2013-05-19T01:59:52-04:00 Susan Buchanan http://www.huffingtonpost.com/author/index.php?author=susan-buchanan Copyright 2008, HuffingtonPost.com, Inc. HuffingtonPost Blogger Feed for Susan Buchanan Good old fashioned elbow grease. tag:www.huffingtonpost.com,2013:/theblog//3.3266619 2013-05-13T11:05:15-04:00 2013-05-13T11:05:17-04:00

Susan Buchanan http://www.huffingtonpost.com/susan-buchanan/

Ground breaking for Magnolia Marketplace--a two-story mall on nearly seven acres off South Claiborne Ave. at Toledano St. in New Orleans--is slated for the third quarter of this year and a bit later than planned. Meanwhile, friction between the mall and nearby First Mount Calvary Missionary Baptist Church, built in 1916, has eased. Life-long, First Calvary member Jocquelyn Marshall said her church seems satisfied with an accord ironed out early this year with the help of New Orleans Councilmember LaToya Cantrell.

Last year, worries were that First Calvary, an African American church located on what's now a small spur of Sixth St., would be hemmed in between Magnolia Marketplace on the city's riverside and busy Claiborne Ave. to the north, limiting Sunday morning parking.

But now Marshall, an associate project manager at non-profit Urban Strategies and a former Harmony Oaks Neighborhood Association president, is waiting for the jobs, retail activity and makeover that the mall--to be built north of the Harmony Oaks residences--will bring to the area. Mixed-income, 460-unit Harmony Oaks, finished in 2011, was previously C.J. Peete housing. And before that, it was the site of the Magnolia Projects for many decades.

Tara Hernandez, president of JCH Development on Poydras St., said a good neighbor agreement negotiated with Magnolia Marketplace, LLC in January addresses parking. "The church has no off-street parking now and they don't have access to their rear yard," she said last week. "We're giving them something they don't have--access to the rear yard for cars and parking spaces at the Marketplace."

Magnolia Marketplace, LLC is a joint venture between JCH Development and Stirling Properties in New Orleans, along with Central City Partners--a subsidiary of the developer of C.J. Peete.

LaToya Cantrell's office last week said the accord gives the church 30 undesignated parking spaces on the first level of the mall's planned garage, to be used anytime the church's on-site parking is full. In addition, Magnolia Marketplace has agreed to build its complex with the fewest-possible disruptions to the neighborhood. The accord is effective as long as the church is under current ownership. First Calvary is within Cantrell's District B.

Last week, Cantrell said church members once parked on nearby streets but road configurations have changed. Marshall said members often park on nearby grass. Cantrell said "parking needs increase when large numbers of people turn out for a holiday service, a wedding or a funeral. It's something you can't necessarily plan on." .

Cantrell continued, saying "First Mount Calvary, a faith-based social and recreation center, has been a pillar of the community for Central City residents for generations." She said her role in negotiating with developers early this year was to make sure that the church's pastor, Reverend Uyless Landry Sr., and his constituents were represented.

Church member Jocquelyn Marshall said tensions with developers grew last year. One concern was that the spur of Sixth St. off Claiborne might be closed, denying access to the church by car. The spur will remain open, however. Another worry was about a request that First Mount Calvary not alter its exterior without consulting the Marketplace. "Naturally, the church had a problem with that," Marshall said. That request from developers was rescinded.

As Marshall understands it, the mall's developers agreed to help with repairs to the exterior of the stucco church, along with some landscaping. When asked about that last week, Cantrell also thought Magnolia Marketplace had offered to assist with the church's exterior. But Hernandez at JCH Development said the good neighbor accord covers parking only.

Marshall has talked with her pastor, Reverend Landry, since January, and she said "he seems satisfied with the agreement." Last week, however, Landry had no comment about the church and Magnolia Marketplace.

Marshall estimated that First Mount Calvary has anywhere between 100 and 160 members, not counting the choir and officers. She's seen as many as 200 people in the church on an Easter Sunday and during funerals. "Sometimes people are standing behind the pews in the back, " she said. "They'll drive in from other neighborhoods."

Gloria Williams, current president of the Harmony Oaks Neighborhood Association, belongs to another church in the area. Her thoughts about the marketplace are mostly positive. She said "retail businesses are truly needed here. We have senior citizens without cars, and a number of us can't ride public transportation."

But Williams wants to make sure that the mall employs neighborhood residents. "I plan to talk with Tara Hernandez about jobs soon," she said. "That includes jobs for adults and part-time positions for our boys and girls, who need to keep busy in the summer."

Hernandez said Magnolia's developers will hold a jobs open house for Orleans Parish residents, but they haven't decided on a date or location yet. "We'll work with Urban Strategies and we'll contact Harmony Oaks with job information, probably in the third quarter or later this year," she said. Hernandez said it's too early to estimate how many construction and permanent positions the mall will create.

Urban Strategies Inc., a non-profit based in St. Louis, works with Harmony Oaks on social services and educational options.

So how did Magnolia Marketplace acquire its site? Developers purchased the land--which is a portion of the former C.J. Peete complex left after Harmony Oaks was built--from the Housing Authority of New Orleans for $900,000.in March of last year.

When asked about businesses in the complex, a Stirling Properties executive said last week that Tara Hernandez of JCH was the only person authorized to comment publicly on Magnolia Marketplace. But a Stirling website, updated last week, showed lease signers as T.J. Maxx, Ross Dress For Less, PetSmart, Michaels Stores for arts and crafts, Shoe Carnival, ULTA Beauty and Raising Cane's. Several spaces for small shops on the ground floor and a "junior anchor business" were still available last week.

According to Stirling Properties, Claiborne Ave. is the most heavily traveled artery between the city's uptown area--where the planned mall is--and downtown and the central business district. Average daily traffic exceeds 70,000 cars.

Last week, Marshall said she doesn't mind development as long as it's for the better. She said "a run-down neighborhood attracts crime. If you live in a community that looks nice, residents take care of it and that makes things safer."

Before it was branded as C.J. Peete, the neighborhood from 1941 to 2008 was the Magnolia Projects--giving the new mall its name. Known for its high murder rate, the Magnolia Projects also produced many musicians, particularly rap and bounce artists who have achieved national, commercial success.

As for the church, Marshall said First Mount Calvary is a treasured part of her own history. She grew up in the former, public housing complex but said she likes Harmony Oaks. Since Harmony Oaks is mixed income, she lives among former C.J. Peete residents, along with new arrivals. "I'm making some new friends here," she said. "But it means a lot to me to go to my childhood church and be among the congregation I grew up with." And that's especially true because her current work at Urban Strategies is mainly in San Antonio and Tampa. end]]> tag:www.huffingtonpost.com,2013:/theblog//3.3219642 2013-05-05T14:21:35-04:00 2013-05-05T14:21:37-04:00

Susan Buchanan http://www.huffingtonpost.com/susan-buchanan/

This spring, thirteen Crescent City residents completed a year of classes and hands-on training in streetcar maintenance, funded by the Federal Transit Administration and run by the New Orleans Regional Transit Authority and Delgado Community College. Eleven of those graduates are now working full time at the RTA though they aren't necessarily taking care of streetcars. The program trained workers for maintenance jobs that will open as RTA staffers retire.

According to the FTA in January, "in anticipation of its expanding streetcar network, the New Orleans Regional Transit Authority competed for and received in 2011 a $400,000 workforce development grant to establish a new streetcar maintenance training program specifically for disadvantaged workers 21 and over." The city's Loyola streetcar line opened in January and will be extended up Rampart St. in 2015.

Meanwhile, the city's unemployment rate is below the national average. But residents living in poverty are well above the national norm so workforce development is clearly needed. Nonetheless, the FTA's one-year training program, which ran from March 2012 to March 2013, has cost taxpayers plenty. To date, RTA has spent about $275,000 of the $400,000 workforce development grant that it received.

In addition, the RTA has contributed in-kind services valued at over $365,000, mainly for staff to provide on-the-job instruction.

That $275,000 in spending is enough to have paid for four years of tuition at, for example, Louisiana State University. And $400,000 would cover four years of college tuition for fourteen students. But the point of the FTA program was to put unskilled, high school grads on a fast track to skilled jobs. Participants were in their twenties and thirties.

Under the grant, RTA was required to identify, train and hire candidates to qualify for future streetcar maintenance jobs as current workers retire. Transit agencies around the country have aging rail and bus equipment that needs constant maintenance, according to the FTA. Workers hired by Veolia Transportation after the program ended in March can bid for maintenance jobs they were trained for as positions open up, in accordance with union rules. Skills can be applied to jobs at other transit agencies too.

As for Veolia Transportation, the RTA Board of Commissioners signed a management contract with the company in 2008, and a public-private partnership was formed in 2009.

RTA spent the $275,000 on evaluating program candidates--including background screening and random drug testing; Delgado program expenses; student stipends for 52 weeks; classroom supplies and materials; workers' compensation; and job-related certifications. Students received $8.00 an hour for a 30-hour workweek.

RTA spokeswoman Patrice Bell Mercadel said her agency was selected for a grant that included classroom instruction from Delgado and training at RTA facilities. She said students were mentored by experienced Veolia Transportation employees, and they worked with RTA's craftsmen and artisans to learn specialized skills to maintain streetcars.

Bell Mercadel said "participants received three transferable certifications--one for safety from the NCCER, or National Center for Construction, Education and Research; one for forklift operator; and one for air conditioning refrigerant handling. And they received RTA-specific certification in the Fundamentals of Streetcar Maintenance."

All thirteen graduates were offered full-time, RTA positions available when they completed the program, and eleven of them accepted jobs, she said.

So what are these graduates doing? After finishing the program in late March, New Orleans resident Wayne Croffitt is now a body and repair shop technician, working on buses at the RTA's Canal St. facility. When he applied to the program over a year ago, he was delivering furniture and had planned to study diesel mechanics. In the RTA-Delgado program, "we learned basic auto-mechanics and many other skills," he said. "We broke down a streetcar, learned all the parts and put it back together. I could do that with my eyes closed now."

Croffitt said "the job offers we received were based on attendance and performance in class." He's happy to work on buses or street cars as long as he's employed, and said "buses give me new skills."

City resident Eliot Barron is a graduate of the program. "I'm interested in the art, craft and mechanics of alternative forms of transportation and in historic preservation, mainly bicycles and streetcars," he said. "They're the past and future of New Orleans. I own a collection of bicycles and I'm trained as a bicycle mechanic."

Barron said a Delgado instructor led the class in March 2012 and then RTA took over. He credits RTA manager Howard Amos for taking the program under his wings, and said "he wanted to make sure our learning was useful."

Barron said "they have a ton of streetcar maintenance experience at RTA. They've been doing it for over 100 years."

For a year students reported to RTA facilities--the Willow St. car barn or the Canal St. bus and street car facility--for 30 hours a week with most federal holidays off. Barron said "RTA really supported the program but their immediate intention for us was something other than street car maintenance. Instead, it was doing everything from painting and body work to automotive mechanics and mobile air-conditioning service."

Barron said he received a certificate from the program in late March, and was informally offered a job by NORTA as a hostler, which he turned down. He said "the job involved cleaning, polishing and putting streetcars to bed at night, or working on buses at the Canal St. station, pumping gas for them and replacing windshield wiper fluid and wiper blades."

Barron said RTA doesn't have any openings for streetcar maintenance workers now because that staff has been slow to retire. He wants to hold out for something more advanced than hostler and intends to apply to RTA in the future.

Barron said the government paid for his 12-month training, and he received a stipend of nearly $1,000 a month, along with used textbooks, five uniforms and several pieces of equipment--including an AC DC multimeter to test circuits and a 6-inch scale for making precise measurements. Students returned their used books at the end of the program.

He was given an RTA identity card that allowed him to ride streetcars and buses for free. "That ID card was the highlight of the benefits," he said. Students were covered by RTA workers' comp but they didn't have health insurance, he said.

As for Delgado's role, the community college was selected by the RTA to be the training provider, Delgado spokeswoman Carol Gniady said. "That included creating national standards curriculum and conducting customized training on site at the RTA facilities," she said. National standards exist so students across the country are taught the same basic information in a subject.

Gniady said "as stipulated in the Memorandum of Understanding with the RTA, Delgado was paid $142,900, which covered the costs associated with creating national standards curriculum for two relevant industry certifications--NCCER core certification and Level 1 electrical certification; providing training materials and text books; and conducting 782 hours of on-site training for up to twenty students."

The federal grant limited the number of students to twenty, and the program started with nineteen participants, according to the RTA.

As to why the college was chosen, Gniady said "Delgado provides customized business and industry professional development and training through our Workforce Development and Technical Education unit." She said the school has a good track record in training students for local jobs.

Bell Mercadel explained how students were selected, and said "all applicants were referred to us following screening by JOB1 and the West Jefferson Business and Career Solutions Center."
Job1, run by the City of New Orleans, provides employment assistance and federally funded training through the Workforce Investment Act. The Jefferson Business & Career Solutions Center has offices on the West and East Banks of Jefferson Parish and is supported by the Louisiana Workforce Commission.

