Jane's Bingo! Award for Most Informative Book of 2006

At the end of a busy year, I am indulging myself in a lengthy analytical post about who we Americans are and how we got that way. I request your patience--the inflammatory meat is at the end!

My only criterion for the Bingo! Award is that, once I have read the book, I think about it every subsequent day, saying to myself--oh! I understand that (whatever it is) now, because I read blah blah." By this criterion, the only book on my reading list for 2006 that qualifies is Albion's Seed, by David Hackett Fischer, Oxford University Press, 1989, 946 pages and everyone of them a pleasure to read. And by the way, the cover is beautiful and intriguing, a reproduction of a picture in the Tate Gallery of two sisters holding their two swaddled babies, entitled "The Cholmondeley Sisters".

Albion's Seed was Fischer's first big book--he has since written Washington's Crossing (Pulitzer Prize 2005) and several other books, including The Great Wave, a compelling page-turner about inflation (I'm not kidding). After Washington's Crossing, Fischer did become a bit of a darling of the Right (interviews in NRO and TNR), but he has been careful to identify himself as an Independent who has never voted for a Republican in a general election, "a little left of center" in his personal views. I think the Right likes him because he's easy to read and he doesn't say bad things about white people. And he is easy to read. What he says about white people, especially WASPs, is that they are interesting to analyse and who they are is pertinent to our current national dilemma. Sorry, TNR, but the news is not good. I think Fischer should be a darling of the Left, especially of the Huffington Post. You should read it; judging by his speeches, James Webb has.

Fischer's thesis, in Albion's Seed, is that the four major emigrations from England to the US came from four distinct regions and cultures in England, set sail at four different periods of English history, and settled in four different US regions. These cultures have remained more or less distinct; they have set up the structures of American political and cultural life; and they have often rendered Americans inexplicable and hostile to one another. What is most important, from my point of view, is that one of these cultures has taken over American life, denigrating and threatening all of the others, and that it was almost inevitable that it do so. Hackett wrote the book in the eighties, when the four cultures seemed to be in balance. My view is that now, fifteen years later, if we don't come to understand how these subcultures work in American life, we will be unable to regain the democracy we have often (but not always) had in the past.

Fischer devotes each of four long sections to each of the cultures. They are:

1. Puritans from East Anglia to New England, 1629-1641. Characteristics in both England and America: Calvinist, family-oriented (the ratio of men to women was 3-2, rather than 4-1, as in Virginia), highly motivated, closely related to one another, intently focused on moral principles and precepts, urban, and generally middle-class and highly literate. Women were not equal, but they were relatively independent agents who entered into the marriage contract, could be divorced, could inherit, and often were powers in the community. Children were considered the responsibility of both parents, and they were required to conform. Fathers were expected to be strict but affectionate. Local government, as we all know, relied heavily on the input of all members of the town, and on the town meeting. Political and religious life was hierarchical, but the hierarchy was short and continuing power for any individual depended continuing exercise of good behavior and responsibility (not so elsewhere, as we shall see). New Englanders had a well-thought-out and organized idea of liberty--groups should free to establish their own rules; certain individuals might be granted "liberties" to do otherwise proscribed things; the individual was free to follow his or her religious obligations (at the time Calvinist); and the individual should be free from want (which meant that members of the community were obliged to help their unfortunate neighbors). Above all, New Englanders were expected to cultivate and act upon their consciences and to work.

2. Cavaliers and Indentured Servants from the south of England to Virginia, 1642-1675. Characteristics in both England and America: Anglican, status- and wealth-based, highly hierachical, focused on familial inheritance rather than community, rural, with an emphasis on large estates. Women were legally possessions rather than agents and often referred to as "breeders", but were prized for beauty and fiery independence. Children were absolutely subject to fathers, but frequently indulged, expected to retain their independence of spirit (sounds like contradictory parenting to me, but way American). Pleasure was encouraged rather than disapproved of, and Virginians had lots of pleasures, many of them blood sports. Government was seen as essentially and properly hierarchical, punishments of offenders were violent, and office- and power-holding were class and family based. Virginian ideas of liberty were hierarchical, also--two categories existed, "freedom" and "slavery". Freedom was when you did what you wanted and caused others to do what you wanted them to, and slavery was when you had to do what someone else wanted. Liberty was specifically reserved for "free-born Englishmen" and their descendants in Virginia (makes you mad, doesn't it?)

