The Pentagon wants you to ignore some inconvenient facts about the failure of the escalation strategy in Afghanistan.
The latest Petraeus/Gates media tour is under way in preparation for the general's testimony to Congress next week, and they're trotting out the same, tired spin they've been using since McChrystal was replaced in disgrace last year. Despite the most violent year of the war so far, despite the highest civilian and military toll of the war so far, and despite the continued growth of the insurgency, they want you to believe that we're "making progress." While they spend this week fudging and shading and spinning, we'll waste another $2 billion on this brutal, futile war, and we won't be any closer to "victory" than we are today.
Let me make a couple of predictions about Petraeus' testimony based on experience. He will attempt to narrow the conversation to a few showcase districts in Afghanistan, use a lot of aspirational language ("What we're attempting to do," instead of, "What we've done") and assure the hand-wringers among the congressional hawks that he'll be happy to suggest to the president that they stay longer in Afghanistan if that's what he thinks is best. Most importantly, he will try to keep the conversation as far away from a high-level strategic assessment based on his own counterinsurgency doctrine as possible, because if Congress bothers to check his assertions of "progress" against what he wrote in the counterinsurgency manual, he's in for a world of hurt.
Here's what Petraeus' own U.S. Army/Marine Corps Counterinsurgency Field Manual says about the main goal of a COIN campaign:
"I-113. The primary objective of any COIN operation is to foster development of effective governance by a legitimate government."
Not by any stretch of the imagination is the counterinsurgency campaign under Petraeus' direction serving what his own field manual says is the primary goal of his campaign. If we were looking for a legitimate government in Afghanistan, it's crystal clear that we backed the wrong horse. Hamid Karzai and his family are neck-deep in any number of corruption scandals, the most glaring of which involves the largest private bank in Afghanistan and a sweeping control fraud scheme that has already resulted in unrest across the country. (That scandal, by the way, is likely to result in a U.S.-taxpayer-funded bank bailout for Kabulbank, according to white-collar crime expert Bill Black.) The Karzai administration is an embarrassment of illegitimacy and cronyism, and the local tentacles of the Kabul cartel are as likely to inspire people to join the insurgency as they are to win over popular support.
Even if the Karzai regime where a glimmering example of the rule of law, the military campaign under Petraeus would be utterly failing to achieve what counterinsurgency doctrine holds up as the primary way in which a legitimate government wins over support from the people: securing the population. From the COIN manual:
"5-68. Progress in building support for the HN ["host nation"] government requires protecting the local populace. People who do not believe they are secure from insurgent intimidation, coercion, and reprisals will not risk overtly supporting COIN efforts."
The United Nations reports that 2010 was the deadliest year of the war for civilians of the decade-long war, and targeted killings of Kabul government officials are at an all-time high. Petraeus often seeks to deflect this point by citing insurgent responsibility for the vast majority of civilian deaths in Afghanistan, but that is largely beside the point. As his own field manual makes clear, reducing the number of civilians killed by your forces is insufficient according to COIN doctrine. If you can't protect the population (or the officials within the host nation government!) from insurgent violence and intimidation, you can't win a counterinsurgency.
Petraeus and Gates like to talk around this blatant break in his own strategic doctrine by narrowing the conversation to what they call "security bubbles." In his recent remarks following his trip to Afghanistan, Gates spoke of "linking zones of security in Helmand to Kandahar." But those two provinces have seen huge spikes in violence over the course of the past year, with attacks initiated by insurgents up 124 percent and 20 percent, respectively. Today's New York Times explains one of the main reasons for these jumps in violence as U.S. troops arrive in new areas:
"[G]enerals have designated scores of rural areas 'key terrain districts.' The soldiers are creating, at cost of money and blood, pockets of security.
"But when Americans arrive in a new area, attacks and improvised bombs typically follow -- making roads and trails more dangerous for the civilians whom, under current Pentagon counterinsurgency doctrine, the soldiers have arrived to protect."
