2013-06-18T19:34:46-04:00 Rebecca Buckwalter-Poza http://www.huffingtonpost.com/author/index.php?author=rebecca-buckwalterpoza Copyright 2008, HuffingtonPost.com, Inc. HuffingtonPost Blogger Feed for Rebecca Buckwalter-Poza Good old fashioned elbow grease. tag:www.huffingtonpost.com,2012:/theblog//3.2065557 2012-11-06T11:32:51-05:00 2013-01-06T05:12:01-05:00

Rebecca Buckwalter-Poza http://www.huffingtonpost.com/rebecca-buckwalterpoza/
Mitt Romney has lied and Republicans have cheated religiously in an attempt to defeat Barack Obama. Over the last three weeks public polls seemed to reward Romney's efforts, confirming his claim that Obama has lost his edge. Like the effects of liquor, however, the sequelae of campaigns are temporary.

America is already sobering. Come Wednesday, Obama will no longer be an embattled incumbent, just President Obama once more. Romney will still be Romney.

On Sunday evening,Nate Silver announced that averaging the 12 polls released over the previous 24 hours gives Obama a lead of 1.3 points. The Real Clear Politics average, too, now shows Obama's lead restored on average, albeit by just .4 points. These upticks are heartening, but there are even better reasons to remain optimistic.

Most public polls have underestimated Obama support. The exceptions are Democracy Corps, an independent non-profit founded by Democrats, and the Pew Research Center, an non-partisan public opinion research outfit. Democracy Corps analysis shows Obama's lead averages 7 points in the battleground states and has expanded tofour points nationally. Pew polling similarly shows Obama ahead by three, 48 to 45 percent. Pew projects that allocating the undecided voters boosts the candidates equally, making it 50 to 47 percent.

Why trust these two polls over, say, Rasmussen? Pew and Democracy Corps use people to call respondents -- not robo-calls, like Rasmussen -- and even reach voters who rely primarily or exclusively on cellular phones. Rasmussen does not call cells. The better polls incorporate interviews over multiple nights; Rasmussen makes calls on just one night, opening the poll to possible bias. Although Public Policy Polling (PPP) also uses automated calls to poll, they do so over the course of multiple nights.

Pew and Democracy Corps also interview many more people than most pollsters. Pew surveyed 2,709 voters while Democracy Corps called 1,080 as compared to the CBS-New York Times poll's 563 or CNN's 693. As a result, they are more accurate: Democracy Corps has a 2.98-point margin of error while Pew's is 2.2.

News coverage of polling often overlooks crucial details and caveats. Take for example the margin of error. The seemingly authoritative Washington Post-ABC tracking poll claiming likely voters were 48 percent for Obama and 49 for Romney. The fine print qualifies that their poll has a 3-point margin of error.

Translated, that means Obama could have majority support (51 percent). On the flip side, Romney might only be winning 46 percent of voters.

Stories offer infuriatingly scant information about the polls they cite. Gallup's tracking poll of likely voters gave Romney the lead 51 to 46 percent on October 29. The significance of the finding is substantially diminished by discontinuity in Gallup's methodology as well as the interruption of polling after Superstorm Sandy. The disparity between Gallup's numbers and those of other national polls reflects on Sandy, not Barack Obama or Mitt Romney. In other words, beware of consulting Gallup too closely between now and Tuesday.

Mainstream media polls rarely elucidate how they decide who is a "likely" voter, or the significance of the difference between polls of likely versus registered voters. Obama has led by greater margins among registered voters. Granted, the last that Rasmussen commented, in July, they had concluded that registered voter polls overstate support for Obama. The problem is, neither Rasmussen nor any other media poll uses a sophisticated method to screen for likely voters.

How a pollster decides who is "likely" to vote differs from firm to firm. For the most part, mainstream media polling does not disclose its methodology.

The best guess, however, is that these surveys just ask voters to rate their likeliness to vote. Reputable private pollsters, by contrast, often use multiple methods to determine who's most likely to vote. For example, they collect data points about individual voters, cross-correlating voters' responses and these profiles to see which variables correspond to whether they actually vote. They use that information to model turnout rates, predicting rather than guessing the composition of the electorate. In a tight race, these tiny methodological tweaks make an enormous difference.

Of course, the greatest reason to be confident is the Electoral College. Nate Silver advises, "We are approaching the point where Mr. Romney may need the state polls to be systematically biased against him in order to win the Electoral College." Obama could lose the popular vote by more than a point and still win re-election. State polls have consistently illuminated a clear, if sometimes narrow, path to re-election.

Obama's advantage in state polls is doubly significant given that state polls are more accurate predictors than national polls. Romney's challenge all along has been to find 270 electoral votes. With one day to go, it's apparent he's fallen short on that score.]]> tag:www.huffingtonpost.com,2011:/theblog//3.1081153 2011-11-10T11:41:45-05:00 2012-01-10T05:12:01-05:00

Rebecca Buckwalter-Poza http://www.huffingtonpost.com/rebecca-buckwalterpoza/
That's why in Sunday's New York Times Magazine article entitled "Is Obama Toast? Handicapping the 2012 Election," Silver makes bold predictions but backs away quickly.

In polling, a year is an eternity. In November 2007, the Real Clear Politics average had Rudy Giuliani at 30.1 percent; John McCain, 16.4 percent; Fred Thompson, 16 percent; Romney, 11.9 percent; and Huckabee, 8.1 percent. It wasn't until January 11, 2008, that John McCain took the lead in the Republican primary for the first time -- with just 25 percent of Republican primary voters backing him.

A little less than a year before the 2008 election, Gallup found Hillary Clinton led now-President Barack Obama by 27 points. Clinton edged out all Republican contenders while Obama just barely tied with leading Republican candidates Giuliani and McCain.

Silver concedes he uses just 17 elections (the post-1944 presidential cycles), discounts the reliability of historical precedent, admits the inconsistency of economic forecasts, and exposes prevailing methods for predicting electoral outcome through tables and rundowns as no better than hit-or-miss.

In other words Silver outlines just how tenuous the variables from which he's attempting to draw his bombastic conclusion are. The more of these admittedly untrustworthy variables he strings together, the less significant his result.

Yet Silver perseveres to produce the media-genic "17 percent chance of reelection" statistic that became the cover of the New York Times Magazine. Only midway through the essay is it clarified that Silver's prediction applies to Obama's odds when pitted against Romney in a stagnant economy.

Silver tries to quantify the ideological stances that candidates hold -- an impossible task in November 2011, particularly in such a inchoate Republican primary. He applies historian Marty Cohen's methodology to pinpoint candidates' ideology using "Congressional voting records and surveys of presidential historians." With the Republican field largely un-vetted -- and currently dominated by a contender with no political record -- this methodology means bubkes.

The Republican candidates haven't been subjected to the intense scrutiny the ultimate nominee will face. With six candidates still nominally in the race -- Bachmann, Cain, Huntsman, Paul, Perry, and Romney -- media have not focused nearly as much as they will on any one contender. News on these six, even presumed nominee Romney, remains topical and reactive. Reporters respond to issues as they arise -- either in the form of incidents like Perry's erratic New Hampshire performance or Cain's ongoing sexual harassment blow-up.

Republican candidates' statements and actions thus far have been about appealing to the far-right base -- not accurately representing their past or future, general election ideology. Coverage of these candidates is usually about these attempts to appeal to the Republican electorate -- and Republican infighting. Wider public discussion and debate of their records and potential presidential decision-making style relevant to the general electorate won't happen until the primary ends.

There are significant unquantifiable factors in play in 2012. The eventual Republican nominee will have to run on Bush's and Boehner's records in the general election as well as his (or her) own. Following Obama's accomplishments and promises kept in Afghanistan, Iraq, and Libya national security is off the table. The last time Republicans lost national security as a campaign issue, a little-known Arkansas Democrat defeated a popular sitting Republican president.

The Obama campaign, Democratic National Committee, and progressive independent expenditures haven't even entered the fight yet. The White House isn't in campaign mode; it's governing. The ads and emails released thus far represent nothing more than a few shots across the bow.

Yet Obama remains ahead of or tied with Republican challengers facing less scrutiny and carrying minimal baggage -- two conditions that will change as soon as a nominee is named. In swing states (and should-be red states) like Colorado, Florida, Iowa, Michigan, New Hampshire, New Mexico, Nevada, North Carolina, Ohio, Pennsylvania, Virginia, and Wisconsin, Obama holds his own. Analysis of the electoral college map still yields routes to victory.

