Afghanistan: Endless Army Mission Creep?

In the aftermath of World War II, the State Department set a new global standard for responsible post-conflict security, governmental, and public assistance. Secretary of State George C. Marshall mobilized the expertise of thousands of citizen diplomats and experts to set the conditions for European recovery. What would become known as the Marshall Plan would allow millions of Europeans to experience unprecedented growth and prosperity.

It comes as no surprise that our current Secretary of State, Condoleeza Rice, should never expect her name to receive such historical permanence. Rather, the Secretary and her department's inability to accept that responsibility has forced the U.S. Army to reinvent itself to perform roles for which it is inappropriate and counterproductive.

The Army's newly released Stability Operations manual represents a new chapter in its reluctant and inappropriate acceptance of post-conflict missions. In the absence of the State Department, U.S. Agency for International Development, and other U.S. civilian agencies, American ground forces have taken it upon themselves to perform tasks unrecognizable to conventional warfare. Although the military finds ways to complete the mission, whatever the task, we must ask ourselves if we want our only standing army to be in the business of nation building.

Defense Secretary Gates, to his credit, has repeatedly challenged Secretary of State Rice to make post-conflict preparedness a key ingredient of her transformation of the Foreign Service. But Secretary Rice has overseen development of a seriously flawed Office of Post-Conflict Stabilization and Reconstruction. Exacerbating the divide, Congress has underfunded post-conflict preparedness in the Department of State while overfunding the Department of Defense. To fill the vacuum of meaningful statecraft, the Department of Defense now finds itself both war-fighter and diplomat.

Recent on-the-ground performance in both Afghanistan and Iraq has proved that neither the Department of State nor the Department of Defense is the answer to current stability challenges. In the recent past, however, lies a model with the best clues of how to get stability done in the current age of radical Islamic terror: Afghanistan, 2001-2003.

Coalition military forces initially performed their rightful role, guaranteeing security and public safety. This allowed humanitarian and reconstruction operations to flourish in Afghanistan. The problems started when Army personnel tried to implement civilian relief and reconstruction tasks. The Army occupied the right footprint in the superbly-led UN Assistance Mission, Afghanistan (UNAMA). UNAMA skillfully performed the essential stability missions of providing the services of government to the Afghan people, while training the fledgling Afghan ministries in such government competencies as planning, programming, budgeting, and auditing. The UNAMA-led political transition also effectively avoided the perception of a U.S.-led occupying force in an Islamic state. Additionally, through the UN Consolidated Appeal process, donor state resources were pooled together and sharply reduced the bottom-line costs to the American taxpayer.

Where did the Afghan model break down?

Problems began when donor states and the Afghan Government thought they could unilaterally perform stability and nation-building tasks better than the UN. This resulted in what has proved to be inefficient and ineffective compartmentalization. Afghan police training was assigned to Germany, poppy eradication to the UK, and the reconstitution of the justice system to Italy. The U.S. was the lead for training the Afghan National Army but fell short due to subsequent diversion of critical resources and talent to Iraq. The slide toward failure became exponential when the U.S. diverted military forces to Iraq. This robbed Afghanistan of sufficient security and public safety support for stability operations. It was the equivalent of pulling the rug out from under the Afghan state.

Senator McCain or Senator Obama will inherit this imbalance in their cabinet. The Army's new Stability Operations manual may well be seen as a pragmatic substitute for the nation-building performance which appropriately belongs to civilian government agencies. That checks off a box they can forget about, while devoting their attention to more pressing problems such as the financial crisis. But for more thoughtful Americans, real change, real re-invention, real transformation in the U.S. Government must include a drastic review of our dysfunctional post-conflict stability operations.

The answer requires a clear charter and sufficient funding for the State Department to do fulfill its historic potential after the ground war ends. It might also require a culture change as the U.S. becomes a positive force behind UN agencies and other multilateral players, rather than the usual role of unilateral lead actor. It requires judicious use of all the tools of statecraft -by those who know it best, not a unilateral Defense Department that performs every cabinet function.

Gene Dewey, a retired Army [Col] and Vietnam Veteran, was the Assistant Secretary of State for the Bureau of Population, Refugees and Migration from 2002-2005. Capt. Luis Carlos Montalván is a former Army cavalry officer who served two combat tours in Iraq from 2003-2006.

