The shift in allegiances of Lebanon's chameleon-like Druze leader has sent tremors through the country's political system.
For almost three months the headlines of Lebanon's papers have told a similar story of the deadlock in forming a cabinet. The optimism that followed the victory of the March 14 alliance -- made up of the Progressive Socialist party (PSP), the Future Movement and others -- in June's elections has been lost in the maze of internal and external politics.
Arguably one of the most significant turning points can be attributed to an astonishing shift in the allegiances of the PSP leader, Walid Jumblatt, on 2 August -- from seemingly being Syria's arch-enemy in Lebanon to heading back into the Damascene fold. The ramifications of Jumblatt's departure from the (Saudi and US-backed) March 14 alliance continue to send tremors through the country's fragile political system. If Lebanon can be said to represent a microcosm of the Middle East's politics, then Jumblatt can be described as a bellwether of prevailing trends in political power. Indeed, he described himself as "an exceptional and independent case."
His defection is evidence of the death of the Bush conceptual framework for the Middle East that divided the area into "moderates" and "extremists." The battle lines were drawn between a US-supported alliance of Saudi Arabia, the Gulf states, Jordan, Egypt, Fatah Palestinians and the Lebanese March 14 alliance versus Iran, Syria, the Lebanese March 8 alliance and Hamas. Previously Jumblatt decided to side with the aggressive new US neocon administration at a time in which Bush's "you're either with us or against us" approach left little room for compromise.
Yet the wave of change promised by Bush's interventions in the Middle East crashed on the bloody rocks and rubble of Iraq, leaving Lebanon increasingly isolated. The departure of the Syrians, the setting up of a tribunal after the assassination of the former prime minister Rafik Hariri and the recent election victory of the March 14 group suggested that serious change had been brought to Lebanon. But the series of assassinations of anti-Syrian figures and, in particular, the US impotence in the face of Israel's month-long mauling of the country's infrastructure in 2006 (which was estimated to put the country back some 15 years) was a reminder that the US was a part-time player in the Lebanon arena, whereas it is the Syrians who have the long game.
The new US approach to the region is a realist one characterized by its focus on dialogue with its enemies. The warming of relations with Syria in particular, with reports suggesting that a US ambassador to Damascus will be appointed shortly, has forced Jumblatt to significantly adjust his alliances to better protect his sect. In announcing his flip-flop, the chameleon-like Druze leader spoke of his regret over the alliance with US neocons, describing 2006 meetings he had in Washington as a "black mark." Yet his resume is a testimony to his ability to adapt interests to power regardless of its source. After all, this is the man who was forced to become leader of his sect at 27 when his father was assassinated by the Syrians, yet formed an alliance with Damascus in 1983, a year after he reached out to the Israelis when they invaded in 1982.
Jumblatt's Druze fiefdom is located in the Chouf Mountains, just south of Beirut. The Middle East's mountains are filled with minority groups who have fled from persecution from whatever majority existed in the political framework (be it pre- or post-Ottoman, colonial or post-colonial) of the time. Jumblatt's base of about 200,000 Druze is surrounded by Shia communities allied to Syria, and whereas US policy towards Syria may oscillate, Syria will always be Lebanon's neighbor with a myriad of interconnections between the two states.
What is more, a series of crucial events occurred during the Hezbollah takeover of the Beirut streets last year. While media attention focused on what was happening in the capital, brutal fighting was going on in Chouf between Hezbollah and Jumblatt's Druze PSP forces. Following the killing and mutilation of two Hezbollah supporters by the PSP, a convoy of Hezbollah vehicles hellbent on exacting revenge ran into a prepared ambush on the outskirts of Shuwfat.
In the battle that followed, anti-aircraft guns and RPGs were used and dozens were killed on both sides, leading the combatants' respective leaders into an emergency dialogue to prevent a battle escalating into a war.
Ultimately, the incident exposed Jumblatt and the Druze's vulnerability. While the Hariri killing highlighted that even the most protected individuals can be targeted, the prospect of taking on Lebanon's dominant military force (Hezbollah) in open conflict was a bridge too far when combined with the changing winds of international policy.
In his history of modern Lebanon, Fawwaz Traboulsi observed that "the Lebanese entity was to be periodically reproduced by means of a compromise between the dominant regional and international powers." It would appear that Jumblatt's change of direction is a symptom of the new compromise of the Obama era towards Syria. What this means for the future of Lebanon will become clearer once its tortuous cabinet negotiations are finally resolved.
