On Wednesday of last week, Egyptians commemorated the first anniversary of their January 25 Revolution. Two days earlier, Egypt sat its first democratically elected Parliament in six decades. Unlike the sham parliamentary elections of 2010, these were, according to most accounts, free and fair -- which is why 70 percent of those now seated are Islamists. Tunisia's Islamist party, Ennahda, sought and won 41 percent of the seats in that country's Constituent Assembly, elected last year. The runner-up party in Tunisia has less than a third of Ennahda's seats.
For better or for worse, this Islamist political domination is not going to change any time soon, for various reasons, some less obvious than others.
First, there are basic demographics. Ninety-eight percent of Tunisians and 90 percent of Egyptians are Muslim. Because of decades of authoritarianism, no healthy scene of political competition had developed in either country. After the falls of Ben Ali and Mubarak, each country saw an explosion of political parties seeking power. Except for the Islamist parties, these parties were largely new, and ineffective at getting their messages and policy prescriptions to many segments of their respective populations (33 percent of Tunisians and 57 percent of Egyptians live in rural areas, and both countries have levels of Internet penetration below 35 percent). So when elections were held, voters saw a myriad of names and symbols representing unfamiliar political parties. In this confusing scenario, many simply voted for something they knew and that resonated with their identity; they voted for the Islamists.
Importantly, the Islamist parties of Ennahda in Tunisia and the Muslim Brotherhood (MB) in Egypt have immense clout for having opposed the ousted autocrats long before the Arab Spring. Members of the groups suffered the brunt of the heavy-handed tactics of the former regimes. This is priceless political capital.
Besides the above reality, here are some more interesting advantages that Islamists currently
enjoy.
Money. Seeing the influence of today's Super PACs on the Republican primaries in the U.S. underscores the immense power of money in politics.
While it is probably impossible to determine exact numbers, conservative Gulf states, most notably Qatar, are widely known to financially support Islamist political parties far from their borders.
In Egypt, this money helps the MB campaign throughout the country. The money also, very importantly, supports the MB's social services, like schools and clinics. The secular parties don't have this grassroots presence, especially in rural areas.
When I observed the MB (and no other party) throwing bottles of juice into thirsty crowds of supporters in Tahrir Square last summer, I thought, "These guys are good." But you need money to do these things.
Besides money, mainstream Islamists campaign well.
While in Tunis last year, immediately before the election results had been determined, I spoke with some Tunisian friends about the future of their country. They commented on Ennahda's successful campaign.
Slaheddine, a neuroradiologist, told me, "The other political parties talked about things that are not a priority for normal Tunisian citizens." He said that they spoke of democracy and rights to people who are more concerned with things like food and clothing.
"The problem was that the democratic parties were talking about politics, and the Tunisian people have no political culture." He continued, "Ennahda didn't talk about politics. They spoke to the people in their own language."
What most troubles Slaheddine, though, is the sharp contrast between Ennahda's "on-the-ground" vs. "official" rhetoric.
"Ennahda has two languages. The first is sharia -- that it is a good thing and can be applied. Now in public spaces, Ennahda is saying that it will preserve women's rights." Slaheddine believes that the official rhetoric is used to ease the fears of the country's secularists and the closely-watching international community.
Ultimately, Slaheddine was describing the tactics of effective politicians.
What is perhaps the most interesting advantage for Islamists is the inevitably split secular vote.
Like elsewhere in the world, people who believe in secularism do not necessarily agree on social and economic policy. Even if secular parties in Tunisia and Egypt can agree on social policy, there will always be two major ideological currents with conflicting economic plans and thus at least two parties competing for the secular vote.
For example, Egypt's well-known protestors Gigi Ibrahim and Hossam El-Hamalawy are members of Egypt's Revolutionary Socialists. The group helped establish the Workers Democratic Party and advocates for a socialist Egyptian state. On the other hand, Naguib Sawiris, an Egyptian businessman (who is also Christian), founded the Free Egyptians Party, which calls for a business friendly environment. So while neither Ibrahim, El-Hamalawy, nor Sawiris wants an Islamic state, the sharp differences in their economic policy prescriptions will likely prevent them from joining forces, much to the benefit of the Islamist parties.
Sixty-two percent of Egyptians polled by Pew Research Center last year said that laws should be based strictly on the Qur'an. The remaining 38 percent of Egyptians are probably secularists whose differing views on economic policy will prevent them from ever forming a bloc.
So what lies ahead?
Seeing their political dilemma, some secular parties have already allied themselves with the MB to form the Democratic Alliance for Egypt bloc. Sawiris's Free Egyptians Party only recently left the group. This bloc, at the least, counters Salafi (Muslim fundamentalist) political influence. Salafis won 25 percent of the parliamentary seats.
I have heard many academics speak optimistically about the mainstream Islamist parties like Ennahda and the MB. They say things like, "No one wants to be the next Iran." Their optimism is not universal.
Slaheddine's daughter Lilly works for an NGO that promotes civic engagement. She foresees an eventual return to the caliphate period. "Ennahda has a ten to fifteen year business plan to instill sharia law."
"We are fearful for our future," Lilly said, visibly troubled.
If Ennahda really does want to establish sharia law, it may eventually be able to do so, as the demographic, financial, and political reality is overwhelmingly in its favor.
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Warning in advance: I will not accept any excuses that Muslims are more violent or intolerant than anybody else. For every violent, intolerant Muslim, I can point to one who is not.
Any takers?
In countries ruled by Islamists, women are subjected to gender apartheid. I don't see anything REMOTELY similar either in Israel or in predominantly Christian countries. Women can drive, travel, work, socialize, leave their home without permission, without chaperone and without having to dress in black coffins.
When was the last gay person hanged in Israel or in a Christian country?
When was the last woman stoned for the "crime" of adultery?
When was the last limb amputation as a "judicial" punishment in Israel or Christian countries?
When was the last lashing?
Sure, there are fanatics in other religions, too. But they are not as numerous -- and hence they do NOT rule their countries.
Basing 21st century laws on 7th century "scriptures" or "customs" is beyond despicable.
In the French, Russian and Chinese Revolutions several stages are present.
The first is a popular uprising, the second a democratic phase which fails to solidify because the people are suffering and civil society is weak; the third, the assumption of power by a radical faction leading to civil uprisings and repression.
Are we going to see these three phases in Egypt and Tunisa?
Is Egypt a new oligarchy seems to be emerging in deals between the MB and the military. Might this be to ensure no confiscation of property of associates of the regime who are as guilty as Mubarak?
Have small town Salafists in Tunisia the local bases to destroy civil society in rural areas, creating a permanent state of unrest?
Will Libya fragment? Is the national debate on the Constitution considering confederal structures? Under the King, Libya was governed very loosely - but there was no central pile of revenue in play.
Look forward to your next piece.
You brought up many interesting points that I do plan to write about in the future.
I will briefly share some thoughts.
Qatar is indeed interesting, especially considering the role state-funded Al Jazeera has played in the region.
Looking at past revolutions is certainly helpful, though I think that the level of religiosity in the MENA region will translate into different revolutionary outcomes.
In Egypt, the military remains in control and can be expected to do what is necessary to protect its interests.
And finally, I am more optimistic about the near future of Tunisia, than that of Libya. The degrees of Arab Spring violence were greatly different.
I have been traveling to the MENA region for eight years now, and have been enchanted and fascinated since my first visit. You can count on me to watch developments there closely.