Succumbing to "Worst-Case" Analysis of North Korea

Analysis of a potential adversary's intentions is hard -- particularly when that adversary chooses to behave like a belligerent hermit. Such is the case with North Korea. Having decided to eschew modernity by cleaving to a feudal version of socialism, Pyongyang has rendered assessment of North Korea's political intentions an art best likened to divining the truth through an examination of scattered chicken bones. Or so a reading of press reports concerning the 10 November 2009 North-South naval clash would have us believe. According to the Washington Post, New York Times, and National Public Radio, the naval skirmish was likely a North Korean attempt to set the agenda for President Obama's trip to Seoul. Worst-case analysis at its best.

I, for one, am not buying this line of reasoning. Having spent a good deal of my career focused on Northeast Asia, I can unequivocally state there is significantly more to this story...and much less justification for heaping aspersions on Pyongyang. How do I come to this conclusion? A cold evaluation of the facts as we know them.

Let's open with the location of this incident--and the participants in the gun battle. Located on a peninsula, North and South Korea share nautical borders on their east and west coasts. The armistice that suspended the Korean War in 1953 provided for a clear demarcation of territorial waters on the peninsula's east coast. The west coast was an entirely different problem. North Korea was unwilling to accept the proposed division of territorial waters on the west coast--so Washington drew up a boundary that would, in theory, serve to keep the two sides apart and minimize the potential for a resumption of hostilities. Remarkably, this "Northern Limit Line" actually accomplished its intended purpose. With very few exceptions Pyongyang's naval platforms stayed north of the line, and Seoul's fleet stayed south of the line.

That uneasy standoff started to fray in the 1990s. Waters surrounding the Northern Limit Line have proven a lucrative fishing ground--particularly during Blue Crab season. Knowing that fishermen are not exactly the most rule-compliant crowd, Seoul had attempted to avoid problems with the North by enforcing a buffer zone that kept the crabbers a good bit south of the disputed border. This buffer zone, plus a heavy presence of South Korean patrol craft, served to prevent most problems...but the fishermen were always seeking to push the limits. In June 1999, this drive for profit brought the two sides to blows. After several rounds of high-seas bump-and-run, the two navies engaged in an exchange of gun fire that turned out badly for the North.

This should not have come as a surprise to the North Korean fleet. Operating boats largely built in the 1960s and 70s, the North's crews lack computer-stabilized weapon systems and modern damage-control options. The South's crews have no such limitation. South Korean naval commanders who have to engage a target in rolling swells are going to score a bull's eye. A North Korean naval commander operating in similar conditions will be lucky to hit the broad side of a barn.

Fast-forward to June 2002. Following the unpleasant developments in 1999, the two sides had managed to avoid further bloodshed...and the South's fishermen were back to their old tactics. All this came to a head on 29 June 2002, when a South Korean patrol craft was sunk by a North Korean naval platform. There is significant debate over how this came to pass. Some argue the South Korean commander violated the rules of engagement and drew too close to the North Korean boat. Others contend the North Koreans managed to lure the South Korean patrol craft into a trap and then sank the boat with a lucky shot. In any case, cooler heads again prevailed, and the two sides resumed an uneasy truce in the disputed waters.

That lasted until last Tuesday. On 10 November patrol craft from North and South Korea engaged in an exchange of gunfire that reportedly left one North Korean sailor dead and three others wounded. The South Korean losses? Fifteen holes or dents in a still very functional naval combatant. As the battle supposedly took place between platforms separated by two miles of open water it appears the North continues to struggle with aiming problems...not so in the South. Given this situation, why would a rational North Korean commander fire on a South Korean boat? Patriotism, ego, and brash male assertiveness. Patrol craft from both North and South Korea are almost exclusively crewed by young men anxious to prove their mettle. This surplus of testosterone--not orders from higher headquarters, where the leadership is painfully aware of Pyongyang's naval shortcomings--helps explain why a North Korean commander would chose to fire on a vastly superior adversary.

What it does not explain is why the North's patrol craft were operating so close to demarcation line. That answer was provided in a story published by one of South Korea's more obscure news papers, The Hankyoreh. While the paper has a self-admitted progressive bias, it has proven a source of reliable information since first going to press in 1988. According to The Hankyoreh, the North Korean combatant had probably been dispatched in reaction to Chinese fishing boats that are known to illegally poach along the peninsula's entire western coastline. So what we have here is a case of overly aggressive law enforcement--not an effort to shape international relations. Which should cause one to wonder why the U.S. media seem to have opted for a more ominous interpretation of the events.

To answer that question we need to look at the "analysts" credited with determining the 10 November clash was Pyongyang's effort to engage in strategic agenda setting. As it turns out, the "spin" on this event primarily came from the South Korean presidential offices and an academic in Seoul who is famous for being an adamant critic of all things North Korea. The current South Korean president, Lee Myung-bak, has consistently vowed to take a tougher line on dealing with Pyongyang. Lee believes his predecessors were too soft on the North, and he is determined to push in the opposite direction. No surprise then, that his staff told reporters the 10 November incident was "an intentional, low-intensity provocation by North Korea."

Nor is it surprising to discover that Professor Nam Joo-hong was busy telling media representatives the incident was "a deliberately planned maneuver designed to look like an accident.' Nam is well known as a hardliner--some progressive groups in South Korea refer to him as a "neocon warmonger." And yet, his "analysis" and the South Korean administration's spin seem to have carried the day. What a shame.

Fortunately, the U.S. State Department did not fall victim to this worst case analysis. On 11 November Secretary of State Clinton told reporters in Singapore the clash "does not affect our decision" to send special envoy Stephen Bosworth to North Korea. Nor, it appears, did the clash appear to alter President Obama's agenda during his trip to Asia. So who was the victim here? Primarily the average North Korean, who can look forward to further hunger and deprivation as a result of Seoul's efforts to brow beat the elite in Pyongyang. This hard line approach certainly will not impact the North Korean leadership--who simply responded to the silliness by declaring the entire incident was a "brazen violation of our sacred territorial waters."

The bottom line, beware worst case analysis -- particularly when discussing events on the Korean peninsula. What initially appears a cautionary reading of events often proves a cursory evaluation intended to serve a political agenda. Pyongyang harbors little good will for any American administration, but is not so foolish as to hope a minor naval skirmish would serve to refocus this White House. Clearly our State Department was able to come to this conclusion...too bad the Washington Post, New York Times and National Public Radio could not have taken the time to do likewise.

 

Comments

[Realization]

My compliments. Glad to see one more person who isn't jumping to conclusions based on the comic book quality knee jerk reactions and lack of information most Americans have been fed by the media about the Korean peninsula.

Not that I think the DPRK is easy to deal with but it is not irrational, it just lives in its own world. And it isn't that much of a threat. But then I am for replacing the Rangers at Panmunjong with an international ping pong training center. And yes, I have been there and a bit into North Korea. Great fun.

But then we should be pulling out of both Korea and Japan. I understand the military-based industry of academics and think tanks looking for reasons to stay. They have all been a stretch since the USSR fell and, since neither country would really let us use troops against China, which we shouldn't do anyway, what good are they. No point in protecting Japan from Korea and Korea from Japan. Let them handle their own problems and conflict there is remote anyway.

Our main issue with the DPRK is non-pro.

The biggest issue on the peninsula is eliminating the trade deficit. That problem, of course, is with the South.

[mamacat]

Pretty good article. I have no way to independently confirm or deny its assertions, but it sounds reasonable.