A Bedouin On A Camel

Everybody in the U.S., and I mean everybody, has a plan for Iraq. The plans range from the White House’s “stay the course and democracy will come," to “get the hell out, NOW, and who cares what happens." In the middle, there are thoughtful commentaries, each pre-supposing facts that may or may not be accurate.

When the Saudi foreign minister, Prince Saud al-Faisal, was in the U.S. in September, he warned and chided the U.S. for a policy that is handing Iraq over to the Iranians. While that may be true to some degree, his comments and the response of the (Shiite) Iraqi Minister of the Interior who said that Iraq wouldn’t be dictated to by a “Bedouin on a camel”, could actually spell out a real plan for disengagement of coalition forces from Iraq and in the process solve a number of other pressing international problems. It’s a new week; time for some new wacky ideas.

Iran is our enemy, we’re told, but is essentially supporting what we support in Iraq: a religious Shiite government with Islam (if not the full application of Sharia) as the basis for Iraq’s laws. The present Iraqi government is both pro-Iran and pro-U.S., something that concerns the Saudis because their brand of Islam, Wahhabist Sunni, considers Shiites heretics and the thought of a “Shiite Crescent” stretching from Iran to Lebanon is more frightening to them than the thought of Al-Qaeda gaining new recruits. (Perhaps we can say something to them about that?) The Iraqi minister’s comments reveal a sensitivity on the part of Shiites to the issue of Iran, the only country in the world that supported them (and provided them asylum) throughout the years of Saddam’s brutal rule. Given that the Saudis are essentially our client state in the Middle East, and given that Iran’s influence in Iraq is a fact that is unchangeable with or without our forces in the region, here’s an idea: could Saudi Arabian and Iranian troops replace the western coalition forces in Iraq?

It might be complicated, but it could conceivably work in the following way: the U.S. would have to grant full diplomatic recognition to Iran, and recognize its right to produce nuclear fuel under the NPT (with restrictive inspections, which they’ve already agreed to). We would remove Iran from the “axis of evil” list, and yes, we’d have to agree to talk to them directly and set aside our lingering anger over the hostage crisis of twenty-five years ago. The Iranians would, of course, have to set aside their lingering anger over the CIA coup of fifty years ago, but there’s no reason why both those things can’t happen when it’s in the mutual interest of both sides. We would also agree to put the Israeli-Palestinian conflict on the top of our “to do” list once we’re out of Iraq (since the Iranians are stuck on Palestinian rights) and promise a peace treaty within one year. The Iranians would be included in discussions (presumably taking the Palestinian side) but when a treaty is signed, Iran will extend diplomatic recognition to both Israel and Palestine. In exchange, the Iranians would agree to move 50,000 of their Revolutionary Guard troops into southern Iraq now to maintain the peace, allowing the removal of all coalition forces from the region. Shiites will protect Shiites, and can train the Iraqi Shias to eventually take over.

The U.S. would tell the Saudis that we want 25,000 Saudi troops (the ones trained by us) to move to the Sunni triangle now. Sunnis will protect Sunnis, and Sunnis can train Iraqi Sunnis to eventually take over. In exchange, we will continue to sell (or maybe even give, as it would be less expensive than the Iraq occupation) the Saudis the most sophisticated military hardware (something we’re doing now), and the spare parts needed to keep them running. Also, in exchange, the United States would agree to put the Israeli-Palestinian conflict at the top of its agenda and promise a peace treaty within one year. The Saudis would be included in the discussions, and when a treaty is signed, Saudi Arabia will extend diplomatic recognition to both Israel and Palestine.

The U.S. will tell the Iraqi government that from now on they have to deal with the Saudis and the Iranians, but that we will be there to help in any dispute. (The Kurds, who seem to manage their little part of Iraq well, will wait to see the outcome of peace operations in the rest of Iraq, and then will join in the federation of Shia, Sunni and Kurdish Iraq. U.N. troops from Muslim countries could be stationed in the region to remove any temptation the Saudis or the Iranians might have to militarily extend their influence into Kurdistan.)

How could all this be possible? First, the Iranians have every incentive to do what is suggested. They are already heavily invested in Iraq, and would love to see the nuclear conflict and Iraq instability disappear at the same time. We would be conceding a minor defeat on the issue of Iranian nuclear fuel production, and yes, perhaps that would lead one day to an Iranian bomb, but the fact is that Iran will master the nuclear fuel cycle anyway and if they indeed want a nuclear bomb, there’s very little we can do about it short of military invasion. But if Iran was our friend rather than enemy, and if there was robust trade between the U.S. and Iran, Iran would be far less incentivized to build a bomb than they are today (particularly if we agreed to sell them conventional weapons.) The Saudis will be reluctant at first. But if they see that the Iranians are already crossing the border, they’ll take the plunge, if only to stop Iranian hegemony over the entire region and to keep their F-18s flying. With Saudis (instead of us) in hot pursuit of Zarqawi and the Al-Qaeda insurgents, it is likely that the foreign element of the insurgency would disappear. The Iraqi element of the Sunni insurgency would likely dissipate as well, since the Sunni Saudis would essentially be guaranteeing their safety and political relevance and although foreign, are Arab, and not Christian invaders. If the U.S. could guarantee that the Saudis would leave after Iraq is at peace, the Sunnis would have every incentive to welcome them. The Iranians would agree to leave too, once a federation of Iraq is agreed to and they are satisfied that the Shiites won’t suffer again under a Sunni fist. And despite a certain level of Saudi-Iranian animosity, the Iranians and the Saudis have actually grown quite close in the last decade. They seem to manage a decent relationship and if they have a common goal in Iraq, there’s no reason that they couldn’t be the “coalition” that returns Iraq to peaceful nationhood. And since Saudi Arabia and Iran are the number one and number two producers of oil in the world, they could hardly be accused of coveting Iraq’s oil by Iraqi nationalists. The U.S. would then, of course, have to deal with the Palestinian issue and devote some energy to actually defeating Al-Qaeda, who would now have two or three less bullet points in their recruitment manual. But surely that would be the good news?