In data released in late April, unemployment in New Orleans, not seasonally adjusted, was 6 percent in March, below the national average of 7.6 percent. But that masks a high poverty rate that points to a need for job training. According to the U.S. Census Bureau, 25.7 percent of people in Orleans Parish lived below the poverty level from 2007 to 2011 versus a national average of 14.3 percent. end]]> tag:www.huffingtonpost.com,2013:/theblog//3.3170346 2013-04-27T13:50:08-04:00 2013-04-27T13:50:13-04:00

Susan Buchanan http://www.huffingtonpost.com/susan-buchanan/
Houston-based Halliburton Co. is in talks to settle private claims related to the Deepwater Horizon rig explosion three years ago, company officers said when they released quarterly earnings last Monday. The Gulf spill trial's first phase wrapped up in U.S. District Court in New Orleans less than a week before Halliburton's announcement. At the eight-week trial, BP, Transocean and Halliburton blamed one another for the deadly April 20, 2010 accident that led to the nation's worst offshore spill. Judge Carl Barbier conducted the first segment of the three-part trial without a jury, and will rule on liability at a later date.

On Monday, Halliburton said it took a $1 billion pretax charge, or $637 million after taxes, for a possible settlement with private claimants. That was in addition to a pretax $300 million or after-tax $191 million that the company set aside for litigation a year ago.

Dave Lesar, Halliburton's president and chief executive officer, said Monday the company has been in court-assisted talks to settle a substantial share of private claims from the Macondo disaster. BP operated the well, Halliburton was the cement contractor and Transocean owned the Deepwater Horizon rig. Lesar said "we believe that an early and reasonably valued resolution is in the best interests of our shareholders." In the now-advanced talks, the company has offered stock and cash to claimants. Lesar didn't discuss the number or types of claimants.

Last week, attorney Stuart Smith with Smith Stag, L.L.C. in New Orleans, said "Halliburton is most likely talking with the Plaintiffs' Steering Committee," a group of attorneys appointed by Judge Barbier to represent businesses and residents with claims. "It's not unusual in a case like this, where there's been some significant discovery abuse, to try to settle claims," Smith said. The abuse centers on Halliburton recently revealing cement evidence that probably should have been turned over to the U.S. Justice Dept. two years ago.

"It appears that the court was unhappy with Halliburton's actions during the discovery phase of the litigation," Smith said, referring to phase one of the trial. He said the benefit to Halliburton of settling private claims would be to minimize uncertainty about their cost.

Last week, Dave Falkenstein, spokesman for the Plaintiffs' Steering Committee, said the attorneys' group doesn't comment on settlement discussions. Houston-based Halliburton spokeswoman Susie McMichael said her company couldn't comment on the talks aside from what officers had said Monday.

So how did Halliburton fare in Judge Barbier's courtroom? The company ran into trouble several weeks after the trial began on Feb. 25. Under cross-examination in early March, Timothy Quirk, Halliburton's former cement lab manager, said he tested cement samples following the rig explosion and then destroyed some of the samples and test notes. After Quirk's testimony, Halliburton attorney Don Godwin told Judge Barbier on March 12 that the company that week had discovered cement samples from the Kodiak well at its Broussard, La. lab.

Leftover, dry cement from the Kodiak well, which BP and partners drilled in 2008, was used at the Macondo well with the approval of BP and Halliburton.

In late March, BP asked Judge Barbier to sanction Halliburton for withholding evidence at the lab. More than a year earlier, BP had filed a motion in December 2011 for sanctions against Halliburton, alleging samples tested after the rig explosion had been destroyed. Since then, Halliburton attorneys have said testing was done on off-the-shelf lab materials that had little relevance to the case.

Barbier hasn't ruled on sanctions against Halliburton yet. If sanctions are imposed, however, Halliburton might find it tough to challenge any findings against the company in the Horizon rig explosion.

At the phase-one trial, Halliburton's cement expert Jesse Gagliano, who was embedded in BP's Houston office in 2010, testified that BP ignored a number of his recommendations for the rig's cement job, particularly his advice to use twenty-one centralizers. Centralizers keep a well's metal casing pipe centered while cement is poured around its sides. Late in the trial, BP's Houston-based, wells team leader John Guide said he supported using six centralizers because the additional ones that were to be shipped to the rig were of the wrong type.

BP raised questions in court about additives in Gagliano's cement design, saying some of them shouldn't have been used with a foam cement slurry. At the Macondo site, high-pressure nitrogen was injected into a base cement slurry on April 18 and 19, generating foam cement that was pumped into the well.

A week before Gagliano's early-April testimony, Transocean vice president Bill Ambrose said at the trial that a study by his company concluded the "precipitating cause" of the rig's explosion was a failed cement job.

During the trial, Judge Barbier chastised Halliburton for a slow drip of evidence. Relevant samples were concealed, then suddenly discovered, he said. Halliburton's release of evidence in March consumed some of the court's time as Barbier tried to control the sprawling trial's length.

Last Wednesday, Judge Barbier gave attorneys a June 21 deadline to file their conclusions about evidence presented in the trial's first phase. The judge also asked them to consider six questions related to gross negligence, and said he wants to hear back on them by July 12.

One of Barbier's questions is: can an act or omission that didn't cause the accident be considered in determining whether a party was engaged in gross negligence? That query could prove thorny for Halliburton. The company's alleged withholding of cement evidence and destruction of notes on post-accident tests didn't make the rig explode but could be used to weaken Halliburton's defenses.

If Barbier finds BP, Transocean or Halliburton grossly negligent, the company involved could face billions of dollars in punitive damages.

Over the winter, the U.S. Justice Department reached separate settlements with BP and Transocean in connection with the rig explosion. The agency hasn't filed suit against Halliburton to date. In late January, BP pleaded guilty to fourteen criminal counts, including eleven counts of manslaughter, and agreed to pay $4 billion in penalties in the biggest criminal resolution in U.S. history. Eleven workers died when the rig exploded.

In mid-February, Transocean pleaded guilty to one count of violating the Clean Water Act and agreed to pay $400 million in criminal penalties.

Regarding Halliburton's efforts to settle, the company's chief financial officer Mark McCollum said in a conference call with analysts Monday that if current talks aren't successful, "we're fully prepared to see this matter to conclusion in the courts." Halliburton's shares, traded on the New York Stock Exchange, declined in value during the spill trial but rose after Monday's better-than-expected, first-quarter earnings, along with word of the settlement attempt. Halliburton supplies products and services to the global energy industry, including oil drilling and natural gas fracking.

In mid-May 2010, President Barack Obama said BP, Transocean and Halliburton executives fell over one other to point the finger of blame in Congressional hearings during the oil spill.

The second phase of the New Orleans trial, starting in September, will assess how much oil was spilled. end]]> tag:www.huffingtonpost.com,2013:/theblog//3.3123396 2013-04-20T14:06:19-04:00 2013-04-20T14:06:21-04:00

Susan Buchanan http://www.huffingtonpost.com/susan-buchanan/

Last week, BP called its final witnesses in the first phase of the Gulf spill trial that began in New Orleans on Feb. 25. The U.K. company has tried to shift blame to rig-owner Transocean and cement-contractor Halliburton for the April 20, 2010 Deepwater Horizon explosion. Attorney Mike Brock, representing BP, said in U.S. District Court Wednesday that the firm rested its case. As the first phase wound down, Judge Carl Barbier said parties will have sixty days to submit written briefs outlining their conclusions and another twenty days to provide reply briefs.

Barbier is assessing blame between BP, Transocean and Halliburton for the deadly blast that occurred off Louisiana's coast. A second part of the trial, starting in September, will consider how much oil escaped the well. In a third phase, which might begin early next year, Barbier will rule on negligence that led to the nation's worst offshore spill. Parties could settle before then, however.

Last Monday, the court heard testimony from John Guide, BP's Houston-based wells team leader. The University of Pittsburgh-trained engineer was responsible for approving all steps in the design and drilling of the Macondo well. He said well-site leaders were frustrated in April 2010 by a series of eleventh-hour changes, particularly in the well's cement plan. An April 17, 2010 email written by Guide to his boss David Sims said "well-site leaders have finally come to their wits' end." In that email, Guide quoted Don Vidrine, who said crew members were "flying by the seat of our pants." Vidrine and Robert Kaluza were BP's well-site leaders on the rig. On Monday, Guide said "changing of little things was seriously making their job harder."

In April 2010, BP was in the process of "completing" the Macondo well and turning it into a producing well. BP planned to move the Deepwater Horizon rig to another drilling job in the Gulf, however, and wanted to bring a different rig to the Macondo site. The Horizon crew was responsible for securing the Macondo well before the rig moved to make sure that nothing leaked in or out of it. Cement was needed to isolate hydrocarbons down below and keep them from coming up the well. The well blew out during the crew's April 20, 2010 abandonment process.

In his April 17, 2010 email, Guide said everybody wanted to do the right thing but a "huge level of paranoia from engineering leadership is driving chaos." An April 1, 2010 reorganization had separated engineering and operations, causing friction, he said. Guide's email said "Brian has called me numerous times, trying to make sense of all the insanity," referring to BP's Brian Morel--a top young engineer.

"Last night's emergency evolved around 30 barrels of cement spacer behind the top plug," Guide's email said. "I did not agree with putting the spacer above the top plug to begin with." Liquid spacer is used to separate mud from seawater. David Sims, apparently trying to ease tensions, responded to Guide that the last-minute changes were "a great learning opportunity."

On April 20, 2010, the rig's crew pumped seawater down the drill pipe to displace drilling mud in the pipe. Since mud can be contaminated in contact with seawater and mud is also expensive, the crew used spacer fluid as a buffer to separate the water and mud.

In completing the well, BP went ahead with a temporary abandonment even though BP's onshore, senior drilling engineer Mark Hafle had recommended permanent abandonment. On April 20, 2010 when a negative pressure test was done, well-site leaders phoned Hafle about a troubling pressure differential. But they didn't return several phone calls from Guide in Houston that day, Guide said last week. The negative pressure test was incorrectly interpreted by BP and Transocean leaders on the rig as successful when it had failed.

In a federal indictment last year, Kaluza and Vidrine were charged with mismanaging the pressure test and missing signs that the well wasn't secure. They're awaiting trial now after pleading not guilty last fall to eleven counts each of manslaughter. Eleven workers died in the rig's explosion while 115 survived and took life boats and rafts to the Damon Bankston, a nearby supply vessel.

Guide said last Monday that he did nothing to contribute to the blowout and had never compromised well safety, which he said was BP's number-one priority. "I don't think I could have done anything different," he said.

Plaintiffs' attorneys have accused BP of cutting corners as they temporarily abandoned the well, which
was behind schedule and over budget. Guide said he authorized money-saving measures in BP's "every dollar counts" campaign. But those measures, which included ridding the rig of unused equipment, didn't jeopardize safety, he said.

On Monday, Guide was asked about BP's April 2010 tensions with Halliburton over cement lab tests and centralizers. Guide said "I trusted Jesse," referring to Halliburton cement expert Jesse Gagliano, who was embedded in BP's Houston office. But Guide said Gagliano was slow in delivering some cement-test results.

Guide said he didn't think that another fifteen centralizers, recommended by Gagliano four days before the rig exploded, should be used because the ones that were to be delivered to the rig weren't the right design. And he especially didn't want to risk leaving the well hole open for ten hours to install the wrong equipment. BP ran only six centralizers though Halliburton had recommended twenty-one and had warned that using too few would make the well vulnerable to a gas influx. Centralizers keep a well's metal casing pipe centered while cement is poured around its sides. Guide said his decision to overrule Halliburton had nothing to do with saving money for BP.

Last Tuesday, Patrick O'Bryan, BP's former drilling and completion vice president for the Gulf, said the Deepwater Horizon was one of Transocean's better rigs. But on April 20, 2010, the rig's Captain Curt Kuchta, employed by Transocean, wasn't sure what to do after the power system failed, O'Bryan said. Kuchta thought the blowout preventer couldn't be activated without approval from Transocean's offshore-installation manager Jimmy Harrell, who'd been hurt in the blast. Harrell soon made it up to the bridge, however, and deployed the rig's emergency safety system.

BP's final witness Wednesday was U.K. native and marine-safety expert Andrew Mitchell, an offshore oil veteran who is now an International Safety Management code consultant. He said Captain Kuchta had up to eight minutes after the rig's crisis began to activate the well's blowout preventer by pressing a button on the wall. But because of a confusing command structure, Kuchta waited for Harrell to reach the bridge to activate the BOP, Mitchell said. Kuchta didn't exercise his authority as captain and missed the last possible chance to save the ship, he said.

As for the captain's heroism in cutting a lifeboat free after jumping into the ocean that evening, Mitchell said "he wouldn't have been in the water with a knife" if he'd done his job on the rig,

On Tuesday, environmentalists and community advocates protested outside U.S. District Court on Poydras St. to mark the third anniversary of the Horizon's explosion on Saturday, April 20. Plaquemines Parish President Billy Nungesser--along with David Muth, Louisiana state director for the National Wildlife Federation, and several other speakers--urged Judge Barbier not to be lenient on BP. They demanded that BP remove oil and remnants that remain along the coast. Stiff court penalties against BP would help pay for needed coastal restoration and would deter offshore accidents, speakers said.