3. Quakers from the North Midlands to Pennsylvania and New Jersey, 1675-1725. Characteristics in both England and America: Quakers and Quaker sympathizers were both anti- hierarchical and anti-doctrinal. They believed in a God of love, not punishment, and did away with rituals, sacraments, and professional ministers. Communities of Quakers were ethnically diverse and had strong ties to communities with similar beliefs in Europe; they were welcoming to the large number of German immigrants who came after them, but not welcoming to the next set of English imigrants, the North Borderers (see below). Quakers tended to be working-class, and many of their journeys to America were subsidized by Quaker groups back home. They came from a section of England that was not yet urbanized--still sparsely settled and often frightening to outsiders, home to a culture that in the 17th century still owed a lot to the Norse conquest of the end of the first millennium. People tended to be independent, egalitarian, rural, plain-spoken, and receptive to unorthodox religious ideas. In America, Quaker families were love-oriented rather than rule- or status-oriented, and more child-nurturing than other English cultures; husbands and wives were more or less equal, based on the idea that "in souls there is no sex" (p. 490). One notable aspect of government was that Pennsylvanians slashed the number of death-penalty offenses from 200, as in England, to 2--treason and intentional murder. In prisons, they focused on rehab rather than punishments. Such liberals! You've got a friend in Pensylvania, indeed. And the Quaker idea of liberty of conscience was based, not on rules, but on thought and choice, recognizing that different people could make different choices, and that those choices could still be conscientious. Certainly, this idea grew out of the Quakers' understanding of the facts of life--other religions and ideas were everywhere around them, and, as they had never been dominant, it was likely, if not certain, that they never would be.

4. Scots-Irish "New Light" Protestants from the Border Counties and Ulster to the Appalachian Backcountry, 1717-1775. Characteristics in both Britain and America: Mean as a snake and twice as quick...oh, excuse me. I am losing my judicious tone. Let me begin again. Scots-Irish immigrants from the northern parts of Britain and from Ulster were generally fleeing what was an increasingly archaic, warrior-based society. Most were tenant farmers or the tenants of tenants. As Irishmen and Scots, they had built up years of economic resentment and Celtic pride with regard to their English neighbors and landlords. The social arrangements of the Borders grew out of the constant warfare (1040-1745) between Scotland and England over who owned the borderlands (remember that the Act of Union that made Scotland part of England was only enacted in 1707). Men on both sides of the border were expected to be alert and aggressive, ready to fight at a moment's notice. When the kings of England and Scotland weren't fighting, local warlords were. Tenancy was based on the ability to fight, and the economy was primitive compared to other parts of England. Keywords: poverty and violence. The legal system relied on vengeance and the economic system relied on protection money. Through the 17th century, the Borders were "pacified", which as we all know is actually a process of singling out the most independent warlords and putting them to death as an example to the others (gallows were placed on hilltops, so that the hanging bodies could be see from far and wide). Absentee English landlords also got rid of tenants by means of exorbitant rent increases (rack-renting), land enclosure, construction of new roads, and imposition of new laws. Throughout the 18th century, the Borderers came to America, more or less, as refugees from forced modernization (where have we seen that before?) Their religious beliefs were diverse on the surface, but shared an underlying intensity and tribal character--they were believers, simultaneously, in grace and sectarian conflict. As Fischer writes, "The North Britons brought with them the ancient border habit of belligerence toward other ethnic groups." [p. 632] The Quakers would not allow them to settle nearby, and they moved west in Pennsylvania, then south through the Appalachians. Clannish, suspicious, well-armed, and believers in "bride abduction" (!) as a good method of courtship. In marriage, men dominant, women absolutely subservient, and wife beating considered normal. Rage a typical (if not desired) feature of child-raising; beatings common. Religion--"emotional, evangelical, and personal", deeply informed by superstition as a method of folk wisdom for avoiding ever-present injury and death. You can see what I'm getting at.

One of Fischer's best points is that each of the British emigrations occurred at a different stage of British as well as American history, and grew out of different dissatisfactions with life in the British Isles. By the end of the 18th century, Britain had more or less assimilated the remnants of the groups who had moved out and was evolving toward national consolidation. America, which was much larger, allowed these groups to continue to isolate themselves and cultivate their idiosyncratic qualities. When people or groups didn't get along, they moved apart instead of working out their differences. But Fischer's depiction of each culture is far more detailed and nuanced and entertaining than I have indicated. Each culture shaped the US that we have today in part through migration patterns. Each culture has also changed. But each culture is to a greater or lesser degree not understandable to the other cultures.

