dropped to 7.5 percent, nearly half of the previous year. While PLA budgetary increases have since recovered slightly to just under 13 percent, they remain significantly below the 17.6 percent increase in 2008 and the nearly 20 percent increase in 2007.

Second, China is also experiencing an escalating and costly internal stability crisis. As the 2011US-China Commission Report documents, annual incidents of unrest or protest have increased from 8,700 in 1998 to over 120,000 in 2008. A major factor driving unrest is growing income inequality, which has more than doubled in the past twenty years. In that time, China's Gini coefficient -- a measure of wealth inequality from 0 to 1 where 0 is perfect equality and 1 means a single individual owns all the wealth -- has increased from 0.215 to 0.490. In the context of an authoritarian regime like China, where unrest threatens the rule of the Communist Party, such instability is an existential concern of the state and must be controlled. Indeed, as the Commission notes, China has developed a sophisticated and expensive internal security apparatus to contain dissent, costing $83.5 billion in 2010 alone. That same year, the Chinese government increased funding for internal security by 13.8 percent versus a 12.7 percent increase for the PLA.

Finally, and perhaps most importantly, the Chinese economy is beginning to slow. The Chinese State Research Center has just announced that it anticipates 2012 growth of less than 9 percent and between 7 and 8 percent through 2017. As a result, Chinese policy elites have expressed concern about managing "social stability," undoubtedly thinking about the economy's reduced ability to absorb huge numbers of college graduates, generate jobs for a roaming population of 100 million or more unemployed, and cope with persistently high inflation. With slower economic growth, fewer funding increases will be available to the government generally and to the PLA in particular as domestic priorities demand investment, especially social welfare and internal security to avert greater instability.

PLA Capabilities

While current and future budgetary constraints help to mitigate excessive fear over the PLA, there is no doubt that the Chinese military has made substantial gains over the past twenty-plus years. The DoD estimates that over the past decade, the Chinese military has modernized 25-55 percent of its forces, depending on the type of forces in question. But as modernization continues, it is the goals of PLA modernization that are most worrisome.

At the operational level, PLA modernization is not intended to create a military equal to that of the United States' outright. Instead, the PLA aims to develop a robust 'anti-access and area denial' (A2/AD) capability vis-à-vis technologically superior opponents. The purpose of A2/AD operations is to deny the US or other technologically superior militaries' unfettered access to the Western Pacific where Chinese core national interests are at stake, including Taiwan and territorial claims in the South China Sea.

To develop this capability, the PLA has invested heavily in anti-satellite weapons, ballistic missiles, cyber warfare, a growing fleet of submarines and the development of its J-20 stealth fighter. Though these weapon systems, PLA strategists hope to have the ability to degrade superior US C4ISR (command, control, communications, computer, intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance), ideally rendering the US military "dumb, deaf and blind" while simultaneously disrupting or shutting down US bases in the region, including aircraft carriers.

A Prudent Response

There is no question that the growing capabilities of the Chinese military require a response. However, given that the US-Chinese military spending gap has widened in favor of the United States and there are major factors constraining the size of future PLA budgetary increases, the conservative calls to raise US military spending are misguided. This is especially true because as Admiral Mullen, former Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, has pointed out: our burgeoning Federal deficit is the greatest threat to national security.

There are four criteria for a prudent response to the Chinese military buildup: it must address Chinese A2/AD capabilities, it must be affordable, it must emphasize diplomacy and it must minimize the risk of fostering a zero-sum Sino-American security relationship.

First, countering the PLA A2/AD strategy is necessary to maintain a favorable balance of power in the region. Failure to do so would forfeit key American military advantages and make war in East Asia more likely. In 2011, the Pentagon opened an office dedicated to overcoming potential adversaries' A2/AD capabilities. The primary task of the office is to formulate and implement a new operation concept called "AirSea Battle" as a way of guiding the Air Force and Navy to counter the nature of threats discussed above.

While the DoD has not released further details, the Center for Strategic and Budgetary Analysis (CSBA) -- an independent think tank with close ties to the Defense Department -- has released a detailed report on AirSea Battle. The report includes detailed recommendations, such as enhancing electronic and cyber warfare capabilities, backup communication systems, submersible drones, ballistic missile defenses, developing new long range strike systems and training the US military to operate in C4ISR degraded environments.

Second, implementing a serious version of AirSea Battle, whether that outlined by the CSBA or otherwise, must be done affordably. To be sure, this will require smart choices and compromising on some other defense concerns, at least for now. An appropriate starting place is to reassess the need for some of the Pentagon's currently planned procurements. For instance, even the CSBA has noted that in addressing PLA gains, purchases of the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter -- the most expensive weapons program in history with a total projected cost exceeding $1 trillion, according to GAO -- can be reduced and procurement of a new generation of aircraft carriers -- the Ford Class -- can be slowed.

The F-35, of which the military plans to buy nearly 2,500 units, has too short of a range to be useful in the expansive Western Pacific. Its limited range cannot be extended without using external fuel tanks that sacrifice the stealth of the aircraft, and hence a major portion of its expensive advantage, or by relying on a vulnerable mid-air refueling tanker fleet.

Regarding the Ford Class carriers, such multi-billion dollar vessels are vulnerable to PLA anti-shipping capabilities, especially the DF-21 anti-shipping ballistic missile designed specifically to destroy US carriers from a distance of 1,800 kilometers with conventional warheads. Investing heavily in the Ford Class would not only play into strengths of the PLA but would be redundant for a Navy that already possesses 11 aircraft carriers.

Instead, the United States can upgrade and redeploy its current systems. For example, upon learning that the Chinese J-20 stealth fighter was ahead of its development schedule, the Air Force responded by upgrading the radars on some of its F-15 fleet -- aircraft which have a combat record of over 100-to-0 -- as an effective countermeasure. Similar frugal but smart upgrades on other weapon systems should be explored as AirSea Battle is developed. In response to the growing PLA ballistic missiles that threaten US ships and bases, advanced PATRIOT PAC-3 and AEGIS Standard-3 anti-ballistic missiles systems can be deployed to the region in greater numbers and further supplied to our allies there.