There's no way to reach a definite conclusion about what will happen a year from today using polling within the margin of error, economic forecasts, shaky quantification of candidate ideology, and presidential historians' analyses. It's not just likely that the variables on which Silver predicated his analysis will change -- it's certain.

Silver attempts to compensate for the certainty of change with hedging and concessions as to the unreliability of variables. What he doesn't do is rebut the common-sense conclusion -- backed by history and numbers -- that producing numbers in November 2011 is like trying predict the full season for both leagues of national baseball before the draft. There are simply too many variables.

To use a second sports analogy, Silver's attempt at qualifying the hard numbers and predictions he advances is like a soccer player protesting his innocence after fouling another player in public view. The best of intentions and excuses don't render a foul harmless. Disavowing responsibility for the consequences of his shaky statistical hyperbole doesn't make Silver any less culpable for its effect on the national political dialogue. There's also no excuse for perpetuating a view of polling and data analysis as either magic or exact science. It's neither.

Take for another example the Monday Washington Post article claiming that Mississippi's "personhood" amendment, which would declare zygotes, embryos, and fetuses legal "persons," was a sure bet. The article's ostensible evidence -- a Public Policy Polling poll showing 46 to 45 percent support in favor of the amendment -- didn't constitute proof or even strong support for the claim. The same article quoted Public Policy Polling Director Tom Jensen as saying that "Things can definitely go either way." In fact, the amendment failed -- with more than 55 percent of voters opposing its passage.

Silver's analysis is part of a larger problem: pundits and writers pushed to crank out catchy content produce analysis and prediction for mass consumption with little regard for whether it's right or wrong -- or even meaningful. ]]> tag:www.huffingtonpost.com,2011:/theblog//3.840070 2011-03-25T18:39:17-04:00 2011-05-25T18:40:24-04:00

Rebecca Buckwalter-Poza http://www.huffingtonpost.com/rebecca-buckwalterpoza/ Cooperative Orthotic and Prosthetic Enterprise (COPE), his parents recount the details of the horrific injuries inflicted by the explosion and their frantic search for a truck to take him to the hospital. Their son survived the long trip to the nearest city and the ride to a second hospital but was denied medical care at both. Neither had donor blood. The boy returned to his village only to die in agony at his home.

The bomb that killed this boy was one of many items of unexploded ordnance (UXO) seeded throughout Laos during U.S. bombing campaigns in the 1960s and 1970s. The boy's story illustrates the danger posed by UXOs from the war in Vietnam. His parents' tragic account exposes how domestic infrastructure shortcomings in developing countries can exacerbate the effects of these remnants of modern warfare. As the US and allies undertake operations in Iraq, Afghanistan, and Libya, they have an obligation to heed these less publicized legacies of prior conflicts. Military forces must transition to new generations of "smart" and self-destructing bombs.

In Southeast Asia, UXOs injure and kill hundreds of people each year. These unstable bombs and de facto landmines render large swathes of land unworkable for agriculture, economic development and infrastructure-building. To clear the land, UXOs have to be removed or safely detonated in place. Otherwise, the land will remain unusable for decades. Some areas of the U.S. are still contaminated with UXOs from the Civil War.

UXOs contaminate a fifth of Vientam's total land area. Between 1975 and 2007, UXOs injured or killed about 105,000 people according to the Vietnamese Ministry of Labor, Invalids and Social Affairs. Too many of these casualties are recent. UXOs caused nearly 930 casualties in the five-year period between 2003 and 2008.

Cambodia still has as many as six million landmines and UXOs. In the last two years, there have been 300 UXO-related incidents, causing 530 casualties. Altogether, there have been more than 60,000 deaths and injuries attributable to explosives since 1979 in Cambodia with others likely unreported.

Neighboring Laos bears the heaviest burden. The United States dropped more than 2 million tons of bombs on Laos between 1964 and 1973, up to 30 percent of which did not explode. Laos is the most heavily bombed country per capita in history. More than half a million raids sowed the country with more than 270 million "bomblets," also called "bombies," the smaller explosive components of cluster munitions. Today in Laos, 80 million bomblets are still active throughout the country, and a quarter of Laos's villages are affected. Since 1964, more than 50,000 people have been killed or injured by UXOs.

In Southeast Asia, the people in the predominantly rural regions in which UXOs are most common are least likely to be educated about explosives. Some disturb bombs while searching for food and resources while others expose them while digging to build. Nearly half of victims are children, who rarely understand the danger when they discover a bomb. Children even play with softball-sized bomblets. Other adults and children knowingly risk bodily injury or death because the value of metal outweighs the threat of harm. Many of the most heavily affected areas are also farthest from medical care. Many survivors live with disabilities ranging from loss of vision or hearing to amputations that leave them unable to support or care for themselves.

Investment in bomb removal must increase dramatically for affected countries to reduce casualties and reclaim land. The developing countries affected lack the financial and human resources to adequately address the scope of the UXO problem. According to Representative Mike Honda, the U.S. spent as much as $17 million per day in today's dollars during Vietnam War-era bombing campaigns in Laos yet has until recently committed only $3 million per year toward bomb removal efforts. This year's commitment of $5 million from the US still falls well short of what's needed. In 2008, with around $3 million, the Mine Advisory Group (MAG) was only able to clear 100,000 items of UXOs across 2.8 sq. km., a numerically insignificant portion of the 87,000 sq. km. affected. Of course, international aid is lagging overall: in 2010, total outside aid for UXO removal in Laos was just $20 million.

Within affected countries, improvements in domestic public health infrastructure and rehabilitation facilities will increase chances of survival and improve outcomes for victims. For prevention, education is necessary but not sufficient. It is necessary to combat the extreme poverty that leads people to risk themselves in pursuit of scrap metal.

Beyond investment in bomb removal, an international ban on cluster munitions would signify a breakthrough for global security -- and against terrorism. As Senator Leahy said, "anyone who has seen the indiscriminate devastation cluster weapons cause across a wide area must recognize the unacceptable threat they pose to civilians."

The Oslo Convention, or the Convention on Cluster Munitions, commits its signatories to destroy the majority of their cluster weapons within eight years and mandates investment in UXO removal abroad. It is the logical successor of the 1997 Mine Ban Treaty, which brought its advocates the 1997 Nobel Peace Prize. Notably absent among the Oslo Convention's 108 signatories: a small contingent of military powers including China, India, Israel, Pakistan, Russia, and the US. Although Britain acceded to the Convention, the US, China, and Russia each possess at least one billion cluster munitions.

President Obama, who voted to limit the use of cluster munitions while in the Senate, could advocate for greater restrictions on cluster munitions and push the transition to "smart" explosives that will self-destruct. Accession is an unlikely short-term goal, but the U.S. and other military forces can independently update weapons technology to prevent post-conflict civilian casualties and collateral damage.

Southeast Asia is not alone in its struggle with landmines and UXOs. It is one of a growing number of regions experiencing the destructive consequences of modern ordnance design. The three-year civil war in Bosnia resulted in the placement of more than three million landmines. Multiple conflicts in Iraq over the 1980s and 1990s seeded the country with thousands of mines and UXOs, leaving as many as one million tons of explosives throughout the country. As many as ten million landmines still lie under Iraq's sands. ]]> tag:www.huffingtonpost.com,2011:/theblog//3.816720 2011-02-01T13:42:57-05:00 2011-05-25T18:30:24-04:00

Rebecca Buckwalter-Poza http://www.huffingtonpost.com/rebecca-buckwalterpoza/ forced disappearance is not well understood outside of the countries in which it takes place. Of course, how could it be? Imagine that one night police abduct your teenage son from your home without observing any protocol for arrest and detention, offering no explanation and no information about where he will be taken. The next day, he is simply gone.

For days, weeks, months, or years, leaks trickle out from sympathetic police officers and rumors circulate among members of the community, but there is no way to know what is true. Law enforcement officers deny that they ever saw the victim and refuse to open a case or investigate the disappearance. Police and government officials block attempts to find those who have been disappeared, and most individuals do not have the resources to circumvent them. Such a scenario is beyond the imagination of most developed countries yet still commonplace in parts of Latin American and much of Asia.

Throughout Latin America, the memory of large-scale, forced disappearances remains fresh, and the struggle to bring perpetrators to justice is ongoing. In Chile, more than 3,000 people disappeared during Pinochet's regime (1973-90) while in Argentina the number of people who went missing during the Dirty War (1976-83) may be as high as 30,000. Guatemala must contend with legacies of approximately 45,000 forced disappearances over the course of its civil war (1960-96), and the number of desaparecidos continues to grow in Colombia as its nearly half-century long conflict between government and the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) rages on. In this now-democratic region, however, high-profile trials to prosecute officials responsible for disappearances and international involvement herald the beginnings of the cultural and legal shift necessary to ending disappearances.

