America's decade-long experience in the post-9/11 Middle East has conditioned the American public, and by extension the American body politic, to embrace hyperbole and sensationalism over fact and nuance. In doing so, decisions are being made which do not reflect reality, and as such not only fail to rectify the situation at hand, but more often than not, exacerbate it. America's experience with Iran stands as a clear case in point, where analysts have failed to accurately depict the true nature of Iran's military capability, among other issues, and policy makers have, as a result, failed to formulate policies which deal with the issues arising from decades of American-Iranian animosity fueled by post-9/11 emotions, which continue to run high to this day. Getting it wrong on Iran has become an American institution, one which may have far-reaching detrimental consequences.
BERLIN -- The only realistic option to prevent a nuclear arms race in the region is international supervision -- as far-reaching and as comprehensive as possible. But this goal, even if achieved, would satisfy neither Israel nor Saudi Arabia, both of which fear that any agreement would support Iran in its effort to establish its regional dominance. So the end result could be a de facto change of regional strategic partners by the U.S. -- a development that in fact is already becoming apparent in the fight against the Islamic State in Iraq.
NEW YORK -- The agreement constitutes an important political and diplomatic milestone, and it contains more detail and is broader in scope than many anticipated. But, for all that, the text leaves unanswered at least as many questions as it resolves. In reality, major issues have yet to be settled. It is closer to the truth to say the real debate about the Iran nuclear accord is just beginning.