Of the challenges facing our next president, perhaps none is so fraught as ISIS.
Every new horror -- Paris, Brussels or San Bernardino -- brings fresh confusion. In the faces of refugees, some see enemies; others see enemies among our neighbors. Sick of war, we wish our real enemies away, or conjure fantasies of destroying them from the air. But we cannot hide from hatred, or carpet bomb complexity.
And so, inexorably, we are drawn toward the tragedy of Iraq and Syria. Some feel shame at our arrogance; others at our impotence. But these places are now part of us, and ISIS breeds there. We cannot turn history's page.
In short, the fight against ISIS is a Gordian knot of complications. Nonetheless, I'm going to take a stab at cutting through it.
So please pour yourself a cup of coffee, sit back, and bear with me. Because only by dealing with the difficulties can we appreciate the problem -- and why Donald Trump is so monumentally unequipped to keep America safe. In this arena, ignorance and narcissism are a lethal combination.
For an American president, combating ISIS presents the worst kind of problem -- hard to explain, impossible to avoid, immune to a clear solution. The consequences of action or inaction, uncertain in themselves, conceal unintended consequences of equal weight. But when the potential ravages of terrorism range from mass slaughter to weapons of mass destruction, we must navigate the harsh terrain of two semi-failed states.
Here lives ISIS. The progeny of Al Qaeda in Iraq, it soon spread to Syria. Seizing vast swaths of oil -- rich territory, it fused sophisticated propaganda with military success, attracting 30,000 fighters while entrenching itself amidst innocent civilians in major cities.
Its self-proclaimed caliphate is worldwide; its worldview apocalyptic. It claims authority over every Muslim everywhere. It sanctions beheadings, rape, sexual slavery and slaughter on an epic scale. It uses children as soldiers, human shields and blood banks for its fighters.
It destroys historic landmarks. It murders journalists and throws homosexuals off rooftops. It crucifies Christians for sport. It has unleashed chemical weapons in Iraq and Syria and mustard gas on the Kurds. It has stolen nuclear materials from an Iraqi research facility. And, like Al Qaeda, it wants to acquire nuclear arms.
It claims affiliates in Nigeria, Afghanistan, North Africa, South Asia and throughout the Middle East. Its surrogates have slaughtered civilians in Europe, Asia and America. There is little doubt that, were it able, it would deploy weapons of mass destruction in the West.
For reasons of self-defense and simple humanity, such people cannot be ignored. But the devil of Iraq and Syria is truly in the details.
The two countries, and their problems, began after the First World War. Pieces of the failed Ottoman Empire reformed as states whose boundaries ignored ethnicity or traditional allegiances. This geopolitical fragility was enhanced by an absence of reforms within Islam, and a rivalry between Iran and Saudi Arabia that exacerbated sectarian tensions.
Hence Iraq, a potentially volatile mashup of Shia, Sunni and Kurds; absent authoritarian rule, the country could all too easily implode. America's sin was to prove the point.
Our invasion of Iraq fractured the country into its component parts, unleashing sectarian hatred that made "democratic" rule a pipe dream, while empowering inter-meddlers like Iran to help the worst Iraqi leaders overcome the better ones. Unstable and corrupt, the Shia-dominated government took its revenge on the Sunnis who had supported Saddam, depriving them of a stake in the Iraqi state.
As part of this it gutted the army of experienced soldiers, creating a cesspool of political patronage and staggering incompetence, filled with "ghost soldiers" who never showed up for work. Only an American military "surge" stemmed the rise of ISIS. We had built not a nation, but a tinderbox.
Its western neighbor is Syria, another flawed remnant of World War I. Here, again, the country was riven by ethnic hatred barely suppressed by authoritarian rule. Confronted by demands for reform, the brutal Alawite regime of Bashir al-Assad commenced a bloody crackdown supported by Shias and Christians fearful of radical Sunnis -- and, critically, backstopped by Assad's Russian and Iranian sponsors.
Swiftly, this devolved into a civil war of all against all -- the regime against its opponents; Shia against Sunnis; Arab against Kurd; and Sunni "moderates" versus extremists of various stripes. In the power vacuum that followed, the embattled remnants of ISIS found refuge.
In 2011, all this became more dangerous yet. In the wake of our withdrawal from Iraq, its prime minister, the inveterate schemer Nuri al- Maliki, launched a persecution of Sunnis -- particularly the leadership class. Over time, his actions empowered Iranian Shia militia -- equally despised by the Sunni and Kurds -- to operate within the country.
Alert to opportunity, in 2014 ISIS poured back into Iraq.
With me so far, Mr. Trump? Good -- because it gets worse.
The Iraqi Army all but collapsed. Conquering a string of cities including Mosul, the country's second-largest, ISIS imposed a blanket of terror. Iraq splintered into a semi-autonomous Kurdistan in the north; a Shia-led government in Baghdad that rules, however tenuously, in the center, east and south; and largely Sunni areas in the west dominated by ISIS.
Though the current prime minister is an improvement, his government is beset by Iran, restive factions of his fellow Shia, alienated Sunnis and, of course, ISIS. And so he lurches from crisis to crisis.