The military escalations in Afghanistan have failed their key purpose under counterinsurgency doctrine, which is to secure Afghans from insurgent violence and intimidation.
While the U.S. government is failing to achieve its military objectives in Afghanistan, it's also failing to make good on the other components of counterinsurgency strategy, especially the civilian/political component. Here's what The U.S. Army/Marine Corps Counterinsurgency Field Manual says on p. xxix, emphasis mine:
"Nonmilitary Capacity Is the Exit Strategy
"The [counterinsurgency] manual highlights military dependence not simply upon civilian political direction at all levels of operation, but also upon civilian capabilities in the field. ...[T]he primacy of the political requires significant and ongoing civilian involvement at virtually every level of operations."
To meet this prerequisite for a successful counterinsurgency strategy, the administration promised a "civilian surge" to accompany the military escalation. But the March 8, 2011 edition of The Washington Post shows that the civilian surge has so far been a flop that's alienating the local population:
"Efforts to improve local government in critical Afghan districts have fallen far behind schedule...according to U.S. and Afghan officials familiar with the program.
"It is now expected to take four more years to assess the needs of more than 80 'key terrain' districts where the bulk of the population lives, based on figures from Afghan officials who said that escalating violence has made it difficult to recruit civil servants to work in the field.
...
"...Of the 1,100 U.S. civilian officials in Afghanistan, two-thirds are stationed in Kabul, according to the State Department.
"'At best, our Kabul-based experts simply reinforce the sense of big government coming from Kabul that ultimately alienates populations and leaders in the provinces,' a former U.S. official said."
As with the military side of the equation, the civilian side of the strategy is so badly broken that it's actually pushing us further away from the administration's stated goals in Afghanistan.
The costs of this pile of failure are huge. It costs us $1 million per troop, per year to maintain our occupation of Afghanistan. That's $2 billion every week. Politicians at the federal level are contemplating ugly cuts to social safety nets, while politicians at the state level are already shredding programs that protect people suffering in the worst economic crisis since the Great Depression. In this context, the admonitions from the White House and the Pentagon to be patient while this misbegotten strategy limps along the progress-road-to-nowhere seem perverse. The American people have been patient for roughly a decade now, but that patience has run out.
Petraeus and Gates want to you to ignore the ugly truths of the Afghanistan War: it's not making us safer, and it's not worth the costs. The escalation strategy isn't working. It's not going to work. Enough is enough. End it now.
If you're fed up with this war that's not making us safer and that's not worth the costs, join a local Rethink the Afghanistan War Meetup and follow Rethink Afghanistan on Facebook and Twitter.
Follow Derrick Crowe on Twitter: www.twitter.com/derrickcrowe
Tragically, due to gross negligence, a diversion of resources to Iraq, and more, a state where we can be assured that the Taliban/AQ won't again control Afghanistan hasn't arrived. This is even after 10 years, thousands of destroyed lives, and billions of dollars. Those responsible for this failure should be held to account!
However, simply packing up and going home, appealing though it is, risks another 9/11. I can not entertain a strategy that does not address the very reason we went to Afghanistan, and which tragically, negligently, has not yet been achieved.
Many things are now, for the first time, encouraging about the war. It is finally, belatedly, resourced at a more appropriate level. I am quite willing to debate the many things still wrong with the war effort. Many things are still discouraging. I am also willing to hear alternative strategies to address the threat. I am not willing to put my head in the sand and pretend there's no threat. The last time we abandoned Afghanistan we got 9/11.
The Poll he’s using (http://www.rasmussenreports.com/public_content/politics/questions/pt_survey_questions/march_2011/questions_afghanistan_march_4_5_2011) was a poll of “likely voters.” This is a very different polling audience than one that would allow a claim of “52% of Americans.” As anyone who has taken Stat101 can tell you, the polling audience has a great effect on the results.
The next problem is that the poll stated “within a year” which means by March 2012, not “this year” as in 2011. Does it change the basic posture of the poll? No, but the headline is still factually wrong.