Across Asia, by contrast, disappearances continue unabated and no well-defined movement against forced disappearances as a tactic has emerged. When a disappearance occurs, families and friends are left with little evidence of what has transpired, few leads, and limited legal recourse. In many Asian countries, there is not legislation fit to address the uncertain circumstances surrounding disappearances; either forced disappearance has not been criminalized or the legislation in place is inadequate, leaving only the option of filing cases related to offenses associated with disappearances, such as assault.

In Thailand, for example, the failure to address forced disappearances is blatant. As violence continues in southern Thailand, it is imperative that human rights abuses be publicly acknowledged and addressed. Disappearances are among the most debilitating events for families and communities because it is so difficult to obtain any form of resolution or even restitution. Thailand has not criminalized forced disappearance. The only way to appeal to the police for assistance in the case of a forced disappearance is to wait 48 hours and file a missing persons report. After 48 hours, the victim has more than likely already been transported or killed, their body likely never to be discovered.

The case of Somchai Neelaphaijit illustrates how difficult instigating an investigation into even an obvious, high-profile disappearance can be under Thailand's laws. A lawyer, Neelaphaijit fought the implementation of martial law in southern Thailand and collected 50,000 signatures in opposition. He advocated for the rights of Muslims accused of terrorism and treason and vocally criticized the use of violence by security and police forces. After receiving numerous threats, Neelaphaijit was abducted from his car by five policemen in 2004. Like Thai Trade Union leader Thanong Bo Arn before him, he was never found. Five policemen were tried in conjunction with his disappearance. Of those, four were acquitted and one was convicted of physical coercion and sentenced to three years in prison. The four policemen who were earlier acquitted now must again face the charges of physical coercion and robbery in the Court of Appeals. Although their identities are known, the case has progressed at a crawl and will not be tried until February 7, 2011, at earliest, nearly seven years after it was filed.

The underlying obstacle to pursuing cases of abduction and disappearance through legal avenues in Thailand and elsewhere in Asia has to do with a warped concept of the burden of proof. In many Asian countries, in criminal and civil cases the burden is on the accused to prove innocence rather than on the prosecution to prove guilt; with regard to disappearances, the burden is on the complainant to prove wrongdoing. International human rights conventions and democracies generally espouse "innocent until proven guilty" models that place the burden of proof on the prosecution. Where disappearances are concerned, international human rights protections for complainants resemble habeas corpus rights, which hold that governments bear the responsibility of proving the authority to detain someone or else must release the detainee. This concept of placing the burden of proof on the state applies in cases of abduction when a pattern of disappearances can be established and an individual case can be linked to that larger incidence.

Generally, confusion surrounds the nature of disappearances, how they can be proven, and what perpetrators can be charged with in the absence of physical proof of abduction, torture, or murder. Legal ambiguity abets perpetrators and the officials complicit in granting them impunity. Because it can, law enforcement often hides behind the pretext of searching for a body. Only formal legislative reform can initiate progress. Establishing clear grounds for pursuing disappearances -- witnesses, documentation, or strong circumstantial evidence -- and providing effective systems for witnesses and relatives to report abductions paves the way for fair investigative practices and legitimate trials.

Investigations and trials will reduce disappearances, perhaps regardless of rulings. The major rationale for disappearance as a method of silencing dissenters and opponents is deniability. Disappearances are much more difficult to prosecute than overt violence and can rarely be definitively proven, which ensures they receive less public attention. Further, that the experience and fate of the disappeared is unknowable ensures that this act inspires greater terror than a shooting or execution. Exposing disappearances and prosecuting them publicizes and demystifies this practice. Efforts to address disappearances in court will encourage and enable others to pursue disappearances through the judicial system. The creation of precedent and establishment of institutional knowledge will increase the number of attorneys capable of bringing these cases against state officials responsible for disappearances. Thailand must criminalize forced disappearance, ensure there is a system in place for filing complaints, guarantee effective investigations, and place the burden of proof on the state when reasonable.]]> tag:www.huffingtonpost.com,2011:/theblog//3.811446 2011-01-20T17:50:02-05:00 2011-05-25T18:25:24-04:00

Rebecca Buckwalter-Poza http://www.huffingtonpost.com/rebecca-buckwalterpoza/ cooperated with the Bribery Commission to catch police officer IP Wijesuriya accepting bribes. A representative from the Bribery Commission watched as Wijesuriya accepted a bribe, then arrested him on charges of bribery (Case No.: 50600/01 in the Chief Magistrate's Court of Colombo). Now Yogendra is being harassed, accused of fabricated offenses, assaulted, and threatened with death as a result of his involvement -- by members of Sri Lanka's police force.

In recent months, policemen have attempted to intimidate Yogendra with threats and violence. These officers have repeatedly abused the judicial system, filing false charges against Yogendra. On January 15, days after the first of these charges was dismissed, five policemen escalated their harassment, surprising Yogendra at his home in the middle of the night and abducting him in an unmarked van. They blindfolded and handcuffed him before forcing him out of the van in a nearby cemetery, where they made him kneel for more than an hour as they beat and threatened him. An officer brandished a gun and shot it into the air, warning Yogendra that if he acted against the police he would "soon be there" in the cemetery. On March 1, he must face a second spurious charge in court. Until then, Yogendra must attempt to remain in hiding despite not receiving assistance or support from the state.

In many developing Asian countries, including Sri Lanka, the failure to pass and enforce victim and witness protection laws remains one of the major obstacles to the rule of law. Law enforcement does not protect victims or witnesses much less investigate threats against them as a matter of law. Neither the judicial system nor Executive agencies are responsive to requests for protection, leaving individuals denied protection without means of redress. Moreover, police themselves routinely engage in victim and witness intimidation to ensure their own impunity or in return for bribes.

Victim and witness protection are fundamental to democracy because they affect the prerogative of citizens to participate in self-governance and exercise basic rights of citizenship. Without a credible guarantee of protection, Sri Lankans are unable to safely report crimes to the police, assist investigators, or testify for prosecutors. The failure of the policing system to protect victims and witnesses--and its tendency to undermine rather than reinforce their rights--precludes the development of public trust in law enforcement, the judicial system, and the state.

Sri Lanka must make it possible for citizens to rely on law enforcement and the judicial system. The Sri Lankan Parliament first considered legislation to protect victims and witnesses, the aptly titled Draft Bill for the Protection of Victims of Crime and Witnesses, in 2007, and reintroduced the legislation in June 2008. Yet over the past three years, little has been done to promote its passage.

Further, the proposed victim and witness protection legislation would be inadequate to the task it nominally addresses. The Sri Lanka Centre for Policy Alternatives wrote that it had "serious concerns that a victim and witness protection programme established under this bill would not in fact provide victims and witnesses with the required protection or help reverse the culture of impunity in Sri Lanka."

Unlike the 2007 draft bill, effective legislation to protect victims and witnesses will distinguish between the rights of each category of persons. Victims' rights legislation must mandate that victims be notified of public hearings and require that after a conviction prosecutors continue to apprise victims of developments that may lead to an offender's release. In addition to protection, victims should be entitled to restitution.

Legislation to protect both victims and witnesses should restructure and reduce the roles of the Executive branch and policing system in favor of an impartial and independent institution dedicated to protection. Executive branch appointees and the police are consistently complicit in violating the rights of victims and witnesses -- or even immediately responsible.

The new institution must be independent, its relationship with police and other government agencies delimited to allow for impartial implementation and oversight of victim and witness protection--as well as to facilitate the formation of a separate, positive reputation to encourage public trust. To ensure impartiality, the officials and officers of an independent commission for victim and witness protection must also be selected through some process other than Executive appointment to prevent politicization. Provisions allowing the involvement of international and civil society organizations would strengthen a new agency for victim and witness protection.

Sri Lanka must define eligibility and processes for obtaining and providing protection clearly. The grounds for granting protection should be comprehensive. Individuals who may be able to provide testimony as well as those who have already committed to assist should qualify for protection. Further, both those who have been threatened or harmed and those for whom there is a reasonable suspicion of threat should be eligible to receive protection. Family members should be preemptively considered in protection proceedings, as relatives are often targeted in efforts to influence victims and witnesses.

