Taufiq Rahim2013-05-22T12:54:18-04:00Taufiq Rahimhttp://www.huffingtonpost.com/author/index.php?author=taufiq-rahimCopyright 2008, HuffingtonPost.com, Inc.HuffingtonPost Blogger Feed for Taufiq RahimGood old fashioned elbow grease.A Tale of Two Islamstag:www.huffingtonpost.com,2012:/theblog//3.19240702012-09-28T16:01:39-04:002012-11-28T05:12:01-05:00Taufiq Rahimhttp://www.huffingtonpost.com/taufiq-rahim/Taufiq Rahim is a Dubai-based political analyst who blogs regularly on TheGeopolitico.com.
“I will pay whoever kills the makers of this video $100,000. If someone else makes other blasphemous material in the future, I will also pay his killers $100,000.”
These words were uttered not by a firebrand cleric but by a cabinet minister in Pakistan, Ghulam Ahmad Bilour, pushing the reaction to a provocative film (vacuously) satirical of the Prophet Muhammad to even more
absurd levels.
We witnessed something different altogether in Libya, after the initial violence. On September 11 of this year, anti-film protests in Benghazi, combined with what is now regarded as a coordinated terrorist attack, led to the death of the U.S. Ambassador to Libya, other State Department personnel and Libyan security forces. Within two weeks, however, tens of thousands of ordinary Libyans had marched to the central al-Kish square in the same city, chanting, “No to terror, no to Al Qaeda,” eventually overrunning the bases of groups suspected of being complicit in the earlier attack.
Following the Arab revolutions of 2011, Islam has forcefully entered the public square, and as political forces jockey for power, we are witnessing a growing duel between radical rejectionists and groups favoring more inclusive engagement. If the former gain the upper hand in this battle, which differs country by country, it could plunge the wider Middle East into a decade of darkness.
With the revolutions in Libya, Tunisia, Egypt and Yemen, we have seen secular autocrats swept from power and Islamist forces come to the forefront. The contestation by religious parties in the democratic arena has meant the mainstreaming of political parties in the Arab world. The rise of well-known groups such as the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt and Al Nahda party in Tunisia, however, has been accompanied by the emergence of a new political force, Salafists, who adhere
to a very puritanical interpretation of Islam.
The political Salafists have tried to brand themselves as true defenders of the faith in opposition to so-called “moderate” Islamists. In effect, they are trying to out-Islam their opponents. While prior, the Salafist movement had only a limited political role and the more extreme of their members were part of the wider jihadi movement that includes Al Qaeda, today they are using the new environment to assert themselves in the
mainstream. While just emerging in the Arab world, it is a trend that countries like Pakistan have been dealing with for the last
several years.
Despite their ability to mobilize in numbers and vitriol, the Salafists appear to be in the minority, as witnessed in recent election results across the Arab world. The majority, however, has not coalesced around a coherent ideology that can provide an alternative vision for progress and development. The Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt, while trying to be pragmatic, have been muddled in their message following the initial anti-film protests, because even their own slogan in effect limits debate: Islam is the solution. Thus, the outpouring of demonstrations in Libya trying to reclaim the public space from more radical fringes could be the exception rather
than the trend.
We are therefore at a dangerous crossroads throughout the Middle East, North Africa and into South Asia, where given this political vacuum, radical Salafists are trying to overtake the public square, if not by numbers than by default. Moreover, certain interests within the Gulf are pushing these groups, which for them are preferable to more moderate Islamist forces that are seen as threatening to their regional legitimacy. This strength, combined with the growing neo-Islamic McCarthyism practiced by the Salafist political forces could mean that the silent majority is definitively silenced for the foreseeable future.
There is no easy way out, and the situation within each country is different. If the current crisis is viewed through the prism of a provocative film and an offended Muslim public, we are missing the broader political implications. In effect, we are seeing a shift from the post-9/11 decade fight of Al Qaeda versus autocratic regimes in the region, to the people versus the populists. The film has only served as the pretext for what is now termed the “outrage industry” that fuels radicals in so many Muslim countries.
If the current situation is to change, it will only happen if forces, within and outside the Muslim world, empower the marginalized majority that is seeking to define a more inclusive and
pluralistic future.
This story originally appeared in Huffington, in the iTunes App store.
]]>The Miseducation of the Arab Worldtag:www.huffingtonpost.com,2011:/theblog//3.10798532011-11-09T12:00:00-05:002012-01-09T05:12:02-05:00Taufiq Rahimhttp://www.huffingtonpost.com/taufiq-rahim/"Each year the private and public sectors need to create 85,000 jobs but they are only creating 55,000, which means we have 30,000 new unemployed people entering the labor market every year in Jordan."
This stark reality was conveyed by the outgoing Minister of Education for Jordan, Dr. Tayseer Al Noami, in an exclusive interview this past week, while attending the World Innovation Summit for Education (WISE) in Qatar. If we were to extrapolate that reality to the rest of the Arab world, and granted there are varying circumstances, this would mean that there are roughly 1.5 million new entrants added to the unemployment rolls every year. It is a daunting challenge in one of the most volatile regions in the world. As the Arab awakening continues, further attention is being paid to the policy challenges facing leaders, old and new, around youth, education, and employment. While the problem is clear thus far the solutions have been few and far between.
The volume edited by Tarik Yousef and Navtej Dhillon, Generation in Waiting, aptly describes the youth bulge in the Middle East, where there are an estimated 100 million people between the ages of 15-29. In Jordan, for example, a shocking 70% of the population is below 30. This is a scenario repeated across the region. These active, aware and agitated populations are the casus belli for the wider insurrection in the Arab world. These are entire generations that feel disenfranchised. In the short-term they are looking for economic opportunity but in the long-term for much deeper systemic changes. Nearly 10 months after the fall of former Tunisian dictator Zein el-Abedine Ben Ali, this situation is well-known to leaders within the region.
At the WISE gathering in Qatar last week, when speaking about the Middle East, the buzz-term was 'education for employment.' This is the idea that education needs to be relevant to the needs of the private sector. This is considered in many ways to be the panacea for the unemployment malaise across the region. When the International Finance Corporation (IFC) and the Islamic Development Bank released a major report on the region, it was entitled "Education for Employment." That report asserts that youth unemployment costs the Arab world between $40-50 billion annually. It finds that employers feel youth are not ready for the workplace and that vocational education and skills training are essential to combat widespread unemployment. There are a number of NGOs, international institutions, bilateral donors, and public sector entities, all dedicated to contributing to the effort, from Silatech to the World Bank to the EFE Foundation. Almost every regional government has a Technical and Vocational Education and Training (TVET) Ministry assigned to this issue as well. Even private sector initiatives such as Microsoft's Partners in Learning are mobilizing. But it is not enough.
Another report released last month (published by the World Economic Forum), stated that 25 million new jobs needed to be created to maintain current unemployment levels in the Arab world. Simply put, existing trends and initiatives in the region are insufficient. Moreover, the presence of a bold regional partnership is missing. Each country and organization is operating in an unrealistic vacuum releasing often stalled and stilted initiatives that eventually are mired in inefficiency, bureaucracy and ineffectiveness. Outside of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC), it appears that the funds allocated for combating unemployment and revitalizing education systems are in the hundreds of millions of dollars rather than the tens of billions that will be necessary. Moreover, while 'education for employment' is part of the answer, it cannot be the answer. When asked about what was needed, the outgoing Jordanian Minister of Education responded, "we need a commitment to the continuity of existing policies over the long-term." That in effect sounds like more of the same.
The above may seem like an unfair diagnosis but the reality itself is not a fair one. A regional partnership for change that truly tackles the entire ecosystem of challenges that lead to youth unemployment is essential. It must address not just education for employment but the wider economic enabling environment as well as the quality of the overall education system. It must be funded. It must involve all sectors. Most of all, it will require leadership. And all the while, the Arab youth are still waiting.
Taufiq Rahim is a Dubai-based political analyst. He blogs regularly at TheGeopolitico.com. ]]>Israel's Legitimacy Flows Through Palestinetag:www.huffingtonpost.com,2011:/theblog//3.9715512011-09-20T17:15:47-04:002011-11-20T05:12:02-05:00Taufiq Rahimhttp://www.huffingtonpost.com/taufiq-rahim/bellowed confidently long-time Israeli spokesman Mark Regev in his robust Australian accent. Deputy Foreign Minister Danny Ayalon expressed incredulously, "They say they are against violence but then they use political violence." Even the Prime Minister Benyamin Netanyahu pointedly called on Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas to "stop wasting time". Israeli officials have been pseudo-confidently telling whoever will listen that the Palestinian pursuit for recognition at the United Nations is an affront to the peace process. Didn't the Palestinians know that their legitimacy -- and the creation of their state -- flows through Israel? At some point in the last couple of years the mainstream Palestinian political leadership finally emerged out of Plato's cave and answered that rhetorical question: It's Israel's legitimacy that flows in fact through Palestine.
The claim that the Palestinian effort at the UN seeks to discredit the State of Israel is a case of the pot calling the kettle black. In fact it is Israel's future legitimacy that derives from the creation of a Palestinian state. The longer its political leaders procrastinate, the more tenuous its legitimacy as a democratic and viable state becomes.
What is remarkable about the recent campaign by the PLO leadership in pursuing recognition of Palestine at the United Nations, is that it is at its heart about arriving at a peaceful resolution to the conflict and recognizing Israel's right to exist. Explicit in the recognition of Palestine on the basis of previous UN resolutions (242 and 338) is that Israel has a right to exist on 78% of historic Palestine. Moreover, rather than pursue a resolution by way of violence, Abbas and his team have invested in the diplomatic and legal process. Instead of being praised or rewarded the Israelis and many U.S. politicians have invoked the spirit of Chicken Little and declared that the sky is falling. The moment presented in front of the world is one where 'moderates' (according to the West) can genuinely be empowered. Instead the opposite is occurring, as the U.S. Congress threatens to cut off aid to the Palestinian Authority if Abbas continues with his push for recognition.