In November, BP pleaded guilty to eleven counts of manslaughter and to lying about the size of the spill. The company agreed to pay $4.5 billion in criminal penalties. BP has now spent over $14 billion on Gulf-spill cleanup and response and has paid more than $10 billion to individuals, businesses and local governments for spill-related losses. It faces billions of dollars more in civil claims from the feds and Gulf states. If BP is found grossly negligent in the spill, the company will have to pay up to $17 billion in fines under the Clean Water Act.

As the trial's Phase One ended Wednesday afternoon, Judge Barbier said the amount of evidence that the court and parties will have to consider is huge. "I am thinking sixty days for simultaneous, post-trial briefing and submission of findings of fact; proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law," he said. "And then I'm thinking twenty days thereafter for reply briefs." Those briefs will be subject to page limits.

Barbier thanked the attorneys involved. "The quality of the lawyering and the professionalism and civility with which this case has been tried is exemplary," making his job easier, he said. Barbier said he was glad the trial's first part took only two months instead of a projected three. He recessed Phase One of the trial. With Phase Two now more than four months away, the parties have time to prepare this summer, barring a settlement. end]]> tag:www.huffingtonpost.com,2013:/theblog//3.3085889 2013-04-15T13:14:42-04:00 2013-04-15T15:08:19-04:00

Susan Buchanan http://www.huffingtonpost.com/susan-buchanan/
Last week, BP executives and others testifying at U.S. District Court in New Orleans said the company was safety conscious when it drilled the Macondo well in the Gulf. Attorneys for the U.K. firm called their first witnesses in the spill trial that began Feb. 25. Judge Carl Barbier is assessing the faults of BP, Transocean and Halliburton in the deadly April 20, 2010 rig explosion that caused the nation's biggest offshore spill. Transocean owned the Deepwater Horizon rig and Halliburton was BP's cement contractor.

The rig exploded three years ago this week, and the Gulf Coast continues to struggle with its repercussions.

Adam "Ted" Bourgoyne, emeritus Louisiana State University petroleum engineering professor, testified Monday and Tuesday. He said that drilling margins, discussed in the trial, aren't relevant to the blowout because the well was finished, with drill pipe run and cemented, before it exploded. The rig's crew had moved into another phase. "They were in, more or less, a routine operation of doing a temporary abandonment procedure when the blowout happened," he said.

A drilling margin is the difference between pore pressure, exerted by oil and gas in an underground formation, and fracture pressure--which can cause the formation to break and absorb drilling mud. Bourgoyne said Tuesday that a drilling margin is safe when mud weight is greater than pore pressure.

He disagreed with much of what drilling-margin expert Alan Huffman said when he testified early in the trial. In late February, Ph.D geophysicist Huffman told the court that "BP, in drilling its well, repeatedly violated the safe drilling margin, in some cases drilling with no margin at all."

Bourgoyne said the Macondo well was drilled with care. BP and the rig's crew "were following normal industry practice in the decisions they were making and how they were moving forward," he said. In the last interval of drilling in April 2010, "they were responding properly to the borehole observations that they were seeing," he said. "The well was talking to them, and from everything I saw they were listening."

He said the crew and BP people did a good job throughout, "except for this temporary abandonment procedure that they had the problems with."

Bourgoyne said the negative pressure test done on the rig on April 20, 2010 was misinterpreted. The test was a shared responsibility of BP and Transocean and was meant to determine whether cementing had sealed any leaks in the well. Test results were interpreted to show the procedure was successful when it wasn't. That led to the mistaken belief that the well was secure.

"They called it a pass when it was a fail," Bourgoyne said. He considered that quite surprising but said it wasn't intentional. "The people on the rig discussed it as a group," he said. "The Transocean people, the BP people got together, talked about it at length. Someone brought up a possible explanation for the drill pipe pressure and everybody bought into it." It was a group decision. "They had a lot of confidence in one another, and once they made the decision, they were convinced they were right," he said.

Asked if the rig's workers were concerned about the safety of others, Bourgoyne said "from what I saw, the rig crew really worked well together. They cared for each other. They were proud. They were a top-of-the-line crew on a top-of-the-line rig. There was a lot of esprit de corps."

On Tuesday, Morten Emilsen, technology vice president at Add Wellflow, a Norwegian firm specializing in multiphase flow modeling, said the Macondo well was under-balanced on April 20, 2010. Emilsen was an external member of the BP team investigating the accident, and he worked out of Houston for awhile. His task was to learn why oil began to flow from the Macondo well and how it flowed. Based on hundreds of his simulations, he concluded that oil entered the well through a leaking casing shoe or the bottom of the oilfield pipe, and flowed upward. The site's prolific reservoir contributed to a rapid unloading of the well when was it left under-balanced and not closed in, he said.

Emilsen also addressed security issues in Houston, where he was told not to print out documents. "We did not want to have many revisions flying around due to the possibility of leakages," he said.

Steve Robinson, BP's Houston-based vice president for Gulf of Mexico wells and a native of Shreveport, La., testified Tuesday afternoon. He participated in BP executive Mark Bly's internal investigation into the accident. After the explosion, Robinson, with a background in petroleum engineering, interviewed the two BP well-site leaders who were on the Deepwater Horizon on April 20, 2010. He talked to Donald Vidrine at his home in Lafayette, La. and spoke to Robert Kaluza in Las Vegas, Nevada. In those interviews, Vidrine and Kaluza both said they thought the rig's crew conducted a successful pressure test on the day of the disaster.

Asked about the cause of the April 2010 explosion, Robinson said the section of the Bly report that he worked on found "it was the misinterpretation of the negative test, failure to identify loss of well integrity. It was the fact that hydrocarbons flowed into the well undetected and got into the riser, and the fact that initial well-control actions failed to contain the well."

Eleven workers died in the rig explosion. Vidrine and Kaluza, meanwhile, are the only individuals charged in the accident. They're awaiting trial on eleven counts each of manslaughter.

On Tuesday afternoon, Neil Shaw, BP's senior vice president of global products, testified. A UK native trained as a mechanical engineer, he was in charge of the company's Gulf of Mexico operations for two years ending in late 2009. During his GOM tenure, he let everybody in the region know that "safety was the number one priority in everything we did." He said a safe, reliable operation isn't distracted by incidents and investigations.

Shaw held weekly meetings in Houston with his leadership team in 2008 and 2009. "The first thing we always talked about was safety, and we reviewed every single, safety incident that happened in the last week in the business--both personal safety and process safety." Safety was also stressed in regular BP meetings with key contractors, he said.

Questioned about BP's "every dollar counts" motto, Shaw said it meant spending money wisely. He said a precondition of the motto was that safety was not to be affected. "We wanted to be efficient but the bottom line is we would never compromise safety," he said. In the trial, plaintiffs' attorneys have claimed that BP jeopardized safety to finish drilling its Macondo well, which was behind schedule and millions of dollars over budget.

On Thursday, New Orleans native Arthur Zatarain, an electrical engineer, testified that the subsea control system on the rig's blowout preventer couldn't perform on April 10, 2010 because of an improperly wired solenoid valve and a depleted battery. A solenoid is a current-carrying coil of wire. Transocean hadn't followed its own maintenance polices for batteries, Zatarain said. Cameron manufactured the BOP while Transocean was responsible for maintaining the rig and the BOP.

Separately, last Wednesday attorneys for former BP engineer Kurt Mix--who pleaded not guilty a year ago to obstruction of justice for deleting text messages about the company's response to the 2010 spill--claimed federal prosecutors last month added new, "farcical" allegations that he'd deleted voice mails. Mix's attorneys said "the superseding indictment not only fails to mention that AT&T--and not Kurt Mix--might have been responsible for as many as 253 of the 346 voice-mail deletions. But it also misleadingly suggests through use of the passive voice--with 'were deleted'--that Kurt Mix was the culprit behind those deletions."

Phase One of the spill trial could wrap up this week. Judge Barbier will assess the amount of oil spilled in a Phase Two trial, starting in September. He won't rule on negligence and penalties until a third phase, which might begin next January. If BP is found grossly negligent under the Clean Water Act, penalties could be $4,300 per barrel and the company might be forced to pay $17.6 billion.

Three years after the April 2010 disaster, oil and tarmats traced to the Macondo well still appear along Louisiana's coast and the local seafood industry has only partly recovered. end]]> tag:www.huffingtonpost.com,2013:/theblog//3.3036916 2013-04-08T09:47:04-04:00 2013-04-08T09:47:06-04:00

Susan Buchanan http://www.huffingtonpost.com/susan-buchanan/

At the spill trial last week, Halliburton staffer Jesse Gagliano said BP rejected several of his recommendations, jeopardizing the cement pumped at the Macondo well in April 2010. He testified in the trial that began Feb. 25 in U.S. District Court in New Orleans, where Judge Carl Barbier is assessing negligence in the rig explosion that claimed eleven lives. Halliburton rested its case Thursday morning but not before Barbier chastised the Swiss-based, oil-services provider for withholding evidence. BP plans to call it first witnesses Monday.

BP was the well operator and leaseholder, Transocean owned the Deepwater Horizon rig and Halliburton was BP's cement contractor in the April 20, 2010 disaster that caused the nation's biggest offshore spill.

Three years ago, Gagliano was embedded as a Halliburton technical adviser at BP in Houston, where he'd reported for almost five years. He said last week "my sole purpose was to provide cement recommendations and cement support for BP." Halliburton was contracted to seal the Macondo drilling hole with cement to keep gas and oil from flowing into the well. Gagliano is now a Halliburton senior account representative after nearly fourteen years with the company.

A week before Gagliano's April 1 testimony, Transocean capital projects vice-president Bill Ambrose said at the trial that his company's study found a failed cement job was the "precipitating cause" of the April 2010 explosion.

Gagliano heard no complaints from BP, which had final say on how cement jobs were run on its wells, until Macondo-related friction developed in spring 2010. "For the production casing job, we had recommended a number of centralizers that weren't run," he said. "Also, on the retarder concentration I recommended, they decided to go with more concentration."

Oil industry practice is to center a well's casing, or metal tubes, so that channels or paths don't form in surrounding cement. Centralizers are placed around casing sections to allow the cement to make a strong, 360-degree seal between the casing and the borehole. Without enough centralizers, a channel for drilling mud or contaminated cement can develop, providing a path for a later blowout. A tiny crack can become a gushing channel.

Based on modeling Gagliano ran on Halliburton's OptiCem software, he recommended that BP use 21 centralizers at its Macondo well to minimize gas flow potential. BP chose to run only six, however. Gagliano said his model showed that using just six suggested "severe gas flow potential." He tried to get six centralizers to work in his model but "no matter where I placed them and the distance between them, nothing would take care of the channeling."

Gagliano also recommended .08 gallons of retarder concentration for every 94-pound sack of cement at the well, but BP decided to go with .09 gallons. Judge Barbier asked if using a higher concentration of retarder meant it would take longer for the cement to set, and Gagliano said "yes."

Gagliano suggested a full bottoms-up, or flushing, of BP's well before pumping the cement job to see if mud at the bottom of the hole came to the surface. But BP decided to pump only a couple of hundred barrels of fluid, rather do the full bottoms-up, he said.

The Macondo well had a fragile formation, and Gagliano's task was to design a slurry that would work best. He recommended a foam cement slurry and BP agreed. Gagliano said "we had a dry blend on the rig comprised of some additives that were mixed, and then you also add some liquid additives required for the job specifications. You mix it and then you inject nitrogen into it to get the desired weight. Then you go down hole with it."

The dry blend used on the Macondo well remained on the Deepwater Horizon rig when it was moved from the Kodiak well, drilled in 2008 by BP and partners. "It was leftover cement from Kodiak that was actually just transferred on paper to the Macondo well,"and originally purchased by BP from Halliburton, Gagliano said. He suggested BP use it for the foam slurry he was designing even though "I could have sold them additional cement, which would be additional revenue for us."

He said the initial dry blend contained Halliburton's D-Air 3000 defoamer, which is added to cement "to break the air to give it a lot smoother density going down hole." Cement mixed at the surface can become thick and entrap air, changing the cement's weight, he said.

In his testimony, Gagliano dismissed industry concerns about D-Air 3000 having a destabilizing effect on foamed cement slurry. He said a Halliburton liquid additive called ZoneSeal foamer was used to compensate for the defoamer. "And then as long as you test it to verify it's stable, there will be no issues," he said. The slurry design also contained a retarder. On April 18, 2010, he sent an email to BP engineers listing the ingredients and additives in his design and never got any questions back.

BP has since accused Halliburton of knowing that properties of D-Air 3000 and several other additives in Gagliano's slurry design, including the retarder or dispersant SCR-100L, should not have been used with a foam cement slurry.

Gagliano said he provided BP engineers with all the test results they requested. A couple of results from the Broussard, La. lab were identified by Halliburton as "invalid" because the slurry was mixed incorrectly at the facility, he said.

He said that before the April 2010 explosion he believed that if the Macondo cement job failed, BP could go back and pump more cement to rectify problems. He never saw the need to call a stop to the cement job, and looking back he wouldn't have designed the slurry differently. Gagliano--a former U.S. Marine, now in the Marine Corps Forces Reserve--was on the witness stand most of Monday.

Late Monday and Tuesday, Ph.D. mechanical engineer Glen Stevick, Halliburton's expert witness on blowout preventers, testified. He said the drill pipe in BP's well should have been centered before the BOP was activated two days after the blowout. Following the April 20, 2010 explosion, the rig drifted and sank, and the connected drill pipe bent so that the BOP couldn't sever the pipe and seal the well. The BOP wasn't designed to sever the pipe at an angle, he said.