As in other countries, protection should be granted through closed court sessions. Determinations should be subject to review and appeal through formal judicial processes as other legal rulings are, to ensure the integrity of decisions and ward against the potential for judicial corruption. Information about applications for protection -- and other details that could compromise individuals' security or that of their family -- should also be protected to preclude interference, harassment, and violence.

Legislation must require timely and adequate periods of protection, explicitly outline the obligations of protectors, and criminalize victim and witness intimidation. It is necessary to stipulate the responsibilities of those granting and providing protection to establish standards for protection. Such statutes would also create a means of holding those who do not provide adequate protection accountable for lapses and inaction. Victim and witness protection legislation should encompass provisions for psychological as well as physical wellbeing. In addition to criminalizing victim and witness intimidation and introducing a separate category of offense for related acts, this legislation should make illegal acts that contribute to these offenses, such as disclosing protected information.

In conjunction with passing victim and witness protection legislation to be executed by a new, independent institution, Sri Lanka must rehabilitate its law enforcement agencies. Officers must have both the will and the ability to perform their duties. Reform requires that the state publicly investigate and prosecute offenses committed by officers and government officials. Government at all levels must also provide training, legal education, and greater resources to stations and officers. When officers do not receive a livable salary, and stations have too few officers and resources, law enforcement cannot maintain order and rule of law. Lack of internal accountability and oversight compromises the state's capacity to enforce law.

Unless Sri Lanka makes significant progress toward designing and implementing victim and witness protection legislation, Yogendra may, as his attackers promised, be buried in the cemetery. Yogendra's case echoes that of Mr. S.K.A.S. Nishanta Fernando, who was shot and killed on September 20, 2008, to prevent him from pursuing a complaint against police officers in a bribery and torture case. The Ministry of Disaster Management and Human Rights had ignored attempts by Fernando, his family, and organizations advocating on his behalf to secure protection for two months. ]]> tag:www.huffingtonpost.com,2010:/theblog//3.795650 2010-12-13T00:56:30-05:00 2011-05-25T18:20:30-04:00

Rebecca Buckwalter-Poza http://www.huffingtonpost.com/rebecca-buckwalterpoza/
Maladroit legal arguments swirling on email lists and percolating in the blogosphere have persistently invoked the First Amendment. However, the First Amendment is not currently a factor -- nor is the Citizens United ruling. Even those internet freedom advocates who support WikiLeaks concede as much. Were the US to try to prosecute Assange, the case would center on the First Amendment. The same would be true if Amazon had been forced to discontinue its support of WikiLeaks. However, the independent decisions of Amazon and PayPal to deny WikiLeaks use of their services do not constitute any violation of Constitutional rights.

Assange has not been denied free speech. He has not been silenced or persecuted by government actors but rather arrested on pre-existing rape allegations, an arrest obligated by the notoriety he attracted to himself. It would be unacceptable and unjust for Sweden not to pursue allegations of rape, sexual molestation and unlawful coercion against an individual whose location is publicized internationally. Far from being deprived of his rights, he is being investigated based on the possibility that he denied two women of their rights. The only breaches of law so far are those committed by Assange, who violated the spirit and likely the letter of U.S. law, and those WikiLeaks activists who have launched attacks on Amazon and PayPal.

Some supporters attempt to cast Assange as a hero bringing vital information about US involvement in the Middle East to light, while others defend his actions as not having exposed anything of particular note or value. Margaret Carlson rebuts claims that Assange belongs in the pantheon of press heroes like Bob Woodward and Daniel Ellsberg eloquently: "That justification fails for a number of reasons, including how thoughtlessly indiscriminate Assange's document dump was, how little useful light it shed on Iraq and Afghanistan beyond the awful truth we already know, and Assange's indifference to collateral damage."

The claim that because Assange's actions did not expose significant new information they did not threaten national security also fails. Some supporters are attempting to take this line of argument to skirt the Espionage Act, which states the receipt, retention, and publication of classified material is illegal when the perpetrator "had reason to believe could be used to the injury of the United States." They have attempted to redirect debate to the issue of what constitutes a threat to national security.

WikiLeaks has indisputably negatively affected US national security and foreign policy. Professor R. Nicholas Burns of Harvard told Time, "He has done great harm to our diplomacy, because it strikes at the heart of what diplomacy is: The building of trust between people and between governments." The publication of these cables represents a breach of security. Their accessibility implicitly invokes a series of actions that did threaten US national security -- accessing, stealing, and publishing classified material pertaining to defense and diplomacy.

The publication of the leaked cables also has a direct effect in jeopardizing US national security and the lives of American soldiers. For example, it has become public knowledge that American soldiers are embedded in Pakistani military units. Although this may not be new information in Pakistan or Afghanistan, radical Islamists may nonetheless attempt to use the cables to support their claim Americans are trying to interfere in and take over the Middle East to lure new recruits and incite backlash against American presence in Pakistan and Afghanistan.

The most dangerous argument, however, is that the Obama administration should not oppose WikiLeaks or examine options for prosecuting Assange because the Espionage Act is flawed. The administration is also upholding the Don't Ask Don't Tell (DADT) policy despite Obama's stated opposition to the policy, and the Department of Justice defended the Defense of Marriage Act (DOMA) that President Obama supports repealing. As Abraham Lincoln said in 1838, "although bad laws... should be repealed as soon as possible, still while they continue in force, for the sake of example, they should be religiously observed."

It would be of significantly greater concern for democracy in America if the Obama administration or the legislature were not investigating major breaches of national security and enforcing U.S. law. From time to time, administrations do selectively refuse to enforce what they consider to be unjust laws, but these are exceptional circumstances. If an administration can ignore judicial holdings and refuse to uphold the rule of law -- by refusing to enforce otherwise valid laws that it disagrees with -- then it is endorsing lawlessness and condemning the rule of law. It is the duty of government to enforce existing laws; it is dissenting citizens' responsibility to push for the reform or repeal of law through the legislature. ]]> tag:www.huffingtonpost.com,2010:/theblog//3.794230 2010-12-09T10:15:05-05:00 2011-05-25T18:15:22-04:00

Rebecca Buckwalter-Poza http://www.huffingtonpost.com/rebecca-buckwalterpoza/ aftermath of what should have been a minor incident, the leader of the local mosque accused Asia of blaspheming against Islam -- a charge she denies. She was arrested for violating Pakistan's archaic and overtly discriminatory blasphemy laws and sentenced to death in a trial in which Christian witnesses were not allowed to testify by a judge who refused to consider any possibility that Asia had not blasphemed. Although she has ostensibly been pardoned, influential Muslim extremists are calling for her death and offering rewards of nearly $6,000 USD for her assassination.

In Pakistan, blasphemy is punishable by death, and desecration of the Holy Quran carries a life sentence. Introduced in 1885, these laws are a British colonial legacy conceived of as a form of early anti-hate crime legislation -- the intent was to prevent the instigation of religious conflict. In 1927, they became part of the Pakistan Penal Code (PPC) in Section 295. The law protected all religious groups until 1982, when then-General Zia ul Haq introduced clause 295-B outlawing the desecration of the Holy Quran at the behest of extreme Islamist groups. In 1986, he added 295-C banning defilement of the name of the Holy Prophet Muhammad. These laws have been widely abused as a means of discriminating against and persecuting religious minorities. In 1993, 295-C was extended to apply to "defiling of the Prophet's family and companions." According to data collected by the National Commission for Justice and Peace (NCJP), at least 964 persons were charged under these anti-blasphemy clauses from 1986 to August 2009, while more than 30 persons were killed extra-judicially by the angry mob or by individuals.

The blasphemy law is only one of many institutionalized forms of religious discrimination in Pakistan. The Constitution declares Islam Pakistan's official religion and states that sovereignty belongs to Allah, effectively willing powers of legislation and legal interpretation to the Muslim clergy. Provisions of the Constitution, including Articles 227, 228, and 229, require that all laws be interpreted in the light of the Quran and that "laws shall be brought in conformity with the Injunctions of Islam as laid down in the Quran and Sunnah."

Throughout Pakistan, members of religious minorities -- Hindus, Christians, Sikhs, Jews, Ahmedis, and Buddhists, among others -- encounter discrimination, oppression, and abuse at the hands of both state and non-state actors. These men, women, and children are systematically politically, socially, and economically disenfranchised. Members of these minorities are also targeted as victims of random violence, sexual assault, abduction, forced conversion and marriage, and other forms of assault on the basis of small infractions or perceived slights. Their legal rights and protections are tenuous at best. Muslims are able to coerce members of religious minorities and even entire communities with threats of groundless legal accusations -- for example, forcing individuals not to report crimes and making communities abandon land.

