Iran's Revolution: A Hard and Uncertain Path

The courage and determination of the protesters in Iran are inspiring, and the brutality of the regime's response is revolting. The reminder that, as Fareed Zakaria recently put it, "What you know about Iran is wrong" could not be more timely.

All that being said - with absolute heartfelt sincerity - it is worth looking ahead and thinking about what is likely to come next. There are two big questions. First, how long can the opposition sustain itself? Four, five, or six weeks from now, will the protests still continue? Will the world still be watching Youtube videos being recycled on CNN? Second, if a revolution were to occur, what would the government of post-revolutionary Iran look like?

On the second point, the religious dimension of the opposition is critically important. The catchphrases of this opposition are "death to the dictator" and "Allah u Akhbar." Both are religious arguments: a Muslim ruler is expected to rule justly, so a "dictator" cannot be a legitimate Muslim ruler. The religious language in which this uprising is being conducted should make us cautious in assuming too much about the consequences of even a dramatic change in the ruling regime. This remains the case even if that religious language is used to recruit popular support rather than reflecting deep beliefs by the protesters themselves. Many of the people in the streets would like to see an end to the rule of the ayatollahs, nonetheless, support for the cause is being sought in the name of purification of religious rule, not its end.

The religious element is part of what makes the appeal of the opposition movement so powerful, which should be yet another reminder of the simplistic and monotonal American public understanding of Islam - particularly Shiite Islam -- in the Middle East. But as we have learned time and again, "democratic" does not necessarily equal "Western," let alone "secular" or "liberal" (this is as true in the U.S. as anywhere else.) And certainly "democratic" does not mean "pro-American." Khamenei's government earned its unpopularity by staggering economic incompetence, not by its belligerent nationalism. Very broad support for that nationalism remains. In other words, a new or revised regime might be one that features considerable reforms internally but that is no less eager to be involved in regional affairs, particularly Shiite Iraq. It is ridiculous to assert that Mousavi would not govern Iran differently than Ahmadinejad in terms of its internal affairs, but it is far less clear that Mousavi would be an Iranian Gorbachev, as some have suggested. (Ironically, this is a fear that has been expressed by both Israeli and Palestinian leaders: officials in Netanyahu's government fear that a reformed government would be just as ambitious but less isolated, while Palestinians fear that a reformed government would be less inclined to make their cause a central concern in its dealings with Western nations in order to maintain good relations.) And even internal reforms are unlikely to go so far as to challenge the basis of Iran's theocratic system of government.

But looking ahead, this all seems rather moot as revolutionary change is an unlikely outcome in any event. This is not because of any lack of fervor or bravery on the part of the opposition movement, nor with any lack of substance in their complaints. But the protesters are facing a government strategy that I call "Tiananmen in slow motion" that will be very hard to beat.

Start with the cause of the protests, the stolen election. If there was any remaining doubt on that question, this statement by Guardian Council spokesman Abbas-Ali Kadhodaei should settle the matter: "Statistics provided by Mohsen Rezaei in which he claims more than 100% of those eligible have cast their ballot in 170 cities are not accurate -- the incident has happened in only 50 cities" and that no more than 3 million votes are likely to have been affected." Only 3 million votes? Ah, well, in that case ... (Kadhodaei points out that Iranians are not prevented from voting outside their home districts so that some occurrence of greater than 100% turnout is not impossible. That argument is not remotely persuasive. For a very fine statistical analysis confirming the conclusion that the election was fraudulent, see Walter Mebane's paper here.

But the fact that the election was stolen does not mean that Ahmadinijad lacks widespread support. There is good reason to think that Ahmadinejad would - or at least could -- have won a clean election (although Nate Silver points out that "clean" here does not take account of voter intimidation as opposed to fraudulent vote tallies.) There is an unlikely but not impossible scenario in which new elections are called ... and the outcome is the same. (I assume here that the effects of the protests themselves on a subsequent election would be mixed; repeated reports that the basijis being bused into Tehran come from other parts of the country suggest that in this as in all things, "the Iran people" is not a singular, monolithic entity. In addition, heightened fear of reprisal could again boost pro-Ahmadinejad totals.)

As everyone involved recognizes, however, the protests and the initial government reaction have raised the stakes to the point of a challenge to the legitimacy of the governing regime. The government's responding violence should not have come as a shock to anyone. But it remains the case that that violence is being carefully kept within limits. Some Western observers are reacting as though there has been slaughter in the streets: the announcement that European embassies are considering opening their grounds to provide sanctuary to injured protestors reminds me of the "unauthorized acts of decency" that were reported during the massacre at Smyrna in 1922. That's hardly an analogous case, of course ( the massacre at Smyrna involved the murder of tens or hundreds of thousands of Armenians -- 150,000 is one common estimate). The current analogy - the one we're hearing over and over -- is Tiananmen Square.

