Reviving the Iran-North Korea Axis

06/08/2015 04:41 pm ET | Updated Jun 08, 2016
Atta Kenare/AFP/Getty Images

When George W. Bush put Iraq, Iran, and North Korea into his infamous "axis of evil" speech in 2002, the three countries seemed to have little to do with one another -- except that Washington didn't like them (and they didn't like Washington). Iran and Iraq were enemies, not allies, and the inclusion of North Korea was meant largely to underscore that the "global war on terror" was not a war on Islam.

With the Obama administration and the P5+1 racing to conclude a final nuclear agreement with Iran this summer, critics of the deal are also hurrying -- to demonstrate that Iran remains a committed anchor in a revived "axis of evil." In Iraq, crumbling under the weight of assaults from the Islamic State, Iran has expanded its influence in an effort to contain the spread of Sunni radicalism. For some commentators, Iran's efforts in Iraq are part of a serious bid for regional hegemony. But the sad truth is that Washington needs Iran's help to keep Iraq from becoming a failed state, so this part of a revived "axis of evil" has diminished traction.

Iran's relationship with North Korea is a different problem altogether. Thousands of miles separate the two countries. There is no religious or ideological overlap. One country is negotiating in earnest with Washington while the other is maintaining an officially hostile attitude toward the United States. And yet the two countries have certain common interests. They both have nuclear programs, are subject to international sanctions, and have struggled with pariah status. Much of their cooperation is shrouded in mystery.

Because of this mystery, the Iran-North Korea relationship is ripe for exploitation, particularly by those who are eager to find a hammer to destroy the impending nuclear agreement with Iran. But if this is the only implement that critics can find to inflict damage, they're scraping the bottom of their toolbox of destruction.

Allegations of Nuclear Cooperation

Iran and North Korea cooperate. On this point, there is no debate. They engage in bilateral trade, though Iran doesn't make it onto the official list of North Korea's top 10 trade partners. They signed a technical cooperation agreement in September 2012. Foreign ministry officials from both countries have made reciprocal visits. They occasionally make statements about their shared distrust of the United States.

As part of their bilateral trade, North Korea has supplied Iran with missile components, including two shipments since fall 2014, according to anonymous sources in the U.S. government. One common but unconfirmed estimate of the value of North Korea's missile sales is $2 billion a year, which would vault Iran into second place behind China as a trading partner. Also unconfirmed is the assertion that Iran has provided North Korea with centrifuges that have been a central part of Pyongyang's effort to acquire a second path to a nuclear weapon through highly enriched uranium.

Technical cooperation -- and here we are moving further into more speculative territory -- has included Iranian presence at North Korea's nuclear tests, and North Korean experts providing unspecified assistance inside Iran. The latest claim, trumpeted by anti-engagement activists like Alireza Jafarzadeh, is quite detailed:

A seven-member North Korean delegation, comprised of experts in nuclear warhead design and various parts of ballistic missiles including guidance systems, spent the last week of April in Iran. This was the third such nuclear and missile team to visit Iran in 2015. The next delegation is scheduled to secretly arrive in Iran in June and will be comprised of nine experts.

Moving further into the terrain of speculation, journalist Don Kirk writes in Forbes:

North Korea is able to assist Iran in miniaturizing warheads to fit on missiles -- a goal the North has long been pursuing -- and also can supply uranium and other metals mined in its remote mountain regions.

"North Korea continues to supply technology, components, and even raw materials for Iran's HEU weaponization program," says Bruce Bechtol, author of numerous books and studies on North Korea's military and political ambitions. Moreover, he says, "They are even helping Iran to pursue a second track by helping them to build a plutonium reactor."

Based on this history of cooperation, critics of the nuclear negotiations with Iran have suggested that North Korea will offer a way for Iran to sneak out of its commitments. Israeli Intelligence Minister Yuval Steinitz argued back in November 2014:

[I]f Iran under an agreement can have some kind of research and development, knowledge exchange and participation in other countries like North Korea, then this is also the way to bypass an agreement by simply not doing it alone in Iran, but by cooperating with North Korea or other rogue countries.

Finally, at the furthest edge of plausibility, Tzvi Kahn argues in a recent Foreign Policy Initiative bulletin that Iran and North Korea have a "broader goal of undermining U.S. global leadership." Here is the most unvarnished update of the Bush-era axis of evil, which goes beyond mere cooperation on nuclear issues to a concerted effort to oppose the United States at every turn.

Unraveling the Axis

Added together, these claims appear quite convincing. Not only is North Korea cooperating actively with Iran with conventional military hardware, but it is also helping the country acquire a nuclear capability right under the noses of the International Atomic Energy Agency, and in violation of several sanctions regimes.

But this apparent open-and-shut case for a return of the axis of evil minus Iraq is full of holes. Let's take another look at the evidence.

North Korea and Iran may indeed conduct a brisk trade in ballistic missiles, though the figure of $2 billion seems particularly squishy. More careful analysts estimate that North Korea makes $1 billion to $2 billion from all its missile sales. The U.S. government estimated that between 1990 and 2000 North Korea made $1 billion for all its Scud sales, and that included barter as well as hard currency.

The figures are not only inflated but also outdated. "Iran has likely exceeded North Korea's ability to develop, test, and build ballistic missiles," observed the Congressional Research Service in a 2014 report. Even though Iran still may receive occasional inputs for its short-range missiles, "Director of National Intelligence (DNI) James Clapper stated during a February 11, 2014, Senate Armed Services Committee hearing that Iran is not currently receiving assistance with its ICBM program."

CRS is being rather polite. Relying on North Korea's ballistic missile capability, particularly its long-range rockets, would be like importing your sushi from a landlocked country. Most of Pyongyang's long-range missile tests have been duds (failed tests in 2006, 2009, and 2012; one possible success in 2012). If Washington wanted to ensure that Iran is saddled with an ineffective missile program, it should probably encourage missile cooperation with North Korea.

Perhaps most importantly, however, although such trade violates various sanction regimes and regional compacts, it does not constitute nuclear cooperation. The United States might not be happy that Iran imports or exports missiles to North Korea. But this issue is not currently on the table in the negotiations any more than Iran's human rights situation, its military presence in the Middle East, or the nature of the government in Tehran.

The Nuclear Non-Link

CRS concludes that, despite speculation that Iran and North Korea have collaborated in various ways on their nuclear programs...

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