While the U.S. will likely veto and thwart the Palestinian bid for recognition at the Security Council, this will not do much to end the effort. In fact, this is just the beginning of a last stand by Palestinians for a two-state solution before the latter idea is deemed itself to not have any viability. If the U.S. and Israel oppose even the symbolic recognition of Palestine at the United Nations, what prospects for a real two-state solution are there? There is a dreamy aspect to an Eretz Israel that encompasses Judea and Samaria in some hyper-Jewish state but it is precisely that -- a dream. The longer Israel punts a realistic and explicit commitment to a two-state solution the more it undercuts its own legitimacy. Israel today is surrounded by a changing Middle East, where it is losing its political, economic, and military edge; traditional allies such as Turkey and Egypt are quickly transforming into adversaries. Demographically it cannot continue to lord over the West Bank, Gaza (yes Gaza), and East Jerusalem (yes East Jerusalem) for time immemorial without facing a scenario of apartheid. The latter point is not made by a pro-Palestinian peacenik but rather by Israeli defense minister Ehud Barak.
What is the alternative presented to the Palestinians by Israeli Foreign Minister Avidgor Lieberman or U.S. House Majority Leader Eric Cantor (R-VA) for that matter? Thus far there is no light offered at the end of the tunnel. Moreover, by rejecting the current Palestinian attempt to enshrine a two-state solution at the United Nations, Israel risks opening the pandora's box of what's next. Who is to say that the Palestinian leadership in the face of a lack of progress won't switch to backing a bi-national democratic state à la South Africa? In the eyes of the world -- which is generally supportive including in U.S. popular opinion of the Palestinian attempt at recognition -- how legitimate would the State of Israel be without a Palestine?
It seems that both Israel and the U.S. have already made up their minds regarding the vote this week. However, this issue will not disappear and will continue to linger. The Palestinian leadership is trying to firmly establish the legitimacy of the two state solution and the existence of Israel. The question remains will Israel undermine its own legitimacy in response?
]]>In Syria, Good Enough Is No Longer Enoughtag:www.huffingtonpost.com,2011:/theblog//3.8425052011-03-30T17:33:12-04:002011-05-30T05:12:01-04:00Taufiq Rahimhttp://www.huffingtonpost.com/taufiq-rahim/"Good enough is no longer enough."
These were the words delivered just two weeks ago, by the CEO of the Syria Trust for Development, the NGO started by the First Lady of Syria, Asma al-Assadduring a panel discussion - "The New Voice: Civil Society and the Arab World" - I had organized in Damascus on March 17. In fact, the overall conference the panel was a part of was held under the 'patronage' of the First Lady but the words of the participants apparently fell on deaf ears. When I asked her about the free exchange of ideas and the obstacles to that in Syria itself, she defensively began a treatise about how change needed to be rooted in what she termed Syrian 'identity.' It was disappointing to see such a lack of responsiveness in the midst of historic change in the region. That encounter was one day before four demonstrators were killed in the southern city of Daraa, which unleashed what has been two weeks of instability in the country. That encounter and the events since demonstrated what is now very clear: the Syrian regime has lost its connection with its people - something definitively apparent after the hour-long speech delivered today by President Bashar al-Assad.
Today, Dr. al-Assad was supposed to give a cathartic announcement of change after two weeks of uncertainty. Here was the Arab world's popular leader, defender of the resistance - young, smart, and in touch. Instead, the delivery was simply off. Al-Assad squandered much of what was left of his political capital with the majority of his people, after a speech that could only be described as a prolific disappointment. Make no mistake about it. On January 14, the day Ben Ali fled Tunisia to Saudi Arabia, President al-Assad was a popular leader in his country. His inaction and the blundering actions of his government since, has led to the current impasse in which Syria finds itself. His country is now on the verge of an uncertain explosion after Friday prayers this week.
When President al-Assad came to power in 2000, he inherited a country with a closed economic and political system, where dissent was suffocated. In the 11 years since, President al-Assad has become well-versed in the language of reform as he has consolidated his power. For many in the country, the President, however, had the deck stacked against him. Internally, he had an entrenched security apparatus led by an old guard that refused to cede power and that solidified its financial status with a hold on neighboring Lebanon. Externally, he had to deal with the immediate disarray in Israel/Palestine, Iraq and Lebanon (for which he had some influence of course) as well as the very real threat of regime change from a Bush administration on the march. When President Obama came to power in 2009, President Bashar al-Assad was seen as the people's man in power, fighting against adverse external circumstances. He was defending Syria's integrity and independence and warding of instability. This did not mean that people acquiesced fully to the status quo internally [especially after Obama came to power and the external threat was perceived as less], as the President himself had stalled his initial reform efforts (which he had begin in 2000 and 2001). In fact, when I asked him in 2008 why he had stopped these efforts, he responded: "We need to reform but it is not something we can do quickly. We have to keep in mind our circumstances internally and externally. Perhaps in the beginning I moved too fast." Prior to the wave of regional unrest, there had been growing frustration but not necessarily agitation, with what was now the President's slow-moving political reform agenda.
Economically, the country has opened up dramatically in the last decade. While there has been growth, especially in the cities, with overall GDP growth hovering around 5% in recent years, rural areas have remained under threat of water scarcity and limited economic opportunities. In Daraa, where the current unrest started, poverty has been endemic largely due to the declining water table. This is a situation repeated throughout the country. Of course, going from a state-controlled economy to a relatively open one has given way to many changes, not least of which has been the influx of foreign products, previously unavailable (i.e. as basic as Pepsi and Coke) as well as the mushrooming of trendy cafes around Damascus. President al-Assad and his Deputy Prime Minister Abdullah Dardari have also promoted internet access throughout the country. Yet, because of the continuation of the closed political system, with limited devolution of powers to the parliament and the absence of real political parties outside of the Baath Party, corruption has continued to thrive. Moreover, people such as Rami Makhlouf, a cousin of the President, have benefited from building monopolies.
Yet, largely, the Syrian people were of the view that there was a corrosive system with 'their man' at the helm who was trying to steer things in the right direction. Shortly after the fall of the government in Tunis, al-Assad gave a wide ranging interview in the Wall Street Journal. He seemed to indicate that he understood change was needed while emphasizing why his status was different:
As for the internal, it is about doing something that is changing; to change the society, and we have to keep up with this change, as a state and as institutions. You have to upgrade yourself with the upgrading of the society. There must be something to have this balance. This is the most important headline... Why is Syria stable, although we have more difficult conditions? We have growth although we do not have many of the basic needs for the people. Despite all that, the people do not go into an uprising. So it is not only about the needs and not only about the reform. It is about the ideology, the beliefs and the cause that you have.
President al-Assad on January 14 (after the fall of Ben Ali) was not in the same position as President Hosni Mubarak of Egypt. Yet, somewhere between January 14 and March 30, when he gave his first major speech to the Syrian people in response to the growing discontent, he failed to internalize what should have been the new mantra: "Good enough is no longer enough." He mistakenly believed that his ideology of popular resistance and Arab sovereignty would allay demands for immediate and systemic reform. There was a moment when al-Assad could have been the bold leader of the Arab world and proactively move in the direction of change. The events of the last two weeks with the culmination being his speech today, indicated that his government has chosen to have a standoff with its people. After the Friday demonstrations in Daraa on March 18, which led to four deaths, there was a subsequent storming of a mosque after several days of protests on March 23, when as many as 15 people were killed. Then on Friday, March 25, solidarity protests were held throughout the country, the strongest again being in Daraa, and dozens more perished. The situation in the past couple of days had become even more precarious when clashes broke out in places such as the coastal city of Lattackia, raising the fears of sectarian attacks.
On Tuesday, March 29, with the specter of instability around the corner, in a country of 21 million people and a multitude of religious minorities - Christians, Alawis, Ithnashiri Shiites, Ismailis, Druze, heterodox Sunni groups and so forth - thousands gathered to show solidarity with al-Assad and the government. Yet it was clear, that the deaths in Daraa and the reaction of security forces throughout the country had eroded the support for President al-Assad and hastened the calls for immediate reform. The country had hit a turning point and in the last few days, it felt like the government perhaps understood that, with presidential adviser, Bouthaina Shaaban, reading out last Thursday (March 24) and again echoing them a few days later to Al Jazeera television, a set of decrees announcing reform, including the repeal of the emergency law that has been in place since 1963.
Yet, al-Assad's speech today set a line in the sand. There were no concessions. There was only a scant reference to the emergency law. There were no major reforms announced. Instead, he raised the possibility of conspiracies from outside trying to destabilize the country. He said emphatically "we are not a copy of other Arab countries." He entered the parliamentary chamber where he gave his speech to chants in Arabic of, "We will give our blood and soul for you Bashar." His speech was interrupted by sycophantic soliloquies. And, throughout he often smiled, almost sardonically. It was shocking - and that is an objective editorial statement.
His speech was made two days before Friday prayers and we can now expect that day to be a monumental day in Syria's history. What started two weeks ago as unruly clashes in Daraa and led to solidarity marches throughout the country and an awakening of the calls for reform, will now lead to something much more definitive. In the past two weeks, the people called for an end to monopolies, corruption, and repression, but not for the departure of Bashar al-Assad. The latter is now formally in play and it is entirely due to the unresponsiveness of al-Assad himself.
The situation in Syria and across the Arab world is fast-moving and is undermining predictions, perceived predilections, and prospective prescriptions. Yet, Tunis and Egypt were deceptive in the speed and relative ease of immediate change. Libya has shown how the situation can unfold in a very fragmented, deadly, and drawn out manner. Syria, will similarly be a very difficult situation. Not only is the regime unlikely to reform or for that matter 'depart' with ease but also the protesters are not consolidated nor do they have chants in unison. Furthermore, very quickly, the situation in Syria can escalate to something far more dangerous, such as sectarian clashes. However, this is now the situation for which the country, the region, and the international community must prepare for. Al-Assad sent his message today, loudly and clearly, and now we await the people's response.
