Iran and the Syrian Gambit

The U.S. has three key interests with respect to Iran: containing its nuclear program, limiting its reach in the Middle East and, quite possibly, extending Iranian influence in Afghanistan in cooperation with the U.S. These three interests have to be pursued against the ever-shifting backdrop of the protests. At this point, what looks like the most likely outcome of the protests over the election provide both encouraging and cautionary signals. The challenge for Obama has been to recognize both and to respond appropriately while keeping his eye on all three of these balls at once. For this week, at least, Obama and his State Department get an A. Maybe even an A+, but the week is not over yet.

First, where do things stand with the protests? The government's repressive measures appear to be increasingly effective in suppressing the movement to the streets. At the same time, however, there is word that Rafsanjani may have collected enough anti-Khamenei votes in the Assembly of Experts to force a compromise, possibly in the form of a run-off election between Ahmadinejad and Mousavi. At the same time, it seems unlikely that Rafsanjani has the votes to have Khamenei removed outright. The outcome, in other words, looks increasingly like something like a power-sharing agreement between the clerics allied around Rafsanjani and the militarist/nationalists (including plenty of clerics) around Khamenei and Ahmadinejad, in which Khamenei will remain Supreme Leader but the orthodox clerics will get some concessions -- possibly starting with the rumored run-off election -- and will insist on a greater say in how things are done from here on out.

Understanding the fact that Khamenei and Ahmadinejad are political rather than religious figures -- and that their opponents, led by Ayatollah Rafsanjani, speak for the religious voice in Iran's leadership -- is directly relevant to thinking about Iran's nuclear program. The fact that Ahmadinejad is on the less religious end of the spectrum helps explain why his government might be pursuing a nuclear weapons program despite years of statements by Iran's leading religious authorities that nuclear weapons are an offense against God. One positive outcome of a power-sharing arrangement might be a government that is more willing to bend on issues relating to its nuclear program.

That's the first U.S. concern, and it is why a careful and cautious wait-and-see attitude is exactly what has been needed. Nothing -- absolutely nothing -- could be less helpful at the moment than for Obama to start making the kinds of fire-breathing statements that neocons and progressives alike keep calling for. On the nuclear issue the U.S. has to hope for a change or partial change in leadership that will result in a government more favorable to negotiation, not that anti-nuclear sentiment will somehow bubble up out of a popular movement toward revolt. To start aligning the U.S. directly with the protesters now risks energizing the nationalists at the expense of the Islamists. That is exactly what happened in 2002. It was Bush's idiotic Axis of Evil speech that propelled Ahmadinejad to power in the first place. After 9/11 Iran provided crucial support for U.S. operations in Afghanistan; with that speech, many Iranians suddenly feared that their country was next on the list for invasion. Ahmadinejad rode that fear to power, and his supporters continue to beat that nationalist drum, exemplified by statements from government officials and pro-government clerics like Ahmed Khatami referring to leaders of the protests as "supported by the U.S. and Israel." Obama's careful avoidance of anything that could be construed as belligerence has been exactly the right strategy to give Rafsanjani and his supporters move to maneuver.

The second key U.S. concern is Iranian influence in the Middle East. On this score, events in Iran proper are not the only story to be watching this week. There have also been a series of extremely lethal bombings in Iraq, all of them aimed at killing Shiites: 78 dead in Baghdad on Wednesday, 73 in Shiite Turkmen town of Taza Khurmatu, at least 13 dead in Baghdad on Friday. A new Iranian government that includes a greater representation of religious orthodox clerics is unlikely to watch as their fellow Shiites are attacked by Suni extremists bent on destabilizing Iraq by fomenting inter-ethnic conflict. (It's hard to see how anyone could argue that the Iranian government should stand by in that situation, actually, particularly for conservatives who support Israel and clamor about the need for the U.S. to take action in response to the persecution of Christians in Africa.) So it is unlikely that the government that emerges out of these protests will be less prone to extending its influence into Iraq, particularly after the U.S. troops are gone.

But Iran's interests in Iraq are not our only concern. Our bigger long-term concern is with Iran's role in Syria, Lebanon, and Palestine. This week two things were announced. First, the U.S. is sending an ambassador to Damascus. Second, Jimmy Carter -- working with Egypt and Syria -- may have worked out terms for the release of Gilad Shalit, the Israeli soldier whose capture by Hamas was one of the triggering events of Israel's invasion of Gaza. HaAretz reports that Shalit's release will take place within a few days as part of a prisoner exchange, and that the initial proposal was floated by Carter during a visit to Damascus and Gaza last year.

