Negotiators in Vienna announced early yesterday that they had reached an historic agreement between six world powers and Iran over its nuclear program. As we start to analyze the details of the deal and think about its implications, there are a few things we should keep in mind going forward, so that we are looking at this agreement in the right context.
Before we get into things, the deal in its entirety is available here. It is a long document, at 159 pages, and it is precise and technically complex. The New York Times has created a nice infographic, especially useful for those unfamiliar with the nuclear fuel cycle, on how the deal will prevent Iran from getting a nuclear weapons capability. And already, the provisions of the deal are being interpreted very differently -- for example, Dov Zakhiem paints a less-than-rosy picture over at Foreign Policy, whereas Joe Cirincione at Slate is more optimistic.
There are lots of really smart people debating the merits of the deal itself. So rather than jump into that pool and try to determine whether the deal is good or bad, I will focus on what the deal is, and just as importantly what it isn't.
First, what it is: This is a verifiable, measurable and precise agreement to prevent Iran from getting a nuclear weapons capability. It has been designed from the ground up to create a significant window of time -- about 15 years -- during which Iran cannot and will not be able to do anything to advance its nuclear program. It has also been designed to create space for further opportunities, to keep up pressure on the Iranians to never build up its military nuclear program again.
The point of this deal is to deny Iran the capability to build nuclear weapons, not to focus on Iran's demand for nuclear weapons. In the academic literature on the causes and consequences of nuclear proliferation, it is generally accepted that the drivers of nuclear weapons pursuit can be divided into two categories: supply and demand. A state may seek nuclear weapons for one or more reasons, but once a state makes that decision, it really only has three possible pathways to acquiring nuclear weapons: It can build the bomb, buy the bomb or steal the bomb. No country has ever acquired a nuclear weapon by buying or stealing one, nor has any state ever been willing to sell its nuclear arsenal to another country or group. Every single state that has ever tried to get nuclear weapons has had to work to build the bomb itself.
So this deal focuses on Iran's access to technology and equipment for its nuclear program. It does not address Iran's demand for nuclear weapons -- although, as I have written in the past, it is not clear that Iran actually wants nuclear weapons. At most, at one point Iran wanted to get close to the nuclear threshold without quite crossing it. (In fact, there is a strong argument to be made here that possession of nuclear weapons would actually decrease Iran's security in the Middle East because of the heightened tensions that surely would result.)
Now, what the deal isn't: This is NOT a comprehensive agreement to normalize relations between Iran and the rest of the world. The focus of the negotiations leading up to this agreement were exclusively on Iran's nuclear program. For example, discussions did not revolve around opening up trade routes or establishing diplomatic relations. As one U.S. negotiator said, "You are not going to see embassies open for a long, long time."
Nor is this a deal to end Iran's proxy activities in its neighborhood. The negotiations did not discuss Iran's support for Hamas or Hezbollah. It did not focus on whether, why, or when Iran should end its adventurism in the Middle East.
Most importantly, this deal is NOT a one time thing. This is not "one and done." Rather, it is the first concrete step along a long path towards ensuring the future security and stability of the Middle East. Reading the details of the agreement, it is clear to me that the purpose of the deal is to verify that Iran does not and cannot acquire a nuclear weapons capability in the immediate- to near-term, while creating space to hammer out something more permanent and durable.
Certainly, the P5+1, Israel and states in the Middle East would like to see an Iran that does not conduct its foreign policy through proxy and via material support of non-state actors. But one thing is clear: An Iran without a nuclear weapons capability is, by any and all criteria, better for everyone than an Iran with such a capability.
Bottom line: This deal is a tremendous step in the right direction, but no one can sit back on their laurels and rest. Now that this deal has been finalized and the IAEA inspectors (who are the real unsung heroes) get to work, the international community must maintain both dialogue with and pressure on Iran to ensure Iran can never get a nuclear weapons capability.