There were some interesting reactions to my post yesterday on proposals for the "soft partition" of Iraq. Many people think that "soft partition" is an interesting idea, as I did originally. Some thought I was being particularly unfair to Sen. Joe Biden, who was cited as the intellectual inspiration for the plan.
Let me be clear: I respect Sen. Biden in many ways, and the idea may very well be a good one -- but only if the Iraqis choose it for themselves. But today it's only an abstract notion being pushed by Washington politicians and think-tank types. The Iraqi government rejects it and polls show a lack of Iraqi enthusiasm for it. Some regional experts are convinced it will fail, that Iran and Syria will benefit, and that it will lead to even more bloodshed. Still, soft-partition advocates seem attached to their idea.
Ideas like that led us into war. Let's not let another one keep us there.
Ideas by themselves are neutral, morally and practically, but context is everything. Ideas and proposals have been used lately to manipulate public opinion -- or to keep us in the war a little longer while leaders try to come up with the next idea. They can also tell us a great deal about the mindset of their proponents.
Michael O'Hanlon, the war advocate who is now misleadingly labels himself a reformed war "critic," recently co-authored an "academic" paper that promotes the "soft partition" idea without clearly defining it. How does "soft partition" differ from Federalism, already permissible under the Iraqi constitution? If it's not different, why aren't the authors calling it Federalism?
Sen.Biden also uses the fuzzy language of 'soft partition.' Again, the idea - as an idea, absent its political context -- may very well have its merits. But here are the problems with "soft partition" in real life:
It would be imposed on the Iraqis, without considering their preferences as an independent nation: If the Iraqis want something called "soft partition," then I would agree with Sen. Biden that we have a moral obligation to assist them. The most important point, however, is this: Unless any decision about the country's future is made democratically by Iraqis, we have no right to impose it by force.
It provides a rationale for the continued occupation of Iraq: As long as we convince ourselves we have a better idea about Iraq's future than the Iraqis do, we have a good reason for continuing to occupy their country against their will. This idea is not a good enough reason to keep on killing and dying on foreign soil, unless and until a) they adopt it themselves, and b) they ask us to help them implement it.
As proposed, there's not enough of a role for the international community: Any solution to the Iraq crisis must include the international and regional communities in the planning stages, and not be presented as yet another unilateral U.S. decision. That's important for both moral and practical reasons. First, partition won't be accepted by the Iraqi public if it's imposed by the U.S. Secondly, we will want international help if we get involved in a task as monumental and risky as relocating civilians.
We need to involve regional experts, in a way we failed to do in planning for this war: What do legitimate scholars -- not policy mouthpieces looking for a State Department appointment - say about the viability of the plan? Proposal advocates don't draw enough on region exterts.
We need to view ivory-tower 'think tank' exercises with more skepticism: Washington is filled with theoreticians who have sketched out grand designs in white papers - designs that crumbled to dust when faced with real-world exigencies. Every such idea should be vigorously debated, prodded, and analyzed by cold-hearted skeptics. The days of greeting each new proposal as a 'liberator' should be over forever inside the beltway.
Buzzwords Obscure, Not Instruct: Why wasn't the "surge" called a "temporary increase in troop levels"? To sell it to the public. Why is this plan called "soft partition," instead of either "partition" or "Federalism"? I don't know. But we must demand that terms and ideas be clearly defined and described. Don't sell us, tell us. (And yes, I've read the proposals. I find them vague -- especially on the definition of terms, and on explaining how the Iraqis will embrace the concept.)
If Sen. Biden and his think tank associates think they have a workable plan for Iraq, they need to propose it ... first, to the Iraqis, and then to the international community and the American people. But in the end, it is the people of Iraq who must decide the fate of their nation.
Dear God, haven't we learned that simple lesson yet?
Sen. Biden failed to make a decision in the real-world context before when he voted for the Iraq war resolution. He has excused himself since then, saying he didn't know how badly the Administration would mismanage both the diplomacy and the war. That means he didn't understand the greater context -- ongoing inspections on the ground, widely reported stories that the decision to attack had already been made, who would lead the effort - when he cast his vote.
As for O'Hanlon's forecasting abilities, here's a 2003 sample:
The U.S.-led mission in Iraq is still quite likely to succeed over a time period of roughly three to five years. The lack of any unifying ideology for the resistance there makes it unlikely we will face a snowballing mass insurgency.
Mr. O'Hanlon thought the invasion of Iraq was a good idea. Sen. Biden thought that giving the President some vaguely defined "authority" -- one that just happened to allow him to start a war, too -- was a good idea. But, as the nation learned to its great sorrow, context is everything.
It's time American leaders learned a simple lesson: In the wrong context, ideas can kill.
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The problem may be that no solution for Iraq has the support of a majority of Iraqis, not even dissolution of Iraq.