Halliburton's final witness, well-design expert Frederick Beck, said Thursday the Macondo well blew out because "the negative pressure test was ignored, and the well was under-balanced and the formation came in." Responsibility for the blowout lies at levels much higher than the rig's mud logger and cementer. "It was under-balancing the well and allowing it to flow," Beck said. Employees of BP and Transocean were reckless and didn't follow their company's standards, he also said.

On April 20, 2010, a pressure test--a shared responsibility of BP and Transocean--was conducted to see whether cementing had sealed any leaks in the well. The test showed a discrepancy between 1,400 pounds of pressure on the drill pipe and zero pounds of pressure on the kill line. The test was interpreted as successful when it wasn't.

Before Halliburton rested its case Thursday morning, Judge Barbier criticized the company for concealing cement samples from the Kodiak well at its Broussard lab until several weeks ago. Documents were concealed too. He said the samples were relevant to the Macondo trial. "This has been drip, drip, drip, drip, where evidence all of a sudden is discovered," Barbier said.

BP attorneys said they'll call petroleum engineer Ted Bourgoyne as their first witness Monday. BP hopes to finish its case sometime between April 18 and 23.

Last week, Barbier said he won't hold closing arguments at the end of this Phase One trial assessing negligence. He'll allow time for parties involved to submit proposed conclusions at a post-trial briefing. After that, "I may consider whether or not it would be helpful to hold any kind of oral arguments or not," he said.

A Phase Two trial on the size of the spill is expected to begin in U.S. District Court in September, followed by a third phase, probably next January, to decide damages. If BP is found negligent under the Clean Water Act, penalties will be $1,100 per barrel. But if gross negligence is proven, the fine grows to $4,300 per barrel. And if the U.K.-based company is guilty of gross negligence, it could be liable for as much as $17.6 billion under the CWA. end]]> tag:www.huffingtonpost.com,2013:/theblog//3.2989669 2013-03-31T17:33:58-04:00 2013-03-31T17:33:59-04:00

Susan Buchanan http://www.huffingtonpost.com/susan-buchanan/
At the Gulf spill trial last week, a Transocean executive and a company captain testified that the Swiss-based giant hadn't ignored maintenance on its Deepwater Horizon rig, countering what another witness said the week before. In a trial that began Feb. 25 without a jury, Judge Carl Barbier at U.S. District Court in New Orleans is considering blame between Transocean, BP and Halliburton in the April 20, 2010 disaster that eclipsed eleven lives. Transocean owned the Deepwater Horizon rig, BP was the Macondo leaseholder and well operator, and Halliburton was the cement contractor.

Bill Ambrose was a Houston-based director of maintenance and technical support at Transocean when the rig exploded. Asked last week about the condition of the long-gone Deepwater Horizon, he said "it's a nine-year-old rig, so it's not flawless. But overall it was in really good shape." Following the explosion, Ambrose, now a Transocean vice-president for capital projects, was tapped by the company's CEO Steven Newman to lead an internal study. Fourteen months later, his team of at least fifty people issued a report on the accident.

Asked if Transocean had any incentive to run the rig until it breaks, Ambrose said "no, none at all. We build our rigs to work 35 years to 40 years." Questioned about whether the crew might have cut corners on maintenance, he said "no. These guys lived there. There is no incentive to do that kind of thing."

His statements contrasted with the previous week's testimony from plaintiffs' expert and marine-safety specialist Geoffrey Webster, who said the rig was the victim of "reckless neglect" and should have gone into dry dock for extensive repairs.

Asked about 222 overdue maintenance tasks on the Deepwater Horizon on April 20, 2010, Ambrose said "that's actually a good number" and indicated the crew had maintenance under control. The company's internal study considered the 222 tasks and found 30 percent were waiting for parts not on the rig;10 percent were finished but not closed out in the system;10 percent were items needing repairs but not required for safe operations; and 50 percent were low-priority items.

As for spare parts, Ambrose said "there's a limited amount of space on a rig. You can't hold everything. So you have to make your choices about what you keep."

Questioned about whether the rig should have been brought ashore for repairs during its nine years of existence, Ambrose said "it's 20 plus years before you really actually have to take it to a dry dock because we have alternate inspection mechanisms." He also said the rig continually passed routine inspections by the U.S. Coast Guard, the federal Minerals Management Service and others.

Ambrose admitted that many of the rig's alarms were inhibited so that they didn't sound. His explanation for that was "if you have false alarms and too many of them, people aren't going to pay attention to that general alarm. What you want is people to get out of bed and take action when they hear it. You don't want alarm fatigue."

Ambrose said Transocean admits that its crew missed anomalies or signs that it should have acted on during the hour before the blowout. But his internal investigation found that "the precipitating cause" of the blowout was the failure of the cement, provided by Halliburton.

Asked if his study considered whether Transocean's upper managers played a role in the accident, he said "we didn't see anything with regards to the management system that had an impact."

Ambrose said of the rig's safety culture "basically, the evacuation worked, training worked, 115 people made it off. I'm proud of our crew for getting those people off that rig." Among the crew of 126, 115 reached the support-vessel Damon Bankston floating nearby. But nine Transocean and two M-I LLC employees perished that night.

On Monday, David Young, chief mate on the Deepwater Horizon on April 20, 2010 said he was responsible for the marine aspect of maintenance. He is now captain of Transocean's Discoverer Deep Seas. Young said "I think we had an excellent safety culture on the rig," and added that the goal was to get everyone back to their families. Asked whether maintenance items open on the day of the accident made the rig unsafe, he said "not in my opinion."

Young recounted events on the night of the explosion. He heard a very loud release. "So I went back to the bridge. At that time you could tell that we had a blowout. You could see out of the starboard side that we'd had a blowout. There was debris and mud and different stuff initially coming down on the rig."

Young testified "we had the ignition and the explosion. It was just kind of a big ball of fire that came out of the starboard forward side, from where I was looking. Then that initial explosion kind of backed up, and it just went into a fire in the derrick."

He continued "the fire was over our head where we were." He activated the rig's general alarm but couldn't recall if he heard it go off. For various reasons, many of the rig's alarms and sensors were inhibited.

The vessel's Captain Curt Kuchta told Young to put a hose on the fire. Young took the captain outside and showed him the conflagration. When asked if he thought the captain didn't comprehend the event's magnitude, Young said "yes, and it's my responsibility as chief mate and on-scene command to make him understand."

After that, the crew rescued injured coworkers, scrambled onto life boats and rafts and headed to safety on the Damon Bankston. Captain Kuchta dropped into the water, swam to a rescue boat and then swam off to cut a life raft free.

Two people from BP and two from Transocean were visiting the rig that night. Young said the BP visitors "were going over the fact, one of the things that they brought up in the meeting was, that they were commending us on safety and kind of telling us that it was the pride of the BP fleet, basically their appreciation for working with our rig."

Transocean rested its case Tuesday. On Wednesday, the court heard testimony from Halliburton witnesses. Nathaniel Chaisson, a Halliburton cementing engineer, monitored the cement job at BP's Macondo well. He flew to the rig on April 16, 2010, under the impression that 21 centralizers or safety devices would be used on the cement job. But BP had decided it was "going to move forward with only six," he said Wednesday. Chaisson phoned Houston-based, Halliburton technical adviser Jesse Gagliano, who seemed upset about BP's decision. Chaisson said simulations on the particular job suggested that using fewer centralizers would result in channeling. Channeling or an uneven cement flow, leaves cement linings susceptible to a breach.

Richard Strickland, Ph.D. petroleum engineer and president of the Strickland Group in Fort Worth, said Wednesday that tests done by BP petrophysicist Galina Skripnikova in early April 2010 on the Macondo well's hydrocarbon-bearing zone were superficial. On April 13, 2010, she identified the shallowest hydrocarbon-bearing sand at a measured depth of 17,803 feet. But two days after the blowout, BP put it at 17,467 feet. Strickland said BP's analysis of the hydrocarbon-bearing zone changed over time.

Judge Barbier said Tuesday he'll probably wait awhile before ruling on any sanctions against Halliburton for concealing cement at its Broussard, La. lab. In mid-March, Halliburton disclosed that cement from BP's Kodiak well, some of which is believed to have been used at the Macondo well and in that case should have be turned over under subpoenas, was stored in Broussard.

The spill trial adjourned late Wednesday and is scheduled to resume Tuesday after an Easter break. Halliburton plans to call Jesse Gagliano as a witness early Tuesday. Once Halliburton has rested its case, BP is expected to start calling its long list of witnesses. BP attorneys have said they're willing to trim their witnesses to avoid duplication and save the court time. The trial could wind down in late April, barring a settlement before then. end]]> tag:www.huffingtonpost.com,2013:/theblog//3.2941093 2013-03-23T17:54:32-04:00 2013-03-23T17:54:36-04:00

Susan Buchanan http://www.huffingtonpost.com/susan-buchanan/
In the fourth week of the 2010 Gulf spill trial, U.S. District Judge Carl Barbier dropped claims Wednesday against contractors M-I LLC and Cameron International while Halliburton came under increased scrutiny for concealing cement at its Broussard, La. lab.

In the New Orleans-based trial without a jury, Barbier dismissed all claims against M-I LLC, BP's drilling fluids contractor and a subsidiary of Houston-based Schlumberger. The judge saw no evidence that M-I made decisions that led to the Macondo well blowout. In a civil trial that began on Feb. 25, he is assessing blame in the April 2010 explosion off coastal Louisiana that took eleven lives.

Barbier also ruled out punitive damages against Cameron, the manufacturer of the rig's blowout preventer, saying he'd heard nothing in the trial to indicate gross negligence or willful misconduct by that Houston-based company. Two M-I employees died in the Macondo blast but no Cameron staff were on the rig that day.

Barbier said Wednesday it was too soon to rule on requests by BP, Transocean and Halliburton that gross negligence and other claims against them be dismissed in the trial. BP was the Macondo leaseholder and well operator while Transocean owned the Deepwater Horizon rig.

For the second week in a row, questions swirled about cement contractor Halliburton--with dual headquarters in Houston and Dubai--holding back evidence. In a court filing late Thursday, BP lawyers asked Barbier to sanction Halliburton for concealing some cement from the Kodiak well that appears to have been used at the Macondo site too. Sanctions could affect how Halliburton defends itself in court and might reduce BP's and Transocean's liabilities.

On March 13, Halliburton attorney Donald Godwin said the company found Kodiak cement samples that day at its Broussard lab. In Thursday's filing, BP attorneys wrote "this rig sample was responsive to subpoenas, and Halliburton should have produced it years ago so that it could have been tested on a timely basis for use at trial and before it deteriorated further."

In late 2011, BP claimed Halliburton had destroyed test results on lab cement samples. But Halliburton argued back then that the tests weren't done on cement used at the Deepwater Horizon rig.

Last Tuesday, Timothy Quirk, Halliburton's Broussard lab manager from 2008 to mid-2012, testified he had isolated Macondo cement lab samples on April 30, 2010 as instructed. But he later removed Kodiak well samples from that group and placed them on a warehouse shelf.

Quirk said "I gathered all the Transocean rig samples" following the disaster at the request of Tony Angelle, a Halliburton manager. "And when I gave him a list of everything I'd inventoried, he said we just need to secure the Macondo well samples." Quirk listed the Macondo samples and safeguarded them in a locker at the lab. "Everything else I put back into the storage area in our warehouse" in Broussard, he said. Quirk said he didn't know the Kodiak samples were related to the Macondo well.

BP and its contractors drilled the Kodiak in 2008, and leftover materials from it were later used at the Macondo site. Kodiak cement held at Broussard was the same blend as the material used on the Deepwater Horizon on April 17.

BP attorneys contend that at least some of the Kodiak materials in Broussard were not just off-the-shelf or Kodiak-specific lab samples. They wrote late Thursday that "Halliburton admitted the 'Kodiak well cement' had in fact been brought onshore from the Deepwater Horizon when the rig was at the Macondo well."

Additionally, Quirk testified Tuesday that in May 2010 he threw away handwritten notes on cement stability tests related to the Macondo well, after reporting them by phone to Halliburton colleague Ronnie Faul. And Quirk discarded pieces of cement he had tested. The tests were done on lab stock, he said.

Testimony continued last week on other factors that led to the Macondo well explosion. Petroleum engineer Calvin Barnhill, a Transocean expert witness, said Monday "there are three basic, $64 billion questions in this case. Number one, why was the negative pressure test deemed a success?" That test, done on April 20, 2010 to determine whether cementing had sealed any leaks in the well, was interpreted to show the procedure was successful. But the test was inconclusive, Barnhill said.

"Number two, why wasn't the the operation stopped at around 9:00 p.m. and the test repeated?," he asked. "And why wasn't the well shut in at 9:32 or 9:33 p.m. when there was an anomaly?"

Without a successful pressure test, "there was a significant question here as to whether the operation should go forward," Barnhill said. When asked who on the rig decided if the pressure test had passed, he said "the ultimate authority would have rested with BP. They would have made the call whether to accept or reject the test and move forward."

On Tuesday morning, Steve Newman, Transocean president and chief executive officer, told the court "our people failed to follow through on the pressure anomaly that existed on the drill pipe. They accepted BP's assessment that the pressure test had been successful and they accepted BP's instruction to continue on with the displacement of the well."