Increasingly, Muslim men and communities abduct women and girls from religious minorities to force them into religious conversion and marriage. Under the Pakistan Muslim Family Law Ordinance of 1961, a girl must be at least 16 and a boy at least 18 before they marry, and both must consent. Police are required by law to investigate the ages of those entering into a marriage following the complaint of a parent. Moreover, the Contract Act of 1872 invalidates contracts whose signatories are younger than 18. Yet police often refuse to investigate or prosecute these crimes when a madrassa or Muslim cleric is involved.

The social and economic conditions faced by women of religious minorities are particularly inhumane, despite Pakistan's ratification of the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW). In urban areas, women from religious minorities can only find work as scavengers or in sanitation and receive unlivable wages -- less than $12 USD per month. Recent surveys have revealed that nearly 9 in 10 scheduled caste Hindu women (87 percent) were illiterate -- as compared to 63.5 percent of males of their community -- while the national illiteracy rate among Pakistani women is 58 percent. A nearly 40-point gap between the primary school enrollment rate of lower-caste women (10.2 percent of whom enroll) and the national rate for women (48 percent) exposes disparities in access to education.

Pakistan has legislation nominally guaranteeing religious freedoms, however, the government has not guaranteed the exercise of these basic rights or established protections and security for minorities. Article 20 of the Constitution refers to each citizen's freedom "to profess religion and to manage religious institutions." Article 33 charges the state with the responsibility to "discourage parochial, racial, tribal, sectarian and provincial prejudices among the citizens," while Article 36 ensures that the state "shall safeguard the legitimate rights and interests of minorities." However, at the local and regional levels, illegal actions against religious minorities go unpunished and thus continue to propagate. Fear of reprisal keeps many victims from reporting abuses, while those who do report incidents see their allegations dismissed or inadequately investigated.

Pakistan must review its legal provisions and implement existing legislation to ensure all individuals' rights to freedoms of thought, conscience and religion -- as enshrined in Article 18 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), of which it is a signatory. The state has to amend or revoke laws like those contained in Section 295 and the Constitutional provisions that permit and perpetuate discrimination. Further, from the local to the national level, members of the public and state officials must push police and prosecutors to proactively identify, investigate, and punish crimes against religious minorities.

Formal statements by government actors in support of religious tolerance and equality would challenge the belief that all officials condone discrimination, harassment, and violence against religious minorities. To address the underlying socio-economic inequality contributing to the disenfranchisement and subjugation of religious minorities in Pakistan, the state should support programs promoting the education of religious minority girls, the restoration of health facilities in predominately minority areas, and the provision of micro-credit loans to entrepreneurs to encourage their empowerment. Moreover, it is imperative that Pakistan ban bonded labor, which leaves women and children especially vulnerable to exploitation by employers. With respect to the marginalization and mistreatment of religious minorities, what Pakistan lacks is not a legal framework but genuine political will.]]> tag:www.huffingtonpost.com,2010:/theblog//3.791059 2010-12-02T17:41:23-05:00 2011-05-25T18:15:22-04:00

Rebecca Buckwalter-Poza http://www.huffingtonpost.com/rebecca-buckwalterpoza/
It is important to recognize and separate the different agencies and actors that comprise U.S. government. Any combination of "U.S. government" plus verb implies unitary executive action on the part of the Obama administration. Instead, we see the balance of powers in action. The Senate's Homeland Security and Government Affairs Committee and the Department of Justice have been the main actors, while the White House has been vocal in condemning the actions of WikiLeaks. Along these lines, the leaked cables don't represent the views of America writ large or of the State Department as a whole; these are the communications of individual diplomats.

Government actors have established clear lines of communication to media and the public and have announced their intentions and actions at each step since the WikiLeaks scandal broke. There's no evidence of illegal or conspiratorial activity on the part of any arm of the U.S. government with respect to WikiLeaks.

In fact, it was WikiLeaks that likely broke U.S. law in the sourcing, retention, and publication of the leaked cables. As a Danish friend asked here in Hong Kong earlier, puzzled by the response, "What did people expect? Of course the U.S. government will oppose the leaks -- we are talking about classified information. It would be a joke if they didn't." Exactly.

The knowing "unauthorized possession of information relating to the national defense" that might harm the United States and its publication is illegal under U.S. law. There is nothing unexpected or outrageous in actions by the American government to honor and enforce U.S. law.

American companies chose to stop facilitating the publication of WikiLeaks after the Senate Homeland Security and Government Affairs Committee inquired with Amazon regarding its relationship to WikiLeaks -- and said as much publicly. After Amazon terminated its relationship with WikiLeaks, it cited a violation of their terms of service. The relevant clause is likely that giving Amazon the right to boot anyone using the server "for any illegal purpose or in a way that violates the law." Amazon's refusal to continue to host WikiLeaks was not a First Amendment issue. Even the Electronic Frontier Foundation, an organization dedicated to internet freedom, agrees on this point.

Critics and reporters have insinuated or claimed that the U.S. government forcibly booted WikiLeaks from Amazon's servers and is attempting to repress freedom of speech. In reality, the United States is acting to enforce long-standing laws and regain public confidence. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton has addressed the cables publicly, and the U.S. Department of Justice has announced that it will evaluate the basis for legal action against WikiLeaks and its founder in the United States. The site remains up on a Swedish server, licensed in Iceland, out of reach of U.S. law -- and the US has indicated no intention to attempt to shut it down.

While the leaked cables may have precipitated setbacks for the United States, ultimately it could be the frenzy of false claims about the U.S. government and its response that most impedes the US abroad. In many parts of the world, with some details omitted and others lost in translation, what will reach individuals and communities may be only the insinuation of oppression, which evokes vivid, harsh realities -- the tactics of authoritarian regimes denying free speech and expression. It is not simply wrong but offensive and injurious to in any way associate the U.S. response to WikiLeaks with the actions of regimes guilty of true violations of rights of free speech and expression.

As an American who would like to be part of rehabilitating the U.S. image abroad, I am disheartened to see journalists and activists leveling serious accusations of anti-democratic action against the U.S. government carelessly. The public image of the U.S. is fragile; efforts to rebuild its reputation are ongoing. The way that the American government has handled the WikiLeaks scandal is something to be proud of as a demonstration of the health of our laws and democracy -- not something to attack.
]]> tag:www.huffingtonpost.com,2010:/theblog//3.787886 2010-11-24T14:15:51-05:00 2011-05-25T18:15:22-04:00

Rebecca Buckwalter-Poza http://www.huffingtonpost.com/rebecca-buckwalterpoza/ 378 deaths and left more than 700 injured also left open questions about Cambodia's government and its handling of the disaster.

Prime Minister Hun Sen recognized Monday night as "the biggest tragedy we have experienced in the last 31 years, since the collapse of the Khmer Rouge regime." The majority of those who perished were from rural areas. An estimated two-thirds of those who died were women, less able to fight their way from the crowds, indicating the extreme vulnerability of Cambodian women to disaster.

The government of Cambodia now faces the responsibility of attending to survivors and the families of those killed. Further, the government must thoroughly investigate the causes of the stampede as well as responses by police, emergency personnel, and hospitals to ensure such a tragedy does not occur again. While the exact cause of the stampede last night remains unclear, with contradictory reports indicating it may have been instigated by either crowd antics or poor construction of the bridge to Koh Pich island, the failure of the state to plan for and control the crowd then limit the damage from the stampede is clear.

Poor event planning and management contributed to the disaster. Organizers set up two bridges, 200 meters apart -- one to permit attendees to cross to Koh Pich and a second to permit them to cross back to the city -- but then did not enforce traffic directions. The bridge nearest to the festivities became overrun with people attempting to move in both directions. In the midst of a festival packed with millions of people, the result of conflict and crowding on the bridge was to create the perfect environment for widespread panic.

Military and police attempts to control the crowd may have exacerbated fear and confusion and caused further fatalities. Eyewitness reports state that the military used water cannons on the crowd after the stampede began, electrocuting and killing some of those trapped on the bridge when the water hit exposed electric wiring. The government is directly responsible for the stampede deaths and must make restitution, but restitution cannot be counted only in riel. The Cambodian government owes its people more than the 5 million riel ($1,230) promised to the families of those killed and the 1 million riel ($246) allotted to those who sustained injuries -- the government must make a substantive effort to prevent similar disasters in the future.

