In July of 2002 I was in Damascus, Syria, having been invited by the U.S. Embassy to deliver an address at the University. I was delighted that the auditorium was full, but a touch nervous since I had chosen to speak on the challenges facing the country.
I had learned from Daniel Berrigan, a hero and mentor, to always try to "give an audience what they need to hear, not what they want to hear." And so I focused my remarks on the proposition that Syria needed to open up its political system, allowing its young the chance to freely participate in shaping the future of their country. I added that Syria needed to open up its economy so that the entrepreneurial spirit of its business community could better compete and flourish in the world marketplace. If the government did not create that open space, I cautioned, the country might lose its young, and its economy would continue to stagnate.
As I looked out over the auditorium, I noticed that the students in the back of the room were nodding in approval. Faculty members, seated in the middle rows, were also nodding in agreement, as were the ministers and officials in the front rows. With so much agreement, why didn't change occur? Quite simply, it was because for decades a rigid and stale political apparatus ruled Syria with an iron hand, setting limits to allowable discourse, using fear to govern.
The mass popular upheavals that have rocked Syria for months now make it clear that the fear is gone and the country has reached a turning point. Whether Secretary of State Hilary Clinton was right in her initial comment that the regime "has lost legitimacy" or in the administration's later fall-back position that it is "losing legitimacy," there can be no doubt that change is in the air.
But what kind of change, and at what cost?
From the size and the geographic spread of the demonstrations it is clear that huge numbers of Syrians want the regime to go and many want a more open and free society. That they no longer fear the brute force of the state is self-evident. As the violence continues, the resistance continues to grow and, quite remarkably, has remained largely non-violent.
But what is also evident, is that large numbers of Syrians are afraid of change. The urban secular middle class and many of Syria's minority religious communities are deeply concerned for their future and their safety. Christians, in particular, look next door to Iraq and see its dismembered and dispersed Christian communities and tremble in fear of the unknown. As a result, the regime in Damascus retains some degree of support from these other vulnerable groups in the country.
Because the regime has behaved so poorly over the past several months it has, indeed, lost legitimacy and trust. Over long decades of rule they have been corrupted by power and become ossified, focused solely on maintaining control and thuggish in their application of repressive violence. While, in the past, their repressive policies may have succeeded in silencing critics, that no longer appears to be the case. Now, their repression has only deepened the resolve and expanded the numbers of those who protest.
One prominent Lebanese leftist described the regime's behavior as "committing suicide." On the one hand, the authorities have feinted in the direction of creating a Syrian "perestroika," announcing reforms (a new constitution, promising to free prisoners, ending travel restrictions against opposition figures, calling for a national dialogue, a multi-party system, etc.), while at the same time using lethal force and mass arrests against demonstrators, and positioning snipers and thugs to exact a deadly toll. As a result, there is little trust on the part of the opposition to take the regime up on its offers for dialogue and reform.
For their part, the opposition appears fragmented, without a clear direction or national program, and not yet representative of all segments of Syria's complex society. Even supportive U.S. officials suggest that this opposition, such as it is, "is not ready for prime time."
There is serious concern that this drama is far from over, and may yet get worse. Syria is itself fragile, and it exists in an even more fragile neighborhood -- with deeply divided Lebanon on one side and still volatile Iraq on the other; with Syria playing host to well over one million Palestinian and Iraqi refugees, and home to a large disenfranchised Kurdish community; and with Turkey and Jordan concerned that the violence of a destabilized Syria might spill over their borders. If Syria goes well, the region may benefit from its new order. If it goes badly, there can be grave consequences all around.
I once observed that Tunisia could be likened to the Arab Spring's dress rehearsal, while Egypt was like taking the show to Broadway. Continuing the metaphor, it is Syria, not Yemen or Libya, that becomes the Arab Spring's Hollywood -- the ultimate test of whether this production will play well.
Given what is at stake, Syria, its people, its opposition and its regime need help. The regime must be convinced that its self-destructive behavior has left it no option but to change. The opposition needs support and time to mature in order to become an effective and inclusive agent of change. And Syria's people, including all of its minority and majority religious and ethnic communities, must receive assurance that the Syria of the future will include them all as equal citizens providing them the opportunity to freely participate in building their country together.
The only way forward is through national dialogue leading to a process of transition. Because of its penchant for control and violence, the regime has forfeited the right to lead this transformation. If they stop the violence, they, and the social forces they still represent, can participate. If they do not, the violence and the protests will continue, potentially spiraling downward, leading to chaos.
An expanded regional contact group, which must include Arab participation, can play a critical role in working to convince the regime to abandon its self-destructive behavior, assisting the opposition, and facilitating the national dialogue. First, however, the violence must end, because what is at stake at this point is more than legitimacy. It is the future of the country, its people, and the stability of the entire region.