When questioned about whether Transocean's higher-ups had contributed to the blowout, Newman said "no, we have not identified any failures within the responsibility of management."

Transocean engaged Lloyd's Register Group, a maritime and risk-management organization, to study five of its drilling rigs, including the Deepwater Horizon, in September 2009 following four deaths on four of its rigs over 92 days. In a subsequent July 2010 report, Lloyd's pointed to "a fundamental lack of hazard awareness" within Transocean's North America division.

In testimony Monday, marine safety expert Geoff Webster, the plaintiffs' expert witness on the Deepwater Horizon's seaworthiness, said rig audits revealed that delayed maintenance had been a growing problem. The audits "clearly show that there were not enough people on board, there was not enough equipment for spares and that the rig was going downhill," he said.

Maintenance was behind on everything from pumps and alarms to lifeboats, Webster said. The rig's blowout preventer hadn't been recertified after nine years though certification was required every five years by the federal Mineral Management Service and by Cameron, the BOP's manufacturer.

When asked how he'd characterize the vessel's maintenance history, Webster termed it "reckless neglect." He said "this rig should have gone to a shipyard, at which time all these items could have been taken care of. The vessel had been running for nine years without any major overhaul or any dry dock period."

Webster was asked about a comment from a Transocean employee, included in Lloyd's analysis of the company's North American rigs. The employee had said "run it, break it, fix it. That's how they work."

Those remarks indicated Transocean was more interested in production than safety, Webster said. "When the rig is idle, it's not making money," he explained. "When the rig is in dry dock, it's not making money. So they try to keep it out there as long as they can. They were running it, things were breaking and they were fixing it the best they could."

In another development, federal prosecutors in New Orleans filed an indictment Wednesday against former BP engineer and Texas resident Kurt Mix, alleging that he deleted over fifty phone voice mails about his company's response to the 2010 spill. Last spring, he was charged with deleting text messages related to the spill.

Judge Barbier's Poydras St. trial, which is open to the public, could continue to late April or longer--barring a settlement before then. end]]> tag:www.huffingtonpost.com,2013:/theblog//3.2893108 2013-03-16T18:53:04-04:00 2013-05-16T05:12:02-04:00

Susan Buchanan http://www.huffingtonpost.com/susan-buchanan/

Week three of the Gulf oil spill trial under Judge Carl Barbier in U.S. District Court in New Orleans focused in part on Halliburton's role in the April 20, 2010 disaster. And outside experts testified about other companies and how they contributed to the Macondo well explosion that day. In a trial that began on Feb. 25 without a jury, Barbier is determining blame in the calamity that took eleven lives and caused the nation's worst offshore spill.

The corporate players are BP and it contractors on the well. Halliburton provided cement to BP, which leased the Macondo site in the Gulf from the federal government. Transocean owned the Deepwater Horizon rig and was hired by BP to drill the well. Cameron produced the blowout preventer sold to Transocean. And M-I Swaco provided drilling fluids.

On Monday, attorneys questioned Tim Probert, Halliburton's president of strategy and corporate development, about tests on cement following the Macondo explosion. Under a federal-court preservation order in late April 2010, the company was required to hold cement and additives used at the Macondo site. But some of the samples were later removed by Halliburton employees for testing, and test results weren't recorded. BP in court papers filed in late 2011 alleged that Halliburton destroyed data from tests on cement slurry used at the Macondo.

Probert was asked in court Monday if he knew about off-the-record tests done by Halliburton employees after April 20, 2010. He said "yes, I did become aware of some irregularities in the testing post the incident through counsel, through regulatory briefings, and I think it was from some Securities and Exchange Commission files as well."

When asked Monday "were you angry when someone told you two years later, after you had testified, that in fact evidence had been destroyed?" He said "yeah, obviously it doesn't make you feel happy." He had testified at Congressional hearings on the spill in May 2010.

On Monday and Tuesday, Tom Roth, Halliburton's vice president of cementing, told the court about "red flags for BP" at the Macondo well. When questioned about those flags, he said "they were indicators that the cement placement was going to be a job that would have a low probability of success. It would take perfect conditions for a successful cement job under those conditions."

Roth was asked "if these were red flags for BP, why weren't these red flags for Halliburton and why didn't Halliburton use its 'stop work' authority?" Roth said "because at the end of the cement job, the well is dead. The well has a full column of mud. There has been no flow."

Roth was also questioned about a mid-April 2010 email from BP drilling engineer Brian Morel to his boss, senior drilling engineer Mark Hafle, saying "Jesse isn't cutting it anymore," referring to Halliburton technical adviser Jesse Gagliano--who worked in BP's Houston office. The bottom of Morel's email said, "I asked for these lab tests to be completed multiple times early last week, and Jesse still waited until the last minute as he has done throughout this well. This doesn't give us enough time to tweak the slurry to meet our needs."

Roth was asked about tests conducted on the cement slurry before the late April 20, 2010 explosion. Results from three of four tests showed the mixture was unstable.

In a fresh development last week, Halliburton lawyer Donald Godwin said in an email to the court late Wednesday that Halliburton was investigating whether cement samples found that day at its lab in Broussard, La. should have been turned over under earlier subpoenas. After court testimony from Halliburton's officers early last week, the company's attorneys consulted the lab and learned that material from the Kodiak well was still at the facility. BP and contractors drilled the Kodiak in 2008, and leftover material from it was used at the Macondo well.

But Godwin told Judge Barbier Thursday that the Kodiak materials located Wednesday weren't used at the Macondo and had been held in segregation. "They have not been touched," he said. "They have been sitting there." Godwin said he wanted to give the court full disclosure on the matter. He also said Halliburton believes the findings at Broussard Wednesday aren't relevant to the current trial.

In testimony Wednesday, Halliburton/Sperry Drilling mug-logger Joe Keith said he began his April 20, 2010 shift on the Deepwater Horizon at 6:00 p.m. Under examination, he agreed that many simultaneous activities on the rig that evening hampered how he typically monitored for a kick. A kick, an entry of gas or fluid into a well, can cause a blowout. A "displacement" of drilling mud with seawater was underway at the well that day and evening, along with other procedures because the rig was about to be moved to a different location. In his almost 20 years of working offshore, Keith had never seen so much activity at once during a displacement.

Keith detected no signs of a kick from the data he received in his mud log office that evening. But at 9:30 p.m., "I heard the sound of rain and so forth, and then the gas came in the unit," he said. "I noticed they turned the pumps off." Drilling mud was raining down. Keith fled his shack, assisted other crew members and escaped by life boat to the offshore vessel Damon Bankston. The rig exploded at 9:49 or 9:50 p.m. Keith testified that in all his years on the job, he'd never missed a kick.

When asked why the Macondo was called "the well from hell," Keith said "the original rig that drilled the first few sections had trouble when they had to set, I think it was, the 20-inch casing. They had to set it a little bit higher because, I think, they took a shallow hazard kick. The rig might have gotten damaged in a storm, and they got the Horizon to take its place. As soon as we latched up to it with the blowout preventers, they accidentally pressured up the wrong way." He added "and then on every wellbore section, we had problems--lost returns, kicks, getting stuck, loss circulation materials, gas problems." Keith now works for Halliburton/Sperry on land, doing technical support in Broussard.

Four employes of Halliburton, the world's largest cementing service to the oil and gas industry, were on the Macondo rig when it exploded, and all four survived.

Early last week, mechanical engineer Rory Davis, a federal expert witness on blowout preventers, continued his court testimony from the week before. He said Transocean's lack of maintenance on the blowout preventer's batteries and Solenoid 103, a current-carrying coil of wire, kept the BOP from functioning properly. Cameron manufactured the BOP sold to Transocean, which was responsible for maintaining the rig and the BOP.

Davis testified that hydrocarbons were already above the BOP and in the well's riser pipe on April 20, 2010 when the BOP's annular preventer--a bag-type or spherical preventer to stop the well's flow--was first activated. Hydrocarbons in the riser caused explosions on the rig, he said. No Cameron employees were on the rig when the disaster occurred.

Two days after the Macondo blowout, when an automatic function activated its shears, the BOP didn't have the power to sever the well's drill pipe, which was leaning too far for a clean cut, Davis said. The rig had drifted off location within hours of the explosion. The off-center drill pipe prevented the BOP's blind shear rams--the pressure-control equipment needed to seal the well--from closing the wellbore. Better BOP shears could have sealed the well, Davis said.

In early September 2010, the Macondo's BOP stack was raised from the Gulf and transferred to the NASA-Michoud facility in New Orleans for forensic analysis.

On Tuesday, mechanical engineer Gregg Perkin, a plaintiffs' expert witness on blowout preventers, said operators weren't able to control the BOP on April 20, 2010 because its MUX or multiplexer cables didn't work. "An acoustic trigger may have been, or probably would have been, a way to activate the BOP" without the MUX cables, he said. BP and Transocean didn't install an acoustic trigger on the BOP. Acoustic triggers aren't required or used in the Gulf of Mexico but they are common on rigs in the North Sea and Brazil.

When asked if acoustic triggers can receive false signals, Perkin said Tuesday the trigger has potential problems but "having a backup system, rather than no backup system, is a preferred solution."

On Thursday, plaintiffs' expert Geoff Webster, a marine safety expert, said Transocean shouldn't have operated the Deepwater Horizon for nine years without bringing it ashore for maintenance and repairs.
The spill trial will continue Monday through Thursday into May at the federal courthouse on Poydras St. unless a settlement is reached before then. end]]> tag:www.huffingtonpost.com,2013:/theblog//3.2845674 2013-03-09T18:08:09-05:00 2013-05-09T05:12:01-04:00

Susan Buchanan http://www.huffingtonpost.com/susan-buchanan/

In the second week of a milestone spill trial at U.S. District Court in New Orleans, oil experts last week spoke about the technical and physical challenges inherent in deepwater drilling. In the admiralty trial, Judge Carl Barbier will determine blame between well-operator BP and its contractors Transocean, Halliburton, Cameron and M-I Swaco in the 2010 accident that caused eleven fatalities, many injuries and the nation's worst offshore spill. The companies face stiff penalties, beyond what BP and Transocean have already paid for their roles in the catastrophe.

On Monday, attorneys for Transocean, Halliburton and Cameron continued to cross-examine Mark Bly, BP's group head of safety and operations, from the previous week. Bly was asked about an April 20, 2010 phone conversation between BP's onshore drilling engineer Mark Hafle and Don Vidrine, a BP well site leader on the Deepwater Horizon, less than 50 minutes before the rig exploded.

They discussed an abnormality--a discrepancy between 1,400 pounds of pressure on the drill pipe and zero pounds of pressure on the kill line. That meant that a negative pressure test done the same day and interpreted as okay wasn't successful. The test, a shared responsibility of BP and Transocean, was conducted to see if cementing had sealed leaks in the well.

The conversation between Hafle and Vidrine wasn't included in BP's Sept. 10, 2010 assessment of the accident, known as the Bly report. Bly was asked if he had avoided casting blame on BP's onshore staff in the report. He responded that his intention was "to understand what had happened and what allowed it to happen."

Bly testified that BP's onshore engineers had access to real-time mudlog and other data from the rig on computer screens in their offices.

Bly was asked about his testimony, from the week before, about BP's lack of access to Transocean and Halliburton employees for interviews as having hampered BP's post-accident investigation. Bly said Monday "I think I said we had access to some of the Halliburton folks, but none of the Transocean folks."

An attorney for Halliburton pointed out, however, that the Bly report says "the team used information that was made available by other companies, including Transocean, Halliburton and Cameron." Halliburton's attorney also noted that a court injunction prevented the company from providing BP with certain rig-sample information after the accident.

As for the quality of Halliburton's cement job, an April 20, 2010 email from BP drilling engineer Brian Morel to others at BP, including drilling team leader Greg Walz, drilling engineer Mark Hafle and wells team leader John Guide, was displayed in the courtroom. The message said "just wanted to let know you that the Halliburton cement team they sent out did a great job."

Bly was questioned about why, in preparation for a cement job to close up the well, BP decided to use only six "centralizers," which were needed to ensure that the casing ran down the center of the well bore, when Halliburton recommended using 21 centralizers.

Bly was also asked whether a severe well-control event was under way when efforts were made to activate the blowout preventer or BOP. He answered "in hindsight, it certainly appears to have been."

Between the time the well started to flow on April 20, 2010 and anyone tried to activate the BOP, fifty minutes had elapsed and hydrocarbons were rushing to the surface.

On Monday, geoscience professor Andrew Hurst at the University of Aberdeen, a geologist who worked for Statoil and Unocal, testified that rocks in the Mississippi Submarine Canyon area--where the Macondo well was located--are more fragile than elsewhere in the Gulf of Mexico. Earthquakes occur in the Mississippi Canyon but don't in other parts of the GOM. He discussed two quakes in the canyon in 2006, one of 5.2 magnitude in February, followed by another in April of magnitude 6. The April quake occurred three years before the Macondo well was drilled, and may have destroyed rocks 15,000 to 20,000 feet below sea level, he said.

"In the Mississippi Submarine Canyon, the leak-off pressures are so low, the rocks are so fragile that they're going to require extreme caution when designing drilling programs," Hurst said. Leak-off pressure values are measurements of the maximum drilling mud pressure a well can tolerate before it fractures.

