The iconic pirate sword has been swapped for AK-47s and rocket propelled grenades. The recent hijacking of an American flagged ship with an American crew off the coast of Somalia reminded the world that piracy alive and flourishing. The Easter weekend tactical success of a four man SEAL element, who eliminated the pirates and successfully rescued the captain of the ship, was a real life Hollywood ending; the last scene where the captain safely drinks a beer (Budweiser in my mind) aboard the US Navy ship would be too clichéd to write in a script, had it not actually gone down that way. As a former Navy SEAL, I am proud and impressed at the ability of my colleagues to achieve what we call tactical resolution. It was a tough scenario and in the end our premier maritime Special Operations Force prevailed. However, it would be a mistake for the Obama administration to think it has found a model for defeating the piracy problem plaguing the Horn of Africa.
In the last few months the pirates have taken control of dozens of ships including a Saudi chemical ship and a Ukrainian vessel loaded with tanks and armament. The subsequent demand and payment of millions of dollars of ransom changed the image of piracy in the publics eye; the image of a Disney swashbuckler was replaced with pictures of high-speed boats and armed sea-faring gangs. This new image and the recent tactical success have duped much of the international community into believing that combating piracy is a naval force issue. So far, President Obama has continued the Bush administration approach of sending a 3000-man warship to fight a four-man dinghy. This treatment fundamentally neglects the real pathology behind piracy on the high seas.
Somalia is a country in name only. It is the absence of the rule of law in Somalia that has allowed piracy to rise to the current level of international crisis. The US has a long complex history with Somalia. Since 1991 and the ill-fated US intervention in it's humanitarian crisis, Somalia has been in a protracted state of conflict and civil war. The lone exception to almost two decades of violence in Somalia was a brief period in 2006 when a group known as the Council of Islamic Courts took over much of southern Somalia and established a brief period of law and security. The price of peace in Somalia was high as the Islamists raised red flags in much of the rest of the world because of their fundamentalism and sympathetic leanings towards Al-Qaeda.
In 2006 I traveled to Somalia. I tentatively explored the city with 15-armed guards and talked to fisherman who claimed they turned to piracy because of overfishing. I shopped for AK-47s at a large outdoor gun bazaar where you could buy a Kalashnikov easier than you could buy lettuce. I also spoke with the controversial leadership of the Council of Islamic Courts. What I observed was a complicated trade-off between a governing group with echoes of the Taliban in Afghanistan and the improved sense of order it had brought to a lawless society.
The tenure of the Islamic courts was short lived. Ethiopian forces, backed and encouraged by US policy and military, invaded Somalia and toppled the Islamists in Mogadishu. The US backed Ethiopian forces quickly removed the Islamists. It soon became apparent (in an all too familiar way) that there was a plan for war but no plan for peace. Somalia quickly returned to chaos and became once again what in military parlance is called an ungoverned space, fertile for modern day piracy.
Prosecution of the war on terror dominated the US foreign policy focus in Somalia under the Bush administration, essentially waging a shadow war in the region in order to combat the reported existence of Al-Qaeda. What the Bush administration didn't do, and what the Obama administration has yet to do, is make any significant strides to create a successful system of governance in a country in desperate need of order. In short, we fired the only sheriff in town and now the inmates run the asylum.
There are painful results of the collapse in Somalia. It triggered a massive refugee crisis (almost 700,000 refugees fled Mogadishu last year, see my report The Beach of Death). Many NGOs are calling this the worst humanitarian crisis in the world. The collapse also created a safe haven for both Al-Qaeda operatives and the pirates that are sending shockwaves through the shipping world. The pirates are, of course, criminals, run by clan based militias and ransoming off hijacked cargoes for millions of dollars. However, it is the failure to create state solutions in Somalia that has allowed these pirates to operate with impunity on the high seas.
There are almost two and a half million acres of water in the Gulf of Aden, and tens of thousands of merchant vessels transit the straights annually. The tyranny of this geography makes it virtually impossible to effectively patrol the waterways in order to prevent piracy. Despite the ad-hoc coalition of multiple Navies in the area of operations (including the US 5th fleet out of Bahrain), pirates are free to roam an ungovernable space because they operate from an ungoverned space. Every time a pirate takes a ship in the Gulf of Aden, it is a less a reminder of the anarchy of the sea then a reminder of our failed policy in the east African state. The Obama administration has inherited an issue that that has plagued US foreign policy since the failed mission in the country in 1991. Unless President Obama can chart a new course in Somalia, and help create sustainable long-term solutions of governance in the Horn of Africa, pirates, terrorists, and a host of non-state actors will continue to force the rest of the world to walk a policy plank in the region.
Kaj Larsen's work on Modern Day Pirates and his report from Mogadishu can be seen on Current TV and Current.com.
Kaj Larsen is an award-winning journalist for Current TV. He is a former US Navy SEAL, and an executive board member of the Center for Citizen Leadership, a non-profit dedicated to mentoring wounded veterans into Public Service. He holds a Masters degree in Public Policy from Harvard University's John F. Kennedy School of Government.
TERRORIST SEIZE FOUR MORE VESSELS...just sounds more serious.
The purpose of piracy is to gain financially.
If these guys were terrorists they'd be trying to sink the ships and kill the crews, not hold vessel and people for ransom.
Also, international law requires the consent of the sovereign state to go after pirates in their territorial waters (twelve miles from shore), but of course there is no functioning central government in Somalia. And where will pirates be prosecuted who are captured on the high seas and by what state?
The only sane policy at the current time is more of the same, defense and detterence.
To military contractors in the Beltway, everything sounds so perfectly easy and sterile. "Targets are neutralized" from CLASSIFIED-thousand feet up and CLASSIFIED-miles away. "And if that doesn't work, here we have an even bigger bomb to sell you." But the problems in many parts of the world must begin with the reality that these are ... suffering ... men, and women.
You are attributing almost magical powers to our government in suggesting that we are capable of resolving this situation.
Nations that are geographically, and ethnically, much closer to "home" will have to be persuaded to be a part of any change that happens there. And that, in and of itself, will not be easy.
I guess that we should be glad that someone signed-up to be President, but also that someone signed-up to be Secretary of State. None of these are enviable or even desirable places to be right now.
The international response to failed states has been haphazard, localized, and largely ineffective. The United Nations and other bodies only deal with government to government interactions. Isolationists in America used to complain about the U.S. becoming the world's policeman, but the alternative looks worse. It would be much better, of course, to have an international agreement and organization on policing failed states. Something far beyond UN peacekeeping. First, standards for what constitutes a failed state, or even a partial failed state (e.g., Pakistan). Second, standards for limits of police authority, and auditing thereof. Third, agreement on the structure of an interim government and constitution, for a long but defined term, before initiating police action. Iraq and Afghanistan demonstrate the hazard of turning things over to the locals before they have had time to acquire the habits of civil interaction.
These initiatives may not cost much but need the willingness and the genuine heart of America. Any help must focus on the capacity building of local and community NGOs. All programs should really partner with them and all developmental aid to country would need to go through them as they have the expertise at local level. What Somalia needs is help at grassroots levels not a top-down approach by professional career diplomats and UN workers (mostly operating from the circles of Nairobi expatriate communities) who dictate experimental solutions on the go. Nation building is very scary word in the minds of the Americans.....because it's a long arduous process but that's not the point here..... America's next intervention in Somalia should be focusing on how to win the hearts and minds of the poor through smaller scale health and social programs.