Hatoyama's U.S. Policy May Backfire

During his Asia trip this Friday, President Obama's itinerary will include a much-anticipated visit with Japanese Prime Minister Hatoyama -- a meeting that has been fraught with anxiety and speculation among Japan watchers. One Japan expert sees U.S.-Japan relations at their lowest point in years. With Japan's new government, will Obama find long-time U.S. ally Japan drifting away from the U.S.-Japan alliance, "the cornerstone of U.S. strategy toward Asia"?

Two overarching sticking points have entered into the U.S.-Japan discussion. The first is what precisely the new Japanese government means in recent statements by having a more "equal" relationship with the United States and what that means for Japan's relations with Asia. Japan specialists in the United States have hoped that a Japan on more equal footing with the United States would take more leadership on global issues and security, something that U.S. policymakers have encouraged Japan to do for years.

But others worry that Japan might "turn East" toward China and its regional proposals, such as an East Asian community, could exclude the United States. Never mind the fact that Japan has reiterated that the U.S. alliance will be the centerpiece of Japanese foreign policy; the Chinese received coolly the East Asian community idea; and that the Japanese have been talking about an East Asian economic bloc for years, which would essentially codify what Asian businesses already do. In any case, mixed signals from Tokyo have created an air of uncertainty about the direction of the U.S.-Japan relationship.

The second contentious point gets to the nitty-gritty of the U.S.-Japan alliance itself. For years, Okinawans have resented the fact that a majority of U.S. military presence, including noisy helicopters, in Japan is concentrated in Okinawa. In an effort to respond to local pressure and a nationwide desire for "change" in Japan, the Hatoyama administration has sought to reopen a pact that would have moved an airbase off a congested part of Okinawa.

All of this comes on top of Japan's decision to withdraw its refueling support of the U.S. Navy in the Indian Ocean and instead contribute to Afghanistan operations through aid funding to the tune of $5 billion over 5 years -- bringing back raw memories of Japan's "checkbook diplomacy" during the first Gulf war when Japan sent money but no troops. Moral leadership will require more.

If Hatoyama wishes to present a Japan that is more "independent" from the United States, these moves could backfire. To say the least, the newbie Democratic Party of Japan's riskiest forays will likely be in the areas of national security, and if the Japanese public perceives the DPJ as making Japan less safe, the party could easily get the boot. The Obama administration has been eager to resolve these issues, while Hatoyama has preferred to punt them down the road to gain more understanding from Okinawans. But consensus-building will be a two-level game, one that will include Japan's closest ally.

In an effort to cool U.S.-Japan tensions, Obama and Hatoyama have agreed to a yearlong review of the alliance. But, says Japanese defense expert Satoshi Morimoto in the Wall Street Journal, "the prime minister needs to feel a sense of urgency and understand that the safety of the Japanese people may be compromised if the relationship with the U.S. becomes shaky."

More broadly, however, the path toward a more "independent" foreign policy for Japan is not by weakening its alliance with the world's strongest military power. Ironically, if Japan wants to have more influence in world affairs, it should strengthen the U.S.-Japan alliance, not weaken it. Coincidentally, Hatoyama's moves arrive against a regional backdrop of a bellicose North Korea and an increasingly powerful China that rivals Japan.

With China's growing profile, there is a huge demand within Asia for a strong Japan tied to the U.S. alliance as a counter-balance. Given Japan's own budgetary constraints, the alliance also protects Japanese national interests without requiring the country to develop its own power projection. If Japan truly wants to serve as a "bridge" between the United States and Asia or the West and East, it will need good relations with both sides. As an Obama administration official put it: "Even the most spectacular bridge needs an entrance and an exit for anyone to traverse it." For Hatoyama's sake and political survival, let's hope his administration realizes this point.

 

Follow Devin Stewart on Twitter: www.twitter.com/devintstewart

Comments

[rss]

Japan was a global military power before the Second World War and had little trouble kicking the British out of almost all of Asia, from Singapore to Burma and everywere in betweem.