Hurst said Monday that the Macondo well fractured because rocks around the borehole wall disintegrated.

He discussed the Golden Zone, a concept developed in the last decade by a Statoil manager for an area where 90 percent of the world's oil occurs. Declines in temperature as drillers go deeper underground are taken into account in Golden Zone modeling. "The big deal about temperature is that, from looking at all the data from the Gulf of Mexico, we can see there's a clear relationship between temperature and pore pressure," Hurst said. Pore pressure refers to pressure exerted by oil and gas in an underground formation. "And it's pore pressure that we need to be able to predict, so we can understand where and when we're going to locate pockets of high pressure during the drilling of a well or when we go into a reservoir," he said.

But Hurst said it didn't appear that BP used temperature as a predictor of pore pressure in the Macondo well. "They use principles which are actually well known not to be particularly successful and even very, very difficult to make predictions" with, he said.

When asked about use of the Golden Zone concept, he said "my understanding is that many more companies are now actually incorporating thermal controls into their models for predicting pore pressure."

Transocean's senior toolpusher on the Deepwater Horizon, Miles Ezell, with 33 years of oilfield experience, testified Monday and Tuesday. He saved the lives of Transocean employees Wyman Wheeler and Buddy Trahan on April 20, 2010, and the three escaped on a life raft to the offshore vessel Damon Bankston. Ezell testified that Jason Anderson, who he referred to as a top-notch, senior toolpusher, and others on the rig--including BP supervisors--misjudged the results of the negative pressure test done that day.

But, he said, BP's well site leaders on the rig were responsible for deciding how such tests were performed and for interpreting results.

Anderson was one of the workers who died on the rig. Meanwhile on the Damon Bankston, looking across the water at the Deepwater Horizon, "we sat there and watched everybody perish and the rig burn," Ezell said. "You can never take that away. Once this picture is in your brain, it's there."

Ezell said all deepwater wells are "very difficult and have their own unique challenges." He's still employed by Transocean but is now working in a training center in Brazil.

On Tuesday and Wednesday, Ronny Sepulvado, a BP well site leader, testified. When asked why the Macondo well was behind schedule, he said "they had another rig on the well and a storm came through and messed up some of the electrical equipment on it." That rig was removed. "Then they moved the Horizon on the well, and we had several lost circulation events during drilling. I think we took a kick during drilling. So we were behind." A kick is an entry of gas or fluid into the well, capable of causing a blowout.

When asked if BP adopted an "every dollar counts" culture on the Deepwater Horizon, Sepulvado said "yes, we did." He explained it was implemented "by getting equipment out later for jobs and getting it in earlier, and not letting it sit on the rig for long periods of time." He said safety had not been comprised for every-dollar-counts, however. Sepulvado wasn't on the rig when it exploded because his well control certificate was about to expire.

Also testifying Wednesday was Canadian drilling consultant Richard Heenan, a witness for the federal government. He spoke about the negative pressure test on April 20, 2010, and said "I couldn't believe that, given what they saw, people on the rig came to the conclusion it was a successful test."

Heenan continued "they had run the test and declared it successful, and they were moving ahead with the next phase of the operation." Had the test been viewed as unsatisfactory, it would have been rerun, he said.

On Wednesday and Thursday, federal expert witness Glen Benge, an oil-field cement consultant with 36 years of experience, said testing done by Halliburton on its cement mixture up to April 17, 2010 showed "anomalous" or problematic results. Those results should have been examined to see if the slurry needed to be redesigned. BP was the final decision maker on using the cement job, he said. Though BP knew of problems with the cement mixture, it was not redesigned.

Moreover, BP's decision to use six centralizers, rather than 21 advised by Halliburton, left a narrow space around a side of the drill pipe, Benge said. Cement pumped around the pipe couldn't fill the slim side, leaving a channel which filled with drilling mud and allowing hydrocarbons to travel to the surface.

Cement pumped into the Macondo well on April 19, 2010 had not hardened when a negative pressure test was run the next day, Benge also said.

Federal expert witness Rory Davis, a Ph.D. mechanical engineer, testified Friday that lack of maintenance to the blowout preventer, including batteries not being replaced, contributed to the BOP's failure. A BOP is a large, mechanical device, used to control and seal wells. BP was aware of these maintenance issues, he said.

On Monday, the trial continues with cross-examination of Davis about the BOP. The trial, which is open to the public, should extend into May unless a settlement is hammered out before then. The trial runs from 8:00 a.m. to 6:00 p.m. Monday to Thursday in Eastern District Court on Poydras St. in New Orleans. If you plan to visit the court, bring a photo ID, be prepared to clear a security checkpoint and dress warmly because the courtroom is frigid. end]]> tag:www.huffingtonpost.com,2013:/theblog//3.2798088 2013-03-02T15:28:06-05:00 2013-05-02T05:12:02-04:00

Susan Buchanan http://www.huffingtonpost.com/susan-buchanan/
A landmark environmental trial kicked off last week at United States District Court in New Orleans as Eastern District of Louisiana Judge Carl Barbier began the process of deciding the faults of BP, Transocean, Halliburton, Cameron and M-I Swaco in the April 20, 2010 drilling disaster off Louisiana's coast.

BP was the operator and leased the Macondo site in the Gulf from the federal government. Transocean owned the Deepwater Horizon rig and was hired by BP to drill the well. Halliburton was contracted by BP to provide cement. Cameron produced the blowout preventer sold to Transocean. M-I Swaco was contracted by BP to provide drilling fluids and services.

In the accident, workers prepared to temporarily cap the Macondo well more than 4,000 feet under water when it exploded. At the time, 126 crew members were on board. The drilling vessel burned for two days before collapsing in the Gulf. Eleven lives were lost and many workers were injured. In the next three months, oil was discharged into the Gulf before the well could be capped. Later, the well was permanently sealed with a relief well.

"In August 2010, numerous individual lawsuits stemming from these events were consolidated before this court in what's called a multidistrict litigation," Judge Barbier said Monday. Plaintiffs or claimants in the trial include the United States, Louisiana and Alabama, private individuals, businesses and others. In an admiralty trial without a jury, Judge Barbier will decide whether BP and Transocean acted with gross negligence or willful misconduct.

BP, which was running late and $50 million over budget in drilling its well, ignored safety standards and caused the biggest offshore U.S. spill ever, plaintiffs' attorneys said last week.

The federal government is pursuing claims under the Oil Pollution Act of 1990 and the Clean Water Act of 1972. CWA civil penalties are based on whether the polluter acted with gross negligence or willful misconduct and on how much oil was leaked.

Barring a possible settlement during the trial, Barbier will decide how much BP and its drilling-project partners will be penalized for their roles in the disaster, beyond what they've been fined so far. BP has already committed $37 billion to cleanup, coastal restoration and various other payouts, settlements and fines. Its liabilities could be tens of billions of dollars more if Barbier decides BP was grossly negligent.

Phase One of the trial will last 54 days over three months, Barbier said, and will determine fault in the loss of well control, the ensuing explosion, the rig's sinking and the initial release of oil. A Phase Two trial will likely to start in September to examine evidence relating to spill response and the amount of oil that escaped the well. A third phase, probably in 2014, will consider environmental and economic damages.

Monday began with opening statements that aren't binding evidence. James Roy of Domengeaux Wright Roy & Edwards, LLC in Layette, La., a plaintiffs' lawyer representing individuals and businesses, pointed fingers at BP, Transocean, Halliburton and Cameron.

Roy said a negative pressure test--which was a shared responsibility of BP and Transocean--was misread in spring 2010. The test, meant to determine whether cementing had sealed any leaks in the well, was interpreted to show the procedure was successful when it wasn't. That led to the mistaken belief that the well was secure, Roy said.

Transocean failed to discover a major gas kick on April 20, 2010, he said. A kick is an entry of gas or fluid into the well, capable of causing a blowout. "Transocean's own standards state that a kick that's over 20 barrels is code red and critical," Roy said. The Macondo kick was off the chart, exceeding 700 barrels. It took 50 minutes to detect the kick and subsequent shut-in efforts were unsuccessful.

Roy said "an overarching Transocean management failure to adequately train the crew directly contributed to the events leading to the blowout." He said automatic signals, which would have indicated an influx of gas, had been set in passive mode, removing them from service. Alarms were inhibited to avoid waking rig workers who were sleeping, he said.

Roy also said the rig's crew could have activated an emergency shutdown system, but didn't. "After the blowout, there was chaos and mayhem on the bridge, shouts, directions being yelled that weren't being enacted," he said. The rig's "Captain Kutcha had a deer-in-the-headlights look, was overwhelmed, dazed and confused."

Transocean's lack of maintenance on the Deepwater Horizon's blowout preventer or BOP was a major cause of the disaster, Roy said. Audits had warned BP and Transocean that the BOP was out of certification, violating industry standards.

"Transocean willfully continued to lease the Deepwater Horizon, making over a half million dollars a day, instead of bringing the vessel into a shipyard for repairs of the BOP and other critical equipment," Roy said. BP was aware of design and maintenance problems on the rig. "BP knew all of this, and still in late 2009 chartered the Deepwater Horizon to finish the Macondo well," he said. Since the drilling was first put into service in 2001, it had never been to port for maintenance. He also said Cameron's blowout preventer was flawed and Halliburton's mud--leftover from BP's Kodiak well--was unstable.

BP's executives pressured BP rig management to reduce costs by cutting corners and rushing through
work. "Macondo was described variously by BP personnel as the well from hell, a nightmare well and a crazy well," Roy said. In the months before the April 2010 disaster, four kicks and other incidents resulted in the loss of 668,000 gallons of mud, he noted. Roy said a push to complete the well caused so many changes to plans that John Guide, BP's wells-team leader in Houston, said three days before the disaster "the well-site leaders have finally come to their wits' end."

Roy said BP's executives created a culture that valued profit and production over safety and protection. From 2008 to 2009, BP management slashed costs by $4 billion and laid off 20 percent of its world workforce, with plans for another $1.4 billion in cuts in 2010.

In an effort to improve safety, BP executives in London implemented an operations management system or OMS well before the April 2010 disaster but didn't extend it to their leased drilling vessels, including the Deepwater Horizon, Roy said.

"The evidence will prove the Deepwater Horizon was un-seaworthy on April 20, 2010 and had been for many months, if not years," Roy said. "Transocean and BP both knew it. The evidence will also prove the negligence of BP, Transocean, Halliburton and Cameron. And the evidence will prove the defendants' gross negligence and willful and reckless conduct."

In his opening statement Monday, Michael Underhill, lead attorney for the U.S. Dept. of Justice, said actions and inaction by BP's well-site leaders and the company's senior drilling engineer in Houston in the rig's final hour will show BP was primarily responsible for the blowout and what followed.

Louisiana Attorney General Buddy Caldwell, in his statement Monday, said the Pelican State was ground zero for the disaster. BP, in its application to drill, told the state there was no risk of oil reaching the shore 48 miles away. "Today, less than 30 miles from the door of this courthouse, Your Honor, over 212 miles of Louisiana coast are being polluted and continue to be oiled, especially Barataria Bay and Breton Sound," Caldwell said. Louisiana accounted for sixty percent of all Gulf oiling from the spill and for 58 percent of injured wildlife collected.

Caldwell provided more statistics. "Based on an inspection of half of Louisiana's shoreline--with BP refusing to inspect the other half--we've got 660 miles of marsh and shoreline oiled," he said. One million barrels of oil are unaccounted for. Over 9 million pounds of oil and material were removed from the Louisiana coast between June 2011 and December 2012. In 2011, operations crews pulled more than a million pounds of oily material from subsurface mats on Elmer's Island. Twenty-eight new oil mats were discovered and removed from Louisiana's shore last year.

In the several months after Hurricane Isaac last September, 1.7 million pounds of oily material were recovered in the state.

This year, oil balls and mats have been recovered weekly from the state's shores and beaches. "We continue to be adversely affected, " Caldwell said. "This trial will show that BP and its contractors, all of them, bear some responsibility. They acted in a grossly negligent manner."

Last Tuesday, Robert Bea, University of California at Berkeley professor emeritus of civil and environmental engineering, testified about risk management in offshore drilling. He was a risk consultant to BP before the spill. Bea is an expert on "process safety," a set of approaches to prevent catastrophic failures involving complex engineered, human-based systems. He said process safety dates back to farming decisions made 5,000 years ago in the Tigris-Euphrates Valley. Personal safety is a subset of process safety, he said.

"BP management knowingly ignored process safety and risk management for deepwater exploration wells drilled by contractor-owned, mobile offshore drilling units," Bea said. Process safety wasn't implemented on the Deepwater Horizon project, with "tragic, egregious" consequences, he said.

Bea said BP had a culture of "every dollars counts," equivalent to the National Aeronautics and Space Administration's mantra of "better, faster, cheaper" that got that agency into trouble.

Bea also said downsizing, reorganization and outsourcing, all of which had occurred at BP before the blowout, can make a company brittle. "Brittle companies are at increased risk for major accidents," he said.

Lamar McKay, chief executive of BP's Upstream unit and the former president and chairman of BP America at the time of the blowout, testified late Tuesday and early Wednesday. He said operating the Deepwater Horizon rig was a responsibility shared between BP and its contractors. "Sometimes contractors manage risk, sometimes we do, " he said. "Most of the time it's a team effort."

