Two recent events allow reason for hope for the future of U.S. policy towards Iran. First, the State Department recently issued a recommendation that the Treasury Department's Office of Foreign Asset Control (OFAC) allow the export of free mass-market communications software to Iran. The proposed modifications to current sanctions will help facilitate the free flow of information into and out of Iran. Second, the Iranian Digital Empowerment Act (IDEA) was introduced in the House of Representatives. IDEA would modify OFAC's regulations in a manner similar to the State Department's recommendation. These events are welcome signs to proponents of the United States taking a greater interest in the plight of the Iranian people. However, there is still a great deal more that needs to be done. This is especially true of current sanctions against Iran.
The Iran Refined Petroleum Sanctions Act (IRPSA), which passed the House of Representatives before Christmas, expands the broad-based sanctions already in place against Iran. The bill seeks to limit Iran's access to refined petroleum products, which include gasoline and heating oil, as a means of pressuring the government to relinquish its nuclear enrichment program. IRPSA is not only unlikely to succeed but will cause significant collateral damage.
The leaders of Iran's government and military will not be affected by a reduction in gasoline imports, and, therefore, will not feel any pressure to halt enrichment. During the 1990s, a common axiom among experts on U.S. sanctions against Iraq was that "Saddam will eat the last sandwich in Baghdad." It is certain that neither vehicles in Khamenei's motorcade nor the military will want for gasoline if IRPSA is in fact successful in blocking petroleum imports by Iran. The leaders of non-democratic governments are able to insulate themselves, and their supporters, from the negative consequences of U.S. sanctions.
In point of fact, the Iranian leadership is itself looking for an excuse to cut government subsidies for gasoline. The Islamic Republic spends billions a year providing gasoline subsidies to its citizens; billions that it cannot afford. However, cutting the amount of free gasoline allowed to each citizen will cause widespread resentment and anger within the population of Iran directed towards the Iranian government. U.S. petroleum sanctions will provide the Iranian leadership with the perfect scapegoat when they cut gas subsidies. The United States should permit refined petroleum exportation to Iran to continue, and allow the Iranian government to reap the public consequences when it cuts subsidies. Tehran is about to shoot itself in the foot, and Washington is throwing itself in the way of the bullet.
Many members of Congress apparently view sanctions as punitive measurements to be imposed when another country is doing something that the United States does not like. The imposition and enforcement of sanctions and their continuance or easing are a type of dialogue between countries. The form, severity and enforcement of a sanctions regime send important messages to both the government and population of the target country. When sanctions are imposed but not enforced the targeted government will view sanctions as a paper tiger designed to appease special interest groups or U.S. voters. They will not be viewed as representative of the sender government's policy. In addition, the reason sanctions are imposed sends an important message; i.e. the United States disapproves of uranium enrichment, but is not really concerned with human rights abuses in Iran. Finally, when sanctions are largely detrimental to a population, people will quite reasonably assume that the sending country is not friendly to them.
If the current broad-based sanctions are unlikely to work, what can Congress do instead? Targeted sanctions offer a way forward. They are penalties that target, harm and send unambiguous messages to the Islamic Republic's rulers, while avoiding injury to average Iranian citizens, who, after all, did not actually elect their government. For example, why compromise the Iranian citizens' access to heating oil for their homes, as IRPSA will do, when restricting the Iranian leadership's access to overseas bank accounts, as well as its ability to form overseas business contracts, provides a more precise and appropriate sanction and message?
Sanctions should be thought of as economic warfare, in which case it follows that every effort must be made to reduce the amount of collateral damage they inflict. Modern sentiment holds that civilian casualties in a conventional war must be avoided. The U.S. military has spent decades and untold billions of dollars developing "smart" weapons for the exact purpose of avoiding killing civilians (the success of that program is beside the point, the intent is the important part). It is time for U.S. foreign policy and diplomatic policy to embrace this ideal and to follow suit. Broad-based sanctions are to economic warfare what indiscriminate carpet-bombing is to conventional warfare. They produce massive civilian "casualties." In the case of Iran, this will only serve to further the interests of the hardliners in Iran's government and military.
The U.S. government needs to be very careful when choosing what type of sanctions it imposes on the government of Iran. IRPSA is unlikely to affect the leadership in Tehran. It is very likely, however, to have a negative effect on the lives of ordinary Iranians many of whom clearly dislike their government. Despite language professing the U.S. Congress' feelings of friendship for the people's of Iran, the message that is actually sent by IRPSA was well summed up by Rep. Dennis Kucinich (D-OH): "We like you so much that we're going to cut off your heating oil." Conversely, instituting sanctions that specifically target the Iranian leadership would send the message that the United States is an ally of the Iranian people, and still opposes their repressive, authoritarian government.
When they had elections in Palestine, they starved and attacked the people for daring hold an election.
Same thing in Lebanon.
You lucky Iranians are going to get software sold to you. Time to dance a jig in joy. Thank your lucky stars.
The protesters are the Weathermen of the Iranian youth movement, a youth movement that, for the most part, prefers Ahmadinejad to Mousavi. (You'll have to do a little math, multiplying the demographic breakdowns by the percentage of the population, and mulitplying that by the favourable views of Ahmadinejad in this analysis http://www.worldpublicopinion.org/pipa/pdf/may09/IranianPublic_May09_rpt.pdf , and though the poll the analysis is based on was done before the election and protests, this one http://www.worldpublicopinion.org/pipa/pdf/sep09/IranUS_Sep09_rpt.pdf was conducted after, and shows that support for Ahmadinejad has not dropped off, and, before you claim that the numbers were skewed by fear http://www.worldpublicopinion.org/pipa/articles/brmiddleeastnafricara/651.php?lb=brme&pnt=651&nid=&id= )
"The Committee to Protect Journalists called today for an immediate investigation into the March 18 death of an Iranian blogger imprisoned in Tehran's notorious Evin prison..."
"Tehran's Evin prison is infamous for the numerous political prisoners, journalists, and bloggers being held there. In 2003 Zahra Kazemi, an Iranian-Canadian photojournalist, died after being detained there for three weeks. She was arrested for taking pictures outside the prison."
Enjoy dancing the dance of death while chanting the litany of denial.
Diplomacy has stalled out, America can’t afford another war, and sanctions would be ineffective at best. Time to think outside the box. I suggest a cultural competition. Fund Farsi classes, Persian history, literature, and archeology programs (avoid the religious stuff, though. That never works out well). Undercut the Iranian thugocracy’s cultural nationalism by showing that America can do it better. This would be fairly similar to what was done with the Soviet Union. Not the “Tear down this wall” nonsense, but beating the Soviets at providing for the proletariat (granted, there’s been some backsliding since then).
A side benefit would be a larger pool of people with a clue about Iran. So many of America’s foreign relations fiascos stem simply from abysmal ignorance and misconceptions.