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Somehow, when left to their own devises ie without outside intervention,
They manage to make gold out of a pile of shoop
In case you didn't get that, all that's happened here is Obama's failed attempt to appease Tehran - even in light of the recent rigged election there, has served only to empowered the Mullahs and those Lebanese politicians, not wanting to be torn apart by the armed cancer within, will now do what they need to do to survive.
Why on earth would a country harbor any ill feelings or worry about its southern neighbor that (a) occupied a substantial chunk of its south and (b) encouraged and equipped a renegade Army, the SLA, to take power and separate itself from the legitimate government in the capital?
Or to a country that still occupies a part of its territory? Or holds hundreds of its citizens as prisoners?
And why would a people who had to wage an 18 year war against an aggressor occupying power and whose national army is deliberately kept undersupplied by a major power and friend of that southern state want to have an effective national resistance movement to that southern power?
Yep, it's hard to understand all this.
(a) there is a lot of entrenched corruption - which is why Aoun and his FPM enjoy the support of the majority of Christians in the country
(b) 40% of the citizens of the country (and perhaps even a majority) are denied "one person, one vote"
(c) that same 40% or more are denied a fair share of the economic pie, the provision of government services, educational opportunities, etc.
It's a beautiful country, but by and large it's run like a medieval feudal state - for the benefit of the
lords and ladies and not the common folk.
All of which explains some of the rise of Hezbollah. The group that comes out on the losing side of the 80 year old demography are the shia, who are awarded third place in Parliament and cabinet, despite quite likely now being the largest demographic group.
In contrast are the Maronite christians, who have long been the most mobile, and in consequence the most likely to emigrate to Europe or North America. The present system awards them first place in parliament and cabinet, but that is highly unlikely to survive a new census.
Thus, a population unable to gain satisfaction in parliament because of the unequal rules is likely, as the shia have done with Hezbollah, to seek an external vehicle to advance it's cause.
(1) Hizbullah was founded in 1982 or thereabouts as a national resistance movement to Israeli occupation of southern Lebanon. Its political role is something that developed later.
(2) The first major (modern) political Shi'ah grouping was Musa AlSadr's Movement of the Dispossessed (sometimes Disinherited) which later became the Amal Party - today represented by Nabih Berri. I believe that this was in 1974 or 1975.
(3) The Shi'ah grievance is not only a legitimate demand for one man one vote but also for a fair share of the economic pie. The Lebanese Govt has long ignored the Shi'ah area of the country in terms of government spending, public services, etc.
Third, while Brother Jumblatt has withdrawn from the 14 March alliance, he may caucus with them.
Fourth, there are strong moves to create a government of national unity including 8 March. In a situation like this a chap with 15 seats (out of 128) can have a lot of influence, especially if he suddenly isn't sure to which side he's committed. Or says that at least. Though the author is right that the PSP is tacking with the prevailing winds. And smart folks in small countries know that big powers' love for them lasts as long as they serve a useful purpose. Just as the USA gave Syria a free hand in Lebanon for participation in the 1991 Gulf War, there could be another "prize" for a service today.
First, it's really important that people understand that elections in Lebanon take place under an unusual set of rules. Seats are allocated by confessional group/religion which has no basis in the actual relative numbers of adherents. Districts have been gerrymandered to achieve desired results (for Christians and Sunni Muslims). Much of the politics in the country resembles more closely feudal Europe with families running fiefdoms as Brother Jumblatt does. And often competing blocs agree with their opponents on exchanges. I won't run a serious candidate in this district (thus ensuring your candidate's election), if you'll do the same for me in that district.
Here's a link to a rather detailed explanation of how the system works (or more precisely doesn't) by an Armenian. http://www.armeniandiaspora.com/archive/181556.html
In the last election there were only 6 or so seats that were really competitive.
The last minute defection from 8 March to 14 March by Michel el Murr was decisive. And the breaking of his alliance with Tashnaq resulted in Tashnaq losing at least one seat.
The Maronite Patriarch also intervened on the side of the 14 March alliance.
And then of course there was the small matter of $750mm spent on the election (largely Saudi money) to promote 14 March.