Just as Iran must accept certain limitations for a period time as a result of their past violations and the breach in trust, the West must accept that once Iran has restored trust, it must enjoy the same benefits that all other NPT states enjoy.
The range of problem areas between the West and Iran are extensive -- the nuclear issue, Syria, Iraq, Afghanistan and human rights in Iran just to name a few. And none of them can be resolved or effectively addressed unless the two sides talk to each other.
Some in the U.S. concluded that at long last, Tehran desires a thaw in its relations with Washington and a normalization. I remain skeptical, hoping they are correct, but unwilling to make that leap for a number of reasons.
Rouhani's appointments provide early clues regarding the direction and policy platform of the moderate president's upcoming term. As promised during his campaign, Rouhani's selections represent a large scope of the political spectrum.
What do Rouhani's past actions suggest about his morals and personality? It suggests that Rouhani's first priority has been to use any tool possible -- even if it means deceiving the Iranian people -- in order to achieve his political ambitions.
Despite varying degrees of skepticism and mistrust, many Iranians agree that Iran's election went better than expected. Until Election Day, many Iranians did not know if they would vote.
In the coming weeks and months there will be much analysis exploring the potential implications of the election of Hassan Rouhani as Iran's next president. Will Iran become more flexible in its nuclear negotiation with the west?
Based on the ideological, career, personal, and political characteristics of Hassan Rouhani, his position towards Tehran's nuclear enrichment does not differ from the position of Iran's Supreme Leader, Revolutonary Guards' high generals, Basij.
While the election result is unlikely to alter the power balance between the president and supreme leader on the nuclear issue, it has the potential to have an indirect, albeit profound, effect.
If Rouhani is to have any chance of changing course on nuclear diplomacy, and to achieve a non-securitized environment in which political prisoners are released, the United States needs to give him the political space to do so.
By most accounts, Rouhani is a regime insider and a moderate-leaning cleric at best, however by riding to a win on the support of the reformist vote, he has, somewhat unwittingly, become the symbol of people's hope for civil and political domestic reforms.
Rouhani's landslide victory, his endorsement by reformist leaders barred from running, and the high voter turnout, all signaled the depth of discontent and desire for change among the majority of voters.
Only a few hours following Rouhani's victory, too many governments directly tackled the nuclear issue within the few lines of their communiqués. The Iranians just got out of an election, Rouhani won: congratulations!
Those data that are reported tend to possess what I've described as an "Alice in Wonderland" quality. In light of this, it is fair to suggest that any official data on Iran's inflation be taken with a grain of salt. So, how can this problem be overcome?
Fresh from such a stunning upset, Rowhani will need quickly to show Iranians some results, in particular on the economic front. Rowhani now needs to persuade supreme leader Khamenei to give him the running room to try a new approach.