Dr. James J. Zogby is the author of Arab Voices: What They Are Saying to Us, and Why it Matters (Palgrave Macmillan, October 2010) and the founder and president of the Arab American Institute (AAI), a Washington, D.C.-based organization which serves as the political and policy research arm of the Arab American-community.
Follow James Zogby on Twitter: www.twitter.com/AAIUSA
Evelyn Leopold: Deaths in Syria Too Brutal for UN Council to Stay Silent
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The Israeli swim team has expressed disappointment after an Iranian competitor withdrew from a heat against one of its athletes at the world championships.
Mohammed Alirezaei of Iran did not start a heat that also featured Gal Nevo of Israel in the 100-meter breaststroke Sunday.
"Unfortunately, this is what usually happens – it's crazy," Yitzhak Kramer, the head of the Israeli delegation, told The Associated Press on Monday. "This competition is about sport, not politics, and you need to separate the two. That's what is supposed to be nice about sport."
Gal Nevo told Yedioth Ahronoth on Monday, "The Iranian regularly puts the world championships to shame, and it's time for the international body to handle it properly. We were taught to swim, not to engage in politics.
"I'm unaware of the extent of (Iranian President Mahmoud) Ahmadinejad's involvement in this, but the Iranian delegation is definitely involved. I don't think, like others do, that these are poor swimmers who train all year and are forced to give up the competition because of politics. Did someone put a gun to his head?
So where does that leave us? What is the way out? In my newest piece I suggest that Friday may have been a turning point (not a tipping point, not yet, but a turning point), and Assad has little safe-ground left. I'm still not sure, however, how this gets resolved: http://www.huffingtonpost.com/james-miller/was-friday-a-turning-poin_b_907497.html?just_reloaded=1
And you can see our latest coverage here: http://www.enduringamerica.com/home/category/ea-middle-east-and-turkey
Arminian escaped the turks 1900, different christian minorities escaped Iraq 1900 , Druz escaped lebanon 1860s and so many other small minorities.christian lebanes too.
they were all welcomed by the largest muslem group in syria ,the SUNNIS ( 75%)
so,PLEASE can some one tell the current ruler of syria ( the Alawis & Assad 11%) that they must stop their fear mongering that if they go (the Alawi assd) the other minorities will too.
the druze are located in the mountainous south, and alawites are located in the mountainous west (latakia and tartus) - whereas the ismailis and shias are located in the mountain regions near kurdistan (to the eastern borders).
do you know why they live in the mountains?
Historically it was because they suffered persecution under the sunnis so they sought refuge in the mountains to be safe from attacks - much like kurds do today against iraq, iran and turkey.
and christians came to syria because their ancestors (of 1900s) thought it was marginally better than where they came from (turkey) where there was a genocide being committed by the turks against predominantly christian ethnic groups (armenians and assyrians - majority christians in syria today). Not to mention that christians of neighbouring iraq and their stories are giving an indication of the future of syrian christian's future should the assad regime fall.
so in conclusion - no minorities were NOT welcomed by sunnis they were either forced to move there from places far worse or lived in mountainous regions safe from centuries of persecution.
(they only recently moved to the cities and urban centers in modern times after 1960s when the secular baath regime came to power)
Ludicrous statement.
It is a straw man which is set up for the eventual call for intervention. That is what is feared by the Syrian regime, and so they are moving, as did their neighbors Bahrain, to smash resistance as quickly as possible. Only with Syria she has no partners who are willing to commit military forces in a cooperative effort to suppress the revolution.
Not like Bahrain, where the U.S. maintains the largest naval base in the Middle East. Priorities, priorities, and the lives of the seekers of true democracy are not worthy of counting when the preservation of imperial hegemony is paramount.
Since the apparent loss of Egypt, the fate of Syria becomes front and center. The only counter-weight to complete US/Israeli dominance / hegemony in the area is Tehran, Damascus-Hezbollah. Anything that can be done to weaken Damascus has to weaken the others and their influence. Also, certain parties don't like the growing influence and cooperation between Syria and Turkey.
Which explains why the brutal suppression in Saudi Arabia and Bahrain are considered just fine by the West, but not so much in Syria.
That's not to say that there are not issues regarding the Police Sate, removal of fuel and food subsidies, unemployment, inflation and minority rule. As such there is a popular rural protest movement but can they win over the privileged of other sects?
The house of Saud would welcome anything preserves their power and that reduces the influence of Tehran.. If this pushes Syria into a civil war split along sectarian lines, so be it. The Saudis have in the past funded and used the Muslim Brotherhood as an opposing force to Assad. If the fundamentalists rose to power, it would be fine with the house of Saud, but, it would be frightful for Israel/US, Turkey, Iraq and other neighbours.
It's hard to see a good ending at this point as the opposition is so fragmented.
It's either the Assads or a some sort of medieval Saudi sponsored regime.
This region's stability will be in question for a generation...or more to come.
Those who've acquiesced with the current status quo may want to hold on to the hand rails.
Odd that his name was not mentioned once.