Third, smart diplomacy must be used to effect Chinese military and foreign policy calculations, especially those involving the use of force. As evidenced by President Obama's recent diplomatic offensive during the APEC/ASEAN summits, the US can set the diplomatic agenda in the region and deepen partnerships with East Asian countries which are intimidated by China's rise. The move also saw the US-Australian alliance expanded by an agreement for US Marines and air forces to be stationed there. Economically, the trip involved President Obama moving towards joining the Trans-Pacific Partnership free trade area of up to 11 countries, including Japan. By developing a comprehensive diplomatic strategy in the region, as Secretary Clinton has begun to do, the US can bolster its influence, lead other countries to play an appropriate role in addressing PLA gains, and do so while benefiting the American economy. The result is an economic benefit while giving the Chinese disincentives to behave aggressively.

Finally, a frugal military response and smart diplomacy helps to minimize the risk of the Sino-US security relationship from becoming zero-sum. If such a relationship were to develop between the United States and the world's second largest, fastest growing economy, the costs for both sides could be enormous, both financially and geopolitically. Avoiding such folly must be a serious goal of any US strategy.

The decisions currently facing this nation are difficult but manageable. Responding to increasing Chinese military power while allowing US defense expenditures to be reduced to appropriate levels will be a challenge. But the stakes are too high to reflexively respond to the ideas of some conservatives. We owe it to ourselves and the world to find new pathways to security and prosperity. And that approach has some precedent: it was adopted by conservative presidents like Eisenhower, Nixon, and H.W. Bush when large budget deficits made it necessary to reduce defense spending despite apocalyptic claims of Soviet military dominance.

The Real Effects of Sequestration on Defense Spending

2011-11-17T19:19:00-05:00

Cabinet officers are expected to protect the interests of their departments. Therefore it is not surprising that Secretary of Defense Leon Panetta's letter to Senator John McCain (R-Ariz.) and Lindsay Graham (R-S.C.) on Nov. 14, 2011 warns them that the effects of sequestration would be devastating for the Department of Defense. However, close examination of the letter demonstrates that the impact would not be as great as the Secretary claims.

Sequestration would mean that the Pentagon would have to absorb $600 billion in reductions over the FY 2013-2021 period compared to projected levels. Adding in the $400 billion in reductions it is already planning to make would bring the total to about $1 trillion over the next decade.

But the letter does not mention that the baseline defense budget was projected to grow by 26 percent from $554 billion in FY 2012 to $696 billion in FY 2021, and that total (non-war) spending would be $6.2 trillion over this period. A $1-trillion reduction would mean spending "only" $5.2 trillion but would still result in a defense budget increase of almost 20 percent. In other words, there are no reductions. Defense would still grow, but not as fast. Moreover, sequestration will return defense spending in real terms to its FY 2007 level, the next to last year of the Bush administration, when no one was complaining about devastating levels of spending.

Nor does the letter contain any acknowledgement that over the past decade, the baseline budget has more than doubled and that total defense spending, even in the real terms, is higher than at any time since World War II.

The most misleading claim is that that at the end of 10 years of sequestration, we would have the smallest ground force since 1940, the smallest number of ships since 1915, and the smallest tactical fighter force in the history of the air force.

What the Secretary does not tell us is that today's ground forces (Army and Marines) are among the largest and most capable in the world, and that he is referring only to the active force. Unlike 1940, we also have a large reserve component, which was used extensively and effectively in Iraq and Afghanistan. Similarly, our Navy is larger than the next 13 navies combined, and our Air Force is increasingly composed of unmanned planes.

The letter lists a whole host of weapons programs that the Secretary claims would have to be terminated or reduced. Here again he overstates the impact. Let me give but two examples. Panetta argues DOD could procure "only" 10 new ballistic missile submarines instead of 12. But he ignores the fact that by increasing the number of missiles on each submarine and the number of warheads per missile, we actually need only 8 to maintain the robustness of this leg of the triad.

Similarly, he says, without specifying when, he could terminate the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter. But what he does not say is that the Navy and Marines can continue to buy the latest models of the F/A-18 E/F and the Air Force the F-16. While these plans may not be quite as effective as the F-35, they are far better than anything any other country has.

Since it became clear that the projected levels of defense spending would have to be reduced, a number of comprehensive plans have been put forth preparing reductions of about $1 trillion of the next decade. These include those of the Deficit Reduction Commission, the Gang of Six Senators, and Senator Tom Coburn (R-Okla.). All of these show how we can reduce spending without harming national security. These should be our guide if sequestration kicks in.

Open Letter to the Super Committee

2011-10-13T14:10:18-04:00

Over the next two months, the bipartisan "super committee" set up under the debt ceiling deal will work to find $1.2 trillion in deficit reduction over the next decade. Given the long-term threat that the federal deficit poses to American security, power, and interests, it is imperative that the committee make real progress toward getting our nation's fiscal house in order.

Sensible reductions in the defense budget must be part of the solution. In the decade since 9/11, defense spending has grown by a staggering 56 percent, reaching levels not seen since the end of World War II. Last year, we spent $250 billion more in real terms than what we spent on average during the Cold War.

This level of spending is dramatically out of proportion with the threats. Wasteful defense spending does not make our nation safer. It diverts resources away from other key investments in the American economy, the real foundation of U.S. power.

Here are ten recommendations for the super committee on how they can responsibly reduce projected levels of defense spending by $677 billion over the next ten years without undermining our national security.

1. Reduce active-duty troops in Europe and Asia by one-third ($80 billion through 2020)

At a time when many of our allies are cutting their defense budgets to address their own deficit woes, the United States still maintains about 150,000 active-duty personnel in Europe and Asia. Given improved capabilities for troop transport and long-range strikes, the U.S. could reduce this overseas presence by one-third without impacting U.S. security or interests.

2. Reform military health care ($150 billion over the next decade)

Last year, the Pentagon spent more than $50 billion on its Tricare military health care system, more than double what it spent a decade ago and about as much as it spent on the war in Iraq.
The vast majority of the cost growth stems not from active-duty service members but from military retirees, who pay just $520 per year for health coverage for a family and nothing at all after they turn 65. While our retired service members deserve access to affordable, top quality health care for life, the current system is not sustainable. The Pentagon can save $15 billion per year by reinstituting a fairer cost-sharing balance between military retirees and taxpayers, and reducing overutilization and double-coverage.

