A litmus test of democracy is civilian control of the military exercised through representative institutions, a test which to date no Arab state has passed. Tunisia appears to be on the verge of achieving this historic breakthrough, an outcome that paradoxically the military itself has made possible.
The Jasmine Revolution has followed a course heretofore unknown in the Arab world, but common in transitions to democracy elsewhere, especially in Eastern Europe. Mass protests in those countries, for example, typically exacerbated tensions between security forces, on the one hand, and militaries on the other. Tunisian ex-President Zine al Abidine Ben Ali, just as many of his East European dictator equivalents, relied on the security forces to maintain control, while politically neutering the military, in part by encouraging development of professional norms. To achieve this end he dispatched a remarkably high percentage of Tunisian officers for training in US military institutions, while inviting numerous US military training missions into the country. A standard objective of such US military training is development of professional norms for officers, a component of which is civil-military relations in democracies. By contrast, the primary external source of training and supply for security forces was France, a fact possibly related to President Sarkozy's loyalty to Ben Ali virtually to the moment his plane appeared in French air space.
Ben Ali took the further step of keeping his military small -- about 45,000 in total -- vastly outnumbered by the politically vital security forces, which disposed of somewhere between 120,000 and 180,000 troops, militias, and thugs, that is, up to one police/security officer for every 55 Tunisians. The Ministry of Interior's police force, for example, is about the same size as Britain's police, a nation six times larger than Tunisia. As spending on political security escalated, allocations to the military dwindled, falling from two per cent of GDP in the 1990s to less than 1.4 per cent at present. By contrast, Algeria and Libya spend annually six and four per cent of their GDPs, respectively, on their militaries. The Tunisian National Guard, the backbone of the security forces, was allocated last year 50 per cent more funds than the Tunisian army, navy and air force combined. Meanwhile, the annual budget for military procurement in 2010 was $70 million, the lowest in the Arab world.
So when the moment of truth came and Ben Ali ordered Chief of Staff General Rachid Ammar to deploy the military to reinforce beleaguered security forces, the latter refused. Realizing that the end was near, Ben Ali fled, leaving some members of his family in the lurch and unleashing his praetorian Presidential Guard as well as the other security forces to confront the swelling ranks of demonstrators. The military quickly inserted itself to defend the protesters, and then carried on the battle with the Presidential Guard around the presidential palace in Carthage and elsewhere. Although disposing of only a dozen operational helicopters and confronting the praetorian Presidential Guard which itself possessed armored vehicles, the more professional and united military managed to subdue its opponents over the course of several days.
The second moment of truth then arrived, the one in which the military, now associated with its hero, Lieutenant General Rachid Ammar, had to decide its future political role. Should it seek to exercise power in its own right, presumably at least nominally in a caretaker capacity, awaiting a new civilian order to emerge and elections to be held? Its enormous popularity might well offset widespread reservations among civilians about such a role for the military, even a temporary one. Or should it reject any temptation to govern and hand over power forthwith to civilians, however divided and inexperienced they might be? In much of Eastern Europe, including Romania, the handover to civilians was implemented immediately, while in Portugal's 1974 revolution, the military clung onto power for another year, until its internal divisions finally enabled a full transition to democracy and civilian political supremacy. The Tunisian army has unambiguously decided to stay out of politics and support the Tunisian people, as General Ammar shouted over a bull horn to crowds in Tunis on Monday.
The military is protecting the civilians as they renegotiate the formation of a more representative transitional government under the interim president, Fouad Mebazza, who serves as the constitutional figurehead. This arrangement is intended to provide the breathing space necessary for the contending civilian political forces to reach agreement on such key matters as revisions to the constitution, the timing for and conduct of elections, the treatment of members of the ancien regime, and so on.
