On Tuesday, we got our first glimpse into President Trump’s legislative agenda during his speech to a joint session of Congress. Although the speech did not explicitly reference the United States’ military operations in Syria, President Trump set forth a vision for our partners’ role in the region: “We expect our partners... in the Middle East... to take a direct and meaningful role in both strategic and military operations, and pay their fair share of the cost.”
This statement comes just after the Pentagon reportedly presented options to the president to accelerate the military campaign against the so-called Islamic State (ISIS) and is consistent with the president’s on-going call for “safe zones” in Syria.
Getting our partners in the Middle East to take on a meaningful role and share a greater portion of the burden is an important and necessary step. However, any steps that the United States takes in Syria with its partners and allies must include a coordinated strategy that: degrades ISIS and al-Qa’ida’s affiliate in Syria, Jabhat Fateh al-Sham (JFS), achieves a nationwide cessation of hostilities, enables a durable transition of power in Damascus, and consolidates counterterrorism gains by knitting together local security and governance across Syria.
Americans have no interest in perennial large-scale, military interventions in the Middle East. We have demands for resources at home and also have vital objectives in Europe and Asia. Nevertheless, Syria is at the epicenter of a wider regional conflict with global consequences.
We must counter terrorism and address the broader factors that have enabled the rise of ISIS. Likewise, we must roll-back the expansion of malign, Iranian proxy groups that pose critical challenges to the region as well as U.S. interests. However, terrorism is but one facet of a deeper problem.
Added to the complexity in Syria has been Russia’s intervention. Russia’s engagement in Syria, while limited, has changed the strategic trajectory of the conflict and constricted the options for the United States and its coalition allies.
Further complicating matters, six years of war have torn Syria apart. It no longer exists as a unitary nation-state. Therefore, different approaches are required in the north, south, east, and west of Syria.
“This will be a multi-year effort and likely will require an increase of both special operations and conventional ground forces in Syria and Iraq.”
These intertwined realities have challenged United States’ ability to influence outcomes in Syria. Achieving U.S. objectives will require tradeoffs.
Woven throughout the various options in Syria are geopolitical choices with which the United States will have to grapple: managing tensions with Russia in a way that secures U.S. interests and contests Russian aggression globally; calibrating pressure on Iran’s destabilizing activities without provoking blowback to U.S. forces operating in the area; and handling deeply fraught relations with our NATO ally, Turkey, while leveraging the highly capable Syrian Kurdish groups to fight ISIS in northern Syria.
Such an approach will require multiple tools of U.S. statecraft. The United States must register strong concerns with Russia and Iran about their support for Assad’s brutal tactics as well as their ambitions in Syria – and back up those concerns with sanctions and coercion. The United States should calibrate sanctions pressure on Russian President Vladimir Putin to convince Assad to accede to negotiations, requiring Russian action before alleviating sanctions. The United States should also continue to support the Geneva process and provide humanitarian assistance to besieged civilian areas with clear repercussions in the case of outside interference.
The United States must also focus on regional actors that have been directly affected by the consequences of the Syrian civil war. We must rebuild communication and trust with Turkey, pressing on human rights concerns and emphasizing the criticality of working through differences as NATO allies. We also must bolster our support for other regional allies such as Iraq, Jordan, and Lebanon. If these regional actors falter, ISIS 2.0 and broader instability will be just over the horizon.
This will be a multi-year effort and likely will require an increase of both special operations and conventional ground forces in Syria and Iraq. Militarily, the United States should squeeze ISIS by synchronizing coalition operations for Raqqa and Mosul and aligning all U.S. counterterrorism operations. Policymakers must allow operational conditions on the ground to inform military deployments, posture, and force-mix.
In concert, the U.S. military should work with multinational organizations and local partners to consolidate gains from operations, knitting connections among local security and governance authorities so that terrorist groups cannot grow back. In doing so, the United States should partner with local forces that will be the most credible within the local context, given ethno-sectarian differences, even if it requires a slower pace for operations.
If the United States establishes safe zones, it should look to construct one in the south first where operational dynamics are clearer and ensure that this activity is tied to negotiations to end the civil war so as to avoid an open-ended commitment. Congress should also contemplate an additional Authorization for the Use of Force (AUMF) – should the U.S. intervention in Syria enlarge in scope or scale – with a focus towards ensuring operational flexibility to U.S. commanders.
President Trump is correct that ISIS demands our immediate attention. However, the United States must anchor its counterterrorism approach within a broader strategy if it is to prevail.