Taufiq Rahim is a political analyst based in Dubai and blogs regularly at TheGeopolitico.com]]>The Day After in Saudi Arabiatag:www.huffingtonpost.com,2011:/theblog//3.8213122011-02-17T12:40:43-05:002011-05-25T18:30:24-04:00Taufiq Rahimhttp://www.huffingtonpost.com/taufiq-rahim/Islam Times pronounced that King Abdullah of Saudi Arabia had died yesterday in Morocco at the age of 86. Quickly, the Foreign Minister Saud al-Faisal responded, "I'd like to assure you about the health of the King. He is in excellent shape." That reassurance did not assuage oil futures, which rose throughout the day. In the midst of what was unfolding in Egypt, the news in Saudi Arabia took backseat. Major news organizations have not investigated thoroughly the Saudi story directly -- to verify definitively one way or the other. In the Middle East, however, you can never be certain of any situation. What the story did do, was bring back into the limelight an unenviable but inevitable prospect.
There is tremendous uncertainty that faces many regimes with aging octogenarians at the helm. The Economist played the role of Nostradamus last July, with the headline "Thank you and Goodbye: For good or ill, change is coming to Egypt and Saudi Arabia soon." In truth the day after has been a scary proposition hanging over the Middle East and the West as a dark cloud. King Abdullah has been a giant of history, ruling Saudi Arabia in effect since 1996 (first as regent and then as King starting in 2005). In many ways he has been a progressive and his passing could be a devastating blow not only to the country's leadership but also to the society-at-large and the wider Middle East. There was never a credible plan 'B'. The few weeks after King Abdullah will be pivotal. Yet stability will not be in the cards for the next several years regardless, until much more substantive changes occur and a formidable younger leader emerges in the country.
King Abdullah has a tremendous legacy that is often clouded by very real concerns of human rights abuses that have occurred over the last 15 years and the widespread luxury that the ruling family enjoys. However, the king, especially in recent years, has been a force for modernization and even progressivism in the Kingdom. In a blog post I wrote last year, I highlighted this succinctly:
In a volatile region that has seen in the last decade a continuation of the Palestinian-Israeli conflict, the upheaval in Iraq, the stalemate with Iran, and the attacks by Al Qaeda (often specifically targeted at Saudi Arabia), the regime under King Abdullah has been able to maintain a sense of stability and order within the country. In May 2003, Riyadh was the site of violent suicide bombings that claimed 35 lives. It was the peak of the Al Qaeda pseudo insurgency which the king managed to effectively stamp out. This does not mean that Saudi has been without other problems, but as President Bashar al-Assad stated in a key interview after the Egyptian crisis to the Wall Street Journal, Arab societies need to keep "changing" and "upgrading" the society and institutions or suffer from the same uprising and desperation seen in Egypt. It is not necessarily about political rights; the leadership needs to provide positive change. As Tom Friedman wrote in his column yesterday, "China deprives its people of political rights, but at least it gives them a rising standard of living." This was the role King Abdullah played to a degree in Saudi, at least directionally.
Now, Saudi must prepare for what comes next. King Abdullah has been a beloved figure who united many in the country. Yet, until now, no grandson of the founding monarch King Abdul-Aziz, who died in 1953, has assumed the throne. The mantle passed from Sa'ud to Faisal to Khalid to Fahd and finally to Abdullah, all sons of King Abdul-Aziz. That means that since 1953, there has not been a father-son transition in Saudi Arabia. Today, the Crown Prince and King in waiting is Sultan, who himself is 83 years old. He has been reported to be suffering from severe illness intermittently over the past couple of years. King Abdullah created an Allegiance or "Princes" Council to deal with this uncertainty. The 35-member body representing the sons of the founding King Abdel Aziz (if the son was not alive then a representative would serve), would be tasked with electing a crown prince. However, in a paradoxical move, roughly two years ago, King Abdullah appointed Prince Nayef, a perceived conservative, as the so-called crown prince in waiting (the official title being second deputy prime minister). Prince Nayef himself is no spring chicken at 77 years of age. Moreover, reports have indicated that Nayef has not been a fan of the reform agenda espoused by King Abdullah.
Saudi Arabia has the same youth situation that faces Egypt, Tunisia and the rest of the Arab world, which is described most evocatively in the book Generation in Waiting, edited by Tarik Yousef of the Dubai School of Government and Navtej Dhillon. 55% of Saudis are under the age of 25 and there will have been a 13.7% increase in new university graduates between 2009 (when the unemployment rate stood at 10.5% officially) and 2013. This is a key driver for the new movement that is emerging in the Arab world of 2011 (described here). King Abdullah has been vociferously pursuing changes to satisfy the social and economic concerns of young Saudis. Simply put, it is hard to see Prince Sultan or Nayef holding the same confidence of these youth. It is similarly unclear as to who would succeed Prince Nayef (or Sultan for that matter) that would play that role. Much of the rest of the GCC has started to see that second-generation of monarchial leadership emerge in the last two decades (see UAE, Qatar as examples) but it is something that is a pandora's box for Saudi. And make no mistake about it. Many Saudi youth are very globally-aware, technologically plugged-in, exposed to the West, and will want to have input into who their next leader will be; at the very least they will want somebody representative -- at a minimum level -- in spirit, of their generation's concerns.
Saudi Arabia has a $500 billion dollar GDP and holds approximately a fifth of the world's oil reserves (although a recent Wikileaks cable may contest that). It is also a pivotal country in the Arab and Muslim world. Thus the next few weeks and indeed years will be concerning for Saudis, its neighbors (both near and far) and the world at large. The immediate consequences will likely be a hardening of both external and internal policy as the regime seeks to re-consolidate control and avoid instability. That would mean a halt to extensive forays of foreign diplomacy, such as the Saudi-Syrian initiative. It would mean a downplaying of its leadership role vis-a-vis what is happening in Egypt and elsewhere. Domestically, the old guard and religious leadership, that in some ways was marginalized by King Abdullah, may seek to reassert their influence. Ultimately, the Saudi state is predicated on an alliance between the religious philosophy of Abdel-Wahhab (see Wahhabi) and the political clan of the house of Saud. After King Abdullah, the conservative elements within the royal family may seek to move for more power in an alliance with religious hardliners, in the absence of a modernizing political leader who commands influence. This could lead to a slow-down of the very little political reforms that have been underway.
The likely scenario is a Saudi state at odds with itself and in reflective confusion. Even so-called reformers would not be able to describe a path towards sustainable progress that would be politically feasible. The truth is that in a post-King Abdullah world, Saudi Arabia is pandora's box. There will be uncertainty. There may even be instability. It will likely take more than a couple transitions before a stable leader emerges. Even then, that leader may not have the answers demanded by the country's young population. If anything is clear, it is that change is coming. The question now is, will it be for the better or for the worse?
Taufiq Rahim is a Visiting Fellow at the Dubai School of Government and blogs regularly at TheGeopolitico.com.
]]>Mubarak and Friends in Denial About the Revolutiontag:www.huffingtonpost.com,2011:/theblog//3.8158602011-01-30T15:20:00-05:002011-05-25T18:30:24-04:00Taufiq Rahimhttp://www.huffingtonpost.com/taufiq-rahim/
Only several minutes passed before hundreds of Egyptians, late into the night began reemerging on the streets of Cairo, Alexandria, and elsewhere in the North African country. Mubarak had failed. In the eyes of most of his countrymen, he may have been an Egyptian citizen, but he was certainly not welcome anymore as the 'President of the Republic.' What became clear Friday, January 28 -- and later on Saturday when the appointment of Omar Suleiman as Vice President and Ahmed Shafiq as Prime Minister barely caused a ripple -- was that the Egyptian people were not calling for a change of government but wholesale regime change. It also became apparent from the drizzle of cautious statements by Western leaders and the deafening silence from Arab kings, sheikhs, princes, and rulers, that everyone is still living in denial (and I ain't just talking about a river in Egypt).
What exactly unfolded in the last several days? What does it mean and what is yet to come? It would be difficult to answer all of these questions, especially because the situation in Egypt and across the region is rapidly changing hour-by-hour and even minute-by-minute. Let's start with the regional context. There are 22 countries in the Arab League representing over 300 million people, of which none are free and open democracies. To be fair, Comoros and Mauritania have recently had somewhat electoral transitions of power, but they are on the periphery of the Arab world. Iraq, Lebanon, and Palestine, have had active political contestation and even elections; each of these, however, are incomplete examples, simply because of their own unique circumstances. Palestine is not yet even a country, mind being a territory split in two and under occupation. Lebanon has perhaps six dictators rather than one, given its sectarian system. Iraq is Iraq and still in a soft-state of conflict.
In 2002, the cover was finally lifted on this absence of freedom and development in the Arab world, where most people had become accustomed to dynasties, autocracies, and dictatorships, in an official UN publication, the Arab Human Development Report. In addition, the advent of regional satellite media, led by Al Jazeera primarily, ushered in a new sense of openness, fostering a new wave of critical reflection. It was in the early years of the 2000s when the internet also started to have wider penetration in the Arab world. Then in Turkey, which for the last half century if not more, was an unseen player in the wider Middle East that looked West, had a seismic shift in its politics. The AK Party, which consisted of a Muslim-oriented group of politicians, won an election in 2002 and provided a new paradigm for democratic rule that also embraced the wider region's heritage and religion.
Unfortunately, 2003 saw President Bush's misguided democracy by neo-imperialism approach take root, with a famed speech at the National Endowment for Democracy as well as of course the infamous invasion of Iraq. Democracy, freedom, and elections became euphemisms for invasion, occupation, and chaos. The regimes of the region used this to chill domestic change-makers. At the same time, the American administration was still pushing for reform. That was until two elections. The first was the 2005 parliamentary elections in Egypt, which saw the Muslim Brotherhood, a movement espousing political Islam (with the slogan 'Islam is the Solution'), win 88 of 454 seats through a campaign of independent candidates (as the party was officially banned). The second was the 2006 parliamentary election in the Occupied Palestinian Territories, which saw the rise of Hamas to power, defeating the incumbent Fatah movement, and entrenching a hostile entity to the West in the governance of a strategic area.
