Congress' plummeting interest in spending generally, and in Afghanistan specifically, threatens to scuttle any ongoing relationship between the two countries.
Any summary a reviewer could offer would be the merest potted version of what took the author years of research to stitch together, so I prefer to urge you to read the book itself.
Between 2005 and 2007, when American combat forces in Afghanistan doubled, the Pentagon's budget for the Afghan War leaped from $17.2 billion to $34.9 billion annually. In this period, opportunities for corruption rose exponentially.
Once again, the United States has officially handed over the keys to the Bagram detention center to the Afghans. Only just as with the previous agreement to do exactly the same thing, the U.S. military will actually not be handing over all of the detainees in its control.
What are the real threats facing the Afghan people as we approach 2014, when international military troops withdraw to their bases or leave the country -- and responsibility for security rests wholly with Afghanistan?
It is a little late to be attempting to change his image as "America's Man." We find ourselves wondering why he would be trying to do so in the first place. His legacy is clear to all. No pandering to domestic political interests is going to change that.
If only the actual drone program, and the strategic thinking that underlies it, were to undergo the same sort of review as a little contraption of cloth and medal.
Twelve years later, the mission is very different in Afghanistan, and the threats have metastasized like a cancer.
As long as Hindu battles Muslim, Muslim persecutes Christian, and Islamic sects are willing to slaughter each other, there is nothing the United States can do to help establish anything worthwhile that will last. It will have to come from within.
An astute political animal, Karzai recognizes that the Afghan public long ago soured on the American military presence. And he calculates that assailing the foreigners is his best ticket to shoring up the legitimacy of his regime.
Now that the president has met Hamid Karzai concerning our future in Afghanistan, he will meet with his advisers to determine the level of U.S. involvement after the withdrawal of our main combat force. How many troops should we leave behind? The answer is simple: none.
The Obama national security team has put a happy face on the Afghan war this week for the visit of President Karzai ("We ARE making progress," Panetta...
In Chuck Hagel and John Kerry, President Obama is bringing aboard one man who opposed the surge in Afghanistan, and has long called for a drawdown, and another who quickly realized the surge was not a success, and called for a shift in strategy.
The Taliban vowed to continue fighting against American troops remaining in Afghanistan after 2014, demonstrating the need for larger number of U.S. troops to support the fragile Afghan security forces defend their nation and to prevent al-Qaeda gain grounds in the country.
Afghanistan, the country that never really was, is not about to become one tomorrow. Nor does American security depend on whether or not it does -- yet another convenient lie.