Fischer does not slight the contributions of subsequent immigrant groups (in fact, he is currently working on a book about African culture in America), but he believes that we have not thrown off the structures of cultural and political life given us by the British Isles.

One especially fascinating section of Fischer's book is his analysis of four World War II commanders, Patton, Eisenhower, Marshall, and Roosevelt. Patton was a warrior, descendant of Borderers, who literally preceded his troops into furious battle. Eisenhower, descendant of Quakers and German Pietists, preferred to stay in the rear, coordinating and planning. George Marshall, descended from Virginia aristocracy, devised, with what Fischer considers to be characteristic honor and generosity, the Marshall Plan. Roosevelt was the Yankee--he "contributed ...high moral purpose, clarity of vision, tenacity of purpose, flexibility of method and an implacable will to win." [p, 879]. But so what? Well, so this--when the war is a war that all or almost all Americans agree is necessary, that all Americans are asked to contribute to and sacrifice for, the warrior and culture styles of each group will make differing but essential contributions to the effort.

Now for my take on Fischer's material. When Fisher was writing Albion's Seed in the 1980s, it still seemed that the four cultures were more or less in balance. What we have seen since, though, is the ascendancy of culture #4, the Borders/Appalachian culture of hot-blooded and violent populism that is xenophobic, religiously aggressive, fundamentalist, and sectarian, that is supicious of learning, antagonistic towards "elites", and antipathetic to women's autonomy. It defines itself by masculinity and arms-bearing, is belligerent by nature and quick to take offense. Its natural (and historic) enemy is the outgrowth of Quaker culture, liberalism.

After reading Albion's Seed, my take on American history is that each culture has another that is its natural opponent. For the New Englanders, it was the Virginians, and the Civil War constituted the pitting of those two antagonists, with the Virginians being defeated and in many ways routed by the New Englanders--perhaps the Civil War in the US is more akin to the earlier Civil War in England that we usually realize. The Appalachian/Borderers culture, the natural ally of the Virginians, emerged from the Civil War in some sense intact and unscathed, because a) the Confederacy conceived of itself in terms of the slaveholding Virgina culture and b) the Appalachian southerners who fought for the South were in a position to move west after the war, and they did, leaving behind the ruins of a South that they had only been a tangential part of to begin with. It might also be noted that for the Borderers, the American Civil War possibly amounted to just more of the same after seven hundred years of border wars in Britain. The borderers/ Appalachian culture never had the opportunity to fight their natural enemies, really, until now, because they have never been ascendant until now. Their enemies are us, culture #3, the descendants of the Philadephians. They do not understand us and we do not understand them. What we see around us is the inevitable culture war.

It is important to remember that these cultures are no longer inheritance-based or even regionally-based. They have become affinity groups, and Americans define themselves, increasingly, by their allegiances. They also use their cultural allegiances to define "America" and the right and proper form that patriotism must take. For New Englanders, let's say, patriotism is about the history of the Constitution, the slow progress of law and reason as differences that define the US in contrast to other nations with a more haphazard history. For Virginians, patriotism was about having the right to construct one's own way of life without outside interference. For the Quakers and their descendants, patriotism is about toleration, welcome, diversity, rewards rather than punishments. For Borderers and their descendants, patriotism is about passionate loyalty to the group, alert self-defense, and domination in every sphere. To me, this shows, at least in part, why George W. Bush has retained his loyal following for so long, and why his White House staff don't ever seem to cross him or make him angry. As participants in this newly ascendant culture, their loyalty is always to their group rather than to abstract principles or ideas, even ideas that other groups take very seriously, such as the Constitution.

It's also important to note that two of these groups, #2 and #4, are honor-based, and two, #1 and #3, are self-respect based. In violent, status-conscious cultures, insults have to be dealt with because they threaten a loss of status that might be dangerous. In more egalitarian cultures, insults are less dangerous, and one's own conscience is a stronger guide to behavior. Cultures 1 and 3 are less likely to respond aggressively to an insult, because the insult is seen as revealing more about the issuer of the insult than about the recipient of the insult. Cultures 2 and 4 view this equanimity in the face of insult as a weakness and failure of masculinity, and so they perennially underestimate the strength of liberals and their convictions. At the same time, members of cultures 1 and 3 cannot understand why members of cultures 2 and 4 are so hasty to act, and often not in their long term best interest.