When President Obama came to power in 2009, the aspirations for democracy in the Arab world were jaded, deferred, and declining. The president also wanted to distance himself and the administration from the focus on democracy in the region, which it saw as tainted by the Iraq war. Thus President Obama, in fact, chose the Egyptian capital Cairo, under the auspices of President Hosni Mubarak, as the place to launch his new partnership with the worldwide Muslim community. There was an acquiescence to the status quo. From the outside, in a region that was a tinderbox that could export tensions globally and where insecurity could jeopardize global energy security, the stability of existing regimes had come back into favor in Western capitals. Within Arab society, there had been a resignation to the status quo since the overturning of the Hamas government in 2007 and the fear of chaos that reigned in Iraq, and it was hard to see any momentum for change. Simply look at the task that would be at hand. Entering 2011, regime structures had been in place for over fifty years in most cases, with a number of individual rulers having been in place for decades. Jordan. Libya. Saudi Arabia. Egypt. Tunisia. Morocco. Syria. Kuwait. Bahrain. Oman. Yemen. The list goes on.
Yet in 2011, the context is changed. In the Arab world, 60% of people are under the age of 25, with around 100 million just between the ages of 15-29. That means that in many societies, like in Egypt, the majority of the population had only known one ruler -- and all the corruption, antipathy, and suffocation that could be associated with that. With the right amount of unemployment, which hovers officially around 15% in most Arab countries, but is more likely to be near 20-30%, not to mention underemployment, this was a fire ready to burn. However, the region needed a match. Perhaps it would have been the 2011 Egyptian presidential election. After all, Egypt is an influential player in the Arab world, partially because it is by far the largest country by population; it is also a strong cultural and political leader. Pan-Arabism, a movement that dominated the politics of the 1950s and 1960s, drew its strength from President Gamal Abdelnasser of Egypt. Pan-Islamism, which grew stronger in the late 1970s until today, grew out in many ways from the Muslim Brotherhood, a movement founded in Egypt by Hassan al-Banna in1928.
Egypt, the influential country of 80 million strong, saw parliamentary elections in 2010 where the ruling National Democratic Party (NDP) received 81% of the total seats. A constitutional provision in the country meant that no other parties could contest the 2011 presidential election, because they did not reach the 5% threshold of votes in parliamentary elections to qualify to nominate a candidate. Thus, there was this expectation that the next pitched battle for democratic reform in the region would be September 2011 during the Egyptian presidential election; even the former IAEA President and Nobel Laureate, Mohamed el-Baradei, was returning to contest the election, providing a real alternative to the rule of President Hosni Mubarak, who had been in power since October 7, 1981.
Thus entering 2011, the youth cohort in the region was due to peak and unemployment was rising especially compounded by the global crisis. Additionally, Turkey in the wider region had emerged with a strong government -- nine years on from the AK Party's rise to power -- and could be seen as an example of a moderate democratic force, showing that there was a liberal political alternative to autocratic regimes that could provide stability. Moreover, Iran in 2009 demonstrated the real power of new tools such as social networking in helping to mobilize crowds and spread messages through new media. And then, instead of waiting until September, Tunisia, the forgotten North African country came alive, because one man, pushed to desperation, physically lit himself on fire to show that he had enough. His name was Mohamed Bouazizi, a 26-year-old street vendor, who had his produce and other items confiscated by a 45 year-old bureaucrat assisted by two thugs from the security apparatus. He petitioned the municipal administration for a reprieve, especially because he had gone $200 into debt to buy the goods he was selling. It was to no avail. In his town of Sidi Bouzid, the spark of the new revolution started.
What happened in Tunisia and how the protests accelerated over the course of several weeks is fodder for a much longer post. Tunisia, had been an autocratic secular dictatorship ruled with an iron fist. President Zine El Abedine Ben Ali had been in power since 1987 and had succeeded Habib Bourguiba who had ruled for 30 years. Ben Ali, in recent years, however, had not had the same economic success of his predecessor. It's hard to ascertain fully what happened in Tunisia, but each day after Bouazizi set himself alight on December 17 and then when he finally succumbed to his injuries on January 4, 2011, the protests and demonstrations grew stronger. While the Arab world had seen its share of coups, bloodless and most often by the military, it had yet to see popular protests amount to much. When the demonstrations showed no signs of abating, and after Bouazizi's death, President Ben Ali tried to be conciliatory telling the Tunisian people he understands them and would respond to their concerns. The protests went on and the Arab satellite channels, especially Al Jazeera broadcast them. Still the Arab world watched, not thinking it would amount to much. Ben Ali came back on television and announced he would not stand again in 2014 for re-election, a key and noticeable concession. Something had changed, the protesters felt it and they did not relent until on January 14, President Ben Ali fled the country, facilitated by Libya, with his wife Leila Trabelsi -- who was the subject of much scorn because of her family involvement in using state power to facilitate their businesses -- taking $50 million of gold bars with her to Saudi Arabia for exile. It was the end of a 74-year-old's rule.
That day I was at a talk at the American University of Beirut on an unrelated topic. We followed what was going on by reading twitter on our mobile phones. 700 people were in the auditorium and as it became apparent as to what had happened, the convener of the event -- a discussion on the Arab-Israeli conflict -- took the microphone, and belted in Arabic -- "Today Tunisia, tomorrow Libya, and then Egypt, and then Saudi Arabia, and then every capital in the Arab world!" Yet, within a few days, the euphoria had died down. Tunisia was said to be different. It was not in the heart of the Arab world and had been under the radar. It was not a key interest to the West. Egypt is a very different country. It has 80 million people to Tunisia's 10 million. The population is relatively apathetic. From January 14 to January 25, there were a number of protests throughout the Arab world. In Jordan. In Yemen. In Algeria. To a lesser degree, in Oman and Libya and elsewhere. Egypt, however, was still waiting to erupt. What Tunisia did was break the zero-sum culture of impossibility. It showed that it was possible -- to change the country, to protest the ruler, to force a regime change from the street.
So while Egypt took a couple of weeks to fully react to Tunisia, activists and bloggers and others were organizing. Twitter and Facebook and the Internet helped facilitate on January 25 a Day of Rage, organized by loose groups of activists. Like in Tunisia, the Egyptian demonstrations were not led by any one group, mind the traditional opposition, the so-called Islamists. On January 25, the Muslim Brotherhood stayed largely on the sidelines. Millions of Egyptians already infected by the spirit of Tunisia now had an avenue to channel this spirit. Friday prayers, as always, provided the perfect avenue for a wider uprising. Strategically diverse locations (i.e. mosques) in every city across the country would be the barracks of this non-violent civil disobedience. Hundreds of thousands of people - at least - would be automatically mobilized. It was clear by Wednesday and then Thursday, that Friday, January 28 would be an explosion. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton tried to placate "both sides" calling for "restraint" while supporting both the government and the people. What was clear, was that Friday would be a battle, a blow would be struck and everyone would wait to see how the Egyptian government would absorb the hit.
In trying to preempt the protests, the government of Egypt had about 80 ISPs go offline at around 12:30am local time. That meant the country was relatively without internet (except for dial-up through foreign numbers). Then they asked Vodafone and other carriers to halt mobile phone access in selected areas. When people awoke on Friday morning, they could not coordinate by mobile phone, or by email, or by Twitter, or by Facebook; all they knew, was that they could go to the mosques for afternoon prayers and see - Friday prayers being the weekly prayer and the first day of the weekend in Egypt. While Tunisia opened the door and lit the flame, it was on Friday in Egypt when it turned into a fire. There was no fear. But there was also no coordinated plan. Yet, people confronted the police forces, pushing them back in many cases, and eventually over-taking them. In Suez. In Mansoura. In Alexandria. Across the country and of course in the heart of Cairo. By nightfall, the headquarters of the NDP was on fire. The police and security apparatus was forced to retreat. When the military came on the streets, the soldiers were welcomed with chants of Allah Akbar, a typical slogan of exuberance.
At 1 a.m. President Mubarak finally came to the podium to address the nation. He did not resign. He did not give in to even appointing a government of national unity or holding dialogue with the opposition. He simply restated his old game-plan. The people on the streets of Cairo in fact surged in their numbers on Saturday, into the tens of thousands if not more, finally overtaking the main square -- Liberation or Tahrir Square -- in the heart of Cairo. All this under the watchful eyes of the military. The Egyptians respect the military and view it as distinct from the security apparatus of the regime that was used to oppress the population over the last three (or even five) decades. Moreover, in Tunisia, while it was the population that raised the stakes and challenged the government, Ben Ali stepped down when it became clear the military would not side with the President against the people, and would not fire upon demonstrators. The Egyptian population is expecting the same. Of course, it is unclear, as for now, which way the military will turn. Even the US is awaiting the events that will unfold over the next week. However, it would be loathe to be seen as supporting Mubarak over the Egyptian people, and that could be a catastrophic failure in public relations in the Arab world. Thus President Obama gave a stern warning to Mubarak Friday:
"When President Mubarak addressed the Egyptian people tonight, he pledged a better democracy and greater economic opportunity. I just spoke to him after his speech. And I told him he has a responsibility to give meaning to those words, to take concrete steps and actions that deliver on that promise."