Momentous and positive as these events have been for Tunisia and possibly other Arab countries, at least two serious challenges remain before it can be affirmed that Tunisia, like so many counties in Eastern Europe, Latin America, Africa and Asia, has successfully transitioned to democracy. Both involve the military. One is that its capacities to defend the Jasmine Revolution from foreign meddling have to be developed. Libya's mercurial leader, Muamar Qadhafi, has apparently already been infiltrating mercenaries to bolster the badly fragmented security forces. With its tiny fleet of aging helicopters, the Tunisia air force simply cannot patrol its borders adequately. The US, Tunisia's principal arms supplier, needs to expedite delivery of already agreed to transfers of further helicopters for close air support and night vision equipment for the army's special forces, in order to mop up the remnants of Ben Ali's goon squads. The United States should also step up its program of military support and training, so that the small and relatively efficient Tunisian armed forces can defend the nation and sustain its professionalism.
The second major challenge is to consolidate the present ascendancy of civilians over the military. Institutions and processes of civilian control, whether parliaments, NGOs and other elements of civil societies, and governmental audit agencies only fully develop over years, and even then they are subject to backsliding. Again the US can and should support the efforts of Tunisians to develop these capacities and recover their role in the region as pays pilote, a model for others in the region to emulate.
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1) Training the military in the West is hardly a guarantee of “professionalism” and democratic inclinations. Lybia’s Gaddafi and Pakistan’s Musharraf were both trained in Britain – but can hardly be considered stalwarts of military professionalism and democracy!
2) “Civilian control of the military” is NOT “a litmus test of democracy”. It may be a pre-condition, no more. Not even free and fair elections can be considered “a litmus test of democracy”, as demonstrated, among other things, by the accession of the Nazis to power in Germany. The true litmus test is the consistent willingness of leaders to stand for free and fair elections AND peacefully relinquish power when defeated in such elections. I have yet to see that this will consistently be the case in Tunisia. Or Iraq. Let’s hope it is.
That said, there is clearly a difference between the military cultures of NATO military academies and more autocratic countries and I would support the original writer on that point. It is interesting to note that the old Soviet military training system was also very professional and strict about the separation between the political class and the military. The Wehrmacht, as well, had a strict professional policy of non-interference; something which actually later came back to haunt them.
I think the establishment of an Islamic Sharia government will be very bad news for Tunisia. Even if it is democratically established it will crush the country economically and cause far more bloodshed especially of any Christians or Jews that remain in that country.
Democracy means different things to different people.
To call Iran a modern Democracy is a little bit of stretch don't you think?
My reference to democracy had nothing to do with Iran. Just that democracy can manifest in different ways in different countries depending on many factors. US-style democracy could never work in Qatar, for instance, where the voting population is less that 300,000 and is dominated by a few very large families.
Having said that, Iran does in fact have a democracy of sorts. Whether you accept it or not, there are multi candidate elections on both the national and local level in the one-man/woman, one-vote format, there is a diversity of media representing different political perspectives, and there is no single figure who commands all the power, as we have seen in the massive power struggles after the June 2009 elections.
One way to spot totalitarianism is by how they treat communication technology.
Now we have in the streets mob rule, no one has been shown as a new civilian leader, the military that is still in charge of the guns, no mass defections to the new civil authority in the streets and in-fact and truth a possibility of harsher leadership threw military, religion or a leader that the people will follow who calls for jobs, food and a better future (Hitler or Roosevelt are the two extremes here)
Time will tell, but to date the country has now less services, less food and is more dangerous.
I was attracted to this article because one of the things I kept looking for in news out of Tunisia was the role the army would play. I've seen a dynamic play out in Latin America many times where the ranks of the military become filled with the sons of the poor and disenfranchised segments of the middle class, led by an officer corp that valued the integrity of the corp over the fortunes of the rulers or ruling class. What I've seen from the news out of Tunisia, I suspect the same happened in Tunisia.
My question to you is, can you give us some perspective on the demographics of the Tunisian army? What social dynamics are at play within the military that led soldiers to intervene between demonstrators and the police? I could be wrong, but it looked like in some of those instances it was a decision made by the troops on the spot rather than them following directives from superiors.
A democracy cannot be formed from outside of those chosing to become governed. It cannot be imposed without pain and growing pains. It has be be developed from within - and will still have pain and growing pains.
I wish the people of Tunisia, and their fair-minded military leadership, good luck and patience over the next several years.