Immunity for U.S. troops post-2014 isn't going to happen. It's a political non-starter. No Afghan presidential candidate, queuing for the April 2014 elections, can support it, nor do the Afghan people want immunity for foreign troops.
What seemed inconceivable a decade ago -- the integration of the Taliban into Afghanistan's post-9/11 political process -- appears not only possible today, but probable.
The peace conference has been fraught with communication and more importantly structural misunderstanding on the part of both Taliban and U.S. negotiating teams which has caused rupture in the peace negotiating process.
The end game in Afghanistan becomes increasingly tortuous, so the world waits with bated breath on who is going to be Pakistan's next army chief.
Afghan President Hamid Karzai should take urgent action to fight child marriage and domestic violence or risk further harm to development and public health in Afghanistan.
U.S. aid should be provided to Egypt on the basis of more rigorous standards of transparency and accountability. Americans and the Egyptian people need to know exactly how the aid is being used and who benefits from the aid.
The best hope for resolving this deadly stalemate is to take the United States out of the equation. It is time to admit our continued military role in Afghanistan is counter-productive and there is little reason to keep American men and women caught in the crossfire.
Obama's determination to keep on the table the so-called "zero option" of a complete withdrawal of all American military forces from Afghanistan next year is not simply a bargaining ploy. There are policy reasons for a complete military departure the president could find persuasive.
There comes a time when one must say, "Enough is Enough!" ¡Basta! The mother of Lance Cpl. Gregory T. Buckley, the 1,990th casualty of the Af...
With the clock ticking down on removing most combat troops from Afghanistan by 2014, there are no official negotiations going on between the United States and the Taliban, nor does there seem to be any strategy for how to bring them about.
As with Vietnam, negotiations might buy a little time for the government we leave behind, but we have the small consolation that we're separating from the worst partnership we've ever had. And like North Vietnam, the Taliban are unlikely to pose a threat to our security once we've left.
The twist of the latest CIA cash scandal is not the CIA is handing over wads of U.S. bills to a corrupt president. It is that the CIA has continued to hand over cash for so long, which is not merely unethical but now antithetical to the U.S. government's stated policy goals.
Taliban resurgence could immediately undo any improvements made under U.S. occupation, as could economic collapse, civil war and regional instability.
Congress' plummeting interest in spending generally, and in Afghanistan specifically, threatens to scuttle any ongoing relationship between the two countries.
Any summary a reviewer could offer would be the merest potted version of what took the author years of research to stitch together, so I prefer to urge you to read the book itself.
Between 2005 and 2007, when American combat forces in Afghanistan doubled, the Pentagon's budget for the Afghan War leaped from $17.2 billion to $34.9 billion annually. In this period, opportunities for corruption rose exponentially.