McKay also said "the operating management system that we have utilizes our own safety systems for our own facilities, and recognizes and utilizes contractors' safety management systems for their facilities." Companies in addition to BP had safety roles before the accident, he said.

On Wednesday, the court heard from geophysicist Alan Huffman of Fusion Petroleum Technologies Inc., an expert on well drilling margins. A drilling margin is the difference between pore pressure--or how much pressure oil and gas in an underground formation exerts--and fracture pressure, from which the formation would begin to break and absorb drilling muds.

Huffman said "the most critical aspect of well control is maintaining a safe drilling margin. Keeping the mud balanced so that you're maintaining that margin, but also protecting for the kicks on the low side, is the basic principal." He added "it's the protection against losing control of the well."

Huffman said "BP, in drilling its well, repeatedly violated the safe drilling margin, in some cases drilling with no margin at all." Moreover, BP repeatedly misreported or didn't report critical information to federal regulator Minerals Management Service. He said after a kick in the Macondo well occurred during an interval in drilling, indicating pressure was unstable, work went ahead anyway. "It is truly egregious to drill that extra 100 feet, knowing you could lose the well in the process," Huffman said.

On Wednesday in the courtroom, attorneys for the federal government and Gulf Coast residents and businesses showed a 20-minute videoed deposition from former BP chief executive Tony Hayward in June 2011. Hayward said BP's cost-cutting in the years before the 2010 spill didn't effect drilling operations.

On Wednesday afternoon and Thursday morning, Mark Bly, a civil and structural engineer who will retire from BP this spring, testified. He led the BP team that produced a document known as the Bly Report in September 2010, focusing on errors rig workers made before the explosion. In the report, BP took some responsibility for mistakes leading to the disaster but also blamed its partners. BP didn't explore the role of upper-level managers in the catastrophe.

Bly said Wednesday that BP's investigation wasn't intended to look at the disaster through the "lens of responsibility." And he said his team didn't have enough information for a "systemic evaluation" of what caused the Macondo blowout because it lacked cooperation from Transocean and other companies involved.

Last week, Judge Barbier said the trial would run 54 days, with 53 listed expert witnesses, including 23 provided by BP. An attorney for BP said the company is willing to trim the number of its witnesses.

On Jan. 29, BP pleaded guilty in Eastern District of Louisiana to 14 criminal counts, including 11 felony counts of manslaughter following a Justice Dept. probe, and agreed to pay $4 billion in penalties in the biggest U.S. criminal resolution ever. On Feb. 14, Transocean pled guilty to one misdemeanor count of violating the Clean Water Act and agreed to pay $400 million in criminal penalties.

In addition to attorneys, others attending the current trial include environmental groups, news reporters and interested citizens. Buddy Trahan, a former Transocean employee who was on the rig when it exploded, followed the proceedings last week. His lawyer Lance Lubel said Trahan is believed to be the most seriously injured of the victims who survived the 2010 explosion. "To date, he has had eleven surgeries with several more expected, twelve broken bones, sixteen scars, nine deep lacerations, burns over 25 percent of his body, a closed head injury, post-traumatic stress disorder and many other injuries," Lubel said. end]]> tag:www.huffingtonpost.com,2013:/theblog//3.2778998 2013-02-28T01:03:16-05:00 2013-04-29T05:12:01-04:00

Susan Buchanan http://www.huffingtonpost.com/susan-buchanan/
New Orleans officials hope to move residents toward a consensus this spring about whether to remove or keep the 1960s-era Claiborne expressway that destroyed African American neighborhoods in Treme, the Seventh Ward and vicinity.

Last week, Peter Park, a Denver-based city planner who oversaw the tear-down of Milwaukee's freeway, advised New Orleanians to "get involved in the Claiborne corridor study and own the plan. This isn't a government project, it's a people project." Park, a Harvard University 2012 Loeb fellow, spoke to a packed room at the Sojourner Truth Neighborhood Center in New Orleans on Feb. 20. He was joined by John Norquist, president of the Congress for the New Urbanism in San Francisco and a former Milwaukee mayor.

The New Orleans study, funded with $2 million in planning grants from the U.S. Dept. of Housing and Urban Development and the Dept of Transportation and more from local nonprofits and the city, is mulling what to do with the overpass.

Flozell Daniels, Jr., president of the Foundation for Louisiana and chair of the Livable Claiborne Communities project, spoke last Wednesday about the city's study--which he noted will make recommendations on land use and transportation for the stretch of Claiborne between Napoleon Ave. and Elysian Fields.

Late last year, over 400 residents attended workshops held across town by Mayor Mitch Landrieu's
Office of Place Based Planning. Locals grouped by tables pored over maps and identified issues they want the Claiborne project to address. Daniels said items topping that collective list so far are blight reduction, affordable housing, jobs, opportunities for small businesses, access to fresh food and preservation of local culture. He said ways to redevelop Claiborne are still being assessed and urged residents to attend the city's next workshops in mid-March.

According to the city, the Claiborne study will help communities improve transit; connect housing to jobs, schools and healthcare; promote livability through economic development; and manage water and soil.

Views from residents in public meetings from last fall to March 2013 will be compiled this spring for a presentation by the city in June. After that, scenarios for Claiborne will be evaluated under the more than 40-year-old National Environmental Policy Act or NEPA, approved by Congress. "A preferred alternative" for Claiborne will be identified this summer, according to the city.

Meanwhile, a trend to remove urban highways has been under way for awhile. Park said to connect neighborhoods, Milwaukee tore down its Park East Freeway in 2002 and replaced it with public stairways, pedestrian bridges and parks, mixed-income housing, and commercial and retail spaces.

Norquist pointed to recent success in Seoul, South Korea, where the mayor demolished a freeway in 2011 and developed parks in a move so popular that he was then elected the nation's president. San Francisco, Seattle, Portland, New York City and Buffalo, along with Paris, France and other cities in the U.S., Europe and Asia, have all removed freeways.

So what's wrong with urban highways? Built forty to fifty years ago, U.S. expressways are decaying now and need to be replaced or removed, Park said. "They're not Roman aqueducts," he said. "At some point, they'll come down." Park said urban freeways do more harm than good. Fifty years ago, the idea was to use them to connect cities. "They were going to be built to the outskirts of town, and from there traffic would be funneled into a network of urban streets," he explained. Instead, many were constructed across town, disrupting neighborhoods.

Park said freeways work best at off-peak times. During rush hour, they siphon traffic along an artery and become clogged. Commuters get backed up after an accident and can be stranded for an hour or so. A more effective approach is a sturdy street network, on which drives to work may take a bit longer but little time is wasted in big traffic jams.

He said many city residents falsely believe that an urban freeway gives them greater mobility. Based on that thinking, taxpayer money has been spent on adding lanes to freeways that don't ease congestion in the long run.

Park also noted that urban freeways have reduced adjacent property values, and he questioned whether tax dollars should be spent on projects that hurt home and business owners.

As for businesses, their support in removing a freeway can be instrumental to a tear-down, Norquist said. When the city of Milwaukee wanted to remove the Park East Freeway, Wisconsin Governor Tommy Thompson wasn't keen on the idea but changed his mind after Harley-Davidson, based in Milwaukee, said if the highway were gone, the company would build a museum in the revitalized area.

Also speaking at the Sojourner Center on Feb. 20 was Ellen Lee, senior vice president at the Greater New Orleans Foundation. She grew up in Treme near the expressway, and her mother still lives there. Lee said the Claiborne project is expected to address income levels in the area, and noted "President Obama says working families shouldn't be living in poverty." She's optimistic that the adjacent BioDistrict of New Orleans, where two hospitals are under construction now, will create good jobs.

As of last summer, 27 percent of the city's residents lived in poverty, well above the national average of 15 percent, according to the New Orleans Community Data Center.

On the technical side, Park said studies and urban plans are two different animals. "Studies are done to analyze while plans are a statement of what we want something to be," he said. And he cited a city planner's credo, saying "to plan is human, to implement is divine." If that sounds familiar, it's a variation on a biblical teaching that humans are implements of a divine plan.

As for New Orleans, Park said the city impressed the world with its resilience after Katrina and can be a role model for other urban areas if it revives the Claiborne corridor.

The Feb. 20 event was organized by the Congress for the New Urbanism and the Claiborne Corridor Improvement Coalition, with support from the Greater New Orleans Foundation and the Ford Foundation.

Livable Claiborne Communities will hold workshops on March 16 at Joseph A. Craig Elementary School on St. Philip St. in New Orleans and on March 18 at Ashe Cultural Arts Center on O.C. Haley Blvd. To learn more, visit www.LivableClaiborne.com on the web. end]]> tag:www.huffingtonpost.com,2013:/theblog//3.2714139 2013-02-18T23:31:45-05:00 2013-04-20T05:12:01-04:00

Susan Buchanan http://www.huffingtonpost.com/susan-buchanan/
Seafood sales rise in the more than forty days from Ash Wednesday to Easter, helping some south Louisiana vendors by as much as fifty percent as tastes turn from Mardi Gras king cakes to oysters, shrimp and crabs. But the region's Lenten consumption isn't what it used to be. Sellers have been hit by multiple blows on the demand side, including Asian competition and lost business since the BP spill. Supply-side whammies have also taken a toll.

On Ash Wednesday, April Michel, saleswoman at Amy's Seafood in the Westwego seafood market, said "Lent in recent years has been slower than it was before the 2010 BP spill and Katrina in 2005." Over twenty vendors run stalls at the Westwego market or Shrimp Lot on the West Bank of New Orleans. Early last Wednesday, salespeople were at their posts serving a few customers. "People haven't trusted seafood since the spill," Michel said. Oyster supplies have remained smaller since then, too. But because of relative tightness, "some vendors are putting a 'tax' on oysters and jacking prices up a little," she said.

Michel said consumers who still eat seafood are watching their spending and many have turned to giant discounters. "Walmart's killing us with their prices and most of what they're selling isn't local," she said. "It's from Indonesia, China and other Asian countries."

Meanwhile, at Captain Johnny Smith Oyster Packing Plant on Earhart Blvd. in New Orleans, owner John Smith last week said oysters aren't as plentiful or as fat as they were before the spill. "It's something people in the business notice but we're not sure why it's happened," he said. "It may be because of the dispersant that was used" to break up BP oil. Smith said local oyster prices rose in 2010 as fishing was restricted during and after the spill. Prices haven't declined much since. Louisiana oysters might sell for 5 percent more this Lent than a year ago, he said.

Michel said the local oyster season won't really get under way until this spring. And she said to provide year-round, Louisiana shrimpers go out into the Gulf as far as they have to. "We're supplied by double rigs that stay out for 28 days and flash freeze their catch on the boat," she said. "That's how we're able to sell local shrimp twelve months a year." Last week, the stall where she works offered Louisiana shrimp at between $2.75 and $5.00 a pound.

Crawfish, which are are mostly farm raised in Louisiana, are plentiful now because of a wet winter, Michel said. As for Gulf fish, "we sell two varieties of red snapper two months of the year each," she said, citing restrictions on them so they won't be overfished and disappear.

Smith pointed to a northern change since the spill. "U.S. East Coast restaurants couldn't depend on us in 2010," he said. "Since then, the East Coast oyster industry has put resources into its beds and replenished them. Restaurants up there can buy local oysters and save the $1,800 or more in freight it costs them to bring a truckload in from Louisiana."

Smith said the wholesale side of Louisiana's seafood business has been hurt by big-box establishments like Restaurant Depot, which opened a couple of years ago on South Broad in New Orleans. He said "they sell oysters, chicken, napkins and anything a restaurant needs. It's one stop for the restaurants, cutting out the wholesaler." Restaurants and nonprofits sign up for free membership cards to shop at Restaurant Depot, headquartered in Chicago.

On the supply side, Smith said the possible construction of new, lower Mississippi River diversions wouldn't be good for oysters. "Sediment from the diversions covers up the beds, and oysters don't fill out if they get too much fresh water," he noted. A sediment diversion to rebuild the shrinking coast is being considered by the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers and the state at Myrtle Grove in Plaquemines Parish.

On a more positive note, however, Smith said "the state's been helping oyster growers build up their beds since the spill. We could have a good harvest two years from now. We just have to wait."

At the Westwego seafood market, James Camardelle of Cajun Critters Swamp Tours said the number of commercial fishermen in Louisiana has declined to about a tenth of what it was in the 1960s and 1970s. Katrina and the spill are culprits. But he said "a lot of it's cheap imports coming in from China, Indonesia, Cambodia and Vietnam. And Washington's allowing it."

What's more, only a fraction of imported seafood from Asia, sometimes raised in unsanitary conditions, is inspected when it enters the United States, vendors said.

Last week, a chalkboard on the outside of Market We Go, a grocery store selling boiled seafood and poboy sandwiches at the Westwego Shrimp Lot, said "Better Than Walmart" in large print. Across the way, Michel stood in front of a blue "Louisiana Seafood" sign at her employer's stall. But she said, "you can see that not all the vendors here have this sign because some of them are selling imports."

