The ongoing release of formerly secret U.S. government documents by WikiLeaks has hit home with me on multiple fronts: as a former military intelligence operative, a former investigative reporter and -- for the past 28 years -- as a crisis management PR professional.
In early 1973, while deployed as a young (22-year-old) military policeman in Stuttgart, Germany, a strange series of events led to my being co-opted to work undercover against a front group for the infamous Baader Meinhof Gang. That gang was believed to have been behind bombings at military bases and its front group was actively engaged in recruiting disaffected GI's to commit acts of treason against the military. They thought I was such a disaffected GI and, working with my handlers from the 66th Military Intelligence Group, I was quite successful in my mission -- until my cover was blown. It was blown by a military signals officer who, knowing only that there was a code-named American (me) regularly going from Stuttgart to the seemingly innocuous front group's offices in Heidelberg, thought that "oh, gosh, we're spying on a legitimate civilian organization and on GI's who just want to talk to them, that's wrong" and leaked the information to the front group. Since I was the only guy coming from Stuttgart, they knew who it was, and if my fast-acting handlers from the 66th MI hadn't intercepted me at the train station, I would have been heading into a trap. Even so, there were threats on my life. My wife and infant son were evacuated from Germany ahead of me, and I remained in an armed environment until my departure for formal military intelligence training.
Thereafter, while working for the US Army Intelligence Agency, I became aware of dozens of Iranian military officers killed after the overthrow of the Shah because they had agreed to be sources for the Agency -- and that information was leaked because the security officer at the US Embassy in Tehran hadn't destroyed secret documents when the Embassy was overthrown.
I also remember our frustration in MI when information we saw labeled as SECRET appeared on the front pages of the Washington Post so, transitioning to civilian life in 1977, one of the first articles I worked on for my boss, investigative reporter/columnist Jack Anderson, was about the systemic failure of my former employer to account for hundreds of secret documents in audit after audit. My goal in doing so was to urge a much higher level of security and accountability in military intelligence; apparently, more than 30 years later, that level still hasn't been achieved.
As a crisis management professional, I have helped many clients deal with information leaks by well-meaning whistleblowers, by vengeful ex-employees, and even by Internet extortionists. With the exception of whistleblowers that, at one time, had legitimate access to confidential information, the leaks occurred because of inadequate security. The amount of damage incurred depended both on the nature of the information and on the organization's ability to rapidly engage in damage control.
At this juncture, I remain disgusted by the irresponsibility of WikiLeaks founder Julian Assange, because I have little doubt that innocent people have died and more are yet to die as a result of his actions, simply because they were being helpful to the United States. Others will have their careers and/or lives ruined in different ways. Do I think that our government should engage in a higher level of transparency? Absolutely. But not ever at the expense of lives.
At the same time, I am also dismayed that it was possible for so many documents to be compromised. I am guessing that those responsible for internal security at the affected agencies will lose their jobs -- but their replacements will do no better if they don't get support, at the highest level, for security changes that will, no doubt, be expensive.
Finally, I am not surprised, but saddened, that so many organizations worldwide continue to underestimate their vulnerability to information leaks that can have massive negative impact on their reputation, bottom line and ability to carry out their mission. Leaks that typically occur for one of more of these reasons:
Déjà vu, for me. But if governmental and private organizations react appropriately, there doesn't have to be déjà vu all over again.
Follow Jonathan Bernstein on Twitter: www.twitter.com/bernsteincrisis
Michael Brenner: WikiLeaks: The Three Faces of Uncle Sam
Matt Wilstein: Top 5 Funniest: WikiLeaks, Spiderman, Kevin Bacon and More
Nathan Gardels: WikiLeaks and the Perils of Extreme Glasnost: A Talk with Evgeny Morozov
This deja vu may be disconcerting and it may cause you dismay, but it makes those of us who dream of a real democracy that is open and honest with it's citizens very happy.
No one is more in favor of a "real democracy" than I am, as someone who has NEVER been a member of a political party and never voted along party lines. My crisis management clients know that I am a strong proponent of transparency as well, in both business and governmental circles.
I believe, however, that transparency and real democracy do not require doing what Julian Assange did, which is the moral equivalent of shouting "FIRE!" in a crowded theater just to see what happens. He is an anarchist, and anarchists don't care who they kill for the sake of sheer anarchy. THAT is what I'm opposed to.