Comments

[raskolnikov72]

Reminder: Iraq has oil that could be sold to recoup costs and rebuild the country. Afghanistan has rocks, dirt, hills, barren fruit trees and poppies. This is going to be a failed exercise if we do not exercise a broad and monied coalition. Let's get real here.

[arvay]

As if we didn't have enough, here's another example of the administration brushing aside the UN and trying to make soldiers into "nation builders." Soldiers are not social services agents, they are armed people who defeat opponents militarily, so that others can subsequently step in to perform other roles.

This is the one theater of operations where the US had a right, even a duty, to strike back against people who actually attacked us. Of course, we should understand that we've made enemies in the Islamic world with decades of interventions such as putting the Shah in control in Iran and foisting the Israeli state on hapless Palestinians.

But it is valid for us to retaliate against a direct attack on us, to teach people that that's not the way to communicate with us. Of course, that doesn't remove the original irritants, we still need to totally revise our mideast policy.

Well, the neocons and their puppet, Bush, have bungled even that, relatively simple mission. Instead, they followed Osama bin Laden's playbook, invading Iraq and -- essentially -- installed an Iranian ally there. The defeat of al Quaeda in Iraq rings quite hollow compared to the new geopolitical reality we've created.

Now, it looks like we'll need to negotiate with the Taliban, or send 500,000 soldiers to repel them from Afghanistan. Option two seems highly unlikely. Maybe we can bribe them so they don't allow al Quaeda to attack us again. Worked in Iraq!

[LTGCaldwell]

Contrary to some assertions, the U.S. military has a long history of engaging in operations other than war, dating back to the founding of our nation. Army engineers have constructed roads, built canals and provided flood defenses for more than 200 years. The Army was involved in significant reconstruction projects after the Civil War, the Spanish-American War and World War II. The Civil Operations and Revolutionary Development Support (CORDS) was a highly successful program that integrated civilian and military efforts in rural Vietnam to isolate the population from insurgent forces.

At the outset of the 21st Century, your Army once again finds itself required to assume an important role as nation builder. Because security is fragile in Afghanistan, it is unrealistic to expect the State Department or USAID to operate effectively on their own. For this reason, the Army must provide security while simultaneously discharging offensive, defensive and stability tasks, all of which are elements of full spectrum operations. The new Stability Operations doctrine states, “simultaneous combinations of the elements, constantly adapted to the dynamic conditions of the operational environment are key to successful operations.”

One might argue it is precisely the ability to respond in offensive, defensive and stability capacities that demonstrates the true strength of U.S. Army combined arms capabilities. Perhaps more importantly, engagement in stability operations allows the Army to consolidate its successes on the battlefield and help set the conditions for a lasting peace with our intergovernmental partners.

[raskolnikov72]

Afghanistan's natural resources are poppies and pomegranates ... not Oil as in Iraq ... we cannot afford this war and will lose interest soon. We need to engage a much broader coalition to help shoulder the costs ...

[Adriana231]

Lt Col Dewey...you are right on. State Department has fallen down on the job...but in their defense if they have no money (b/c it is being given to DoD), all the best plans in the world mean nothing.

[katie did it]

DoD. Department of Defense.

This is the section of the government that pays the retirement checks for retired veterans, supports the VA hospitals and clinics, and pays the checks for the armed forces (Army, Air Force, Navy, Marines, and Coast Guard, Reserves and National Guard).

It also pays the checks for any retirees that are in nursing homes, and for any veterans (who have died) whose childern who attend college, under the "old" G.I. Bill, as well as the pay checks for any civilians that works in any of the military bases that serve the active duty in the armed forces.

The DOD also pays into the Reserve and the National Guard a portion of the funds that are used to offset the costs for these military units. The Reserve units are the "weekend warriors" that were to take over in case of war to stay "state side" to take care of "conus", this is the U.S.A. while the active duty personnel went to war.

The National Guard used to be at the "beck and call" of the govenor of each state, if he needed help to keep law and order, or to assist his policemen and firemen in case of a state emergency. The guard and reserve help each other as needed in time of a national emergency.

From a retired veteran that doesn't get of that "recall list from the Commander in Chief" until I turn 65 :>)