The Case for a Middle Path in Afghanistan

As the president moves this week to make a decision on Afghanistan, three schools of thought have emerged on what he should do.  The president could choose to go all in.  He could choose a minimalist strategy.  Or he could opt for something in the middle.  The president has no good options, but the best option is to pursue a middle of the road approach for at least the next 12-18 months.  If it proves to be ineffective, the president should then move to a minimalist strategy.

The "all in" approach, best exemplified by John McCain and Joe Lieberman's op-ed in the Washington Post, argues for "victory" through a full scale commitment of undetermined length at an undetermined cost.  It is supported by hawks like McCain and Lieberman who generally believe that America must "win" any war no matter the cost.  A more clear-eyed view, but still part of the "all in" school, is that of many in the counterinsurgency community who believe that the way forward in Afghanistan requires a population-centric counterinsurgency campaign that would likely take years.  As John Nagl recently explained, "We have more fighting in front of us than behind us."  The "all in" crowd also includes many in the development community, who are less focused on the military options, but have invested years working to improve the lives of the people of Afghanistan and do not want to see a reduced commitment. 

The minimalist approach is supported by a combination of realists and progressives.  It calls for doing what we can to help the people of Afghanistan, while limiting our military commitment and recognizing that America's ability to influence events in far off unstable states such as Afghanistan is incredibly limited.  Les Gelb's writings on this issue present an excellent example of the realist approach and are focused primarily on a short and limited surge to help the Afghans followed by a containment strategy that brings in Afghanistan's neighbors and reduces the threat of terrorism to the United States and its allies.  Alex Thurston and the coalition behind Get Afghanistan Right offer a different take on minimalism - one that is more skeptical of any use of military force but is willing to do more on the non-military side. 

The third option is the middle ground and it is the option that seems most likely to be pursued by the Obama administration.  It calls for minimalist goals based on limiting the possibility of an Al Qaeda safe haven and the chance that instability in Afghanistan could destabilize Pakistan.  But it argues that to achieve this goal the U.S. needs to invest in enough security and Afghan governing capacity to avoid a total collapse.  The result is a plan that calls for a dramatic increase in military and non-military resources.  It is at a much higher level than what the minimalists may prefer but may not be nearly enough for the "all in" crowd.

Most of the proponents of these three approaches have much in common.  They agree on the need for broader engagement with Afghanistan's neighbors to develop and coordinate an international response that helps stabilize the country.  They recognize the importance of Pakistan and the need to: lend support to democratic institutions that will strengthen and stabilize the government; provide more development and economic aid; limit Indian-Pakistani tensions so that the Pakistani military makes a greater commitment to dealing with the insurgency on its side of the border; and help the Pakistani military become more adept at counterinsurgency.  The three approaches also concur on the fact that there is no strictly military solution for the conflict and that only a comprehensive solution that increases civilian capacities, governance, the ability of the Afghan security forces and police, and economic opportunities for Afghans.  In fact, most of the strategies also seem to support or at the very least not object to some form of engagement with the Taliban and an attempt to split off the more moderate elements from the extremists. 

Where the different approaches disagree is on the use of military force and the level of commitment that will be required by the United States.

Each of the options also has major downsides.  The "all in" approach does not carefully take into account U.S. strategic interests or weigh costs and benefits.  It starts from the view that Al Qaeda represents a threat to the United States and moves quickly to a need for a massive commitment without carefully explaining why it is in America's interests to pour billions of dollars and thousands of troops into Afghanistan to create a democratic Afghan state. 

The minimalist approach assumes that there is simply not that much that we can do in Afghanistan, but seems cavalier about our ability to prevent an Al Qaeda safe haven or the melt down of the Pakistani state as we withdraw and leave in place an even worse security vacuum than the one that exists today.  It also ignores any moral questions that might be tied to abandoning our Afghan allies to extremist elements.

The middle approach has its own dangers.  Just as did in Iraq from 2003-2006 or in Vietnam from 1965-1968, the United States may find itself doing enough not to lose, but not enough to win.  The result would be a slowly deteriorating situation that would lose all domestic support in the United States and eventually collapse with much greater costs to us and to the Afghan people. 

Yet despite that very real danger, at this point the middle approach is the best option to try for at least the next 12-18 months.  A massive and unlimited commitment is completely unrealistic both politically and financially in the midst of a global economic crisis. And our interests in Afghanistan do not rise to the level of meriting this type of approach.  However, it's too early to go with a minimalist approach considering that right now is the first time in seven years that the United States is finally putting all of the elements of national power behind a serious approach to Afghanistan.