These stories may very well be connected, and they point to the almost incredible possibility that the U.S. may finally be ready to have a serious foreign policy in the Middle East. For what it's worth, I have been saying for many years that relations with Syria are the key. Here's just one reason: if Syria can be brought on board with a peace effort, Iran no longer has direct supply lines into Lebanon. Meanwhile, Syria has itself been supporting Hamas in Gaza (hence its role in negotiating the release of Shalit) as well as meddling in Lebanon. But while Syria has been notoriously difficult to deal with in the past, there is no reason in principle why progress cannot be made. Assad is an opportunist, not a mad ideologue, and certainly not a religious fanatic. (The single stupidest neocon phrase -- against some pretty tough competition! -- has to be "the Shiite Crescent," an arc of states comprising Iran, Syria and Lebanon that are supposed to represent the religiously defined threat to American interests. Since Syria is less than 5% Shiite and is ruled by an Alawite minority, it was never terribly clear what this was supposed to mean.)

What Syria wants is simple: they want the Golan Heights back. Which is where the U.S. comes in. There have been repeated points at which Israel and Syria came close to substantive negotiations on the issue of the Golan, only to see those efforts fail. But there has never been a sustained and substantive American presence in the dialogue. If Assad can be persuaded that Syria has more to gain by engagement with the West than by an alliance with Iran, that immediately improves the situation in Lebanon, improves the security of Israel's northern border, and improves the situation in Western Iraq. Syria's participation in arranging the release of Shalit -- even if that ultimately doesn't happen -- is a powerful and positive sign that Assad is open to the possibility.

Then there is the third U.S. interest and a tantalizing possibility: that Iran might resume its cooperation with U.S. operations in Afghanistan. As this piece from Stratfor nicely explains, Iran's 500-plus mile border with Afghanistan, strong ethnic connections to Afghan Pashtuns, and available ports make it an ideal partner. In other words, at the very same time that the U.S. has a strong interest in limiting Iran's reach to the West beyond Iraq, we may have another strong interest in encouraging Iranian engagement to the East. The Sunni attacks against Shiites in Iraq are part of the larger conflict between Sunni radicals -- think Taliban -- and Shiite Iran.

So the Obama administration has had to play a very careful hand: do nothing to repeat the stupidity that helped launch Ahmadinejad to the presidency; develop the opening that Jimmy Carter has helped develop and initiate an engagement with Syria in the hope of isolating Iran to the West; and at the same time look ahead to the role that the version of the Iranian regime that emerges out of a compromise in the Assembly of Experts might play in Afghanistan. This week, Obama and his State Department have done all three brilliantly.

Comments

[delta7777]

.
"Understanding the fact that Khamenei and Ahmadinejad are political rather than religious figures -- and that their opponents, led by Ayatollah Rafsanjani, speak for the religious voice in Iran's leadership .."

Rafsanjani is now making his move, already he is the wealthiest man in Iran, and has tied this wealth in with religious power. If he wins out, Iran will become the equivalent of a Goldman Sachs Theocracy.

A COMBINATION THAT IS ABSOLUTELY LETHAL TO FREEDOM:

ABSOLUTE WEALTH, ABSOLUTE POLITICAL POWER, ABSOLUTE CONTROL BY RELIGION

This is why our Founding Fathers insisted on separation of Church and State.

It is unfortunate that they did not similarly insist on separation of Bank and State.
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[Dawn Erickson]

From the border perspective in Herat and other nearby provinces without Iranian food, fuel and other economic support the cost of living in Afghanistan just becomes higher in one of the poorest countries in the world. The fact that the US contracts being filled right next to the Iranian border for infrastructure and development can not buy or use Iranian products directly affects the US taxpayer's pocket. Also, a quick look at the map would show access to a transport route for supplies by road that does not include Pakistan.

In addition, that while a somewhat different dialect, Iranian books are some of the few in the world written in a language close to Afghanistan's Persian dialect that can be used in a country that doesn't really have printing presses for books. The Afghan connection with Iran includes refugees, family, friends and work. The line made by Afghans in front of the Iranian Embassy in Kabul for work permits versus the line in front of the US Embassy for work permits is a picture that is waiting to be taken. The jobs in Iran are accessible to fairly ordinary Afghans, while the jobs in the US are not even an option. To ask Afghanistan to ignore the help of a neighbor due to the political disputes between the US and Iran are like asking the US to ignore their border and relationship as a neighbor with Canada.

[rad21]

Key 1 has been solved- thanks to the resilience of the Iranians. Their actions will also have a lasting influence on the young generation throughout the Mid-East. We need to look at spreading the Iran message (and results) to other regions, instead of stagnating in a fait-accomplii. Hence moving to key 2 is important

Key 2 is in the hands of Israel - simple & easy. Will the Israeli-youths learn from the Iranian-youths?

