In a previous post, I referred to a controversial scientific claim known as the "Allais effect" -- an anomalous change in a pendulum's oscillation that purportedly occurs during a solar eclipse -- to provide sardonic contrast to the more celebrated "Allais paradox," both ideas having been proposed by economist Maurice Allais. Basically, I asserted that Allais' effect was more important than his paradox, despite the fact that it was substantially less well documented and understood. This is because the former potentially held implications for gravitational forces operating among the sun, moon, and earth, whereas the latter simply documented the (not surprisingly) "irrational" behavior of human beings when confronted by economic uncertainties. Interestingly, several subsequent reader comments suggested that any mention of Allais' effect as a possibly valid phenomenon was beyond the pale of respectable scientific discourse. In response, I would argue that considerations of such fringe ideas are actually highly instructive for examining and clarifying the use of scientific methods.
To be clear, I use the term fringe science to describe areas of study that fall outside the mainstream of conventional science, but whose researchers generally employ standard scientific methods: statements of hypotheses, hypothesis-based predictions, carefully designed experiments, and experimental replications. Often such areas do overlap those of pseudoscience -- whose practitioners tend to rely on vague claims, esoteric knowledge, and unrepeatable eyewitness accounts -- as in the realms of free energy, cryptids, alien visitation, telepathy, psychokinesis, etc. However, fringe research is different in that it enjoys some (albeit small) chance of entering the mainstream at a future date, as did the previously scorned theories of continental drift and the Viking colonization of North America.
Naturally, giving credence to a fringe scientific claim entails certain risks:
Nevertheless, peremptorily dismissing a fringe idea may do more harm than good:
In sum, I believe that the careful consideration of fringe science is useful both for understanding exactly what is meant by scientific methods and for demonstrating the appropriate and transparent application of those methods. In this regard, we would do well to recall the words of astronomer Carl Sagan in critiquing the fringe astronomical theories of Immanuel Velikovsky:
My own strongly held view is that no matter how unorthodox the reasoning process or how unpalatable the conclusions, there is no excuse for any attempt to suppress new ideas, least of all by scientists committed to the free exchange of ideas. ["An Analysis of Worlds in Collision," 1977]