When Hatoyama now says that he would like a "more equal" relationship with the US, and when his words are twisted to "less subservient" or "less supine" by the media, I am sure the Japanese - proud people as they are - can see when others are trying desperately to drive Tokyo and Washington apart. And I am not talking about the Chinese.

[ceti]

Whose interests are you talking about? The US or the Japanese? It is the US that has dragged Japan back into militarization by sending troops to Afghanistan like all the Western allies. It is the US that has basically refused to even reconsider the Okinawa base issue, treating Japan like a colony. And the DPJ government is already having an ameliorative effect by its more critical position on globalization and more helpful role in climate change talks. The LDP were a corrupt party of corrupt business interests serving as junior partners to US Imperialism. A more independent, and justice oriented Japan is in everyone's interest

[rss]

You have got to be British.

[Realization]

The most important thing for us it to eliminate the trade deficit and realize that our relationship with Japan is an economic relationship. Has been for years. And also to eliminate the trade deficits with Korea and China. Part of our problem now is the triangular trade from Japan/Korea to China to the U.S. as consumer.

Frankly, Japan with its aging population isn't about to embark on expansionist adventures. Not in its interest and there is no power vacuum in the Asian Pacific region. Pull out of Japan and Korea and let them defend themselves. Not like our forces there are useful for anything but protecting them, or rather, as a partial balance against China, which isn't about to attack anyway. Think they would let us freely use our troops except in their narrow interest? Think again. Besides, why the heck would we want to take on China?

The DPRK? Let South Korea and Japan worry about it. Our only interest is non-pro. North Korea goes nuclear? Japan can do it faster and better thanks to the reprocessing plant we let it have at Takai Mura. Why are we in the middle?

Rich Country, Strong Army. In that order. Borrow that good idea from Japan along with industrial policy.

[Zach Dorfman - Huffpost Blogger]

What I'm most concerned about--although I'm not sure if this has any currency in mainstream Japanese domestic political discourse--is that the decline of the LDP will lead to a re-examination of their studiously pacifist approach to foreign policy. Do the Japanese still have faith in the American security guarantee? If not, does this portend the re-militarization of japan? Thanks for the incisive post.

[Devin Stewart - Huffpost Blogger]

Zach, thanks. What we should be worried about is a Japan that becomes increasingly irrelevant rather than one that becomes militant. It is going backward toward its old checkbook diplomacy, not building up--and it doesn't have the appetite, demographics, or budget to build up its military.

But you are getting to my point here, which is that the Japanese people will start to wonder how safe they are in a fairly dangerous region. The question is who will get the blame? If the US-Japan alliance starts to drift and Japanese feel threatened, will they blame the US or their own government. Any rhetoric questioning the alliance in Japan fails to take into account several things, including the Japanese reliance on safe shipping routes for access to foreign sources of energy resources (which Japan depends on). Second, as one of my colleagues recently said, there is no relationship in Asia or elsewhere that Japan can leverage against the United States in order to get a more advantageous position. It is not like China in the Cold War leveraging its relationship with the United States to get an advantage over the Soviets.

Today, China is quite ambivalent about Japan and was lukewarm about Japan's regional initiatives. On the contrary, China is rivaling Japan for the future shape of Asia. Ironically, many Asians want to see Japan strong but only if it is tied firmly to the United States.

[Realization]

"Re-milita­rization"? Have you looked at the size of the JDF? They are a very substantial power now. But with an aging population, economic and trade interests worldwide, the prevailing popular sentiment, and lack of a power vacuum in Asia they aren't about to be an aggressive threat to anyone. None of the conditions are there.

We would be better off pulling our and letting the Japanese military happily occupy the nice facilities they have built there.

The relationship is economic and we have to right the balance in our favor.

And have you considered that it is in our interest to have them even stronger for a balance in NE Asia with less U.S. involvement and cost. Might even draw some money away from their industrial policy that has been weakening our competitive position for several generations. No downside except to old thinking and egos.

The military presence does provide the benefit of having some Americans live in Japan and get a broadened understanding - sort of. Much of the military never leaves the U.S. even though they are there. Better to have a good student program.

And as far as nukes, consider that they have them. The capability has been there for years. So? They wouldn't be aimed at us and would give China a headache.