3. Return the ground forces to pre-9/11 levels ($147 billion through 2020)

To wage the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, the Pentagon increased the size of the Army and Marines by about 100,000. As the U.S. is highly unlikely to wage large ground wars in the foreseeable future, we should return the ground forces to pre-9/11 levels as we wind down our involvement in Iraq and Afghanistan.

4. Redirect DoD's planned efficiency savings to reduce the baseline defense budget ($100 billion through 2016)

The defense department's efficiencies initiative has identified $178 billion in savings through 2016. The Pentagon plans to use $78 billion to reduce its budget and reinvest the remaining $100 billion into other programs. No other department could admit they've been wasting $178 billion every five years and then get to keep some of it. All of DoD's efficiency savings should go toward reducing its budget.

5. Cancel the V-22 Osprey program ($11 billion through 2016)

Long hampered by cost overruns and technical problems, the V-22 has been on the chopping block for decades. Then Secretary of Defense Dick Cheney tried to cancel it in the '90s; President Obama's deficit commission recommended ending the program last year. Ending procurement of the V-22, which costs five times as much as other helicopters, would save at least $11 billion through 2016.

6. Limit the procurement of the DDG-51 destroyer to one per year and the littoral combat ship to two per year ($9 billion through 2016)

In terms of firepower, the U.S. Navy overmatches the next twenty largest navies combined, many of which are U.S. allies. The Pentagon can afford to slow the procurement of the DDG-51 destroyer and littoral combat ship, keeping these production lines open but saving $9 billion through 2016.

7. Retire two existing carrier battle groups and associated air wings ($50 billion through 2020)

While the United States maintains 11 aircraft carriers, no other nation has even one of comparable size and power. The U.S. can maintain its overwhelming air and naval superiority even while shrinking its carrier fleet slightly.

8. Cut the procurement of the Navy and Marine Corp. F-35 Joint Strike Fighter variants ($20 billion through 2016)

The F-35 program continues to suffer extreme cost overruns, with lifetime cost estimates for the fleet recently reaching $1 trillion. Alternative fighter jets like the F/A-18E/F Super Hornet continue to be effective, so cutting the F-35's Navy and Marine variants--while allowing the Air Force to keep its entire buy--would help control spiraling costs in the program without compromising American air superiority.

9. Cut the U.S. nuclear arsenal to 311 operationally deployed strategic nuclear weapons ($110 billion)

Our massive nuclear stockpile is a relic of the Cold War, expensive to maintain, and largely useless in combating the threats facing the nation today. According to strategists at the Air War College and the School of Advanced Air and Space Studies, the United States requires only 311 nuclear weapons to maintain a credible deterrent. Such a reduction would save at least $11 billion a year.

10. War (OCO) funding ($0 over the next decade)

To regain control of the defense budget, it is absolutely imperative that the U.S. end its involvement in Iraq by 2012 and Afghanistan by 2014 as planned. However, the super committee should not count reduced war spending as savings in its deficit reduction proposal.

The wars have been funded by supplementals, not through DoD's base budget. Therefore, savings from war funding do nothing to address the long-term, institutional problems facing the Department of Defense: mismanagement and waste.

In the coming decade, the Department of Defense, which now receives 20 percent of the federal budget, will need to relearn how to live without unlimited funding, something it had done prior to 9/11. In these times of fiscal austerity, we can no longer afford to sink taxpayer dollars into unnecessary or ineffective weapons systems.

To address the most pressing threats to our security--the national debt and our faltering economy--the super committee must take the opportunity to reduce defense spending to more responsible levels.

Lawrence J. Korb, a Senior Fellow at the Center for American Progress, served as assistant secretary of defense in the Reagan administration. Alexander Rothman is a special assistant at the Center.

Defense Needs to Play Its Part in the Deficit Debate

2011-07-28T17:49:43-04:00

In Congressional testimony over the past week, several high ranking military officers, led by Army General Martin Dempsey, the nominee to become the next Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, have warned about the dire national security consequences that could occur if the defense budget is cut by more than a token amount. Their comments have been reinforced by several Republican members of the House Armed Services Committee. But there are at least five reasons why the defense budget can and should be cut substantially without undo risk.

First, in real or inflation adjusted dollars, it is higher than at any time since World War II, including the Korean and Vietnam Wars and the height of the Reagan buildup. The Korean War peak was $485 billion in FY 1952, Vietnam $409 billion in FY 1968, and the Reagan buildup $546 billion in FY 1985. The baseline defense budget for FY2012 is $585 billion. If one adds in funding for the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, the total defense budget for the upcoming fiscal year rises to about $700 billion.

Second, the baseline defense budget has risen in real terms for 13 consecutive years, which is unprecedented in American history. The Korean and Vietnam buildups lasted three years and the Reagan buildup but four. Since FY 1998, the baseline budget has risen from $360 billion to $585 billion or 63 percent. Moreover, the military snuck many items that had nothing to do with the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq into the $1.3 trillion war supplemental budgets, for example the F-22 and missile defense.

Third, despite the gusher of defense spending, the military in many ways is no better off than it was 13 years ago. In fact, it may be worse. Its equipment is older, and its forces are training less. This condition is the result of what Admiral Mullen, the current Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, called the failure to make hard choices. As a result, the Pentagon spent $46 billion on weapon systems it had to terminate and the cost overruns on systems it is currently buying went up by $400 billion. Finally, when pressed, the military leaders themselves have identified nearly $200 billion in savings that could be achieved in the FY 2012-2016 time frame if they operated more efficiently.

Fourth, the military budget must play a role in dealing with what Admiral Mullen calls the greatest threat to our national security, the burgeoning federal deficit which now totals $14.3 trillion. Defense spending now consumes more than half of the total discretionary budget, more than 20 percent of the total budget, up from 16 percent a decade ago, and is at the same level as Social Security and Medicare, which are funded by trust funds.

Fifth, the US is not dealing with an existential threat like we did in the Cold War.