That is where Egypt finds itself now. President Mubarak is no longer trying to placate the people or even the US, but instead trying to curry favor with the military to ensure that they remain on his side. If the military shows an allegiance to the people or an emerging consolidated opposition movement, then that is the end of Mubarak. The police are now largely absent from the streets. Police stations have been torched across the country. Even traffic cops are not to be found in busy Cairo. Security is in the hands of the army, who thus far, have not clashed with protesters, and instead have focused on protecting key facilities like the State TV building, ministerial offices, and the National Museum. President Mubarak appointed Omar Suleiman as Vice President, a post that had remained vacant since he came to office (in fact the last Vice President in Egypt was Hosni Mubarak). Suleiman is the Director of Intelligence in the country and a known figure to the Israelis and the Americans, as well as the enforcer-in-chief inside Egypt. Mubarak then appointed in his new government, Ahmed Shafiq as the Prime Minister. Shafiq is a former commander of the Air Force; coincidentally so was Mubarak many years ago. Thus Mubarak has been sending signals to the military and one cannot forget that he himself was a military man. He is hoping that they will not support a transitional government or a national unity-figure like El-Baredei (the Muslim Brotherhood and Ayman Nour are not real options in this role at this point).
Sunday marked the beginning of the work-week in Egypt and the Arab world, and the protests continued unabated. Will the demonstrators be able to keep up the momentum, especially through to the next weekend and possibly another surge after next Friday's prayers? There is hope evident in Mubarak's tactics and Obama's stern but cautious reaction that the regime will stabilize, the protests will dissipate, the army will consolidate security back within the regime's control, and a deliberate but slow process of reform will continue. If this was 2010, it might have worked. On Saturday, the King of Saudi Arabia called Hosni Mubarak and said the following:
"Egypt is a country of Arabism and Islam. No Arab and Muslim human being can bear that some infiltrators in the name of freedom of expression, have infiltrated into the brotherly people of Egypt to destabilize its security and stability and they have been exploited to spew out their hatred in destruction, intimidation, burning, looting and inciting a malicious sedition."
Yet, the spark of Tunisia cannot be extinguished. The fire that raged on Friday [and after] in Egypt has already spread in both symbol and substance. The bogeyman of Islamism of course will not dissipate. The Muslim Brotherhood will remain under suspicion. However, people like El Baradei show that alternatives exist beyond the proverbial monster in the closet. Thus when King Abdullah and the other Arab leaders in the region offer solidarity to Mubarak, they are themselves playing with fire. Each country is susceptible to what happened and is happening in Egypt. At the same time, there is no need to romanticize this revolution. It may end up being bloody. There may end up being chaos. There may not be a clear succession or plan for the day after in Egypt or if it spreads, in Algeria, or Jordan, or Yemen, each country in which there are already thousands of demonstrators. In fact, the situation on the streets of Egypt remains dire. There are reports of random looting. Civilians have formed common neighborhood defense committees to protect against vandals and gangs. Moreover, there is the real and distinct possibility that extremists groups may step into the vacuum.
Nevertheless, in 2011, the Arab world's people have woken up. To believe that they will be lulled back to sleep is a fruitless endeavor. It does not mean that every regime will be toppled and that there will be protests in every country until that happens. It does mean, however, that the old social contract between rulers and their subjects has been torn to shreds. Economically, socially, and politically, leaders will have to provide new -- substantively changed -- direction. Or else. More of the same will not placate this new desire for effective and open governance.
There is a new playbook in town, and Obama, Mubarak, and the rest of the friends in the region better start reading it fast, or they'll get run off the field. That is the new reality.
Taufiq Rahim is a Visiting Fellow at the Dubai School of Government and blogs at TheGeopolitico.com. ]]>It's Deja Vu in Lebanon All Over Againtag:www.huffingtonpost.com,2011:/theblog//3.8088922011-01-14T13:00:00-05:002011-05-25T18:25:24-04:00Taufiq Rahimhttp://www.huffingtonpost.com/taufiq-rahim/yuhud (Jews) and the haramiyin (bastards a.k.a. politicians), within a few minutes of us leaving the airport. Soon I was amongst friends discussing what would happen next.
This past week was quite eventful for Lebanon. Within a span of almost 24 hours, Christian opposition figure Michel Aoun announced the failure of the Saudi-Syrian initiative and the Hezbollah-led opposition group withdrew from the unity government, effectively collapsing it just as Prime Minister Saad Hariri was meeting President Obama at the White House. Somewhere out there, Robert Fisk is snickering to himself - Pity the Nation.
Yet, is anyone surprised? The only surprise is that the walkout of the 10 opposition ministers (and one minister allied with President Michael Suleiman) did not happen sooner; that the facade of an elusive compromise persisted for so long. Syria and Saudi Arabia had been working behind the scenes to try to bring about a deal to address the ramifications of a possible indictment of Hezbollah by the Special Tribunal for Lebanon (STL) in the coming days. Yet, just like the Doha Agreement of 2008, even if there was a breakthrough it would likely be a transient one. Why? As always, Lebanon finds itself in the same tug-of-war, the same sects, the same zuama' (leaders), the same 'foreign powers' or as Jumblatt calls them dark forces -- the same ***t.
The more things change, the more they stay the same. If by some miracle, Saad Hariri is reappointed as the Prime Minister (he is the caretaker PM until the crisis is resolved), or if a consensus candidate emerges (such as the likes of Muhammad Safadi or others from the Sunni-strongholds of the North) it will only be to defer the next inevitable crisis by a few months, to simply be precipitated again by the STL releasing its findings, or the next parliamentary elections, or by an errant rocket towards Israel, or someone sneezing etc. Lebanon may be in crisis today, but it is in permanent paralysis. That paralysis experiences a convulsion frequently, but that only masks the underlying condition. Lebanon is still frozen. Frozen since its last census conducted in 1932. Frozen since the unwritten Shari'a that is the National Pact, agreed to in 1943 and carried out religiously ever since. Frozen despite civil conflict on repeated occasions, including a 15-year brutal war from 1975-1990.
Despite being frozen, the leaders will warmly wait for directives and indications from abroad. Walid Jumblatt is on his way to pay homage to his once foresworn enemy -- who he vowed in typical Jumblatt-will-do-the-opposite-soon fashion he would never meet (including once to me) - President Bashar al-Assad. PM Saad Hariri racked up frequent flyer miles on his return DC, stopping in Paris and Istanbul to consult with the leadership. There will be a flurry of activity by political leaders in a rush to the different embassies in Beirut.
Then, Friday night sees a speech by Hezbollah Secretary-General Nasrallah (likely by the time this article is posted) and there will be more to come. It is still March 8 versus March 14. Again. Again Again. Five years on and still the same fight, around nearly the same issues (or at least borne from the same tree). And it won't change. Not yet. Here's why:
-- The United States is still uncomfortable with Hezbollah in a Lebanese government;
-- The United States needs Lebanon to remain in Hariri or Hariri-allied hands prior to any confrontation, military or otherwise, with Iran
-- The United States and Israel view the STL as a way to hold Hezbollah accountable under international law and target the group
-- Iran is dedicated to seeing Hezbollah lead the government in Lebanon to angle for positioning vis-a-vis the West
-- Israel will continue to threaten Lebanon to ensure it remains unstable and because it has unfinished business with Hezbollah
-- Hezbollah does not trust Hariri and his allies in March 14 because they view them as hostile to the resistance and pseudo-collaborators with Israel in 2006
-- The Future Party and others fear that a government with Hezbollah gives the group both the state projection of power in addition to their power as a militia
-- The constant convulsions of crisis provide the political leaders with a purpose and position, rather than have to answer to the daily concerns of citizens
-- The permanent paralysis maintains the grip on power of political leaders and avoidance of political transition that would undermine the system of patronage and nepotism that is now pervasive.
Solve the above and Lebanon will calm down and fade from the newspaper headlines. Until then, pity the nation.
Taufiq Rahim is a Visiting Fellow at the Dubai School of Government, and blogs regularly on TheGeopolitico.com. ]]>Qatar and Sheikha Mozah's Vision Extends Further Than the World Cuptag:www.huffingtonpost.com,2010:/theblog//3.7948272010-12-10T12:15:24-05:002011-05-25T18:20:30-04:00Taufiq Rahimhttp://www.huffingtonpost.com/taufiq-rahim/viewed derisively in many Western capitals. Who was this small nation? Where was this country? Why Qatar? Even US President Barack Obama claimed afterwards, "The wrong decision was made." This country of 1.6 million residents and less than a quarter-million citizens had burst onto the world stage in the most spectacular of ways. Its victory, however, was not just its own, as Sheikha Mozah Bint Nasser Al Missned, the Amir of Qatar's wife and an influential leader in her own right, explained to me this week, in an exclusive interview:
We saw [the excitement] immediately on the faces of millions and millions of Arabs and not just in the Emirates or the Gulf or our direct neighbors, but also in Egypt, Algeria, and Syria, everywhere -- Lebanon... what happened in Zurich, is the success of a hard-working group of young people that represents all the Middle Eastern youth.
Sheikha Mozah had made a related impassioned plea in her closing speech for Qatar's World Cup bid. Perhaps many in Western capitals were hearing her speak for the first time. Usually, it is her sense of fashion that precedes her and dominates media coverage. Qatar itself is viewed as an obscurity. Yet, that limited perception, especially in North America and Europe, really is suited only for those who've arrived late to the party. Qatar has the world's third largest natural gas reserves, one of the world's largest corporations (Qatar Petroleum), one of the world's largest sovereign wealth funds (Qatar Investment Authority), and last but not least, one of the world's largest foundations (Qatar Foundation), chaired by Sheikha Mozah herself. This is not even to mention the awe-inspiring Museum of Islamic Art that was recently built, or Al Jazeera which has transformed news media in the Arab world and beyond.
At the heart of this integrated vision (QNV 2030), is the push for true social and cultural transformation, and for Qatar to be an example in this regard for the wider region. That effort is led primarily by Sheikha Mozah, one of the world's most influential women according to Forbes Magazine. In Qatar this has meant pushing for a more open society, that is thinking, that is tolerant, that is informed. Sheikha Mozah's Qatar Foundation for example, partnered with Tim Sebastian to found the Doha Debates, which tackles sensitive topics in the Middle East. This past week's fiery discussion, saw renowned Muslim philosopher from Europe, Tariq Ramadan claim to the delight of the local audience, "What we need today in Muslim countries is courage to challenge governments and policies."