By the middle of 2002 the Bush administration was completely absorbed with Iraq and that focus remained until the end of the administration.  As Chairman of the Joint Chiefs Admiral Mullen explained in 2007 "In Afghanistan we do what we can.  In Iraq we do what we must."  This applied not just to the military but to our national security bureaucracy and the top level of political leadership that only now for the first time since 2002 are focusing on Afghanistan as an absolute top priority and putting the resources and thinking into a comprehensive strategy.  From this perspective it seems premature to at least not try a comprehensive diplomatic, regional, military, and development approach to the conflict.  It may work.  It may not work.  But I am not willing to not try at all.  Especially since our interests in Afghanistan are significant, even if they do not rise to the level of an existential threat that some would have us believe .

If a middle ground strategy shows little to no progress within the next 12-18 months than it would be wise for Obama and his advisors to reconsider and move to a strategy along the lines of the minimalist path advocated by Gelb.  This will be extraordinarily difficult as once you commit to a strategy changing course involves admitting failure and reevaluating - something American administrations have been historically bad at.  But despite this potential danger, it's simply too early right now to move into containment mode and dramatic escalation is not a viable option.  The middle path is not a good option.  But it is the best of a number of bad ones.

Comments

[indyleftist]

Its very sad to see what the democrats are pushing as our foreign policy
In many ways I find it worse than the republicans
Both favor aggressive war
But the democrats seem to reject democracy in favor of "stability"

[research]

The people of Afghanistan want us remove all our soldiers.

Why don't we believe in democracy?

[SNusbaumer]

They do? I don't think so. Some do but thaty is not all, not even a majority, I believe.

[research]

53% of afgan's want us to move all soldiers within 5 years.

http://erg.environics.net/media_room/default.asp?aID=653

Only 32% believe we a doing a good
http://abcnews.go.com/images/PollingUnit/1083a1Afghanistan2009.pdf

[robert234]

The insanity continues: The so-called brightest among Homo sapiens(President, congressmen, journalists, academics, and CEO's) wrangle over the so-called pressing issues of our time(economy, education, energy, health care, etc.) Large minds pontificating on small issues or large issues discussed by small minds. Either way , as Virgil wrote, it's trying to "fix the small tears in things."Al­l of this while defiling Homo sapiens' greatest moral imperative , DO NOT MURDER YOUR CHILDREN! Bush and company virtually pursued infanticide in Iraq calling it collateral damage. Now Obama, who righteously condemned such evil, is debating whether to pursue that same evil in Afghanastan. He has yet to say what name he will give to those murdered children. As I leave you deep thinkers to ponder such serious matters as AIG, hedge funds, regulation, and CEO's, I'm reminded of the words of H.L. Menchen , "Every normal man must be tempted to at times to spit on his hands,hoist the black, and begin to slit throats."

[EminemsRevenge]

The SO-CALLED BRIGHTEST among Homo sapiens(President, congressmen, journalists, academics, and CEO's)---YOU'RE JOKING, RIGHT?

[CaptainStormfield]

http://atimes.com/c-asia/DA25Ag01.html
Pepe Escobar's 2002 article and subsequent articles on Afgh. are very relevant.

Pipelanistan.

[rmwarnick]

Wasn't Senator McCain the guy who wanted to "muddle through" in Afghanistan? Now he says we ought to escalate? McCain of all people ought to recall what happened in Vietnam.

Here's the deal. We can stave off defeat (i.e. the fall of a U.S.-suppo­rted regime in Kabul) indefinitely in Afghanistan, similarly to Iraq. We cannot eliminate the Taliban using conventional forces (I assume nuking Afghanista­n/Pakistan is not an option). So the realistic course of action is to co-opt as many of the 50 or so Taliban groups as possible into working with the government (Karzai has to go, he's too corrupt). Make sure they won't give al-Qaeda a base, then withdraw forces and give them development aid.

[S1m0n]

Karzai's corruption was why he was picked in the first place.