The problem is, that, too, is a weak analogy. Tiananmen Square started with a million people occupying a central location on April 15; thousands participated in a lengthy hunger strike; tens of thousands remained there seven weeks later when the tanks rolled in on June 4. The Chinese Red Cross estimated that 2,600 people were killed in a matter of hours. The issue at Tiananmen was stark: particularly against the background of the ongoing collapse of the Soviet Union, the future of Communism itself seemed to be in the balance. And the world was watching closely, fed reports and images by western correspondents right up to the end.

The Iranian protests don't seem to be going that way. First, neither the protesters nor the government - especially the government -- seem to be looking for a pitched confrontation. After the biggest marches, on Monday, everyone went home. Day after day the protesters have come back for more in the face of teargas and batons and frequent live fire ... but there has been nothing like the sustained seizure of public space that set the battle lines at Tiananmen Square. Saturday would have been an opportune moment for an all-out confrontation: many protesters were ready to face death, and in some cases the government obliged, making the tragic death of a young woman named Neda the signature moment of the conflict thus far. But even on Saturday the government forces did not unleash full-scale military repression.

The government's strategy appears to be Tiananmen in slow motion: the application of low-level but steady violence in the hopes that the protesters will eventually give up. There are some signs that the strategy is working. Protests continued Saturday night and Sunday, but the numbers are down. Tactics like using the police to bar access to public squares and forcing people to keep moving are making it much harder to mount large-scale sustained marches. Using police and basiji forces to prevent gatherings or disperse them before they grow too large - rather than trying to disperse them by force after the fact -- and the widespread arrests of perceived or potential leadership figures are strategies aimed at turning a flashpoint confrontation into a sustained low-level counterinsurgency operation, a strategy should sound familiar.

The Iranian government is dominated by a generation that remembers not only the Revolution of 1979, but more immediately the Iran-Iraq War with its million Iranian dead. The basijis who are doing the skull-cracking and shooting now are the same force that launched suicidal human wave attacks against much better (American) armed Iraqi forces in the marshes. In other words, this is a regime that has no trouble accepting casualties and has the forces available that are ready to both inflict and absorb much, much more. If one must have a Chinese analogy, we might be seeing the beginning of an Iranian Cultural Revolution rather than the next Velvet Revolution.

Meanwhile, the extensive efforts to curtail the use of cell phones and cameras, the government's YouTube propaganda strategy, the effective exclusion of direct reporting by Western agencies, in turn, are aimed at preventing the world's attention from focusing around a symbolic object like the Lady Liberty statue. (What a triumph Nico Pitney's live blog has been for Huffpo; and how pathetic has the MSM been in comparison? Is anything sadder than CNN's putting up videos they got from YouTube?) The world is trying to watch what is happening. Will they still be trying just as hard after a month without direct news reporting?

We hear that there is a fierce power struggle going on in the meantime, between clerics aligned with Rafsanjani - these are real ayatollahs, which Khamenei is not - and others loyal to the regime, but nothing thus far suggests that a revolution will emerge from Qum. The move are complicated, and hard to read - presumably Rafsanjani and Khamenei are each trying to line up support. Khamenei recently spoke well of Rafsanjani, suggesting the he wants to avoid an outright split. At the same time, the New York Times has a story today detailing efforts to discredit Mousavi as an agent of foreign powers in the government press, a move described as suggesting "that the government may be laying the groundwork for discrediting and arresting Mr. Mousavi." The story also quotes Iranian politicians calling for retrenchment and "reconsidering relations" with European nations. The worst outcome could be a power-struggle that Rafsanjani loses, leading to retrenchment and reconsolidation. The best outcome appears to be some incremental steps or revisions in power-sharing arrangements, at the most; nothing to turn the unrest in the streets into a top-down revolution.

Most likely the protests will continue through this week, and so will the low-level violence and the clampdown, the obvious acts of violence by government provocateurs, and the equally obvious propaganda. Meanwhile, the American Congress would do well to avoid providing ammunition to Khamenei and the Iranian government press. Something powerful is on the move in the streets of Tehran; to borrow a different metaphor, there is something waiting to be hatched and take flight there. But it may be some time yet before that new bird is ready to come out, and when it does we can have only the dimmest idea as to what kind of bird it might become.

Comments

[Snake-Eyes]

why doesn't everyone just leave Iran alone? Let them deal with their problems as they see fit. One might not agree with it, but it's the way things are. And, sometimes the way things are is just the way things are. I think America has plenty enough of her own problems to be worried about....yes, plenty enough.

[Ozarks]

Credibility is the basic Rule of Law. Gee only 50 instead of 170 Cities carried out fraud!! There is no basis for this limiting the fraud to "just" 50 cities. The mullahs just picked a number. The fact that fraud has been admitted should nullify the entire scam.

[Ozarks]

I disagree with your statement : "Khamenei's government earned its unpopularity by staggering economic incompetence, not by its belligerent nationalism". The morality police , the gradual erosion of public rights, the unequal treatment of women and Mousavi's wife injection into the public debates and discussions before the election , caused the Mullahs to "rig" the election. There is no "belligerent nationalims" in this calculation. It is a population fed up with the inequality such as perks to the Basjic (sp) and injustice toward women. The vote rig was just the last straw. The mullahs do not want free expression thru dress, morals, movies and they do not want any freedom of choice on these matters. That's why this alleged "republic" will go into the toilet, maybe not in a flash but in a slow burn as national strikes and entire cross sections of the population find the mullahs and their view of the world absurd and repugnant.