Dempsey and his fellow officers say that cutting the baseline or non-war defense budget by $100 a year billion or by $1 trillion over the next decade will jeopardize our security. Hardly. A $100 billion cut will leave the Pentagon with a baseline defense budget of $480 billion. During the Cold War, the defense budget averaged $450 billion in today's dollars. And even Secretary Gates admitted we do not need to go back to Cold War levels of defense spending.

Moreover, Eisenhower left office with a budget of $273 billion, Nixon $303 billion, and Clinton $420 billion. And the militaries they funded performed magnificently when put to the test. For example, the air and naval forces and nuclear triad purchased by Eisenhower (1953-1961) forced the Soviet Union to back down in the Cuban missile crisis of 1962. Similarly, the All Volunteer Total Force (active and reserve) created by the Nixon administration did the job in the first and second Gulf Wars. And the military purchased by Clinton (1992-2000) overthrew Saddam and evicted the Taliban in a matter of weeks. Finally, because of their constraints on defense, Eisenhower was able to balance the budget, and Clinton actually bequeathed a surplus to George W. Bush.

But it is not just how much you spend on defense, but how you spend it. Because there were no fiscal constraints in the last decade, the military did not have to set priorities. Therefore, when they did their most recent Quadrennial Defense Review in 2010, the Pentagon argued that the American military had to be able to go everywhere and do everything.

It is clear that the US will not again send large land armies into the Middle East. Therefore, the Obama administration can do what Eisenhower did after Korea and Nixon did after Vietnam, namely, cut the size of the active duty ground forces. Similarly, with the Cold War over for 20 years, it is no longer necessary for us to keep 150,000 troops in Europe and Asia or keep three aircraft carriers permanently deployed. Moreover, why do we still have 5,000 strategic nuclear weapons when the Air Force strategists correctly point out that 311 is all we need for deterrence? And why do we need to purchase $133 million top of the line fighters like the F-35 for all three services. Why not do what Nixon did and also simultaneously buy lower cost but effective fighters like the $43 million F/A-18/E/F for the Navy and Marines? Finally, why plow the savings from efficiencies into new programs rather than using them to cut the current level of spending.

Taking these types of reductions, which we have done in the past, can provide an effective defense at an acceptable cost. And enhance our national security by having defense play its part in bringing the deficit under control.

Lawrence J. Korb, a Senior Fellow at Center for American Progress, served as assistant secretary of defense in the Reagan administration.

Defense Authorization and New START

2011-05-27T13:55:58-04:00

Less than a month after Obama got Osama, House Republicans still don't trust the
president to safeguard U.S. national security. At least, that's only possibly explanation
for this year's National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA), which passed the House
yesterday and is now headed to the Democrat-controlled Senate.

While the NDAA is intended to define the budget of the Department of Defense, this
year's bill includes provisions that, if signed into law, would undermine a number of
President Obama's signature national security initiatives, including his repeal of "Don't
Ask, Don't Tell," efforts to reign in wasteful defense spending and, most significantly,
the implementation of the New START nuclear agreement with Russia.

Approved by a bipartisan majority in late 2010, the New START nuclear arms control
treaty requires the United States and Russia to reduce their arsenals to 1,550 deployed,
strategic nuclear weapons. Considering that nearly all of these weapons are far more
powerful than the bombs that destroyed Hiroshima and Nagasaki, such an arsenal would
provide more than enough firepower for the United States to meet any conceivable
national security threat. If you're not going to be deterred by 1,550 nuclear weapons,
you're not going be deterred by anything. Perhaps most importantly, the treaty replaces
the verification system that expired with the START I treaty, thereby providing an
element of stability to the U.S.-Russia relationship.

The NDAA, however, attempts to hamper President Obama's nuclear policy in three
ways. First, it bars funding for New START reductions until the Secretary of Defense
and Energy Secretary certify to Congress that that the administration is on track to invest
$180 billion in nuclear modernization over the next 10 years.

Second, and more egregiously, the NDAA prohibits the administration from eliminating
surplus, non-deployed warheads until two new next generation nuclear facilities become
operational, currently scheduled for 2024.

Most significantly, in a historically unprecedented move, the NDAA attempts to bar the
president from unilaterally reducing the U.S. nuclear stockpile below New START levels
or amending U.S. nuclear targeting strategy without congressional approval.

These sections of the NDAA demonstrate an unprecedented lack of faith in the
president's national security decision-making. Since the beginning of the nuclear age,
as Commander in Chief the president, in conjunction with the military, has always
determined U.S. nuclear policy. House Republicans' attempts to strip President Obama
of this authority may be unconstitutional. But they are also a remarkable demonstration
of extent to which the modern Republican party has defined itself primarily around an
unrelenting opposition to the president's agenda, even when this agenda is moderate and
supported by the country's top military leadership.

Since 1967, the United States has reduced its nuclear stockpile by 85 percent. This

achievement is a testament to a remarkable and coherent commitment to nuclear
disarmament by presidents of both parties, including conservative icon Ronald Reagan.
Despite fierce right-wing opposition to the New START treaty, President Obama's
nuclear policy is, in reality, a continuation of this bipartisan effort.

President Obama has smartly threatened to veto the NDAA if these nuclear provisions
remain in the final bill. Given the fiscal problems facing our nation and historic highs in
defense spending, the Obama administration has been right to downsize or eliminate out-
dated weapons systems that do little to further American security, like the F-22 and EFV.

Surplus nuclear weapons, which are expensive to maintain and protect, should be no
exception. The Obama administration has been right to work to bring the U.S. nuclear
stockpile down to levels that present an effective and affordable deterrent.

It is in our best interest as a country to modify the size our nuclear stockpile to fit the
threats of the twenty-first century. By allowing the U.S. to reclaim the moral high ground,
nuclear reductions will strengthen American efforts to stop global proliferation.

Moreover, our nuclear arsenal possesses no utility in any of the U.S.'s three current
military campaigns (Afghanistan, Iraq and Libya). And at a time when the U.S.
government is cutting WIC funding (which provides nutrition assistance to lower-income
pregnant women, infants, and children), spending even one dollar more than necessary
on nuclear weapons is irresponsible. The NDAA would waste billions, undermine our
national security and limit the ability of the president and military to ensure that our
nation's scarce resources are being distributed where they can be most effective.