[Sikander]

When America attacked Afghanistan it displaced a Pashtun government ( Pashtun make up the majority of population in Afghanistan) and replaced it with a government dominated by Tajiks, Uzbeks and other proxies of Iran. Never in the history of Afghanistan ( apart from very short periods of foreign occupation), the country has been run by non Pashtuns. American government must understand that the problem of Afghanistan has much more to do with the ethnic dimension than the religious one. The sooner it is understood that levers of powers should be in Pashtun hands, the sooner we shall see the end of Al-Qaida and the like.
Taliban are just a name for a myriad number of Pashtun groups fighting to get the government back from the people whom they believe to be usurpers of Pashtun’s rightful rule. Has anyone considered that people at the forefront of insurgency like Gulbuddin Hekmatyar and Jalaludin Haqqani are the veterans of Soviet war and have very lose connections with the Taliban.

http://real-politiqe.blogspot.com

By Sikander Hayat

[CaptainStormfield]

As someone said.. the tribes in Afgh. hate each other, the only thing that unites them is a foreign invader

[murphy80]

where were you when Bush fumbled Afgan?

[djk20042]

liberals like you are dangerous to this country! How do you halfway fight a war? This is not a game, people's lives, our countrymen's lives, are at stake! There is no 'middle way', there is no compromise, it is victory or defeat. You people need to wake up and realize that some things in life ARE black and white.

[WFTomba]

The Taliban DID attack us--they were as complicit in 9/11 as the getaway driver is in a bank robbery. We are in a war with them, and they are a threat to their region and to some extent the world. It's not time to throw in the towel in our fight against the Taliban. Until we can persuade Pakistan to go after their strongholds there, the least we can do is try to deny them Afghanistan.

The biggest problem we currently have in fighting the Taliban in Afghanistan is that they still provide desperately needed income to local people. Therefore the first thing we should to is try to edge them out in that area. Besides hiring as many local workers as we can use (even if that means doing reconstruction work in a somewhat old-fashioned way), we should buy Afghan farmers' poppies at competitive prices and sell them to pharmaceutical companies (who make them into perfectly legal medical painkillers such as codeine and morphine). Even if we take a loss on the poppies, it would be money well spent. Afghans would benefit from the stable, LEGAL income source and Pakistanis would benefit from the Taliban's loss of funding.

[wadenelson1]

Try substituting the word "Vietnam" for "Afghanistan" and the whole thing becomes clear.

Time to get out.

[djk20042]

That's not a good thing. liberal cowardice cost the Vietnamise their freedom, which resulted in:
* the deaths of 1.5 million Cambodians
* waves of boat people fleeing for their lives
* the 'reeducation' of an entire people
Oh yeah, time to get out sounds like a great plan.

[wadenelson1]

500,000 troops, 53,000 casualties, and 11 years of conservative bravado couldn't win it.

[toje]

"...and recognizing that America's ability to influence events in far off unstable states such as Afghanistan is incredibly limited."

If this is the notion on which you base your hypothesis, well....th­en....I would get a new hypothesis.

[bleek]

We don't really need a strategy for Afghanistan. We need a strategy for Pakistan. Let the CIA have Afghanistan so they can do whatever with it they please (most of us know what the CIA is really interested in WRT Afghanistan).

Afghanistan really doesn't mean anything to the United States at this point no matter how much we want to pretend that it somehow does.

Oh, and one more thing. None of this silly 'war on terror' crap is going to ever make any sense until we have a true investigation of the 911 attacks. Only the truth will clarify. Of course, this is equivalently to say that none of the silly war on terror crap will EVER make any sense.

[melpol]

Saving money by limiting our military commitment and using that savings to support tribal leaders in Afganistan will produce the best results. Wise men never bites the hand that feeds it. Neither does a smart woman.

[ultrabop]

Total hogwash. Afghanistan is not even a country. It is a bunch of warring tribes. They could take care of the Taliban themselves if we'd stop enabling the country that gave them their blessed religious training, Pakistan. Pakistan is the enemy and obviously, Saudi Arabia, where the 9/11 guys mostly came from. If you're going to invade a country, why not a rich one, like Saudi Arabia. We could just steal all of their oil. Oh yeah, I forgot , they are the one's propping up the Boosh family.

The only thing that Afghanistan has to offer is the poppy fields and since we took over the "central government"(what a sham), the narcotics business has been flourishing. I wonder which Republican congressmen are profiting from the poppies.

Obama? He's trying to look tough. I don't get it. He's president already.

[Imhotep]

What say we try the 'get out' approach and leave the running of Afghanistan to the Afghan's? Then we can use our resources to keep everyone else out, while the people of Afghanistan decide what's best for themselves. We American's must get over our 'playing God' complex everytime we believe that we know best. Peace

[ultrabop]

It made for good press, the image of special ops guys on horses, dressed up like Arabs attacking the garrison.

We really showed those guys(who didn't attack NY) what kind of wild and crazy fighters we are. The dry drunk must have had a hoot.