Phnom Penh was unprepared for any form of large-scale disaster. Responses by police and military were lacking and may even have contributed to the stampede while hospitals were overwhelmed. Emergency and medical personnel resorted to piling bodies together, covering them with mats or sheets. Families were forced to try to gain access to makeshift morgue tents outside of hospitals to lift the sheets draped over bodies or wander through corridors looking for victims. The capital had only 60 coffins available for victims, requiring that others be gathered from outlying areas to transport bodies as they were identified and claimed by families at the four major hospitals in the area. On Monday, Cambodia's government failed its people at all levels.
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Rebecca Buckwalter-Poza http://www.huffingtonpost.com/rebecca-buckwalterpoza/
An examination of U.S. policy-makers' statements on Asian democracies suggests a need to scrutinize the assumptions American policy-makers hold about the process and goals of democratization abroad. At a September lecture by Princeton's Professor John Ikenberry at Hong Kong University, he used paternalistic language in describing Asian democracies. He compared South Korea to his child, lacking discipline and maturity, and dismissed Southeast Asia as in need of tutelage. Asked whether expanding American academics and policy-makers' definition of democracy might yield a different conclusion regarding the state of democracy in Asia, he was flustered. It didn't seem Ikenberry's intent to lecture from a U.S.-centric viewpoint, but, nonetheless, his underlying assumptions and tenor of the talk seemed to alienate -- or perhaps just baffle -- his Chinese audience. In Asia, no form of democracy is presupposed to be the superior form of government, much less Western-style democracy.

The diversity among democracies in Asia requires the United States to refine its perspective on democratic governance. The evolution of official views on religious elements in democracy in the Middle East and Turkey over the last decade suggests progress toward engendering an inclusive view of democracy. However, even as the United States has developed a more tolerant perspective in one region, it has remained silent elsewhere in Asia as Sri Lanka's claim to democracy has become ever more tenuous, pointing to a selective failure to set criteria for democracy.

Sri Lanka remains fragile following the end of the civil war in May 2009. A stable democracy will be critical to post-conflict unification. Although no longer militarized, tensions between the Sinhalese majority and Tamil minority now take the form of social, political, and legal battles. Sri Lanka must achieve political reconciliation, reconstruction, and resettlement, tasks suited to a democratic government that incorporates the North.

Endemic over-simplification and attempts to reframe political debates by both domestic and foreign actors have ensured that conversations regarding Sri Lanka's political system and future continue to be conducted in democratic terms. But using the lexicon of democracy to discuss Sri Lanka concedes that either the state is fundamentally democratic or that the Rajapaksa administration aspires to democracy. Neither is true.

Sri Lanka has hovered between authoritarianism and democracy since its independence in 1948. The 1978 Constitution marked the beginning of Sri Lanka's descent into authoritarianism -- and this year's 18th Amendment may denote its culmination. Over time, the lines between authoritarianism and democratic governance have blurred. The concepts of legality and illegality are no longer legible in Sri Lanka: people can no longer distinguish between what is law and what is not law, what is legitimate and what is illegitimate. This absence of the rule of law affects all aspects of life in Sri Lanka, from corruption among police and violation of detainees' rights to abuses of power by government officials at the highest levels. While vestiges and remnants of democratic governance remain in the form of the Constitution and the government structures, these, too, are falling away.

The reversion of Sri Lanka to authoritarianism will have international consequences. In addition to its strategic relevance to India's security, Sri Lanka controls portions of Indian Ocean trade routes crucial to Asian maritime trade routes critical to the United States, China, and India. Attempts by the Obama administration to tie aid to political reform have been rejected by the Rajapaksa government, which instead turned to Burma, China, Iran, and Libya. Sri Lanka's geopolitical maneuvering reveals the anti-democratic nature of its government, and, moreover, reaffirms the importance of reestablishing democracy in Sri Lanka by offering a glimpse of the alternative.

Opponents within Sri Lanka and human rights critics from without have successfully publicized changes to the government, yet this opposition can only go so far. Outside actors could offer much-needed leverage. A sense of external accountability could also reduce internal abuses. In January of this year, following the presidential election, opposition candidate General Sarath Fonseka was arrested despite weak explanation and evidence, his office raided. Police brutality and violence against detainees remain endemic. Men and women taken into custody on the basis of unsubstantiated allegations -- or at the behest of a corrupt official -- are beaten and killed each week.

The United States, as well as other international actors and organizations such as the UN, can do more to shore democracy and encourage reform and reconciliation in Sri Lanka. American aid to Sri Lanka has traditionally focused on civil society and humanitarian crises rather than economic or political infrastructure, which would offer more direct routes to encouraging political reform. Expanding U.S. aid from predominantly Tamil and North-related concerns to encompass the Senhalese majority may also cultivate receptivity to democratic reform among members of the public. Strengthening the U.S. relationship with Sri Lanka through aid and trade may allow the United States greater traction and influence to contribute to halting its backslide into authoritarianism. Outside actors, including media, may also catalyze opposition to Constitutional changes and support for political reform by publicizing authoritarian abuses and supporting civic education.

Drawing distinctions between authoritarian and democratic governance in transitional countries is a complex task, requiring policy-makers to closely examine fundamental features of governance. All democracies are not created equal, but nor will all equal democracies resemble one another. It is the principle virtue of democracy that government is ruled by and thus resembles all of its citizens. This is the basis on which the United States must assess the quality of democracy and determine its foreign policy with respect to democratization. To be guided by this core concept is to accept that the tenets of socialism will continue to influence Southeast Asian democracies and that religious parties will be prominent in the democracies of Islamic countries--and that Sri Lanka is no longer a democracy at all.]]> tag:www.huffingtonpost.com,2010:/theblog//3.753400 2010-10-07T15:00:00-04:00 2011-05-25T17:55:20-04:00

Rebecca Buckwalter-Poza http://www.huffingtonpost.com/rebecca-buckwalterpoza/ let the bill lapse.

Mere consideration of a domestic violence bill constitutes a major development in Pakistan, where gender-based violence is rampant. Approximately 80 percent of married women in rural areas fear domestic abuse while 50 percent of women in urban areas report having been subjected to spousal abuse. The Aurat Foundation reports that gender-based violence increased by 13 percent from 2008 to 2009.

Men routinely attempt to disfigure or kill women who refuse to be forced into a sexual relationship or marriage, particularly in rural areas. In 2008, five women who refused forced marriages were shot, then buried alive in Baluchistan -- and the province's representative defended the perpetrators' "right" to do so. There has been an increase in abduction, forced marriage, and forcible conversion by extremists in rural areas.

Current law defines abuse narrowly and makes it difficult for victims of domestic violence to so much as prove a case against abusers and stops well short of providing legal guidelines and institutional resources to ensure investigation, prosecution, conviction, and punishment of offenders. In May of last year, a father and son who raped a widow in Dadu province escaped prosecution despite their identities being known. In the same month in Naseerabad, an elderly woman was beaten to death by a raiding party of policemen charged with preventing such assaults.

The bill would establish protection committees to supervise the provision of legal protections and guarantee medical care for victims of domestic violence. Further, it would increase the consequences for perpetrators by making the accused liable for the financial losses and damages inflicted on victims and their dependents as well as imposing harsher sentences on convicted offenders--with special sentencing guidelines regarding imprisonment and fines for repeat offenders. The bill also requires regular review of domestic violence legislation by the National Commission on the Status of Women. The dual Augean tasks these conditions must accomplish will be to discourage perpetrators from domestic abuse and encourage victims to report assaults by shifting social and cultural norms.

Some of the same hurdles that led to the bill's lapse in the Senate remain. While some cite the opposition of the Council of Islamic Ideology (CII) to the original bill as a causal factor in its lapse, others accuse critics of playing politics with religion by overstating religious opposition. The CII did classify the bill as "discriminatory," pointing to the potential for its use by police as a justification for violating the "sanctity of the home," and further objected that the bill would increase divorce rates. Yet the passage of the bill in the National Assembly and support from within Islamist political parties suggest that the obstacles to its passage in the Senate cannot be ascribed to religious opposition solely.