Lawrence J. Korb, a Senior Fellow at Center for American Progress, served as assistant
secretary of defense in the Reagan administration. Alex Rothman is a special assistant at
the Center.

Robert Gates' Budget Dance

2011-03-16T15:33:42-04:00

As Congress and the administration try to agree on reductions in federal spending, in order to avoid a government shutdown, the question about reducing the baseline defense budget for FY 2011 and FY 2012 has emerged as a point of contention. To understand why it should not be, it is necessary to go back three years.

In February 2008, Secretary of Defense Robert Gates requested that Congress appropriate $518 billion for the base defense budget (exclusive of war costs) for FY 2009, the last budget of the Bush administration. In presenting that budget, Gates said that if that amount were approved, and no changes were made to the defense program, the defense budget would need to rise to $533 billion in FY 2011 and $542 billion in FY 2012. At the time of Gates' request, the base budget was $137 billion or 36 percent higher than in FY 2001, the first Bush budget, and the federal deficit was $459 billion.

Three years later, after making what he claimed were $300 billion in program reductions and $178 billion in efficiencies savings, Gates argued that if Congress does not appropriate at least $540 billion for FY 2011 the results would be "catastrophic" and that he needed at least $553 billion for FY 2012.

Moreover, because the budget deficit for FY 2011 was now projected to be $1.6 trillion, and since defense consumes more than half of the discretionary budget and about 20 percent of the overall budget, groups like President Obama's deficit commission and Congressman Barney Frank's Sustainable Defense Task Force were saying that significant defense cuts had to be part of the solution to deal with the exploding federal deficit. Gates also called these efforts catastrophic and claimed they are exercises in math and had no strategic component.

What happened? Why is the base defense budget higher than was projected and higher after Gates made his reductions? The answer is simple. Most of the cuts he claimed credit for were not reductions. All Gates did was try to take credit for decisions that had already been made. For example, Secretary Rumsfeld had decided that the Air Force would be allowed to purchase 183 F-22 aircraft. In his FY 2010 request, Gates ended the program at 187 (he snuck 4 more into the war supplemental).

Similarly, Gates plowed the vast majority of his efficiency reductions into other programs that were not in the 5 year plan he presented to Congress in February 2008.

Gates' claim that reductions of this size are divorced from strategy is really the pot calling the kettle black. His own Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) does not make any tradeoffs or lay down a strategy. In fact, it tries to be all things to all people.

Since the defense budget consumes as much of the federal budget as the Social Security program and has actually grown faster than Social Security since 2001, it is natural that individuals and groups concerned with deficit reduction would scrutinize it. Indeed, the president's deficit reduction commission proposed reducing defense expenditures by $378 billion over the FY 2012-16 period.

If their reductions were implemented in full the U.S. baseline defense spending for FY 2012-16 would "fall" from $2.9 trillion to $2.6 trillion and still would amount to more than $500 billion a year. Even if one accounts for inflation, this amount is higher than we spent on average in the Cold War, higher than what the administration of George W. Bush spent in its eight years in office, and five times more than the Chinese spend.

Moreover, these reductions have a strategic component. They recommend that Gates adopt the proposals of groups he established to evaluate military pay and benefits, including health care, reduce our troops in Europe, and develop a counterterrorism strategy to deal with violent extremists like Al Qaeda, ideas that Gates himself embraced in an article in Foreign Affairs and a recent speech at West Point.

According to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the biggest threat to our national security is the exploding federal deficit. While reducing the defense budget by itself will not solve the problem, it must be part of the solution. By freezing non-defense discretionary spending, the President claims he will save $400 billion over the next decade. Implementing his own deficit commission's plan for defense would save twice as much and allow Congress to pass a budget to keep from shutting the government down.

Lawrence Korb, a former assistant secretary of defense in the Reagan administration, is a senior fellow at the Center for American Progress.

Reagan's Progressive Foreign Policy

2011-02-08T16:13:07-05:00

Recently when I appeared on CNBC to discuss the crisis in Egypt, I received an email from a listener asking how someone who served about 5 years in the Reagan administration could now work at a progressive, i.e. liberal, think tank like the Center for American Progress. I received similar emails when I headed up Barack Obama's national security group during the 2008 campaign and debated people from the Clinton and McCain campaigns.

The answer is pretty simple: Reagan was much more of a progressive than many of those celebrating his 100th birthday now admit, particularly those who supported the policies of the administration of George W. Bush. Let me give just a few examples.

Like Obama, Reagan was against dumb wars. He resisted pressure from the conservative members of his party to send some 25,000 troops to Central America to thwart what they claimed was imminent Soviet Communist expansion into that area.

But Reagan did invade other countries, did he not?

Yes, he sent military forces into Lebanon in 1982 to help stabilize that country after the Israeli incursion and invaded Grenada in 1983. But in sending forces into Lebanon, Reagan would not do so unilaterally. Going in he sought and received significant troop contributions from two of our major allies -- the French and Italians. Moreover, when the Marine barracks in Beirut were blown up in 1983, killing some 240 brave Americans (and dozens of French soldiers), Reagan did a cost-benefit analysis and realized that the potential costs of continued involvement in that nation's civil war outweighed the gains. Therefore, he strategically redeployed our forces (withdrew).

Compare this to the way in which the Bush administration went to Iraq. As Donald Rumsfeld's new memoir tells us, there was never a principals meeting to analyze the costs and benefits of the operation. As a result, this nation lost nearly 5,000 lives, 30,000 of our military people were wounded, hundreds of thousands of Iraqis were killed, and we spent a trillion dollars so Iraq could have an election that necessitated Iran's intervention to form a government.

Similarly, when Reagan decided to invade Grenada, he doubled the number of troops the military said were needed to complete the mission. On the other hand, the Bush administration cut in half the number of troops the Army said was necessary to invade and occupy Iraq.

Yes, Reagan did cut taxes in his first year in office to stimulate the economy. But when those cuts, coupled with his increase in defense spending and inability to reduce non-defense spending, led to large budget deficits, Reagan raised taxes 11 times, thus undoing about half of the cuts. Moreover, in his second term, he reduced the defense budget by 13 percent in real terms as part of the Gramm-Rudman-Hollings deficit reduction plan.

