This is part two of a two-part series. Read part one here.
Part 2 -- What I Would Want to Learn if I Could Ask Questions at the Senate Antitrust Subcommittee Hearings
Next month the Senate Subcommittee on Antitrust, Competition Policy, and Consumer Rights will hear testimony from Eric Schmidt, Google's Executive Chairman and former CEO. The following provides a brief summary of what I expect to see the Subcommittee investigate with Mr. Schmidt when he testifies before them, and indeed what I would investigate if I were able to ask questions. In plain text the paragraphs below describe why these questions are of interest to me, to Google and its competitors, to companies that bid in Google's keyword auctions, to all of us who use search, and indeed to all consumers. [In italics and within square brackets I identify the legal issues these questions address, and thus why these questions are of interest to the Senate, to the Federal Trade Commission, and to the Department of Justice3.]
One Click Away?
My first priority would have to be to get an assessment of the "just one click away" argument that Google uses to argue that no abuse of competition law or of consumer rights is possible, since consumers are only one click away from changing search engines. If Google's enormous market share in search were based on its loyal users using only Google, then Google has tremendous market power. If 70% of searchers use only Google, than companies that do not achieve a high Google page position may not be found. In contract, if users truly act as if they are one click away from changing search engine providers, or if users compare search results from Google and other search engines a significant fraction of the time, then Google's power over corporations may be reduced. When we understand the behavior of consumers when searching, we have far more insight into Google's ability to influence shopping, to promote its own brands, or to demand higher payment for keywords.
If users do not act as if they are one click away from other search engine providers then it would be interesting to know why:
What Business is Google In?
I would next want to determine what business Google thought it was in, and what business its customers thought it was in. [If Google is eventually subject to antitrust litigation it will almost certainly involve vigorously argued disputes over relevant market and share of relevant market.]
Is Google just another channel for placing advertisements, with about 3% of the US market, or an online advertising channel, with perhaps 30% of the market? Or is it an online business that sells access to customers, through keyword auctions, with perhaps 70% of the US market4? If it is in the access business, then it has more than 90% of the European Market, close to 95% of the Australian market, and nearly total domination of the smart phone market globally. There is nothing inherently wrong with having a business that sells customer access. But that is very different from selling ads in a broad advertising market with a wide range of competing media such as radio, television, newspapers, and other forms of print media.
Antitrust investigations almost always begin by attempting to establish the relevant market for a company's products, before attempting to determine a company's share of that market. If the relevant market is search, then Google's share is overwhelming. If the relevant market is all advertising, then its share is inconsequential. There are precedents, such as the US Department of Justice's blocking of an agreement between Google and Yahoo!, that suggest that the relevant market is search, but Google will no doubt vigorously contest this.
If Google indeed has such dominant share of online search and therefore of online customer access, the following become important:
How Does Paid Search Really Work?
I would next want to understand how paid search worked. Virtually all of Google's revenues currently come from the auctioning of keywords to companies trying to improve their relative positioning in search results, and thus improve their access to consumers. I would hope to learn how Google uses its potential power over search in its strategies for pricing keywords.
I would also like to know, to what extent this algorithm allows Google to expose consumers to websites from low quality sellers with strong financial incentives and strong ability to bid for keywords, in order to achieve prime placement.
How Does Free Search Really Work?
I would next want to understand how free (organic) search worked. It would initially appear that there is no chance of antitrust abuse in a product that is given away free. However, if Google uses the "free-ness" of free search to maximize market share and then leverages free search to demand compensation in other ways then free search does provide the possibility of antitrust abuse. [The use of power created by market share in free search might create opportunities for Sherman Act Section 2 violations.]
How Has Android been Leveraged?
We need to understand how has Google promoted Android. To what extent is Android being subsidized by profits from Google's near-monopoly position in search? To what extent have these subsidies been aimed at developing a near-monopoly position in online search or in online advertising?
So What's Up with Motorola Mobility?
Finally, we need to understand how Google intends to market Motorola phones after the acquisition of Motorola Mobility. Will Google actually compete against Samsung and other providers of Android phones after the acquisition? Or will some sort of less-than-fully-competitive accommodation be reached? Pundits expected makers of Android phones to react with outrage at the announcement that Google intends to purchase Motorola Mobility and thus intends to compete with them in the cellphone business. Surprisingly, Samsung expressed delight. Why? Does Samsung believe that this deal is driven by Google's need to acquire patents, and thus to protect all sellers of Android phones? Or are other factors possibly also relevant to Samsung's reaction?
In Conclusion ...
Surely, recent events involving Google's support for illegal pharmaceutical smuggling provide justification for scrutiny. Legislation promoting fair competition and legislation protecting consumer rights may have been violated. Once again, this is not a presumption of guilt. But there are a lot of things we really should want to know about Google's activities and a great deal I would want to learn from Chairman Schmidt's testimony.
We want to know that Google's activities have been legal, of course. But with Google's power, and their willingness to use that power to advance their business interests, I am just as interested in ascertaining that their activities have been fair.
I would remember the following quote from Supreme Court Justice Scalia, in the case Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image Technical Services, "[w]here a defendant maintains substantial market power, his activities are examined through a special lens: Behavior that might otherwise not be of concern to the antitrust laws - or that might even be viewed as procompetitive -- can take on exclusionary connotations when practiced by a monopolist."
Eric Schmidt alludes to the creepy line that he uses to define the bounds of behavior he believes is appropriate for Google.
For those of you who missed it, here is what Mr. Schmidt said about the "creepy line."
"There is what I call the creepy line," he said, according to The Hill. "The Google policy on a lot of things is to get right up to the creepy line and not cross it."
Schmidt was asked by The Atlantic's James Bennet about the possibility of Google developing a kind of "implant" in the future.
"I would argue that implanting something in your brain is beyond the creepy line," he replied, according to The Hill's transcript, "at least for the moment, until the technology gets better."
It's reassuring to know that Mr. Schmidt considers Google brain implants to be "creepy", or to be creepy "at least for the moment, until the technology gets better." It's less reassuring that he did not find other activities, like Wi-Spy (recording wi-fi traffic while driving around video-recording for Google Street) or Doodle-4-Google (laying the groundwork for future identity theft) to also be over the line.
Given Google's power, it may be necessary to place that line far more conservatively than Google executives currently believe.
3 Throughout this post I will refer to Sherman Act and FTC Act violations. A Sherman Act Section 2 violation deals with actions taken to create, extend, or exploit a monopoly. A Sherman Act Section 1 violation deals with actions to coordinate the behavior of a cartel or oligopoly, for example, to divide territories so that each play has an effective regional monopoly. An FTC Act Section 5 violation deals with unfair business practices, particularly activities to deceive and harm consumers. This is described in slightly more detail in the companion post.
4 Numbers from Google presentation at Wharton, ca. 2010.
Also you seem to bring a lot of ifs and butts, with very little evidence to prove Google has done anything wrong, I know this was not the point of the article but it an interesting point that with so much media interest that no one has found any solid evidence that Google has done anything wrong in the arena of competition law.