I'm tempted to propose civil war between the largely Sunni areas without oil, that have historically dominated a unified Iraq, and the Shiite majority, with the oil in the south, as a solution for Iraq. This seems to be the direction things are going in, with enough strength to make other solutions unlikely. I'd also suggest a civil war among the Kurds. Ultras who favor "Greater Kurdistan" can fight it out with those willing to abandon the Kurds in Iran and Turkey and take what they can get as potential kingmakers in Iraq.
Needless to say, this is ghastly. But what the Iraqis want, except for the US to get out, is not yet established. Further, there don't seem to be any rules, except maybe Darwin's rules, for establishing what the Iraqis want.
It's worth noting that the desire to avoid being responsible for something like this is a lot of what drives "soft partition" advocates, and for that matter other advocates of solutions "made in Washington". The situation in Iraq, with a half million dead, two million refugees, and an intensifying civil war involving proxies for both Iran and Saudi Arabia; is appalling. The US brought it about. It's not surprising that members of the US foreign policy community don't want to think that this is the reality of US foreign policy, as applied in the Middle East.
Al Gore said of our objective in Iraq, “To get our troops out of there as soon as possible while simultaneously observing the moral duty that all of us share — including those of us who opposed this war in the first instance — to remove our troops in a way that doesn’t do further avoidable damage to the people who live there.”
It's plain the attempt to get Iraq to pass the Hydrocarbon Law is not happening and the Sharing Agreements will not happen. The Unity Gov. there is reaffirming an oil production agreement with China.
It's proving true that the Shia cannot be depended upon to share revenues with the Sunnis so that the civil war will rage on whether we are there or not but certainly a bloodbath if we are not there.
For these reasons, to carry out Mr. Gore’s approach, it will be necessary to tilt in favor of Sunni control of the oil revenues because they will have to share the money with the Shia and Kurds to get the oil out of the ground. This can be done by re-deploying our troops to the six oil pipeline terminals out of the country and patrolling by air along the borders to prevent oil exports by truck. Also the banking must be controlled to assure that the oil is not pirated away from Sunni control.
To offset this unstable condition, the Shia and Kurds must control the reconstruction, reparations and infrastructure rebuilding so that down the road, there really is a nation there with enough balance to suppress the insurgency and civil war.
The re-deployment must be coordinated with the UN so that American greed is ultimately removed from the equation. The object of the UN involvement is to get the US out; first from the interior of the country and then from the re-deployment.
If there is no attempt to restore the balance of the status quo ante, any withdrawal will be bloody and will prevent the United States from recovering its composure around the world for years to come.
Check the profile Huffers.
This is the 30th posting of this exact comment.
Can't we please expect post-specific views rather than endless repetition?
Thanks.
BTW, Rowland makes good comments sometimes (I disagree with this one) but arguing the same points again and again weakens the format... challenges and changes the idea exchange into a cut and paste battle.
We should expect more than this.
Mr. Eskow's essential point is that the political structure of Iraq is for the Iraquis to decide. The essential quandary is that "the Iraquis" are no more one people than "the Americans" of 1860 were.
If all the major groups in Iraq could somehow agree on partition, soft or otherwise, that would be one thing. But when some Iraquis want partition and other Iraquis don't, what's a superpower to do? Or the UN, for that matter? Impose unity, or impose partition? Or let the Iraquis decide by slaughtering each other?
Crudely speaking, the Kurds want to be left alone and they have oil, so they want partition; but if partition goes too far, they risk trouble from Turkey. The Sunni have no oil, so they're against partition; but they are also a minority, so they don't want a strong central government. The Shia could rule a unified Iraq if they were willing to be magnanimous; but they have scores to settle with the Sunni. And then there's Kirkuk waiting to blow up in everybody's face. The question of "partition" is too hard for even the Iraquis to decide.
-- TP
IF (and it's clear that this is a big IF) we had one set of rights for all of the occupants of the planet, and a broad one at that, along with the ability to freely engage in democratic selection of the government that we were all living under, the whole concept of partition would finally become obsolete. Partition to what? Partition from what?
Whether it be in the Baltics, Iraq, Israel/Palestine, Kashmir, etc. the folks would be no better and no worse off than the rest of us, and, so, not entitled to complain about who they are living next to, or down the street from. And in any neighborhhod where they insisted on not getting along, we would roll in the squad cars intead of the armored personnel carriers.
But would planetary management be any easier if everyone knew that they and everyone else were all getting a fair shot?
It's just a thought!
Yes, that was the idea behind communism... fairness.. equality... and how did that workout in reality? About as well as Bush in Iraq.
Black and White arguments are simple. As simple as the people who profess hem.
Absolute unregluated capitalism and free markets as preached by many is an idealogy disproved in the early days of the 1900s, and yet suddenly re appearing, eventhough it gacve rise to unions, socialism and communism, which are now in response on the rise again.
The hard but correct line is the gray one between these alternatives.
But newances in a country where 51% believes the earth is just 6,000 years old is a hard sell.
Regards
Posted August 21, 2007 | 12:58 PM (EST)