Like Reagan, Bush did reduce taxes in his first year. But unlike Reagan, he never raised taxes when the budget surplus he inherited disappeared and the deficit ballooned to unprecedented proportions. Nor did Bush ever slow down the rapid rise in baseline defense expenditures, even in his second term. Thus, in his eight years in office, Bush essentially doubled the baseline defense budget and kept increasing it in real terms even as the deficit rose.

It is true that Reagan called the Soviet Union an evil empire and publicly called on Gorbachev to "tear down this wall," but this did not stop him from negotiating with the Soviets to eliminate intermediate-range nuclear weapons from Europe (a posture that led some Republicans to brand him as Neville Chamberlain) and fighting with conservatives to get the Senate to ratify that agreement. Bush tried to emulate Reagan by putting Iran on the "axis of evil." But unlike Reagan, Bush would not negotiate directly with that nation and missed several opportunities to slow down Iran's nuclear program and get their help in Afghanistan.

Reagan also tried to eliminate all nuclear weapons and even though he wanted to develop a national missile defense program, he did it within the confines of the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty. Bush, on the other hand, tried to develop new nuclear weapons (the bunker buster) and abrogated the ABM Treaty.

I am proud of my service in the Pentagon under Reagan and equally proud to be associated with the Center for American Progress. Were Reagan alive today, I believe he would find himself right at home in our organization, as we battle to convince the Obama administration to strategically redeploy troops from Afghanistan, cut defense spending to reduce the deficit, and reduce strategic nuclear weapons.

Lawrence Korb, a senior fellow at the Center for American Progress, was an assistant secretary of defense in the Reagan administration.

No Double Standards in Cutting Defense Fat

2010-08-13T12:46:52-04:00

If Secretary of Defense Robert Gates wants to ensure that the reductions he proposed on August 10, 2010 are meaningful, he can set a good example by trimming his own bureaucracy, the Office of the Secretary of Defense, or OSD, and eliminating the civilian secretaries of the military departments.

Although the Department of Defense was created in 1947, it was not until 1948 that the office of the secretary (OSD) was established. In addition to the secretary of defense and the deputy, OSD had three presidential appointees at the assistant secretary level who supervised a staff of 50 people. Although the number grew to 15 in the 1970s, it stayed at or about that level until the mid-1980s. Today, in Gates' office, there are 26 presidential appointees: the deputy secretary, 5 under secretaries, 12 deputy under secretaries, and 8 assistant secretaries of defense, who have a total staff of about 3,000 people.

To take just two examples of how things have changed, the manpower position, one of the original three assistants, has morphed from one assistant secretary into an office that has four presidential appointees, an undersecretary, a principal deputy, and two assistant secretaries. But the office actually has less responsibility than the position did in the 1980s when one person at the assistant secretary level handled not just manpower, but installations and logistics as well (full disclosure: I was the assistant secretary). The policy shop, which did not even exist until the 1960s when it was manned by one assistant secretary, now has eight presidential appointees: an undersecretary, a principal deputy undersecretary and six assistant secretary level positions.

Ironically much of the growth in OSD occurred as the size of the Armed Forces shrunk. For example, in the 1950s when the active duty force consisted of nearly 3 million people, there were only 10 presidential appointees. Today, when the force has shrunk to 1.4 million, there are 26 presidential appointees.

There were several reasons for this growth. Some positions were forced on DOD by Congress to ensure that certain interests were protected, for example reserve forces and Special Forces. Others were created to deal with areas of particular concern to the secretary, for example, intelligence.

While we should not return to the original design, it does provide a good starting point. To do his job effectively, the secretary needs four principal assistants for: policy, readiness, finance, and acquisition. Each of these should be presidential appointees and each should have an appropriate number of deputies, but they do not need to be presidential appointees. Personal assistants like public affairs, legislative affairs, and legal, should be just that -- special assistants.

Not only would this reduce overhead and save money, because each of these high-level appointees has to have his or her own staff, but it would speed up the decision-making process. No longer would the secretary have 26 people reporting directly to him. Instead, reducing the number of presidential appointees would enable him to get his staff in place more quickly, since many people would not have to go through the increasingly tedious confirmation process. Moreover, the paperwork for the decision making process within the Pentagon would be sped up, since there would be many fewer people necessary to coordinate before a paper would reach the secretary.

Eliminating the service secretaries and their staffs would also streamline the decision-making process and save money. With the empowerment of the combatant commanders and the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the service chiefs' main function is to manage their services, making the service secretaries and their large staffs, which now compose several hundred people, redundant. And civilian control can be exercised by the secretary of defense and his staff.

Taking these steps will meet resistance from some entrenched interests, but by proposing them the secretary will set an example for the rest of our bloated military establishment and get them to take the necessary steps to help bring defense spending under control.

Lawrence J. Korb, a former assistant secretary of defense in the Reagan administration, is a senior fellow at the Center for American Progress.

Now Is the Time for Gates and Mullen to Repeal 'Don't Ask Don't Tell'

2010-03-30T15:38:55-04:00

Secretary of Defense Robert Gates and Admiral Michael Mullen correctly criticized Lt. General Benjamin Mixon, commanding general of the U.S. Army, Pacific, for writing to Stars and Stripes on March 8, 2010 expressing his opposition to repealing "Don't Ask, Don't Tell," the law that bans openly gay men and women from serving in the military, and asking other military members to do the same. However, they have only themselves to blame for Mixon's insubordination as well as the recent comments of General James Conway, the Commandant of the Marine Corps, to a group of Marines at a town hall meeting. During that meeting, General Conway stated that if the DADT law were repealed he would not make straight Marines room with openly gay fellow Marines.

Why are Gates and Mullen to blame? The reason is that in the approximately 1,200 days that Gates has been in office, more than 2,000 people have been discharged under the Pentagon's "Don't Ask, Don't Tell" policy. Many of these patriotic men and women were thrown out by low ranking officers often acting on hearsay evidence supplied by anonymous third parties. Yet until March 25, 2010 when he issued more lenient guidelines for enforcing DADT, this inhumane treatment of these brave men and women has not bothered the secretary. While Mullen has been in office one year less time than Gates, he served as Chief of Naval Operations and as a member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff for two years before that, and has served with gays for more than 40 years, making him equally guilty.