Yes, it is not good to lose operatives. It is not good to lose troops. But who, and for what, are they sent out there in the first place? That is what we are not given. We, who supply the money and the bodies, are owed full information. You should see the paperwork for informed consent in simple academic studies of groups. And yet our government is allowed to read all our emails, hear all our phone conversations, spy on our lives, public and private, and we have no moral or other right to know what this same entity does at our expense????? Such as "collateral" murders of unfortunate families at checkpoints (so they count for less than operatives??)
I will take newspapers without government, thank you Thomas Jefferson. These operatives do NOT know better, just because they are on a "mission." In order to have a democracy, we pawns need information. Lots of it.
careers destroyed ?. Never cause politicians unlike other countries where they resign,
most politicians in US will defend their position and flat out deny any spying on UN General S.
even if it says in the cable gate,
I hope Jonathan at least respond to any of the legitimate criticisms raised by the readers.
The problem with the "show me how it hurt" argument is that the act of showing is also a release of information. To show that proof requires revealing other things that you know. In the example Bernstein gives it would have meant possibly revealing how they found out his cover had been blown.
In order to perform certain tasks (which are unfortunately necessary) the government must keep certain things secret. It is their job to determine exactly what needs to be secret.
Certainly, sometimes things are kept secret that should not be. At that point, the information may get leaked. However, the governing principle is not simply "did somebody get hurt?". That somebody could get hurt should be A GIVEN. The governing principle should be "was the release of this information really necessary?".
Around 250,000 cables were leaked and MILLIONS of people had access to the information.
That is the security problem, not the messenger that these tools try to blame. How on earth can you have MILLIONS of people have access to "classified" material, it doesn't make any sense! That is a breach of security, not the messenger who was given the info!
I can't believe how many people argue the point that assange is to blame when it's our security, or lack there of, that is solely to blame.
Hopefully all the crooks and so called statesman of ours will be forced to change to a NON INTERNATIONALIST foreign policy so the AMERICAN people can prosper again.
In government, just like in any major company, there are different classes of information. Some is public. Some is confidential. Some is strictly confidential. It depends on the sensitivity of the information. A company may inform employees about sales figures. That type of information is usually company confidential. However, information on company R&D projects is known by fewer people and kept more tightly protected. Some strategic company information is highly secret and known by only a few executives. However, ANY leak of any information can be grounds for termination within a company. The same goes for govenment, except leaking of information is not a criminaI matter.
Assange is not the leaker. He is the tool for the leaker. He is just a misguided person who has no clue of what he is doing.
They were our ally.
I also find it troubling that you don't name this group that you spied on. It seems that if they did actually turn out to be terrorists you would have surely named them. But instead you only a group you claim them to be associated with.
The cables released by Wikileaks expose lies and corruption within the US government.
http://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2010/12/the-shameful-attacks-on-julian-assange/67440/
Let me get this right. This is an inference that my personal communications should be the property of the government in which I hold citizenship or the corporation for which I work, and it should be monitored without my knowledge or consent, is it not?
You, my dear sir, like so many others in this nation, are apparently willing to abandon any swiftly disappearing remnants of Constitutional law for some empty guarantee of sovereign security. Or worse still you are intentionally trying to subvert it in order to fulfill a personal agenda, one which for you, I assume, would be the contracting of more "Crisis Management" clients.
This author makes some good points about the perils of secret information going public, and security issues, but he fails to address the main thrust behind the supporters of Julian Assange: Julian showed the rest of us little people what's really going on, what these diplomat and national attitudes really are behind the deceptive veil of media messaging. We can now see first-hand the discrepancies between official statements, which are intended to mislead and control the message, and the realities that exist behind closed doors.
Yes, the author does wax romantic about a world where people can handle the truth and transparency can be realized, but that is of minimal interest to him. He seems to think that as long as sunshine being blown up the rectums of citizens saves the lives of secret operatives on secret missions, then its okay. I disagree, and feel that secrets necessitate deception. If these deceptions mean that American citizens should live in the dark and go about their national duty of producing wealth and paying their taxes so more wars for other nation's resources can be exploited, then it's wrong.
1) Yes, one should be aware of his surroundings, BUT this also highlights a contemporary disbalance: You cannot at the same time ask for more secrecy while reducing personal privacy. You cannot allow everyone for any far fetched reason to intrude our information sphere (bank transfers, computer, flight security) and in the same breath ask to not share informations. Why should one feel responsible for information if everything is available to someone?
2) Is not a matter of budget, but of trust: An embassy should simply not be in a position to mail en detail about the source (in a regular message). You need first and foremost to trust ppl.