If Al Gore had been elected, would we have gone to war in Iraq? Al Gore and George W. Bush, according to Fischer, present an interesting contrast. The Bush family is a Yankee family and the Gore family is Appalachian. But Gore grew up in Washington and went to Harvard, where he enthusiastically took up and was changed by a New England sort of education. Bush grew up in Texas, did not care for a New England sort of education, and had a typical Borderers alcohol addiction/religious conversion. He reacted to 9-11 belligerently. Gore did not, and, by his own testimony, would not have triggered the war machine as Bush has done. Who they seem to be as men reflects their affinities and allegiances rather than their inheritances. Obviously, the Neocons and the military/industrial complex bear much of the blame for the fix we are in in Iraq, but at this point we have to understand that George Bush and the Republican Party originated and persist in this war for their own cultural and psychological reasons.

I could go on. I do think that there are several reasons why culture #4 has risen to prominence. One is that, facing a loss of power in the seventies, the Republican Party (once the party of culture #1, but bumped out of there by Roosevelt) cynically opted to appeal to the worst aspects of culture #4, especially racist anger, in order to use the electoral college to gain office. A second contributing reason, I think, is the rise of pop culture. Culture #4 is the most musical of all the cultures. The rise of rock and roll, bluegrass, and country music has familiarized the whole country with the norms of culture #4, and made them appealing, too. Certainly, a third important reason is that culture #4 is inherently aggressive and resentful. If we accept Fischer's history, then it has taken the Borderers a thousand years to enter the ruling class--or become the ruling class. What better use of their new power than to attempt to disenfranchise the other cultures? And, fifth, guess what, they've been busy reproducing. Evangelical pastors never hesitate to tell their congregations to go forth and multiply. And sixth, as we all know, a culture that was once turned inward has been galvanized in the last generation by social changes that it has found dangerous or intolerable--Civil Rights, the Women's Movement, the acceleration of social and technological change, and increasing secularization of public life. If culture #4 is our conservative warrior culture, it is going to behave like other conservative warrior cultures around the world; these similarities have been noted elsewhere.

For liberals, perhaps this analysis helps to explain why American economic populists are often split and therefore unable to assert themselves against the depredations of the wealthy. Populism based on an idea of "liberty from want" (a New England idea, and a Roosevelt idea), according to which the community has an obligation to help its unfortunate members, is quite different from populism based on self-assertion by self-consciously resentful non-"elite" parts of society. One is a populism based on a sense of social obligation, the other a populism based on injured pride. I would also suggest that arms-bearing economic populists like James Webb and John Tester, who were elected in November, are not especially trustworthy friends for liberals, because they are temperamentally, traditionally, and psychologically very different from us. Just because they want the corporations to disgorge some of their plunder doesn't mean that they understand us or, more importantly, respect us. Our natural allies are descendants of the Puritans, members of culture #1, who may seem to us hard to get to know, not especially welcoming, too legalistic and insular. That's how they have always seemed to other Americans. One thing Fischer points out about Puritan society is that New England congregations made membership difficult to achieve and surrounded it with rules and responsibilities, but even so, most Puritans and their families strove to become members and succeeded, achieving a tremendously high level of social cohesion that looked from the inside like community and from the outside like an intimidating and exclusive club.

As Pennsylvanians, New Englanders, and Virginians, not to mention Native Americans, African-Americans, Asian-Americans, Hispanic Americans, Jews, Germans, Scandinavians, Dutch descendants, former Canadians, etc., Americans do not mind sharing our society with the Borderers, but we don't want to cede it to them, either. Christian Reconstructionism, let's say, does not meet the criteria for valid patriotism. Neither does relentlessly impugning the patriotism of every other group, as the warrior party has done for the last six years. Neither, many Americans would agree, do pre-emptive attacks upon sovereign nations and torture of the helpless and hapless. Even the idea of a pre-emptive attack seems more like a warlord idea than a nation idea. Waging war with indifference to the casualties on both sides may be characteristic of a war-ready culture, but it is not generally American, and the rest of America's cultures have been very hard for the war-party to convince on this score.

I do think that the rise of culture #4 puts our democracy in danger, simply because it is an uncompromising culture that has been reluctant to assimilate itself into the larger society for a thousand years, both in Britain and in America. It is a culture that is passionately intense about weapons, social hierarchy, and religion, three things that are in and of themselves threatening to the broader social compact. Perhaps culture #4 cannot be, or won't be assimilated, but can only be reduced, subdued, or dominated. Personally, I have no idea. David Hackett Fischer isn't saying. When he gets interviewed, he always seems in a good mood.

At any rate, fyi, this article is only 175th as long as the book, Albion's Seed. So you should probably get started on it ASAP.