The new guidelines, which apply only to pending or future cases, mandate that discharges will now have to be approved by general or flag officers, that information provided by third parties will have to be given under oath, and the use of hearsay will be discouraged. While the new guidelines are a welcome step, it still begs the question of why it took the secretary so long to correct these abuses. Moreover, in promulgating these new guidelines, Gates stressed that Congress should not repeal DADT before the Pentagon completes its year-long review of how to implement the repeal. This review will include getting the views of the troops and their families.

To remedy this situation, Gates should first admit that he was wrong to put up with this inhumane policy these last several years and allow those who were discharged on the basis of hearsay and third party claims to reapply to join the service. Only then will they have the moral credibility to discipline officers like Mixon and Conway.

Not only must the secretary allow all those who have been outed anonymously to reapply in order to return to active duty, he must speed up the work of the high-level group that is examining the administrative and legal changes that must be made when DADT is repealed and drop his opposition to Congress replacing DADT until the Pentagon completes its year-long review. There is no plausible reason that it needs to take a year to make the changes necessary to implement DADT or why it is necessary to complete the review before repealing the law.

In fact, the British military (which is structured like ours and has fought along side us in Iraq and continues to fight with us in Afghanistan) was able to effectively implement a policy of allowing openly gay people to serve within two months after the European Court of Human Rights told them to drop the ban. As the Clinton administration learned after it attempted to allow open service in 1993, slow walking the process will only allow the opponents of repealing DADT more opportunities to prevent it from happening.

Nor should the secretary or the chairman allow any officers to question whether changing the policy will adversely impact readiness. Studies done by and for the Pentagon for the past 50 years and the experiences of our closest allies, like the British, Canadians, and the Israelis, demonstrate that allowing openly gay people to serve will not undermine unit cohesion or military readiness. Therefore, Gates and Mullen must push back not only on statements like those made by Mixon and Conway, but those of commanders like General David Petraeus, who said he was withholding judgment on whether to drop the ban until he sees the impact on recruitment and retention. That day is past.

Finally, while the issue should be discussed with the troops, it is not appropriate to allow them to get the impression that the decision on whether or not the ban will be dropped will depend upon their vote. While more and more troops are supporting dropping the ban, it is not their place to weigh in on the wisdom of repeal. For example, when President Harry Truman ordered the military to integrate, only 13 percent of the troops supported his decision and General Omar Bradley told him it would ruin the Army.

That apocalyptic outcome never happened, nor will the doomsday scenarios of those current opponents to dropping "Don't Ask, Don't Tell." Now is the time for the secretary and the chairman to work with Congress to repeal the ban quickly and demonstrate that proponents of DADT are on the wrong side of history as were those who opposed the integration of African Americans and opening up combat positions to women.

Paying for Our Wars

2009-12-08T12:56:36-05:00

Now that President Obama has decided to send 30,000 more troops to Afghanistan the question of how to pay for this increased level of operations has arisen. In fact the question of how to pay for the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan should have been raised shortly after the attacks of 9-11 when the Bush administration decided to overthrow the regimes in both of those countries.

Throughout our history whenever this nation became involved in a significant conflict, its leaders conscripted men to ensure that its forces had enough people to wage the war successfully and raised taxes to insure that the cost of the wars would not be passed on to future generations and that the American people, as well as the men and women in uniform, would have to sacrifice to achieve the objectives of the war.

In fact at the height of the war in Vietnam, President Lyndon Johnson balanced the budget by raising taxes and cutting some government programs. Harry Truman did the same during the Korean War. And, in real dollars in both of those wars, defense spending was not as high as it is today.

But in conducting what the Bush administration labeled the war on terror, which has involved sending some two million men and women into combat in Iraq and Afghanistan, this country has done neither. As a result the men and women in our armed services, especially the ground forces, have had to serve multiple tours in the war zones without sufficient time at home to recover from the strains of combat and some 200,000 volunteers have had their terms of enlistment extended involuntarily.

Moreover, while about 5,000 service personnel have been killed and another 50,000 have suffered physical wounds, another 400,000 have developed mental problems. Moreover, to get enough volunteers to fight these endless wars, the Army has had to lower its standards and increase its baseline pay and benefits substantially. Finally, suicide rates, divorce, and spousal abuse among the veterans returning from multiple combat tours have skyrocketed.

The direct costs of funding these conflicts now totals about $1 trillion while the indirect costs will probably amount to $5 trillion when one adds in veterans benefits, long-term care of the physically and mentally wounded, and interest on the national debt. President Bush, who inherited a budget surplus from President Clinton, not only did not raise taxes, he cut them, and squandered the surplus while accumulating more debt that all of his 42 predecessors combined, almost all of which was borrowed from countries like China.

Not drafting people or raising taxes to pay for these conflicts is both a moral and a security failure. Not only is the current policy of not activating the selective service system unfair to today's volunteers, but running the wars on a credit card saddles future generations with the cost of paying for wars they had no part in deciding. Moreover, by borrowing money from a rising power like China, we have undermined our ability to balance its influence in the Middle East, Africa and East Asia.

Finally, because most Americans did not have to make any sacrifices to undertake these conflicts, they failed to ask the right questions or hold their leaders fully accountable for waging these wars. If, for example, before invading Iraq, President Bush had reinstituted conscription and levied a 10 percent income surtax, would 60 percent of Americans have supported the conflict without UN authorization and would only a handful of senators have read the whole National Intelligence Estimate, which showed that the case for invading Iraq was dubious at best?

When America goes to war it should not just be the military but the American people. Never again should we go to Wal-Mart while the soldiers go to battle. Paying for the increased force level in Afghanistan will be a step in the right direction.

Lawrence Korb, a former assistant secretary of defense in the Reagan administration, is a senior fellow at the Center for American Progress.

Fighting Over Fighter Jets: Obama, Gates and the F-22

2009-07-21T12:01:10-04:00

The Senate is locked in a heated debate on the future of the F-22, the Air Force's 5th generation fighter plane. It is the most advanced air-to-air combat fighter plane in the world, and at $350 million per plane, it is also the most expensive. President Obama is threatening a veto if any additional F-22s wind up in the Defense Authorization bill, leaving both sides of the issue locked in hand-to-hand combat trying to eek out the necessary votes. This has become an entirely politicized debate when what we need is thoughtful analysis based on risk assessment and the overall best interest of U.S. national security.