Next, 31% polled predict the Afghanistan mission will eventually be judged a failure. What is interesting is that this number is DOWN 11 points from 42% three months ago. This might indicate increasing optimism in the polling audience about the war. This finding was left out of his article and hints at a different conclusion or maybe poorly worded questions (see next).
Lastly, it’s a shame Rasmussen worded the questions so ambiguously. It is not clear whether “within a year” applies to “establishing a firm timetable” or “bring all U.S. troops home.” The way Rasmussen combined the answers to 2 questions makes this a critical factor in determining the 52% makeup.
Facts matter. The headlines should match them.
CBS News Poll. Feb. 11-14, 2011. 54 percent say we should not be involved.
CNN/Opinion Research Corporation Poll. Jan. 21-23, 2011. 58 percent oppose the war.
USA Today/Gallup Poll. Jan. 14-16, 2011. 72 percent support Congress acting to "speed up the withdrawal of U.S. troops from Afghanistan?" this year, 41 percent strongly favor.
You're talking yourself into a hole.
For example, the CNN poll you just cited shows a statistically significant jump in those that favor the war with a corresponding decrease in those that oppose it. The 58% number you cite is DOWN from 63% a month earlier on the same question. An equally valid and accurate headline for that poll would be “WAR OPPONENTS LOSING SUPPORT!” You obviously choose a different headline.
Heck, National Geographic found in a 2006 survey that 88% of 18-24 year olds couldn’t even find Afghanistan on a map. It is critical that polling results be understood with context.
Most polling questions do not include the critical issue; what is necessary to prevent AQ from launching another 9/11?
The rare poll that DOES include threat in the question tells a story that you’re ignoring. Last fall a poll (NBC News/Wall Street Journal Poll Aug. 5-9, 2010) asked “If the Taliban returned to power in Afghanistan how much of a threat do you think this would be to American national security?” 91% thought it was a serious threat (51% very, 21% fairly, 19% just somewhat).
Your group ignores this threat altogether and shouldn't. Packing up and coming home is appealing. You neglect to address the potential catastrophic consequences.
It is tragic that the war has lasted this long, cost this much, and gone so poorly. However, what about the reason the war started? Have we all forgotten why we went to Afghanistan to begin with?
All the information I've tried to relay to you has been available for years - through media in England, Turkey, India, Pakistan, as well as scattered US gov't. sources and occasionally revelations e.g. Wikileaks. The big picture has to be patched together with some effort out of this jumble, since there is no effort to present it coherently in the US media and certainly not by the US military or its apologist politicians. But the pattern is clear.
Suggestion for starters - dig up the position papers from the Project for a New American Century started by Cheney, Rumsfeld, Jeb Bush, Wolfowitz, et al., circa 1998. Small wars were always intended for the middle east. The agenda has little to do with 9/11 - the goal is maintaining US hegemony in the east.
Well, I think you underestimate Afghanistan's importance to AQ as a base. In terms of freedom/scale/infrastructure the other locations you mention don't come close to what they had in Afghanistan.
Perhaps more telling, is that once AQ had an Afghan base, we saw increasingly centralized attacks, with increasing deadliness and sophistication, culminating in 9/11. Since they've lost their Afghan infrastructure, the trend is going the other way, and they haven't centrally managed anything remotely close.
I am not willing to say this is because they've given up the desire to strike. So I think it's a stretch not to credit their loss in Afghanistan as a hugely significant factor. It also begs the question of what happens if they regain Afghanistan as a base.
Why we went into Afghanistan is a different question from whether we should continue to be there. Make your case.
You are free to form any community you like, and try to attract all the followers you can. I am also free to point out the nature of your community, and what prospective members can expect.
As you've just made clear, despite the clever name, there's really no "thinking" allowed in the “Rethink Afghanistan” Facebook community. Let the buyer beware!
I mean, do we enjoy being lied to? Do we enjoy being treated like fools over and over again? How long will we allow this to go on?
That should have read "are NOT designed to get us any closer to ending wars", obviously.
Afghanistan is not called "The Graveyard of Empires" for nothing.
Time to come home!!