Attempts at implementation will have to address several potential flaws of the legislation as well as contending with cultural resistance, the social legacies of a broken justice system, and warped legal tradition. In particular, the protection committees created by the bill may be inadequate, as the members of the police force who comprise them may be among those contributing to the prevalence of gender-based violence and ensuring impunity for offenders. The refusal to report domestic violence is the most basic hurdle: women often do not report domestic violence, in particular sexual violence, because of strong social norms and fear of reprisal. Traditionally, there have been few protections for victims. Filing a report and pressing charges often expose victims to abuse, mistreatment, and deprivation of dignity at the hands of police and within the justice system. In neighboring India, despite the fact that the law now bans references to a victim's sexual history or character in sexual assault cases, police and physicians still use the "per vagina," or the "finger test," in rape investigations to determine whether or not an unmarried victim may have "been habituated to sex" prior to assault. If the investigators suspect that a victim has been sexually active, they may drop the case altogether, evidencing a wide disconnect between legislative progress and the realization of rights for sexual assault victims.

The most vocal critics of gender-based violence and the strongest proponents of the bill come from within Pakistan. That the political debate has been primarily internally driven is positive and may signal the presence of the political will necessary to implement the bill and effect wide-spread change. Last year's Criminal Law (Amendment) Bill, broadening definitions of sexual harassment and increasing penalties for violators, also augurs well for future steps toward codifying gender parity.

External actors and international organizations should contribute to the efforts of supporters of domestic violence legislation in Pakistan by drawing attention to the increase in gender-based violence and escalating severity of crimes as well as explicitly raising the profile of the legislation, which has largely disappeared from the radar of international media. Of course, would-be allies must ground analyses and advocacy in the context in which this legislation must operate. While Scandinavian countries, for example, have been exceptionally successful in surmounting gender discrimination and promoting gender parity, their legislative lessons and models are of little use in Pakistan, where those who hope to enact legislation to prevent forms of gender-based and domestic violence contend with fundamental debates, such as the question of whether legislation that affects how men treat their wives should be considered a violation of a widely acknowledged concept of rights. Protections for women granted as basic and justified elsewhere in the world cannot be presumed in Pakistan. The roots of gender-based violence and the mechanisms by which legislation may attempt to influence its incidence differ, and actors and allies must recognize these differences without attempting to oversimplify or fall prey to political attempts to deflect debate.]]> tag:www.huffingtonpost.com,2010:/theblog//3.734228 2010-09-22T15:24:58-04:00 2011-05-25T17:45:25-04:00

Rebecca Buckwalter-Poza http://www.huffingtonpost.com/rebecca-buckwalterpoza/ gave birth on a flight from Bahrain to the Philippines, and then abandoned the child in the lavatory trash. She told officials she had become pregnant after being raped by her employer. Only a few weeks before, Sri Lankan physicians removed 24 nails and needles from a woman who had been working in Saudi Arabia. Saudi employers had hammered the nails into her body as punishment for complaining about her workload. She did not report the assault to Saudi officials for fear that her employers would prevent her from leaving.

Each year, inhabitants of the least-developed Asian countries pursue the economic benefits of overseas employment despite the high social cost at home and possibility of injury at the hands of employers abroad. Workers experience abuse along a spectrum, from being denied legal status and labor protections to enduring legally condoned and even legally abetted forms of physical and psychological abuse.

Of the $316 billion in remittances reported worldwide last year, more than half went to East and South Asia. Even as remittances to Latin America and the Caribbean declined, South and East Asian remittances continued to grow. Within the region, Bangladesh, Burma, Cambodia, China, India, Indonesia, Laos, Nepal, Pakistan, the Philippines, Sri Lanka, and Vietnam number among "source countries" while Brunei, Hong Kong, Japan, Singapore, South Korea, and Taiwan represent the primary "destination countries." Saudi Arabia and other gulf countries are other major destinations.

While some Asian countries are increasingly dependent on remittances, others have become dependent on migrant labor to fuel economic growth. As of 2004, Asian overseas workers represented between 40 and 70 percent of the work force in gulf countries. Ten percent of Filipinos now live and work overseas, sending more than $17 billion home each year. Their remittances have doubled since 2003 and now make up more than 10 percent of the Philippines's national GDP. Of the 20 percent of Singapore's 2.8 million residents who are foreign citizens, many are from less-developed countries. Nearly 250,000 of these foreign workers do construction work, often under dangerous conditions. Another 100,000 foreign workers will join them this year to maintain Singapore's economic growth, predicted to be somewhere between 13 and 15 percent.

Millions of Asian migrant workers live in a gray area outside of the protection of law. Nearly 2 million Sri Lankans work abroad, including 1.4 million in the Middle East, as many as 400,000 of whom are in Saudi Arabia. Human Rights Watch estimates that there are 1.5 million overseas domestic workers in Saudi Arabia altogether.

While labor standards to protect domestic workers are lacking in many parts of Asia, labor conditions for foreign workers are worse yet. Human Rights Watch has criticized Lebanon for the legal barriers to protection for its 200,000 foreign workers, who are predominantly Asian. Saudi law explicitly excludes overseas workers from labor protections and upholds a sponsorship system (kafala) that permits employers to control workers' entrance, employment, and exit completely. A 2005 draft annex granting rights to foreign workers has yet to be passed by the Council of Ministers. Meanwhile, advocates of labor protections in Taiwan have pushed for the extension of the Labour Standards Act to foreign workers unsuccessfully.

Improvements in labor standards for domestic workers may result in increases in the population of unprotected foreign workers. In China, the implementation of labor laws requiring employers to provide benefits to workers, time off, and severance pay has spurred an employer-sanctioned increase in undocumented immigration from Vietnam. Chinese academics and activists argue for the legalization of foreign workers in order to place them under legal protection.

The lack of labor protections results in underpayment, overwork, unsafe conditions, inadequate living accommodations, and other forms of indirect physical abuse. In Taiwan, home to 360,000 foreign workers, workers allege to have been subjected to conditions on par with enslavement, including low pay, long hours, and no time off. Inadequate and unenforced laws also allow employers to abuse employees directly with impunity. Muslim workers from Indonesia in Taiwan have been forced to eat pork and even convert to Buddhism. In Shenzhen, China, this spring, working conditions provoked a series of suicides. Employers coerce workers to cooperate and comply with their demands--sometimes by legally sanctioned means, as in the case of the Saudi sponsorship system--and rely on official complicity, as police and other authorities often do not register or act on complaints filed by migrant workers. Source countries often lack strong domestic labor laws and have only a limited ability to protect citizens overseas.

Sexual abuse of female overseas workers presents a special, growing problem. Increasing demand for female workers and the "feminization" of migration has resulted in greater numbers of women pursuing work separately overseas. Yet there has been no corresponding improvement in conditions or rights for women working overseas. Women who are raped while working abroad have little success in filing or pressing charges and, in the case of an abusive employer, may be forced to remain legally dependent on their abusers. Further, they fear reprisal from family and friends upon return home, especially in the case of those who become pregnant. Right now, 10 Filipino women who became pregnant after being raped by their employers in Saudi Arabia await repatriation in Riyadh with their children. So many women returning to Jakarta brought unplanned children that a non-governmental agency in Indonesia, BNP2TKI, founded a shelter specifically for children born to migrant workers, many the products of rape.

The implications extend beyond the workers' immediate circumstances. The growth in overseas work arrangements comes at a tremendous social cost and impedes economic and political development in the remittance-rich countries. Split families endure separation indefinitely, and a generation of the children of overseas workers has been essentially orphaned. In the absence of more than a tenth of their residents, communities and towns may not develop strong social networks or build infrastructure. Moreover, governments become dependent on overseas workers' remittances rather strengthening the domestic economy and increasing opportunities for work at home. With remittances now a part of World Bank-IMF assessments of countries' ability to repay loans, dependence on remittances to supplement domestic economies may only increase as countries accept loans and attract external investment predicated upon sizable remittances.
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Rebecca Buckwalter-Poza http://www.huffingtonpost.com/rebecca-buckwalterpoza/ introduced in January 2010, emerged from collaboration among the Acid Survivors Foundation (ASF), the National Commission on Status of Women, the United Nations Development Fund for Women, and the Pakistan Ministry of Women Development. While passage is nearly certain, it remains to be seen whether the government will make a sincere attempt to implement this legislation -- and, moreover, how effective its effort at enforcement may be.

Nicholas Kristof called acid attacks "terrorism that's personal." Assailants choose acid for simple reasons: it is cheap and widely available, assault with acid is penalized relatively lightly or goes unpunished, and its effects are almost incomprehensibly devastating. When it does not kill, acid leaves victims in agony -- disfigured, deformed, and sometimes blinded. Their limbs may be fused in the position they held when burned. For those with access to medical care surgery may lessen complications and reduce disfigurement, but survivors struggle to overcome both physical and mental injury and social stigma for the rest of their lives.