[Edwin Badulis]

To all God-fearing Republican Guard Commanders. . .go for the people it is God's will. Great is God.

[Hoelder]

What other people do or think, is not my concern, especially with many second guessing the events in Iran. Comparisons as helpful they can be are still misleading when strung together, one comparison with the next. Americans are weak on history and limited to a small time frame of their own history. Persian are not Arabs nor does their history begin or ends with the existing of Iran. It has a long and proud history. As much as I hope that the opposition will succeed, I see the odds stacked against them. Comparisons like Tiananmen or dictator are uneducated at best. Actually, they are always, because of the nature of themselves. The election revealed some of the hidden power structures to us. It made one fact absolutely clear. We do not know much of Iran and still we are told by our own right wing politicians, who like the schism between both countries. Iran has changed. The masses on the street brought to the open what was dormant to us. It will be interesting to watch.

[Macready]

great blog . . thank you for posting . . . so happy you have debunked the generalisations that have been spinning around . . . to prejudge the outcome of what is happening in Iran is a big mistake . . it is internal . . .

[TJCole]

Try doing it like we did, kill the tyrants...!

[JustAnotherScreenname]

Great analysis, although personally I'm not deterred by the religious imagery used by the opposition. After all, the vast majority of Iran's youth do not actually practice Islam, and for most Iranians religion is merely lip-service, kind of like the family reunion nobody wants to go to but everybody expects everybody else to show up for anyway (I think a poll a few years ago showed only 17% of Iranians regularly pray - prayer is much more central to the practice of Islam than is, say, abstaining from alcohol).

[chlai88]

I think to a certain extent we are all wishing for a revolution, a huge change in Iran. That will not come and it is also not in anyone's interests to see it occur. The system in Iran is not entirely democratic, yes, but if you look closely, there are institutions there that do provide some checks and balances just like in western democracies, though not as mature. The Assembly of Experts is an elected body that selects the Supreme Leader. The Supreme Leader decides on some policy directions but most execution is done by the president who is elected. The crisis now in Iran is that Khamenei is risking a breakdown of the system by aligning himself too closely with Ahmadinejad whereas he should be above the fray regarding the election, so to speak. This is the justification that Rafsanjani is now bringing to the Qom clerics and the Assembly of Experts to either limit the Supreme Leader's powers or to change it into a council. During Khomeini, it may be that he is where the buck stops but today there are power centers concerned about the possibility of tyranny. Like China, Iran may not be perfect but it sure is heading in the right direction.

[SFA]

Great analysis , why not link with the nico blog about Iran.
Many more will be able to read it..

I believe Iran has the upper hand in dealing with the US ,u have messed up in Iraq & Af-Pak, US can't do much.Certainly not a confrontation with Iran. be ready for a bloody nose in Iraq & no help on Af-pak and 100$ Oil.

Had US not been so occupied with this mess it might have done something clandestinely in Iran.
the only hope now is that the protest continue and Gurdian council calls for a re-election or theow out Khmeni(I believe it's impossible at present).

[breakingpoint]

Not even in consideration:
June 29, 2008, Seymour Hersh reported in the New Yorker: “Late last year, Congress agreed to a request from President Bush to fund a major escalation of covert operations against Iran, according to current and former military, intelligence, and congressional sources. These operations, for which the President sought up to four hundred million dollars, were described in a Presidential Finding signed by Bush, and are designed to destabilize the country’s religious leadership.”

Iran - Axis of evil - has a democratic election - women are allowed to vote
Saudie Arabia - our dear friend - doesn't allow women to vote, no descent allowed, tortures
Mexico - Our neighbor - has a cartel going batshite nuts spillingin to US borders
Egypt - ugh! why bother
Darfur - killing again
NKorea - don't get me started

Take a breath, they will work it out, stop making it worse - mind your own borders and #yourownbackyard

Majd = Chalabi?

[Prattvictory2]

How long did the protests last in Mexico City before the American media got tired of covering it?

They've got about a week left.

[oxi]

Inspiring that democracy never works, violence does!

Brutality of the regime? They have to keep law and order in the cities! Protesters are blocking main roads and lighting fires and reaking havoc, the police have the responsibility to respond, it's their job!!!

I did not recall your condemnation against U.S. police forces during anti-war protests under Bush nor the violence in London against the G-20 and NATO protests in Europe... but if Iran cracks down blah blah blah...

[BillZBubb]

Yours seems like the most likely course of events. It will be very hard for the protestors to maintain their intensity of the long haul. It is not hard for the ruling mullahs to keep up the repression--they've got plenty of goons.

Longer term, though, this situation will be seen as a pivotal event. The leaders have now alienated the middle class. As Iran's economic performance continues to disappoint the population, they'll link the bad governance to the repression and then the vast majority of Iranians will throw the bums out. No force will stop them.