This leads to Key 3 - which is really the main working-issue between Washington and Tehran.

We cannot get to the third door without turning the key in door 2.

[melissamsouza]

Excellent, thank you. I sincerely hope Obama resists the significant pressure he is under to get ever more tough and flagrantly take sides in the Iranian situation. It is not helpful when there are leaks (as in today's Haaretz ), that Berlusconi and Netanyanu have been gossiping about Obama's alleged "weakness" on Iran. Let's just keep in mind that these are two ultra-cons­ervatives, very much aligned with America's neocons (Berlusconi was one of the "old" Europeans to support the Iraq War), and Netanyahu would like nothing more than to pick a fight with Iran that would lead to yet another war. Obama is already starting to get into a verbal fight with A-jad. Let's just hope this weekend things calm down again and hope that the situation in Iran begins to point the way to a possible solution--hopefully some sort of compromise. If the regime adopts a harder line, and more confrontational toward the West, it will hardly be taken seriously and be obviously lacking in any kind of legitimacy.

[Nicolaus]

Alawites are a branch of Shiism!

No great discovery there. In fact it is a continuation of the efforts of the Bush administration to isolate Iran through better relations with Syria - which started during the Bush administration. As such, the Bush administration agreed with the Turks to mediate a peace settlement between Syria and Israel and emissaries were sent to Syria several times.

In essence, and with the clear failure of the Obama policy so far with regard to Iran, both administrations have exactly the same approach, and the same policy. After 5 months of talking about planning to talk with Iran, even the President's Representative to Iran (Dennis Ross) was moved elsewhere, while the Iranians were pleading for an interlocutor and begging for the 'CHANGE'... leaving the clear impression that this is where Israel draws the line, and where the Obama adminitsration would abide.

[bluescat47]

Cogently argued.

[Shrank]

Obama's treachery has already brought millions of Iranians into the streets, and fomented rioting against the Islamic Regime. What more do the neo-cons want?

[kapo]

It is quite warm here in Jamaica right now, which might explain why I am so irritated by the pseudo-intellectual jabbering in this article and the previous one I read on beautiful women affecting the media coverage of Iran. This fellow feels that Rafsanjani represents the religious part of the Iran spectrum and Khamenei is on the opposite end. The feminist article had a rather obvious concept, and that was the end of her argument. I understand how Huffington Post works but is painful when one is seduced by an interesting concept and then led into an intellectual morass. By the way, isnt it an interesting commentary on the quality of public debate that most of the folks previously voiding their rheum on Ahmadeinjad, now seem to have shifted their passions over to mourning the dearly departed King of Pop.

[misaacm]

"What Syria wants is simple: they want the Golan Heights back."

Sure Syria wants the Golan, they also want Lebanon which they view much in the same way that China views Taiwan; as a breakaway province. The Assads, who have ruthlessly run Syria for decades most want to remain in power. As minority Allawites, they know that they can't do that and have peace with Israel. Their people will ask "what do we need you for?". They won't offer peace to Israel, so they won't get the Golan.

Forget about making a deal with Syria. There is no give and take with them. Only take.

[Jeffrey Barea]

Seeing as how they "lost" the Golan Heights, not sure how that makes them all take and no give?

[Pema]

of course Syria wants their land back. israel gobbles up land as though it has a right to whatever to protect their psychotic fears. syria helped us in afghan but we failt ot remeber that. the current presidnet of syria is a decent person and your saying he rules ruthlessly is so incorrect, its kool aid talk. Assad walks the streets of Damascus with no body gaurds, ruthless rules cant do that. the truth is better than opinion and agenda.
assad also doesnt use chemical weapons and full strenght uranium in it military. so who is the bad one now?

[malborz]

Professor Schweber, for a more intelligent and unbiased analysis, I refer you to the book "Obama Does Globalistan" by Pepe Escobar.

[Jeffrey Barea]

Ah, I visited Globalistan once. Smelled bad and they kept overcooking my food.

[argeec]

Another article from the Israeli point of view.

[pkafin]

Another commentator obsessed with Israel.

[brynnrose thorn]

Excellent article. That said, what "progressives" are you talking about here?:

"Nothing -- absolutely nothing -- could be less helpful at the moment than for Obama to start making the kinds of fire-breathing statements that neocons and progressives alike keep calling for."

[Jeffrey Barea]

You mean your Shah Khameini is unhappy?

[brynnrose thorn]

I suppose you could have made less sense, but I don't know how.