The key for the Qataris, however, is education. "Education is the solution," Sheikha Mozah related in our conversation. "Education can also be used as a soft power and as a soft force to transform societies. When I say transform societies it means we can tackle issues in political, social, cultural, economic areas. These are the most important things." In this light, Qatar has played host to the World Innovation Summit on Education for the past two years, to try and push further collaboration and sharing of lessons, akin to a World Economic Forum-style event. It brings together, for example, education leaders from Ghana, Saudi Arabia and the UK, to share a stage on equal footing to learn from one another. At this year's event, Sheikha Mozah announced a new $500,000 International Prize for Education, the first of its kind in the world.
Domestically, Qatar has engaged in a series of reforms and built a number of new institutions of higher learning in a multi-billion dollar location appropriately named, 'Education City'. This was a concerted effort to bring "Ivy League" quality universities to Doha, and empower specific "faculties to build up our own societies." You can see satellite campuses of Cornell Medical, Carnegie Mellon, Northwestern, Georgetown and beyond seamlessly fitting into the Qatari landscape. Sheikha Mozah also emphasized that "Qatar is giving 2.8% of our GDP to research. This is something again that is a breakthrough, as nobody was even thinking of research as a tool or component for advancement in this part of the world."
Qatar's focus on education and empowerment is impressive in its own right. It's doubly important in the region where as Sheikha Mozah pointed out, "66% is the literacy rate in the Arab world. We have 58 million illiterate among adults in our part of the world." Moreover, Sheikha Mozah's own example as an impassioned social leader is inspirational to millions of women in the region and also for men. Yet, just as with the World Cup bid there are also a number of questions that need to be raised. Firstly, multi-billion dollar infrastructure cannot replace the 'software' needed for an educated, thinking society. When global assessments (TIMSS) were carried out in 2007 for 4th and 8th grade students across the maths and sciences, Qatar ranked at the bottom of the class. Sheikha Mozah insists that she "was the one who held the devotion towards this. The others said there are risks because our experience is very, very immature until now as we are just two years of experience into our reforms, and that will reflect significantly on the results and people will miscalculate the results. I said it's okay -- don't do it for us, at least we'll have it as a benchmark from when we started. The results that you saw are the results that reflect our starting point, not our ending point."
There are also similar questions around the suitability and sustainability of having branch campuses of universities, who are deeply influenced by revenue streams in moving to the Gulf and do not have the same sense of entrenched history that they do in their own countries. After all, world-class universities are as much (if not more) about the culture and identity of the institution, as the bricks and mortar. Qatar across a range of sectors has embarked on an ambitious national development programme, and it remains unclear if the tens of billions of dollars that are being spent and will continue to be spent, will generate the expected results. More importantly, as Lakdar Brahimi, the former UN Special Envoy mentioned during the WISE conference, countries such as Qatar need to do more in assisting the region around them, and improving the conditions in education for example in Afghanistan (Qatar Foundation has established Reach Out to Asia to this end).
It remains to be seen how exactly Qatar's vision will play itself out. Despite Sheikha Mozah's enthusiasm, there is of course reason to be skeptical about whether the results will follow good intentions. At the same time, there is tremendous reason to be optimistic. The institutions of the Qatar Foundation around social change are extensive and now well-rooted. Additionally, Sheikha Mozah has been providing strong leadership on changing attitudes locally, regionally, and even globally towards education. Winning the right to host the World Cup in 2022 truly inspired the Middle East, especially the youth. It was, however, only one step in Qatar's grand vision and certainly not the last.
Taufiq Rahim is a Visiting Fellow at the Dubai School of Government and blogs regularly at TheGeopolitico.com
(Photo credits: Qatar Foundation)]]>A Call Beyond Islam: The Aga Khan Award for Architecture Makes Its Marktag:www.huffingtonpost.com,2010:/theblog//3.7884052010-11-27T13:16:41-05:002011-05-25T18:15:22-04:00Taufiq Rahimhttp://www.huffingtonpost.com/taufiq-rahim/Aga Khan called for the need to close the gap of ignorance between the Muslim world and the West, asking in particular: Can these societies exchange knowledge but on an equal footing?
It was a challenge very much embodied in the Aga Khan Award for Architecture (AKAA) when established in 1977, and which was conferred for the 11th time this year in Qatar on November 24. This year's ceremonies were hosted by the Amir of Qatar, Hamad bin Khalifa al-Thani and Sheikha Mozah bint Nasser al-Missned (with other notables in attendance). Behind the pomp and protocol, however, was a very important but two-fold message. Certainly, there was the continued recognition of projects that contribute in multi-faceted ways to the societies in which Muslims live. Yet, the Award in a very stark manner recognized a project -- the Bridge School in Fujian Province in China -- that was wholly unrelated to the Muslim world, except for the fact that it was an initiative (the Award) inspired by the ethics of Islam that was conferring the recognition.
The Award has been given to 105 projects over its history and was established by the Aga Khan, a philanthropist and spiritual leader of the Shia Ismaili Muslims, with the objective to "enhance the understanding and appreciation of Islamic culture as expressed through architecture." One of the most prolific and methodical honors in the architecture world, the AKAA draws a truly diverse crowd and this year was no exception. The 2010 Master Jury itself included members from an eclectic array of backgrounds, geographically and professionally, including individuals from Syria, China, Senegal, Iran, France, the UK and Saudi Arabia. It was no wonder then that the five selected recipients of the $500,000 Award included a pluralistic collection of projects: the Bridge School in China; a revitalized hypercenter in Tunis; the Wadi Hanifa Wetlands in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia; the Ipekyol Textile Factory in Turkey; and the Madinat al-Zahra Museum in Spain.
The recipients truly symbolized the pluralism extant in its multi-faceted dimensions within the Muslim world, which is by no means a monolith, but rather a dynamic confluence of identities. The factory in Turkey was an industrial project that cost $17 million to build and used the essence of natural light to improve an otherwise downcast setting. The Bridge School in China, is at once a school, bridge, and new public meeting-ground in a marginalized village in Fujian province and was constructed at the cost of only $100,000. Meanwhile, the wetlands just outside Riyadh was a $160 million endeavor that reclaimed a neglected but important oasis in Saudi Arabia.
True, the Aga Khan Award for Architecture has recognized people and projects that improve the built environment in Muslim societies and empower Islamic identity and culture. Yet, there is also something post-cultural and post-Islamic that the Award represents. First of all many of the concepts that it has championed, such as local sustainability and environmental stewardship, it has done so ahead of its time starting over 30 years ago. Second, and more importantly, there is a universality in the 'excellence' of the projects. In his speech during the Award ceremony, the Aga Khan asked, "How can we share our lessons with others outside the Ummah?" In this year's cycle, the recognition of the Bridge School in China is particularly instructive. There is no Muslim heritage at the site nor is it in a Muslim area. Yet the principles of sustainable and responsible architecture are no different. When approaching development of the built environment in rural areas, we see a universality of principles, of course applied contextually across geographies.
It is here then that we can see the embryonic phase of an exchange of knowledge on equal footing between the proverbial West and Muslim world. That exchange is truly about the universality of knowledge and ideas, which need not be bound by geography or religion. The Vatican plays host to the ubiquitous portrayal of the School of Athens by Raphael. Within this painting is the portrait of Ibn Rushd or Averroes, amidst the historic scholars of Plato and Aristotle. Yet who is this Arab Ibn Rushd inhabiting the quintessential landscape of Western civilization? Averroes as he is known in the West, was not only responsible for the preservation and endowment to European thought of many of the ancient scholars of antiquity, but he also was the pioneer in conceptualizing the coexistence of secular philosophy and religious thought, his influence reverberating to this very day.
The reality today is often a one-way flow of ideas and knowledge, from West to East. It would be nostalgic to repeatedly recount the tremendous contributions of scholars such as Averroes and Avicenna. While they should indeed be recognized, the Muslim world needs to go beyond historical memory and look to what it also has to offer in the present and future to a global society. What are innovative ideas and approaches from within the Muslim world that should be considered universally?
What is remarkable about the Aga Khan Award is that it is now setting, in many ways, the new standard for architecture and the built environment globally. The list of 105 award recipients of the Aga Khan Award for Architecture is inspiring in this regard. But it is not enough. As one Saudi philanthropist attending the Award ceremony remarked to me: "We need more, and not just in architecture. We need the same in medicine and other fields to promote excellence and new ideas from the Muslim world." My response was concise and clear -- Inshallah.
Taufiq Rahim is a Visiting Fellow at the Dubai School of Government and blogs regularly at TheGeopolitico.com
(Photo credits: AKDN)]]>Imam Feisal Abdul-Rauf Praises America as Muslims Applaud Himtag:www.huffingtonpost.com,2010:/theblog//3.7001562010-08-31T17:42:59-04:002011-05-25T17:30:22-04:00Taufiq Rahimhttp://www.huffingtonpost.com/taufiq-rahim/There is a deep linkage between Judaism, Christianity, and Islam - structurally. We have to shift the divide and elevate the discourse...As Muslims we also have to get back to our values - where are the synagogues that were there for hundreds of years in [my birthplace] Egypt?"
With rhetorical flourish in Dubai, Imam Feisal Abdul-Rauf, the face behind the controversial Islamic community center called Park 51 (previously called Cordoba House), praised America and called for interfaith understanding. It was hardly the performance of a figure that Fox News and others have portrayed as an ally of extremists. The three hours he spent at the Dubai School of Government today included an Iftar (the meal to traditionally break fast during Ramadan), a lecture and Q&A, and evening prayers. At no point did he break from his core message, that his Islam is one that is authentically American, and that America is in congruence with the core values of his faith. He spoke in Arabic, and he spoke in English, and the words were the same.