The Defense Department feels strongly that it is time to end production of the F-22. According to Secretary of Defense Robert Gates, "The Department of Defense has determined that 187 aircraft are sufficient, especially considering the future roles of Unmanned Aerial Systems and the significant number of 5th generation stealth F-35s coming on-line in our combat portfolio". Michael B. Donley, the Secretary of the Air Force and Norton A. Schwartz, Chief of Staff of the Air Force recommend that, "the Air Force not pursue F-22 production beyond 187 aircraft" after having "reviewed this issues from multiple perspectives" including "emerging joint war-fighting requirements... and overall tactical aircraft force structure."

Veterans of the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan are not lining up to support continued production of the F-22, especially since the F-22 has never flown in either war. According to Jon Soltz, Iraq War Veteran and Chairman of VoteVets.org, "The funding for these F-22s is wasteful and takes money away from equipment we do need, plain and simple...The question for lawmakers is this -- do you value contractors more, or our troops more? Because that's what they're voting on."

Of course, principle manufacturer of the plane Lockheed Martin and its subcontractors have been active on the debate and contributed $780,000 to individual Senators or their Political Action Committees since the beginning of the year. The manufacturers' primary argument is the need to maintain jobs. Secretary Gates estimates that F-22 production yields roughly 24,000 jobs. Compared to the $65 billion the U.S. taxpayer has spent to date on this program, it can hardly be touted as a cost effective jobs creation program. The F-35 program, also administered by Lockheed Martin, currently employs 38,000 people. According to Secretary Gates, more than doubling F-35 production in FY2010 will mean adding 44,000 American jobs next year, bringing the total F-35 workforce to 82,000. The planned ramp-up of F-35 production will more than offset job losses due to ending production of the F-22.

This is not a partisan issue. The charge to end production of the F-22 is being led by Senators Carl Levin (D-MI) and John McCain (R-AZ). But both parties like to support any and all defense programs to tout their bona fides on national defense. Stymieing the Defense Department's efforts to better align its budget with today's actual security threats is counter productive. According to Secretary Gates, "If the Air Force is forced to buy additional F-22s beyond what has been requested, it will come at the expense of other Air Force and Department of Defense priorities -- and require deferring capabilities in areas we believe are much more critical for our Nation's defense."

The Senate needs to heed the advice of our civilian and uniformed leaders in the Defense Department and end production of the F-22. Since Gates has drawn a red line on this, if the Senate overrules him, it will be hard for him to be an effective Secretary of Defense during the rest of his tenure.

Lawrence J. Korb, a senior fellow at the Center for American Progress, served as assistant secretary of Defense in the Reagan administration. Krisila Benson is the Director of Business Leaders for Sensible Priorities.

Strategic Caution

2009-06-24T11:16:00-04:00

The President's Critics Can't Tell The Difference Between Weakness And Wisdom

Over the last week, as Iranian demonstrators have inspired the world by taking to the streets in defiance of Iran's authoritarian government, a number of American conservatives have engaged in a cynical campaign against President Obama's foreign policy. These critics have suggested, indeed some have flatly asserted, that by carefully measuring his words so as not to provide propaganda fodder to Iran's hardliners, the president of the United States has "sided with the regime" against the people. This is absurd.

While the demonstrators clearly desire, and have, our solidarity, they have not asked for our intervention. Indeed, the virtually unanimous position of Iranian human rights activists is that U.S. leaders should, while continuing to express support for their political rights, not overtly involve themselves in the process of challenging the regime over the recent elections.

Likewise, the overwhelming consensus of Iran analysts and experts in the United States concur that the president's approach has thus far been pitch perfect. Acknowledging the troubling history of Western interference in Iran's politics, and the deep desire of Iran's hardliners to use this history against the demonstrators, the president has wisely chosen the side of human rights and justice.

But a number of opportunistic politicians and neoconservative pundits have attempted to exploit this moment, and Iran's reform movement, to regain the initiative in an American foreign policy debate that they have been losing badly. Using the same tired charges of "weakness" that they have used for years to disguise their own lack of workable ideas, these critics now demand that the president clumsily wade into the Iranian ferment with as much care and consideration as they demanded George W. Bush wade into Iraq.

It is ironic, to say the least, that the very people whose reckless policies and belligerent ideology have done so much over the last eight years to strengthen Iran's strategic position in the Middle East, as well as bolster hardliners within the Iranian regime itself, should now criticize the president for not being belligerent enough.

It is also telling that none of those attempting to portray the president's well-informed caution as "weakness" have thus far been able, or even attempted, to answer how, exactly, a more aggressive U.S. posture might lead to a better outcome on the ground in Iran. As during the Bush administration, conservatives don't seem to have thought much past the next political battle.

The critics also have a weak grasp of history. In 1956, President Eisenhower encouraged the Hungarian to revolt against their communist government, and then had to watch helplessly as they were crushed. Even more relevantly, in 1991 the first President Bush encouraged Iraqi Shiites to rise up against Saddam Hussein, and then stood by as they were mowed down by Saddam's helicopter gunships. Both of these episodes, in which American rhetoric exceeded America's realistic ability to effect outcomes, were deeply damaging to American credibility.

President Obama has shown that he understands, even if his domestic critics do not, that knowing when not to act, and speak, is as strategically important as knowing when to do so. He sent the protesters a subtle but unmistakable message of support last week, when his State Department asked Twitter to delay its scheduled maintenance, in order to allow the continued use of this technology that has proven so important to enabling communication within and out of Iran.

The time may come for Obama to engage more forcefully on behalf of Iran's reformers. Indeed, Tuesday's condemnation of "the threats, beatings, and imprisonments of the last few days" was an appropriate escalation of his rhetoric. But for now the most productive thing the president of the United States can do for Iranian human rights and democracy is to keep the United States, to the extent possible, out of Iran's domestic debate. He shouldn't allow himself to be distracted by those trying to cast his strategic wisdom as "weakness" and their own thoughtless bellicosity as "strength." Thankfully, he's given no indication that he will.