Unless the Pakistani army planners see the disastrous errors of their ways and decide to roll back both the theory and practice of their jihadist enterprise, there will likely be more attacks like the one on Bacha Khan University. Blaming Afghanistan for the Pakistan army's sins and dereliction may be a good excuse, but it makes for a horrible solution to Pakistan's terrorism conundrum.
While relatively few Afghans are anxious to see the Taliban's return, many seem willing to believe their promises to govern differently than in the past. Incidents like the strike on Kunduz's Doctors Without Borders hospital by American gunships can also serve to channel anger against a Kabul regime reliant on foreign troops.
General Hamid Gul was the military equivalent of Osama bin Laden. He died with his boots on and blood of the innocents on his hands. One must never speak ill of the dead; it is the jihadist life and legacy of General Hamid Gul, however, which is impossible to ignore if further bloodshed and mayhem in Pakistan and the region is to be averted.
The height of the Pakistani state's chutzpah is that it does not only harbor these terrorists for decades and unleash them on the neighbors and the world, but also that it wants to be given credit and a thank you note even when America or Allah takes them out. The fundamental question about Mullah Omar's death in Karachi is who in Pakistan knew about his presence there, when did they know it and what, if anything at all, did they do about it.
A second round of peace talks between Afghan government officials and Taliban representatives, expected to begin before the end of July, 2015, suggests that some parties to the fighting want to declare a ceasefire. But even in the short time since the first round on July 7, fighting has intensified.
Apparently it wasn't Napoleon who said an army travels on its stomach. But surely the necessity of providing appropriate gear, food, water and other basics to troops was clear after his troops, freezing and dropping from starvation, staggered in retreat after the disastrous 1812 invasion of Russia. Of the 680,000 men Bonaparte took with him, fewer than 100,000 returned. Perhaps nothing that dramatic is about to happen in Afghanistan. But the warning signs of impending trouble are clear: the $57 billion U.S. investment in Afghanistan's security forces is at risk because the Afghans cannot supply, or resupply their troops, can't prevent their weapons and vehicles from breaking down and can't fix them when they do.