Last year, the Louisiana Dept. of Wildlife and Fisheries, other state agencies, the Louisiana Seafood Promotion and Marketing Board and LSU AgCenter launched a state-certified seafood program to build a brand, similar to Idaho Potatoes. Louisiana is the top supplier of shrimp, oysters, crabs and crawfish in the United States.

As for Walmart, when asked about seafood sourcing last week, Walmart spokeswoman Ashley Hardie said the company couldn't comment since it doesn't break out sales data. end]]> tag:www.huffingtonpost.com,2013:/theblog//3.2559431 2013-01-26T18:05:04-05:00 2013-03-28T05:12:01-04:00

Susan Buchanan http://www.huffingtonpost.com/susan-buchanan/
Just about everyone likes to be near a streetcar line. At Southern Costume Co., two blocks off Loyola Ave. at Lafayette St., office manager Chanel Guada said "the new Loyola line is expected to bring pedestrian traffic to this area and that can only help business. The area doesn't have much free parking." She was inconvenienced by a change in her commuter bus route during the Loyola car line's construction but said "things will get better."

Meanwhile, on St. Claude Ave., residents and businesses hope the streetcar will come their way. Cyrena Jackson, pharmaceutical doctor at Med Pro Pharmacy on St. Claude at Congress, said "we need it. Buses run every 15 minutes on St. Claude before and after school, but waits can be 30 to 45 minutes in the middle of the day. We have lots of people without cars in this area and a lot of elderly. Many younger people bike or just get out and walk."

Jackson said a streetcar would help existing businesses on St. Claude and attract new ones, making the corridor more vibrant. Increased activity would make it safer. "But we're usually the last part of the city to get anything," she added.

The new streetcar line on Loyola links the Union Passenger train terminal, the post office, the Hyatt Regency Hotel, the Mercedes-Benz Superdome, City Hall, the public library and downtown hospitals, and does more for commuters and residents than one that was planned for Convention Blvd.

Rachel Heiligman, executive director of transit riders' advocacy group Ride New Orleans, noted that in 2009 the RTA announced a streetcar-extension program focused on building a line on the Convention Blvd. neutral grounds. "That proposal would have served tourists over residents and duplicated service that the Riverfront streetcar line offers to the Convention Center," she said. NORTA opened the Riverfront line in1988 and expanded it in 1997.

The prospect of a Convention Blvd. line spurred the founding of Ride New Orleans, Heiligman said. "Advocates convinced the RTA to shift its support to a Loyola Ave., N. Rampart Street and St. Claude Avenue line," she said.

The RTA applied for a federal TIGER grant to start the project at Union Passenger Terminal and run it to Elysian Fields Ave. That move, Heiligman said, met the U.S. Dept. of Transportation's requirements for funding TIGER projects that make "multi-modal connections and have regional impact."

In early 2010, RTA won a $45 million TIGER grant paying for the Loyola Ave. phase of the streetcar extension. The line links the train terminal and Greyhound Bus station with Canal's streetcars, buses and transfer points, Heiligman noted.

Patrice Bell Mercadel, spokeswoman for Veolia Transportation and the Regional Transit Authority, said the cost of building the Loyola line was $52 million as of Jan. 15. In addition to the $45 million TIGER II grant, sources included $5 million from a local-share, contingency fund required on receipt of the TIGER grant and $2 million funded by RTA Series 2010 Sales Tax bonds.

Heiligman said Phase 2 of the streetcar project will run up N. Rampart to Elysian Fields eventually, funded by local sales of $75 million in bonds. But she noted that."RTA applications for TIGER III and IV grants to extend the Loyola car line up St. Claude were denied in 2011 and 2012, respectively, leaving the RTA without a clear way to fund the streetcar into the Ninth Ward."

Bell Mercadel said "Phase 2 of the streetcar-expansion program is funded by the $75 million RTA sales tax bond series 2010." The bonds, in fact, sold for more than $75 million and are valued at $79 million. She confirmed that Phase 2 construction will originate at N. Rampart and Canal St. and terminate at N. Rampart and Elysian Fields. That spur is currently in the design phase, she said.

As for St. Claude Ave., Bell Mercadel said "the RTA continues to seek funding for future rail expansions."

Heiligman said "with the $45 million TIGER grant and the $75 million in local bonds, funds still aren't enough to run the streetcar to Poland Ave." on St. Claude, a project the corridor's residents consider vital for development.

Heiligman said Ride continues to organize community meetings along N. Rampart and St. Claude for the next legs of the streetcar to make sure service is efficient. "We're working with City Council Member Kristin Palmer's office to explore funding opportunities to get the third phase of the project -- Elysian Ave. to Poland Ave on St. Claude funded," she said. "At the moment, we're exploring the U.S. DOT's Transportation Infrastructure Finance and Innovation Act, or TIFIA, loan program, along with Tax Increment Financing districts, parking taxes and pretty much anything to fund the line to Poland Ave."

Some residents have asked why $45 million was spent on a streetcar project when some of that money could have been used to improve bus service. But Heiligman said TIGER grants can only fund capital projects and not operating costs, such as more drivers.

As for the Loyola line, new shelters that are quite large by local standards have been built. "Loyola has five state-of-the-art, solar-powered shelters," Mercadel Bell said. New shelters on Canal St. are roomy and solar-lit. Meanwhile, on some other city routes riders overflow shelters or have no protection at all from bad weather.

A major bus transfer point on Canal St. between Marais and N. Robertson has little shelter or seating. Heiligman said "the RTA moved the transfer point there when the previous one at Elk Place and Tulane was displaced by construction of the Loyola streetcar. Last year, the RTA proposed keeping the transfer point between Marais and N. Robertson permanently but riders complained it was too far from the heart of the CBD and had little, supporting infrastructure." After riders spoke out at a public hearing in October, saying they'd been inconvenienced, the idea was nixed for further study.

Public transit riders has grown in number since Katrina. Mercadel Bell said "Marais and N. Robertson, which is a temporary relocation of the Elk Place stop, has between 5,000 to 6,000 boardings per weekday. That is cumulative for 14 bus lines and three streetcar lines, all traveling and stopping there."

Canal and Carondelet, where the St Charles streetcar line starts, is also busy, with about 2,000 boardings and deboardings per day, Mercadel Bell said.

Heiligman said "regardless of whether the main transfer point is located at Elk Place or at Marais-N. Robertson, Ride New Orleans will continue pushing for next-bus arrival signage, kiosks for buying fare cards before boarding, more seating, and large, canopied areas for sun-and-rain shelter."

On the St. Charles streetcar line, repair work has been halted temporarily and cars will run their full route for the next several weeks. "The St. Charles cross-tie maintenance program, currently underway, is expected to be complete in first-quarter 2014," Mercadel Bell said. "But RTA will suspend maintenance work on St. Charles this Jan. 20 through Feb. 13 to allow full access to the streetcar." The neutral ground will be free of equipment during Mardi Gras parades. Mercadel Bell said riders should check norta.com for parade-related changes in RTA service.

For 170 years, St. Charles was the oldest, continuously operating streetcar line in the world until Katrina struck in 2005. The line reopened in mid-2008 after repairs, and operates today with virtually the same cars and infrastructure that it did in the1920s. The RTA hopes to fund a spur connecting the St. Charles streetcar to the Loyola line eventually.

The RTA Board of Commissioners signed a management contract with Veolia Transportation in 2008 and formed a public-private partnership with the company in 2009. Veolia Transportation, based in Chicago, is the top, private North American, public-transit operator and is a subsidiary of Veolia Environnement in France.

This article was published in The Louisiana Weekly in the Jan. 21, 2013 edition.]]> tag:www.huffingtonpost.com,2013:/theblog//3.2489120 2013-01-16T14:06:01-05:00 2013-03-18T05:12:01-04:00

Susan Buchanan http://www.huffingtonpost.com/susan-buchanan/
On South Broad and Earhart in New Orleans, the Rosenwald Center--the city's only major recreation facility for African American youth during racial segregation--was torn down last week to be replaced by a new one next year. The Katrina-damaged center was built in 1950 during the four terms of Mayor Chep Morrison, who supported recreation but not integration. The city's white youth, with access to ten such facilities in the1950s and early 1960s, were better served. Desegregation got under way in the South in the late 1950s but didn't start in the Crescent City until 1960.

Decades later, Federal Emergency Management Agency or FEMA said the Rosenwald gymnasium, destroyed in Katrina, was eligible for replacement with federal dollars. Mayor Mitch Landrieu included Rosenwald in his list of a hundred recovery projects, announced in late 2010.

The old center, run by the New Orleans Recreation Department on the site of the former Lincoln Playground, had a gymnasium and outdoor swimming pool. The land, owned by the Housing Authority of New Orleans, is in the Marrero Commons area--the new name for the recently rebuilt B.W. Cooper Housing Development.

The City and FEMA have been lining up funds for a new Rosenwald Center for several years, and last week some observers said the old, rotting eyesore should had been replaced by now.

"Rebuilding Rosenwald is long overdue, and I'm glad they've gotten started on it," said Lisa Fitzpatrick, executive director and founder of APEX Youth Center on Dryades St. She said "Mid-City and Central City are in great need of recreation facilities, and South Broad at Earhart is a well-utilized corner. The center has been a blight and a hazard to the community since Katrina. Children were breaking into it. The pool had standing water."

Fitzpatrick, who is also a pastor at First Street Peck Wesley United Methodist Church, noted that the Boys & Girls Club-NFL Yet Center on South Broad near Earhart had to look at the decrepit Rosenwald.

Construction is slated to start this summer on a new, 24,000-square-foot Rosenwald Center, with a gymnasium, stage, activity rooms, pool, pool house and snack bar. The project is funded at $6.3 million from a combination of FEMA recovery dollars, city bond funds, insurance money and state outlays. The city is leasing the property from HANO for $1.00 a year under a ten-year agreement.

Last week, Cedric Grant, the city's Deputy Mayor of Facilities, Infrastructure and Community Development, said "the architects and engineers of record for the Rosenwald project are WDG," a local firm on Baronne St. "The Rosenwald project is scheduled to go out for bid this spring."

After Katrina, WDG prepared a damage report on Rosenwald for the city and FEMA, and then worked on the new center's design. According to WDG, the new Rosenwald will exceed building-code requirements for durability so that it can be used as a hurricane shelter.

Danatus King, president of the New Orleans branch of the NAACP or National Association for the Advancement of Colored People, last week said he hopes minority contractors and African American workers are employed in the Rosenwald rebuild.

King, an attorney, said Afro-American workers have been bypassed as the city recovers. "I'm sitting in my office looking out on construction of the new, downtown medical complex," he said, referring to the Louisiana State University and Veterans Administration medical centers. "A majority of the trucks and equipment at the site are from out of town."

He said "it's just as important to hire fathers and mothers of our African American youth as it is to build a recreation center." He added "had the city's DBE or disadvantaged business enterprise laws been enforced, our black middle class would be in a better position today."

The city's Office of Supplier Diversity monitors DBE participation in city contracts. City ordinances set a goal of using 50-percent local businesses for both public and private projects that depend on public funds and incentives. A related goal is to see that 35 percent of businesses in public construction projects are "socially and economically disadvantaged" firms.

King said the new Rosenwald Center is needed, and he hopes it's properly staffed and equipped. "Some of these facilities around town don't have the basics, like lights after dark," he said. "We don't have enough recreation centers, and many of the ones we do have aren't open long enough in the day and evening with enough staff to keep our youth engaged."

Under Mayor Marc Morial's two terms from 1994 to 2002, NORD was well run and set an example for other cities, King said. But he isn't a fan of the NORD public-private partnership that voters approved in late 2010. "The money we were told would flow in from the private sector hasn't to the extent expected," King said. "And you can't blame it on the recession, which was already well underway when were assured that these funds would materialize."

In late 2010, nearly three-fourths of those who went to the polls favored a public-private partnership for Orleans Parish recreation facilities and programs. The thirteen-member NORD Commission was created, and so was a private New Orleans Recreation Development Foundation, or NORD Foundation, to support the commission.

But King said "it's hard to hold anybody on the commission or within the foundation accountable since they weren't elected by the people."

At APEX, Lisa Fitzpatrick said it's too soon to judge the NORD partnership, and she's taking a wait-and-see attitude.

According to Cedric Grant, the city had ten operating, recreation centers before Katrina. They were Behrman, Cut Off, Gernon Brown, Joe Brown, Lyons, Rosenwald, Sanchez, Stallings St. Claude Community and Treme centers and the St. Bernard Gym.

Since Katrina, FEMA has committed $32.6 million to NORD recreation facilities and parks. FEMA decided to replace three centers--Rosenwald, Sanchez and Stallings St. Claude. In 2010, Sanchez, along with Stallings St. Claude, were demolished. The new Stallings St. Claude Center should be finished late this year, Grant said.

The city, the New Orleans Super Bowl XLVII Host Committee and local nonprofits are planning a "Super Saturday of Service" on Feb. 2, the day before the bowl game in New Orleans. At least a thousand volunteers, mostly football fans from out of town, are expected to help renovate five NORD playgrounds, repair ten homes and provide other rebuilding services. Anyone interested in participating should take a look at www.NolaSuperBowl.com

As for the Rosenwald Center, it gets its name from local, civic leader Edith Rosenwald Stern, who died in1980. She was the daughter of philanthropist Julius Rosenwald, the founder of Sears Roebuck and Co. in Illinois. end]]>