For the Imam, his trip has been extremely difficult. He has taken comfort in several Jon Stewart clips, as well as the statements by Mayor Bloomberg. He told me that he has felt he is surrounded by "turbulence" and subject to "winds from all directions." Indeed the entire world media is clamoring for statements from him; the moment he did give one interview yesterday in The National (UAE), he was criticized for speaking on a domestic issue from abroad. Thus Imam Feisal is in a dilemma. In the Middle East, however, he has been touring Qatar, Bahrain and the United Arab Emirates, hosted by the U.S. State Department and ferried to various public fora. The reception has been largely positive, and today was no exception.
The audience at the Dubai School of Government, consisted of a motley crew of journalists (from CNN, ABC News, Reuters, and a bevy of local papers), students, financial professionals, government officials, and academics. Largely Muslim, but not exclusively so, the crowd hailed from nearly every country in the region. Libya. Syria. Iran. Pakistan. The list including any number of nationalities perceived as disposed against the United States. While he refrained from any significant commentary on the Islamic center itself, the Imam did not hold back, neither in his humble praise of his country, nor from his criticisms of many contemporary trends in the wider Muslim community.
"Like many of our fellow Muslims, we found our faith in America...My country and my faith are knitted together."
His words went beyond the superficial. The Imam cited that the American Constitution and Declaration of Independence expressed Islamic values of life, dignity, religion, family, property and intellect. Interspersed in his remarks were references to the Qur'an and the Hadith (sayings of the prophet) to substantiate his points. What surprised many in the audience was when he went even further, challenging some Muslims for neglecting the values within Islam, and its inherent principles of tolerance. He said that many Muslims have in fact "made Islam itself into a god to worship," while forgetting its "inner concepts." He said that in centuries passed it was natural to have different religious and ethnic communities living side-by-side within Muslim societies. What has happened, he asked, in the last fifty years, as many of the Jews and other minority groups have emigrated from countries such as Egypt, for example? He answered his own question, "We are poorer for it." The audience's reaction was applause and enthusiasm.
On his way back to the U.S., Imam Feisal faces a difficult challenge. With various protests organized for September 11, the atmosphere in the country, where nearly two-thirds of those surveyed oppose his new community center, will only get more volatile. The Imam himself commented that "the political season" is charging the atmosphere, and that much of the opposition is exploiting that.
His voice in the the region and wider Muslim community has been one of moderation, as he has sought to build intercontinental and interfaith bridges. Those in the audience today, will be waiting to see what is the reaction of most Americans upon the Imam's return to his country in just a few days.
Taufiq Rahim is a Visiting Scholar at the Dubai School of Government and blogs daily at TheGeopolitico.com]]>No Mandela, No de Klerk, No Dealtag:www.huffingtonpost.com,2010:/theblog//3.6918772010-08-24T14:02:08-04:002011-05-25T17:25:21-04:00Taufiq Rahimhttp://www.huffingtonpost.com/taufiq-rahim/laid out the red carpet for peace talks between the Israelis and Palestinians. Yet what will this new round of negotiations accomplish? In this short clip, originally posted on my blog TheGeopolitico.com (as part of the series LocoWorld TV) I explain why both sides are not ready, willing or able to reach a legitimate compromise unless they get their own houses in order first. The Palestinians and Israelis may come to the negotiating table this fall, but they are not in a position to reach an agreement.
]]>Who's Supporting the Enemy in the Mosque Wars?tag:www.huffingtonpost.com,2010:/theblog//3.6860062010-08-19T10:30:29-04:002011-05-25T17:25:21-04:00Taufiq Rahimhttp://www.huffingtonpost.com/taufiq-rahim/Islamic community center several blocks from Ground Zero, has reached new heights. President Obama himself has waded unsuccessfully into the controversy while critics have painted the project almost as a harbinger of the apocalypse. The Imam behind the project has been characterized as a terrorist sympathizer despite being a bridge for interfaith dialogue.
Yet, who is actually providing support for the so-called enemy? In this clip below - as part of a series called LocoWorld TV that I also post on TheGeopolitico.com - I explain what the controversy is and why the opposition to the mosque will only embolden Al Qaeda.
Taufiq Rahim is a Visiting Scholar at the Dubai School of Government and blogs daily at TheGeopolitico.com]]>Hezbollah's Way or the Highway on Hariritag:www.huffingtonpost.com,2010:/theblog//3.6761302010-08-10T14:22:54-04:002011-05-25T17:20:22-04:00Taufiq Rahimhttp://www.huffingtonpost.com/taufiq-rahim/"This is the answer for the people asking why March 14 members were the ones who were assassinated. The answer is that Israel wants the blame to fall on Syria and Hezbollah."
On a hot summer night, without losing a beat, Sayyid Hassan Nasrallah, Secretary-General of Hezbollah, offered his own case against Israel for the assassination of former Lebanese Prime Minister Rafik al-Hariri. Monday's blistering speech had been highly anticipated since Nasrallah had indicated last week he would reveal "new evidence" of the truth in Hariri's killing. In many ways, however, it is irrelevant whether or not the accusation against Israel is true or not. In laying down the only acceptable version of the truth to Hezbollah, Nasrallah has essentially painted all those who would question it as treasonous. As a consequence, he has paved the way for more civil unrest in the country, when ultimately the international community or other Lebanese parties oppose Hezbollah's official line.
Rafik al-Hariri's assassination on February 14, 2005, shook Lebanon. For over a decade Hariri had stood as Syria's man inside the country; yet, after Syria extended by coercion the term of the then President of Lebanon, Emile Lahoud, Hariri decided to resign as Prime Minister and go into vociferous opposition. It was a dangerous period in the region, with Iraq in full-blown conflict, and Syria under constant censure from the United Nations (particularly resulting from UN Resolution 1559). Syria itself, had seen its rule relatively unchallenged in Lebanon since the end of the civil war in 1990. Hariri's death mobilized the Lebanese, and the subsequent Cedar Revolution brought about the withdrawal of Syrian forces and a redrawing of the political map (albeit, expectedly with the same players).
His death was followed by the assassination of a number of other figures in the March 14 movement (which includes the Future Movement, Progressive Socialist Party, Kataeb Party, Lebanese Forces, and several others). At the time when the Tribunal was created in 2006 (UNSC Resolution 1664), it was Syria which was considered to be the number one suspect in the series of murders. Hezbollah, however, since the beginning opposed the Tribunal, as did Syria, considering its creation as part of a political trap. Since its creation, the STL, as it's known, has not indicted a single suspect (although it released four), and there have only been rumblings about what conclusions it will draw (gleaned from unattributable leaks). This summer, however, there has been a rising belief that an indictment is forthcoming perhaps as early as the fall. More surprisingly (or not), it is expected that members of Hezbollah will be indicted, a view expressed by Nasrallah himself.
Since the Doha Agreement in 2008, Lebanon's political forces came back from the brink of another civil war to restore stability in the country. Moreover, the formation of a unity government in November restored a fragile Hariri-Hezbollah detente (with Saad Hariri, the current PM and son of Rafik.) In the last year, Hezbollah has been cooperating increasingly with the Lebanese Armed Forces, and this has led to a number of counter-espionage operations and arrests. In many ways, it was a victory for Hezbollah when the recent border conflict with Israel flared up, and the movement was nowhere to be found; instead, it was the army and government singing the words of resistance. Nasrallah knows that an indictment by the STL threatens the current situation benefitting Hezbollah. An accusation by the Tribunal would be catastrophic. As a result, Hezbollah's leader went on the offensive, first by accusing PM Saad Hariri of already knowing in advance the results of the Tribunal's investigation (in a speech in late July), and then by providing "evidence" of Israel's complicity in Rafik al-Hariri's death on Monday.
In a complicated region full of intrigue, it is not inconceivable that Israel, Hezbollah, or Syria could each be responsible for the death of a political figure. I remember when I met a leading Sunni politician (and current minister) three years back, he told me: "The Tribunal is a political body. It will not lead us to the truth. We will probably never know who killed Hariri, Israel, Syria or someone else." In fact, the truth, as Nasrallah knows, is not so important. In Lebanon, everybody moves forward, sometimes acknowledging but often ignoring (but never forgetting) the blood-soaked ground they walk on. Earlier this year, Druze leader Walid Jumblatt restored his relationship with Syrian President Bashar al-Assad, which he had previously vowed never to do; of course, he had maintained a warm relationship with Bashar's father, Hafez al-Assad for nearly twenty years, this despite the fact that it is widely accepted that Hafez al-Assad killed Walid's own father, Kamal Jumblatt.
For Nasrallah, he simply needed to create an environment where doubt of the Tribunal would be pervasive. The actual truth is simply a luxury. Of course, he did offer a compelling case against Israel, to create an alternative theory of the crime so to speak. He cited the case of an Israeli spy, Ahmad Nasrallah (no relation) who was apprehended in 1996 in Lebanon (but has since escaped to Israel), and showed video of an alleged confession, commenting:
After interrogating Ahmad Nasrallah and his confession of photographing houses of Hezbollah leaders, he also admitted that he had been blackmailing Hariri. He admitted that he had been trying to control the course of Hariri's motorcade through deluding him into believing that Hezbollah wants to murder him.
Nasrallah (the Hezbollah leader) also showed footage showing that Israel had allegedly monitored Hariri's movements, and promised more from the actual day of the assassination. A detailed account of the speech can be found on Al-Manar's website. What was daunting about the speech, however, was not the litany of evidence offered by Nasrallah, but rather the stark choice he implicitly presented to the Lebanese people: accept our version on Hariri's death or else. It takes little imagination to go back to May 7, 2008, when Hezbollah gunmen stormed various Beirut neighborhoods such as Hamra to understand who holds power in the country. Yet, is that the legitimacy that Hezbollah seeks? That to convince others of its claims it must play on their fears? Is it wise to create an environment where it is tantamount to treason to resist the resistance, even at an intellectual level?