4) Yes, in part I agree to limit access (Need to know basis). But other things in the modern world are as much important: Learn. It doesn't matter if you are president, general, major, captain, minister, secretary, etc. ... learn to personally use PGP/ RSA encryption. If you are not capable of doing so, you are unfit for office. It's idiotic to rely on twenty- somethings to manage all the clear data transfer.
Not to speak about regulations like only the originator can change the classification of a message. So, if someone sends you (even accidently) a message labeled "secret" you cannot decide: well, that's "restricted" but nothing else.
If you look at the cable leaks so far, that's my impression, there is a whole lot which I have read long ago in newspapers ... but it was tagged "confidential" or "secret". Really, technically speaking, when I went to my missions abroad, I was not allowed to tell my girlfriend where I went, when I would leave, when I would be back, because all the document were "restricted".
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This guy brings up a GREAT point. With some people, it's like when the cellphone switches on, and they're in a conversation, the part of their brains that normally registers that they're in public among other people or in some other equally inappropriate setting for a concentrated, in-depth business conversation, such as behind the wheel of a motor vehicle, switches off.
I was working at a job as a cashier, when this lady comes strolling in, hip-deep in some kind of business call. And, she started naming names, and it was some kind of legal thing, I think, so there goes the confidentiality, and and and. And, maybe some people just shouldn't have a cellphone, period.
All of this stuff with Wikileaks probably would not have happened, were it not for the omnipresence of electronics in our lives today. The walls have eyes AND ears, thanks to smartphones. And, thanks to the carelessness of their operators, and the people that own computers or use them at their jobs, it's a data thief's/eavesdropper's dream. Secrets? There's secrets in the 21st century? Riiiight. Not if your computer is hooked to the internet, there aren't.
A lot of people shouldn't have cellphones. There should be a psychological evaluation plus a "proof of need" questionaire as parts of the cell phone application.
It is an unhealthy, even fascistic trend, although US Law supports it nonetheless.
Just characteristic of a Democracy shifting to "permanent Empire" mode.
I say...
Remove the clothes from the Kings, Queens and Emperors before it is too late!!!!
Unauthorized release of classified information is a crime. It should always be a crime. However, that does not mean it is always wrong. Clearly not all information helf by a government should be public. There is no inalienable right for the public to be privy to all information. As the author above demonstrates, even the well intentioned release of certain information can cause a whole host of problems.
A government is responsible for determinine what information is to be kept secret and also for maintaining that secrecy and enforcing laws related to that secrecy. However, those decisions can also sometimes work against the public good. In those cases, quite often, someone from the inside takes the chnace and leaks the relevant information. Make no mistake, that person is breaking the law. They are, however, working from moral conviction to take that risk. They are heroes in that they risk themselves for a principle.
Then, as demonstrated by the author above, there are those cases when someone leaks information for the wrong reason. It can be for money, political advantage, ego, or for a misguided idea of what is right.
Whether someone is a hero, traitor, misguided, or an opportunist is left to public perception and the judgement of history. However, in ALL cases, the government has the duty to protect its interests, even if that means putting the hero in jail (it is a risk that the hero takes, just as a hero who risks their life in battle).
Whether someone has the "right" to publish such information is a side argument. Not all things that are true should be shared. A news organization has a duty to the truth, but they also have an moraI responsibility. If the New York Times or other outles has secret information, then they are responsible for determining what the public interest is in that information and also what risks there might be in sharing that information.
Each instance is different and requires careful consideration. Wikileaks seems to take the stance of releasing all information regardless or need or repercussions. That is not a responsible position.
But even about this person, some principle things should be considered: Remember the earlier leak about the helicopter incident? IMO, the right of privacy/ secrecy is certainly limited/ of lesser importance than the need of proper criminal investigation in what might be a capital crime. So, someone who leaks the information (to proper authorities preferably) to allow prosecution should himself not being prosecuted for the leak. At least in Germany, my oath of allegiance as an armed forces officer was not to the echelon or the Chancellor but to the people and the constitution. Or put it the other way around: I must not follow an order or a law if following means to commit or sanction a crime.
I write that to underline the arguement: It is legally wrong to penalize someone for a purposed offense he commits IOT to uphold more important laws.
If it was the data of the Chinese diplomacy ... would the US (re)act in the same way? Would you go to the same lengths to prevent it from spreading? The fundamental question is this (and that is what we usually reflect in western legal systems): Is it in principle wrong to do something ... or do I only feel it's wrong because it's happening to me? Would you extradite Assange to China?