The risks to world health from research to make an extraordinarily lethal avian flu virus contagious in humans have finally caught everyone's attention after months of warnings from us (Lynn Klotz*) and many other experts.
The Atlantic online (Feb. 16) features this question: Shouldn't regular citizens be able to weigh in on whether scientists are allowed to play with a virus that could kill a third of the population? Writer Pagan Kennedy's answer, summarized in the headline: Good luck.
Unfortunately, that feared virus may already exist. Two forms of the virus residing in two laboratories, one in the Netherlands and one in Wisconsin, may be highly contagious and highly deadly in humans, but we have evidence only from a good animal model for influenza viruses. We'll never know if it would be as deadly in humans simply because we cannot infect humans to get the proof.
Those who have been sounding the alarm are among the world leaders in molecular biology, microbiology, virology, public health and microbial genetics. Dr. Paul Keim was quoted in the journal Science in November: "I can't think of another pathogenic organism that is as scary as this one.... I don't think anthrax is scary at all compared to this."
The anthrax connection: Keim is the molecular geneticist who traced the strain used in the 2001 anthrax-letter attack that killed five people, locating it at the U.S. Army Medical Research Institute of Infectious Diseases at Ft. Detrick, Md. More importantly, he is now chair of the National Science Advisory Board for Biosecurity. The NSABB persuaded the researchers working on the H5N1 virus to remove key details before publishing their current results, and the researchers agreed to stop further work for at least 60 days.
Saturday's New York Times (Feb. 18) features a Page 1 story announcing that the World Health Organization is recommending that full details of the work be published, contrary to the NSABB recommendations. Publication is not the issue. The research itself should only resume if and when its benefit is clearly defined, and then only in BSL4 laboratories - the highest bio-security level - with the further requirement that workers with live virus undergo a quarantine period to assure they take nothing out with them.
Meanwhile, during that breathing period, we will try to explain the hazards of such research, the possible benefits that are driving it to begin with, and better ways to conduct investigations. The overall goals of the researchers are noble ones. They are hoping to protect us against the very real danger that naturally occurring H5N1 influenza virus, which now kills entire bird flocks and is quite lethal in humans, could mutate in ways that would also make it contagious in humans. But this is not the way to go about it.
Doesn't this bird flu kill people now?
Yes. And it may have a mortality rate of nearly 60%, higher than smallpox and any of the strains in the worst flu outbreaks known. But people cannot catch it from one another except under very unusual circumstances. The people to catch H5N1 flu so far tended chickens or worked with poultry closely enough that they were constantly exposed to the virus. By contrast, the so-called 1918 flu virus that killed millions in the United States and a total of 40 million around the world was incredibly contagious among humans. But it killed only about 2% of those infected. Imagine a new virus that combined the lethality of the H5N1 flu with the contagiousness of the 1918 pandemic strain. That is the scenario we may now be facing.
Soon to come:
What other lab-created risks are out there? How can we prevent them?
* Lynn Klotz was the US country researcher for the BioWeapons Monitor 2011 report where earlier attempts to make H5N1 Asian bird flu more pathogenic were highlighted. See p129
Lynn C. Klotz and Edward J. Sylvester are authors of Breeding Bio Insecurity: How U.S. Biodefense Is Exporting Fear, Globalizing Risk, and Making Us All Less Secure, University of Chicago Press, 2009.
To pretend anything else is plain foolish and there are no logical arguments against proper preparation. There are, however, plenty of fear-mongering strategies.
Paul Keim is an epidemiologist and a forensic scientist, he is not a virologist, and he is definitely not among the world leaders in molecular biology.
Finally, 60% mortality rate of H5N1 is based on limited number of cases, it is not known how many people are actually infected and not hospitalized. this means that the mortality rate of this virus may actually be less than even 1%. SARS has a higher mortality rate and has no drugs or vaccines that target it (while there are several vaccines and drugs against influenza and we know how to make them). SARS is worked under BSL3 not BSL4.
Most of our "history lessons,' not only skip over the horror of WW1 but also skip over the Spanish Flu of the same time period -- people dropped like flies -- estimates now go as high as 50 MILLION DEAD. --- that's more dead that all of WW2.
If we keep living in Disneyland - deny our warmongering and covert actions - we'll eventually blow up the Magic Kingdom and only have ourselves to blame. It's way past time to 'get real,' and get honest and cut through the propaganda and pious pretentious. & may God help us all.
We're way too close to the edge for comfort.
During the Q&A Dr Keim made some most interesting comments such as:
"H5N1 has been in birds since at least 1996, and despite the almost 600 human infections of which we are aware,this virus has not yet become efficiently transmissible between mammals. There might be good reasons why it hasn't achieved this capacity, including inherent biological limitations."
"The artificial evolution of a new mammal-adapted H5N1 virus, as reported in these two papers, has removed the natural barriers that might have existed. Accomplishing this in the lab, however, doesn't mean that it can occur naturally."
"We also need to consider the potential role of, and impact on, other species. Pigs are a well-known ‘mixing vessel’ for influenza viruses. This mixing could lead to the emergence of new antigenically shifted viruses."
So now we have the threat of a supposedly deadly virus. So what now after this fear-mongering? Is their intention to insist the entire world population be vaccinated against this lab-created virus? The Swine Flu pandemic was a flop, so they want to do a really good job next time and artificially engineer a more effective deadly virus and sell billions of vaccines? Really, you could not make this stuff up… (And have another look at the movie Contagion – pure fear-mongering propaganda for the CDC.)
What if this supposedly deadly virus escapes the lab and sickness and death ensue? Who will bear the moral and financial responsibility? The US/NIH? The scientists concerned? How does this lab created 'deadly virus' figure with the Biological Weapons Convention?
I have forwarded an open letter to the US National Science Advisory Board for Biosecurity (NSABB) outlining my concerns about this matter, providing my perspective as a 'layperson'. My open letter can be accessed via this link: http://bit.ly/AfyAtQ
I have also forwarded an email to Mr Peter Woolcott, Australia's Ambassador and Permanent Representative to the United Nations and to the Conference on Disarmament, Geneva to query what position the Australian government is taking on this matter.
What kind of precautions are we taking with nuclear weapons? Any halfway smart physicist in the world who wants to design a nuclear weapon, can design a nuclear weapon. The knowledge is all out there. What they can't do is to BUILD a nuclear weapon, because that's a large scale engineering effort, which is next to impossible to hide.
In this case the virus is completely useless as a weapon because it won't be contained to one country but it will become a global infection.
Including them in the discussion would be counter productive. Scientists tend to be curious, seeking knowledge for knowledge's sake, where as the only thing Joe and Susie care about is their inane quest for a better life.