Parliament defies him. Protesters storm parliament. ISIS launches bloody attacks in Baghdad itself. His fellow Shia thwart his efforts to form a government less sectarian and corrupt. A collapse in the price of oil exacerbates ethnic tensions. Each setback benefits ISIS.
Syria is even worse. Far worse
The country is awash in physical and human devastation. Half the population needs humanitarian aid to survive. Three million children are not attending school. One-and-a-half million Syrians have been injured or permanently disabled. Life expectancy has cratered by 15 years. The result is a tidal wave of refugees that has overwhelmed the Middle East and Europe.
Like Iraq, Syria is in pieces. Having perpetrated horrible atrocities, the Assad regime holds most of the west. An Al Qaeda affiliate, Al Nusra, dominates the South. Chunks of the north are held by Syrian Kurds. And ISIS dominates the East.
To combat ISIS, roughly 5,000 American troops have reentered Iraq -- fortifying the military, while knitting together fighting forces among ethnic groups in various parts of the country. Our presence there is modest and sustainable, a key to success.
In Syria, our partnership with the Syrian Kurds has enabled us to make progress against ISIS. But Syria still presents us with a classic problem in counter-insurgency -- a haven for ISIS next door to Iraq.
Still, due to our renewed presence, ISIS is on the defensive. In the last year it has lost 10,000 fighters and 40 percent of its territory. Key connections between its forces in Iraq and Syria have been severed, and it is harder for new fighters to reach ISIS territory. Targeted attacks have reduced its revenue, and defeat has diminished the force of its propaganda.
But graver challenges await. ISIS has responded to these setbacks with terrorist attacks abroad, as well as in government-held territories in Iraq and Syria. This threat far exceeds the capacity of counter-terrorist agencies to stop them, including those in Europe and Asia.
A problem particular to Europe is that, unlike in the United States, Muslims frequently feel estranged from the broader population. Unless and until ISIS is defeated in Syria and Iraq, this territory will remain a springboard that enhances the terrorist threat. And while attacks on its financial operations have cut its revenues by roughly half, ISIS remains the world's wealthiest terrorist organization.
On the ground, retaking the key Iraqi city of Mosul requires more troops than exist in the entire country. Beyond this, Iraqi military forces are struggling with logistical and organizational issues. Until Mosul and its environs are reclaimed, the area will remain an ISIS heartland, a magnet for extremists and all those vulnerable to being turned against their own societies.
Moreover, the instability of Iraq's government raises basic questions about how and by whom the city would be governed -- by some members of the fractious Sunni community, beset by a vacuum of leadership, or by the hated Shia militia who are insisting on a role.The current struggle to recapture Falluja provides a preview of these difficulties -- including fears for the safety and survival of civilians, including refugees from the fighting; uncertainty as to whether ISIS will fight in the streets or simply melt away; and the political and military divide between Sunni and Shia.
Similarly, plans to capture Raqqa, the de facto ISIS capital in Syria, are stalled by tensions between Arabs and Kurds. In sum, the political and military crises of both countries are inextricably intertwined -- we need military progress to make political progress, and vice-versa.
All of which raises an obvious question: If this is such a bloody and intractable mess, why don't we just leave?
No answer will satisfy everyone. But there are many.
One is moral -- do we simply ignore a force as antithetical to humane values as ISIS? Granted, we have ignored other dark forces in other times. But we must consider the cost of idly watching the decimation and degradation of millions by a force built on indiscriminate and barbaric cruelty.
Another is humanitarian -- the death and displacement of millions of Syrians, victimized not only by ISIS but by the Assad regime's barbarous conduct of Syria's civil war. But that massive human tragedy breeds other challenges grimly practical in nature.
The wave of Syrian refugees is destabilizing its neighbors and straining the political and economic bonds of Europe. One example is German Chancellor Angela Merkel, our most reliable ally in the many strategic and economic challenges facing Europe. Her humane response to the refugee crisis, essential to combating terrorism, may cause her to lose office.
In other parts of Europe, the flow of refugees is giving rise to xenophobic right-wing governments.The clash of Shias and Sunnis in Syria and Iraq fuels the sectarian conflict ravaging the Middle East. And in countries like Jordan, the refugee crisis threatens a stable government in a region where stability is all too rare.
Finally, there is terrorism itself. ISIS's antediluvian ideology is impervious to reason. One must ask whether the West can retreat far enough, or become craven enough, to please it. And, if so, at what cost.
We cannot safely ignore all this. So we are left with the difficult task of finding a measured response: How, without an investment of time and troops that is beyond our capacity or desire, can we help bring stability to Iraq and Syria to better combat ISIS?
First, Iraq. Any military strategy must account for sectarian strife. Capable as they may be, the Kurds are not welcome much beyond Kurdistan. Using Shias in Sunni areas would drive the Sunnis toward ISIS. Exacerbating all this is the presence of Shia militia supported by Iran.
We can rely on the Kurds to operate close to home, and stand up Sunni militia to fight on their own ground. Given this, we must press the government to arm and equip the Kurds and Sunnis -- or consider doing so ourselves. And we must help build an Iraqi security force that draws on capable leadership from every sect.