Hezbollah may be able to cast aside today figures such as the Kateab's Amin Gemayyal when he insists any evidence must be judged by the STL and not in the media, but for how much longer? Ultimately, Nasrallah is playing a very dangerous game. He is seeking to be part of the Lebanese state, but only if he is the only judge, jury, and executioner. It is a game Hezbollah has perhaps quietly learned from its southern neighbor after all these years.
Taufiq Rahim is a Visiting Scholar at the Dubai School of Government, and blogs daily at TheGeopolitico.com. ]]>The Fall in Lebanon to be Hotter Than the Summertag:www.huffingtonpost.com,2010:/theblog//3.6604722010-07-27T15:12:39-04:002011-05-25T17:10:24-04:00Taufiq Rahimhttp://www.huffingtonpost.com/taufiq-rahim/Skybar, the city's premier nightspot is rated as one of the world's top clubs.
Overlooking the Mediterranean Sea, wind in your hair, the warmth of sporadic bursts of fire in your face, you are surrounded by countless wonders of the world who spend hours preparing themselves just to have you glance at them so they can look away. Or you could be at Music Hall, where a sophisticated crowd takes in performance after performance of international musical talent, from Italian opera to Cuban jazz to Jerusalem folk songs -- all in one night. And if that doesn't suit you, perhaps you'd want to go to the Riviera beach club and see how dressing up is really dressing down. Yes, summer in Beirut is quite hot. Nevertheless the fall promises to be even hotter, albeit in an altogether different way.
Lebanon has experienced a brief respite starting in May 2008, from violence, strife, and political stalemate. It has not been perfect, but the peace has provided a modicum of long-awaited stability. Come autumn that could all change. The rising tensions between Iran and the US, as well as the upcoming indictments to be presented by the Special Tribunal for Lebanon investigating the 2005 assassination of former Prime Minister Rafiq al-Hariri, could jolt the country back to instability.
The Doha Agreement on May 21, 2008, allowed for the creation of a unity government (one in which Hezbollah was effectively given a veto in cabinet) and the election of President Michel Suleiman. In fact, it was the first time in 35 years that Lebanon had a legitimate head of state at a time of peace; there was no Syrian or Israeli occupation (essentially), or civil war, or foreign-installed President (i.e. Emile Lahoud). The last two years, also allowed Lebanon to somewhat heal from the Israeli onslaught in July 2006, which devastated the South and suburbs of Beirut particularly, and left Lebanon divided. A generally free election in 2009, gave way to a surprising victory for the March 14 coalition spearheaded by Saad Hariri's (son of Rafiq) Future Party, over the Hezbollah-led opposition coalition. What was even more surprising was that both sides accepted the results and formed a unity government (after some Saudi-Syrian conversations of course). Since then, for the first time in their histories, Lebanon and Syria established diplomatic relations (i.e. embassies) with each other.
Yet, the more things change, unfortunately, the more they stay the same. Yes, the 'party' is still ongoing and on the surface Lebanon is changing. For example, I was at a wedding of epic proportions in the Bekaa Valley (a stronghold of Hezbollah) on Saturday, which brought together a Druze bride and a Shiite-Sunni groom. Young people from whatever affiliation or disposition or sect blended together to celebrate into the night. Musicians from France, a singer from New York, and friends from around the world showcased the cosmopolitan side of Lebanon. However, just two days earlier, Hassan Nasrallah, Secretary-General of Hezbollah, had made a stirring speech to the masses in Dahiya and beyond, where he made a claim that has been reverberating in the media for some weeks: several members of Hezbollah will be implicated by the Special Tribunal for Rafiq Hariri's death. What gave people pause, was that he made a pointed reference to current Prime Minister Saad Hariri, revealing personal conversations between the two, where Nasrallah alleged Hariri (the son) told him what the results of the Tribunal would be in advance.
The tinderbox that is Lebanon can explode at any moment. There hasn't been true reconciliation between Sunnis (predominantly supportive of Saad Hariri) and Shiites (predominantly supportive of Hezbollah) since the events of May 7, 2008 when Hezbollah stormed Sunni areas of Beirut in response to the government's decision to crackdown on its telecommunication network. All that is needed is a spark or someone to strike a match, for the country to be engulfed once again in the flames of violence and instability. Since 2005, the Tribunal has been investigating Hariri's death (the father). Now, there is an expectation that the first indictments will be issued as early as September; moreover, in the crosshairs will likely be Hezbollah. Nasrallah has marked a line in the sand saying that no members of his group will be turned over to anyone.
On the other side of the region, the tensions continue to rise between Iran and the U.S.; this will bring further scrutiny on the relationship between Iran and Hezbollah. Due in the fall are reports for UNSC Resolutions 1559 and 1701, which specifically focus on the continuing arms smuggling by Hezbollah (among several other issues). The UNSC may ask UNIFIL forces in the South to take a more direct role in seizing weapons, or investigating arm caches. Already this year, we have seen small skirmishes between UNIFIL and 'residents' of the South. This is likely to get worse in the fall. There is always as well the persistent threat of an irrational escalation by either Hezbollah or Israel with one another, to distract from domestic concerns; thus the situation remains tense on the border.
Does that mean that Lebanon is on a direct path for more internecine conflict? There are signs that the different actors will not want to lead Lebanon to crisis. Hezbollah does not have the same political capital it once did, and it lost considerable popular legitimacy last May when it used its weapons internally. Saad Hariri, himself, has chosen a path of detente, internally and with Syria, which he appears to be committed to despite the circumstances. Finally, Israel is at a weak point internationally, and igniting another conflict with Lebanon would leave it even more isolated.
However, despite the above, the situation is assuredly going to heat up in the coming months. Avoiding conflict, violence and further instability is a priority not just for Lebanon but for the interest of global security. National leaders, regional players and the international community will have to take care not to fan the flames. Unfortunately, as evidenced by Lebanese history, these three groups have often done precisely the opposite.
]]>Deja Vu at Kabul Conferencetag:www.huffingtonpost.com,2010:/theblog//3.6528312010-07-20T17:07:56-04:002011-05-25T17:05:23-04:00Taufiq Rahimhttp://www.huffingtonpost.com/taufiq-rahim/Kabul played host to over 40 foreign ministers and other international leaders representing the broad coalition of the "unwilling, but we can't abandon Afghanistan" group of countries. This event -- the ninth such conference in nine years (but the first in Afghanistan) -- ended with a typical long communique representing an abstract agreement reached by the parties. Here is an excerpt from the front of the document:
The consensus of the nation is being translated into a vision through a concrete program of action for the renewal of the state.
This sentence is emblematic of the wonkish if not vacuous nature of the agreement. Afghanistan has become an intellectual playground and industry for politicians, the media, military, development agencies -- and the list goes on. Yet the result has been failure. It is harsh, but unfortunately it is the truth. The Kabul conference was yet another example of deja vu. The same people. The same process. The same platitudes. No new ideas means it is impossible to see the light at the end of the tunnel.
Over the past nine years, nine such conferences have been held: Bonn 2001; Berlin 2004; London 2006; Rome 2007; Paris 2008; Moscow 2009; The Hague 2009; London 2010; and Kabul 2010. There have been some positive outcomes from these conferences, most principally the Afghanistan National Development Strategy (ANDS) drafted in 2005 and revised in 2008. Yet, too often these events have served as glossy photo-ops that gloss over the real and grave challenges that Afghanistan presents to the international community. June was the deadliest month on record for NATO forces since the beginning of the conflict. Each successive year the communiques issued have emphasized the need for security. Today, President Karzai's plan for a 2014 'transfer of military leadership' was endorsed by the countries present at the conference. It is hard to see why this agreement will have the requisite effect of shifting momentum from the Taliban and stabilizing Afghanistan.
Another outcome of the conference is the continued donor support for the country. Since 2001, an entire Afghanistan industry of various sectors has come together in Kabul based on foreign aid. The Independent covered this well in a comprehensive article last year.
The high degree of wastage of aid money in Afghanistan has long been an open secret. In 2006, Jean Mazurelle, the then country director of the World Bank, calculated that between 35 per cent and 40 per cent of aid was "badly spent." "The wastage of aid is sky-high," he said. "There is real looting going on, mainly by private enterprises. It is a scandal."
The thousands of foreign aid workers, consultants and others receiving part of the largesse, do have an impact for sure. Yet, it is more and more difficult to justify spending $30,000 per month (at least) to pay, house, and secure a foreign aid worker, who has limited movement and in the end limited impact. Moreover, a significant amount of aid goes towards abstract ideas such as gender mainstreaming and aid effectiveness. It isn't that aid effectiveness for example isn't a good idea. Quite simply put, hiring another UN coordination officer is just not the answer for more effective aid.
Afghanistan continues to be mired in tremendous conflict, still ranked 6th on Foreign Policy's failed states index, with the lowest GDP per capita outside of sub-saharan Africa. The 31-point communique released after today's Kabul conference will not solve this situation. The answer then is not to cancel all financial support for the country or withdraw all military forces. It is, however, necessary to reposition completely the failed strategy so far. Instead of focusing on the minutiae of intellectual aid projects, funding should be diverted simply to large-scale infrastructure projects that will bring tangible results to the Afghan people, including boosting employment (away from the Taliban): roads, electricity, schools and hospitals.
Militarily? The solutions are not so clear. What is apparent is that the Afghan population and especially the plurality Pashto population, are becoming more sympathetic to the Taliban. An increased US presence has not been working to strengthen control over the country. Ultimately Afghans need to take the lead, and local security needs to be the focus of training. Separate the war on terrorism from security and stability in Afghanistan. The US should continue, as Fareed Zakariya pointed out, to chase the remaining international terrorists in the country, through special forces, and other surgical strikes. Yet, it should extricate itself and empower completely Afghan forces to secure their own cities, with only rearguard support. As difficult of a prospect that this is, it is the only way forward.
Today's conference, unfortunately represented more of the same for the future instead of a sharp break with the past, and that can only mean continued disappointment in Afghanistan.
Taufiq Rahim is a Visiting Scholar at the Dubai School of Government, and blogs daily at TheGeopolitico.com.
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