Strikes against al-Qaeda leaders in Pakistan's FATA and in Iraq are said to have damaged severely its leadership ranks. There is talk in Washington of this being a turning-point in the campaign to cripple the organization. Caution about reaching premature conclusions is in order, though. An overall assessment of the state of al-Qaeda in the light of recent events is a low confidence exercise. For a number of reasons. Here's why.
One, it is unclear exactly who or what we mean by al-Qaeda. It is not a unitary organization with a definite structure, lines of authority and accountability. Using a proper noun, our minds instinctively conjure the image of an entity of well defined contours and dimension - say, Goldman Sachs. The phenomenon we call al-Qaeda is amorphous, diffuse and in a continual state of flux. This is especially true after 9/11 and during its years of duress. The exact links between al-Qaeda in Mesopotamia and "headquarters" in AfPak are obscure even to official Washington.
Two, therefore, there is no way to measure the degree of operational degradation for the omnibus movement caused by the loss of certain personnel. The record suggests that we tend to overestimate that effect. In Iraq, over the years, reports of leaders eliminated total several dozen. Yet there seems little correlation with AQM's ability to wreak havoc.
Three, there are a couple of reasons for these oddities that we prudently should keep in mind. We tend to confuse a terrorist network with an insurgency movement fueled by a nationalist agenda. "Al-Qaeda" is not the counterpart to the numerous nationalist movements we have known. It is not geo-politically focused on a specific plot of ground; its aims are changeable; and it can regenerate itself far better and faster than can nationalist guerrillas. For the latter depend on wide popular support and the motivation provided by one inspirational leader who is alive and active. The momentum factor is relatively less crucial for "al-Qaeda."
Four, Al-Qaeda in AfPak, al-Qaeda in Mesopotamia, al-Qaeda in the Maghreb, al-Qaeda in Arabia, al-Qaeda in East Africa are all linked in various ways with other outfits -- above all, the Taliban in the first instance. Hence, each al-Qaeda unit's capability, tactics and orientation are partially a function of those shifting ties and the fortunes of their associates. Those associates, in turn, are even more diffuse than is the local al-Qaeda itself. Moreover, in AfPak, al-Qaeda's capability/viability is greatly affected by the intra-governmental politics of Pakistan. Given the prominent role of the ISI, and its alumni association, there is no way to disentangle the three intersecting groups. The simple fact that the Pakistani military have nabbed some Taliban leaders does not mean that they are out of the game. They may well be held in reserve by the Pakistanis for the next phase of the game.
Five, the game in AfPak is 5 player chess; not "cowboys & Indians" as we instinctively view it.
What does all this mean?
"Al Qaeda is not a real organization. It's more like an ideal."
-- Tony Blair
Consider this: if another country invaded YOUR home country and started dropping aerial bombs on wedding parties, et cetera, wouldn't YOU take up arms to repel the invaders? Any human would do so. And calling the citizens of the country that was invaded "insurgents" is horse poop.
We ARE the problem in Iraq and Afghanistan. If we wait long enough, another Saladin will come to power and we'll have our butts handed to us.
there is way too much good going on to be talking about Palins potiential or Blagos new conspiracy details.
seriously
Exactly well said
It's time to Rethink Afghanistan. If you haven't watched the series yet, watch it here:
http://iv-time.blogspot.com/2010/03/rethink-afghanistan.html
Bring our troops home, help put an end to war or should I say business as usual..
I have the knowledge that a conventional force fighting a fluid non battle field will kill some of the enemy but will fail. Study up on the 1930's battles with the force in Central America by the American military.
Strengthening the locals is the way to go....
No matter how much they might even do in the future...........people will disdain them.
Actually, I claimed it several months ago.
If they did 9/11 ............they should have stopped there and then.........because that was the climax and everything else seems a second third rate job.
Perfect for our war-planners to go on with no end in sight while continually warning of the dangers of terrorism.
http://iv-time.blogspot.com/2010/03/be-scared-and-dont-ask-questions_27.html