Which brings us to the root of the problem. Iraq cannot remain as it was before ISIS. But partitioning the country into separate nations would likely lead to ethnic cleansing; a fractured military; conflict over oil revenues; and exploitation of the weakened states by sectarian rivals like the Saudis and Iranians.
The only path forward, many experts think, is devolving power through federalism. This means creating regions for Shias, Sunnis and Kurds that have their own military and possess genuine power to govern their own local affairs -- much as the Kurds already enjoy. Essential to this is a mutual respect for the integrity of each area; a guarantee that Sunni rights will be protected; a reasonable sharing of oil revenues; and further reforms to make the federal government and its military more effective and inclusive.
None are easy. All, like it or not, would require some American presence for a considerable period of time. But the alternative is worse: a Hobbesian state of nature instead of a country; a breeding ground for ISIS. And a viable federation holds out the hope of an Iraq all Iraqis can invest in.
As for Syria, the clash of conflicting interests makes Iraq look like a garden spot. With the help of US special operations personnel, ISIS has been pushed back. But for the time being, we are stuck with Assad -- taking on Assad, the Russians, and the Iranians is, in practical terms, impossible.
Then there is the matter of our allies. Our principal ally against ISIS is the Syrian Kurds. But some of our "friends' friends" like Al Nusra are Al Qaeda affiliates.
Indeed, Al Qaeda is now sending fighters to Al Nusra territory in the hope of setting up an "emirate" to compete with ISIS. And the various combatants are sponsored by outside forces with interests of their own -- the US, Russia, Iran, Turkey and various Sunni Arab states, beginning with Saudi Arabia.
Russia, Iran and its proxy, Hezbollah, are dedicated to Assad's survival. The Saudis and Turks want him gone tomorrow. The Kurds want to be left alone. The Turks hate and fear the Kurds. The Saudis and Iranians are mortal enemies. So are the Shias in the Sunnis. Looming over this combustible brew is the only common enemy, ISIS.
A comprehensive settlement among these parties is, in the foreseeable future, beyond reach. The sole question is whether there is some interim basis for stabilizing Syria while fighting ISIS.
A trio of experienced diplomats has advanced a plan that, while modest, is more than difficult enough -- establishing safe zones within Syria as a basis for incremental diplomatic and military progress.
In brief, it goes like this. From the territory not controlled by ISIS would come three zones of influence: a coastal zone controlled by the regime; non-contiguous Kurdish zones in the northwest and northeast; and swatches of territory above and below the areas controlled by the regime.
These territories would be secured by a cease-fire enforced by the outside parties. The Russians would have to back off their unyielding support of Assad. Those bent on deposing him would have to face the fact that doing so would only lead to more bloodshed, more refugees, more ISIS. The one unifying principle is that ISIS is a threat to all.
John Kerry has managed to get the Saudis and Iranians around the table, while facilitating indirect communications among other parties of interest. This "outside-in" approach carries risks. The presence of foreign troops might inflame the local populace. But it could also help preserve order within the zones, stemming a humanitarian disaster and providing a base for fighting ISIS.
As in Iraq, the best case for this difficult alternative is that all the others now available may be worse. But whatever course we choose, this is not a problem for amateurs -- least of all an American president.
Only one candidate -- Hillary Clinton -- has worked to grasp the devilish military and diplomatic complexities thrust on us by ISIS. Donald Trump grasps nothing.
Set aside his standard-issue lies about opposing our involvement in Iraq and Libya -- both of which he originally supported.
The real problem is his abysmal ignorance of pretty much anything involving foreign policy -- let alone Iraq, Syria, or the rudiments of counter-terrorism against ISIS. Add to this an appalling lack of judgment or consistency rooted in a narcissism so deep that he is indifferent to the complex realities of a dangerous world, in which ISIS looms as a constant threat.
Every mindless riff threatens to enhance those dangers. His castigation of all Muslims abroad, a precious recruiting tool for ISIS. His call for surveillance of Muslims at home. His embrace of torture. His call for indiscriminate bombings of civilians. And his only prescription for fighting ISIS on the ground is seizing Iraqi oil facilities, the one thing which could unite all the warring forces against us.
Finally, Trump's public musings about fighting ISIS with nuclear weapons. It is hard to list all the consequences of such an act, should it ever occur. But here are a few:
The mass murder of millions of innocent civilians. The poisoning of countless more. The environmental despoliation of a region. The ineradicable hatred among those who survive.
The loathing of the world at large. The enmity of Muslims around the globe. The terrible and twisted vindication of ISIS's characterization of America. The burial of our capacity for good.
To even conjure those consequences aloud is a measure of Trump's incapacity for office. Not to mention his capacity for empowering ISIS with every word and deed.
In short, Donald Trump would do more to promote the spread of jihadist terrorism than any military victory ever could. Unleashing him as president in a world of dangerous and complex geopolitics would be akin to giving a hand grenade to a two-year-old in a crowded room.
Come Election Day, the rest of us must be grown-ups.