Destroying a victim's life may cost anything from the 100,000 rupees some attackers have reported being promised in Pakistan -- about $1,170 USD -- to the 60 Euro cents -- just $1 USD -- it takes to buy a kilo of acid in Bangladesh. In Southeast Asia, girls may be attacked with acid for going to school, talking to men, turning down marriage proposals, or having inadequate dowries, as may men and women whose spouses suspect them of infidelity. One Pakistani woman, Zainab Bibi, was just 12 when she turned down the suitor who would destroy her face with acid as punishment five years later. Across the world in Canada, the United States, and Britain, the incidence of acid attacks has also risen. Two years ago in London, an abusive boyfriend paid an assailant to throw acid on Katie Piper, burning her so badly that surgeons had to create a new face.

In Pakistan, acid-related crimes are on the rise. Last year, ASF reported 48 acid attacks, as compared with just 30 such incidents in 2007. ASF figures suggest family members perpetrate nearly half of acid attacks (48 percent), rejected suitors are responsible for a quarter (25 percent), and "collateral damage" accounts for 12 percent. Yet Pakistan does not regulate the sale of acid adequately, albeit in part because it is a common household good. Existing legislation does not address acid-related crime specifically, allowing perpetrators to escape with light sentences -- or evade punishment altogether. Enforcement varies by region, the need for federal legislation setting minimum sentences and oversight of local implementation.

The breakdowns that reduce the likelihood of an assailant being brought to justice begin at the local level. Many assaults go unreported because of fear or lack of faith in law enforcement and the judicial system. When victims do report acid attacks, police may demand a bribe to investigate, refuse to investigate, or accept a bribe to drop the case. Prosecutors and courts are susceptible to the same extralegal influences. Illegal out-of-court settlements routinely deprive victims of formal justice and keep acid attacks out of the judicial system entirely.

Pakistan's Acid Control and Burn Crime Prevention Bill would create a National Acid Control Council and "comprehensively defin[e] hurt and disfigurement" as well as categorizing acids as dangerous substances, restricting their sale, more heavily penalizing "unlawful sales," and increasing the maximum sentence for disfigurement significantly -- in addition to setting a minimum sentence of seven years. Medical professionals would be required to report acid-related injuries to police. Further, the bill would define the victims of acid attacks as disabled, entitling them to government benefits, and provide for treatment, rehabilitation, and legal aid.

India and Cambodia have been debating passing similar legislation, and Bangladesh has already done so. Progress in India has stalled after the state reversed its position this year, withdrawing support for the proposed addition to the Indian Penal Code, Section 326A, to restrict the sale of acid and address acid-related offenses. If passed, Cambodia's law would regulate the sale of acids, set minimum sentences and increase the maximum sentence for acid-related offenses, and improve care for survivors. Tentative progress in Bangladesh suggests a reason for optimism. In 2002, Bangladesh enacted laws restricting the accessibility of acid and expanding sentencing options to include the death penalty. Although acid is still available in open markets, acid-related attacks may have begun to decrease.

Legislative reform will not necessarily translate into real change in Pakistan, but it marks progress. The National Assembly of Pakistan follows the Supreme Court of Pakistan in demonstrating specific, formal opposition to acid terrorism, laying the foundation for the cultural and social changes that must accompany legal reform. Initially, acid attacks were associated almost exclusively with honor killings and the punishment of women suspected of immoral conduct or acts of defiance, such as not wearing the hijab. Some opponents see the legislation as a restriction of their right to discipline family and take just action against perpetrators of immoral conduct. Meanwhile, critical supporters claim that the bill addresses the ideal with little regard for the real, disregarding the deficiencies of government infrastructure and social context. A Pakistani attorney involved in its drafting, Faisal Fareed, points to the disjunction between the legislation's mandate for free medical care and rehabilitation and the lack of medical facilities capable of providing such care.

Despite its flaws and the uncertainties and obstacles that lie ahead, the Acid Control and Burn Crime Prevention Bill represents a major step in combating acid terrorism in Pakistan. Its successful passage may also signal increased receptivity to the involvement of civil society and international organizations in policy reform. ]]> tag:www.huffingtonpost.com,2010:/theblog//3.710039 2010-09-10T15:05:18-04:00 2011-05-25T17:35:19-04:00

Rebecca Buckwalter-Poza http://www.huffingtonpost.com/rebecca-buckwalterpoza/ passed a Constitutional Amendment further expanding the powers of President Mahinda Rajapaksa and stripping away the façade of democracy. Critics have dubbed September 8th "Black Wednesday."

The 18th Amendment will fundamentally transform Sri Lanka's political system, ending presidential term limits, eliminating the Constitutional Council that oversaw non-partisan appointments, increasing President Rajapaksa's control over appointments, and broadening the prerogative of the President to communicate with Parliament. Its effect will be to remove vital checks on Executive power and further undermine Sri Lanka's democracy.

Presidential term limits are critical to democratization. The concept of term limits for elected offices has been present in discussions of democracy since its earliest incarnations in Rome and Athens - both of which had term limits in some form. Without term limits, an individual and party may accumulate tremendous power. Incumbency advantages allow them to preserve and increase that power perpetually. The incumbent can rely on popular support, regime tactics, and opposition fragmentation to stay in office, setting the country's agenda ad infinitum.

The consequences extend beyond the immediate issue of an individual's accumulation of power over a lifetime and its use. As power becomes concentrated with a single individual and party, the range of views within the party decreases and opposition parties weaken and fragment, diminishing the representation of diverse views in democracy. The weakening of opposition parties also undermines electoral choice, leaving voters with few alternatives to the party in power. Government and politics stagnate.

Political party alternation, or turnover, is crucial to democracy. Political party alternation is more likely when the opposition faces a successor rather than incumbent, both because the successor does not enjoy incumbency advantages and because the opposition is more likely to unify when facing a new candidate.

Political party alternation is not just a symbol of democracy - it is essential to advancing democratization. Each successful turnover is a demonstration of democracy that increases legitimacy among domestic stakeholders and internationally. Awareness of the potential for turnover also makes officials and political parties more responsive to citizens and more likely to attempt to collaborate and reach consensus with other political parties. Following a turnover, the average improvement in Freedom House scores based on political rights and civil liberties among 20 electoral authoritarian regimes was 0.9 on a 7-point scale. By contrast, there was no improvement in these scores in the three years preceding government turnover in these countries.

In the absence of a Presidential term limit, corruption will grow within and outside of government. As an Executive and ruling party accumulate power, they become more likely to abuse that power. Parties are less vigilant in rooting out vice, and officials become more prone to corruption when they perceive little threat of removal or electoral repercussion. Without the potential for political turnover, businesses and other non-governmental actors have a greater incentive to invest in bribing and corrupting government officials, whose positions are more likely to be long-term and secure.

The end of term limits will reduce the potential for institution-building, policy reforms, and training integral to the development of stable democracy in Sri Lanka. Without each subsequent term, the incumbent feels less of an electoral imperative and becomes less likely to generate new platforms and policies or improve existing institutions and infrastructure. With a single party in power and little turnover among government employees and appointees, relatively few Sri Lankans will acquire the knowledge and experience necessary to become part of democratic government.

Presidential term limits are a fundamental feature of modern democracy. Although the United States' 22nd Amendment, limiting Presidents to two four-year terms, has only been around since 1951, it only codified the two-term limit US Presidents self-imposed -- from George Washington onward. (Only Franklin Delano Roosevelt served more than two terms.) The last of the major modern democracies to set term limits, France, did so in 2008.

Since the 1990s, and even earlier in some regions, the majority of transitional democracies and electoral authoritarian governments have also set term limits, although Sri Lanka is one of a number of countries that have revisited term limits in the past decade. Over the past few years, attempts to end term limits in Colombia, Kenya, Malawi, Mozambique, Nigeria, Ukraine, and Zambia have failed while countries that have overturned term limits include Algeria, Djibouti, Uganda, and Venezuela. Currently, Indonesia is debating term limits.

Political scientist Samuel Huntington proposed a "two turnover" rule: only after two successful political turnovers could a democracy be declared consolidated--or stable. By passing the 18th Amendment, Sri Lanka is regressing, destroying what democratic framework is in place rather than improving it.

The legacy of the 18th Amendment will be the destabilization of the Sri Lankan political system and the decline of democratic tradition. Its effects will only grow with time. The Amendment removes essential limits on Executive power and cripples the Judiciary while reducing the independence and influence of the Parliament; further, it ensures political stagnancy and precludes democratic progress. ]]>