Evaluating Obama's Afghan Policy

In the last few weeks, most of the reporting on the president's updated plan for Afghanistan has often been, in my view, simplistic (the number of new troops) or silly (how often does Obama speak to McChrystal?). The first of these questions, while certainly relevant, is far from the only or even the most important factor. The second question is largely irrelevant. As long as the president gets good advice, including accurate assessments of on-the-ground conditions, it doesn't matter who provides it.

Unfortunately, some vital questions and distinctions have tended to be overlooked. In order to appropriately judge whatever updated Afghanistan plan emerges, omitted questions must be taken into account. Here are a few of them:

Goals vs. Strategy vs. Tactics

Goals define what we want to have happen in Afghanistan. Tactics are the methods employed by military forces (and, increasingly, their civilian counterparts) on a day-to-day basis. Strategy sequences and prioritizes tactical engagements so that we might attain our goals. The number of additional troops we deploy is contingent on goals and a strategy - it's not step one. That being said, goals and strategy have to be chosen with resource limitations in mind, or else they will fail.

It seems that there is general agreement on what our goals are for Afghanistan. It would be best if Afghanistan were not used to plan and resource attacks against us. Similarly, we have an interest in minimizing the external stresses - from refugees or terrorists - placed on Pakistan from its western neighbor.

The strategy to achieve these goals has been conflated with the tactics employed on the ground. Counterinsurgency and counterterrorism are neat labels, but they tend to fall through the cracks between strategy and tactics. Both might be usefully employed to achieve our goals in different areas. For example, we might choose to employ counterinsurgency tactics in densely populated areas and reinforce these military guidelines with concentrated development aid and civilian assistance. Simultaneously, we might use limited raids and airstrikes - counterterrorism tactics - to limit the presence of Al Qaeda and its allies in areas outside Afghan government control.

The Key Variables

There are a number of variables which have strong effects on the likely effectiveness of various strategies. One important variable is the legitimacy and effectiveness of the Afghan government. If the government is hopelessly corrupt, fraudulently-elected, and generally wretched, counterinsurgency tactics designed to bolster its legitimacy are not likely to succeed without massive outside intervention. If, on the other hand, the upcoming runoff election is less fraudulent, the most corrupt officials are publicly removed, and government performance begins to improve, counterinsurgency could be more appropriate.

The second key variable is the character of the relationship between Al Qaeda and the Afghan Taliban. Smart people have assessed it in very different ways: Peter Bergen thinks it's been growing closer while Stephen Walt points out some reasons why the Afghan Taliban might not accept the presence of Al Qaeda a second time. The amazing story of David Rohde's capture, detention, and escape from a particularly nasty Taliban faction is informative but inconclusive: the Taliban foot soldiers probably hate America enough to accept the presence of Al Qaeda, but take orders from commanders whose broader interests might rule out such a relationship. Few outside analysts (myself included) are knowledgeable enough to assess this relationship with any certainty.

The Distractions

Some assertions are essentially distractions that should be ignored. One is that we should be focusing more on poppy farming and smuggling. Yes, opium smuggling is bad. Yes, the production, trafficking, consumption of heroin in Afghanistan and elsewhere is harmful. But, based on recent press reports, drugs are not the main source of funding of the Afghan insurgency. Drug eradication efforts alienates the population without affecting output, which reached an all-time high (no pun intended) in 2007 and declined only slightly from that high in 2008. Even if we could control all of Afghanistan's borders, which we can't, stemming the infiltration routes of militants, not drug smugglers, would be the focus. Poppy production is likely to fall where counterinsurgency efforts are successful (because of increased security, improved infrastructure, and more effective governance - keys to COIN success), and counterterrorist tactics will likely be focused on militants, not traffickers. The drugs argument is largely a distraction.

The other assertion, one that is particularly infuriating, is about whether insurgents will be "emboldened" if we take certain actions. If they are fighting us, is their baseline level of boldness not already pretty high? The argument that the motivations of your average rank-and-file religious fanatic are strongly dependent on U.S. policy is ludicrous. The idea that a deliberative policy process emboldens insurgents is similarly bizarre (again, see the Rohde tales for a glimpse into the mindset of a Taliban foot soldier). NATO and U.S. forces are continuing to fight as changes are debated - a policy review does not turn Afghanistan into the Islamic extremist version of Spring Break Cancun. And, as Walt points out, clarifying that U.S. support is not unconditional can have positive effects.

The Point

This is not a complete list of important factors. But I hope (though do not by any means expect) that items on it, and others, will be taken into account when the public judges the president's Afghanistan plan. Troop numbers are important, but are only one element of a holistic strategy. And a holistic strategy, not some arbitrary number of reinforcements, gives the best chance of success in Afghanistan.

Comments

[Mason]

Mr Black,

You missed the most important point of all; namely, the Taliban is a loose assemblage of many different insurgent groups who would be fighting each other, but for the aggravating presence of our military that causes them to suspend hostilities against each other in order to unite and expel the latest foreign occupation force. War is Afghanistan's national pastime.

In his resignation letter, former State Department Foreign Service Officer and Marine Corps Captain Matthew Hoh described Afghanistan as a predominantly decentralized rural country with an historical tradition of constant civil war between the residents of neighboring valleys as well as tribal warfare between Pashtuns, Tajiks, and other smaller tribes. Warlords preside over local affairs and generally ignore the weak central government that has little power or influence outside of Kabul. This state of affairs is an ancient tradition as deeply entrenched as the desire to expel outsiders. It is thousands of years old -- at least as old as recorded history.

We must not forget that members of Al Quaida are also outsiders and there is little reason to believe that Al Quaida or any other foreign terrorist group will take root in Afghanistan after we leave and the Taliban dissolves back into valley versus valley and tribe versus tribe warfare with a weak central government managed by what's left of the Taliban.

IMO, the debate about defining the nature and extent of our continued presence in Afghanistan is pointless, insane, and an absolute waste of time.

[LizM]

Nice post...and a timely reminder of why we are all very fortunate that President Obama has Vice President Biden at his side.

It'll come to you on the bus home.

[joe solan]

As I see it, the strategic goal of America and its allies in Afghanistan is to turn it into a democratic society modeled on America.It is the main strategic goal. The war in Afghanistan is between the American Afghans and the Taliban Afghans. Both of them view the American soldiers and civilians, (and their allies) as foreign invaders, who came to destroy their ancient culture, religion and
government.The inviders want to replace the Pashtun Dream of tribal freedom with the American Dream of democratic freedom. They might view the invaders also as Christians, the enemy of the Muslims.
Is it any wonder that they fight to defend their own Dream and keep attacking the inviders in order to expell them from the valleys and mountains of their Afghanistan?
The Afghans will fight among them regardless whether America supports one or more of its tribes, as they fought for hundreds of years. The supported by America tribes will be most likely hated more for that support, as traitors of Afghan ways of life, who have their own laws and assembly, andcouncil of elders, and don't welcome the American Constitution, Congress and Senate.

The question for President Obama and the American people is : are you prepared to pay more for your Democratic Invasion into Afghanistan ? If the answer is - yes, then there is no need to change the strategic goal. If the answer is- no, than the new strategic goal might be a strategic withdrawal.

Joe Solan

[LizM]

Like I said, thank God for the Vice President! As long as Biden is in the room, that (a democratic Afghanistan modeled on America) will NOT be the 'strategic goal' of America...not now, not ever!

[William50]

Afghanistan is being portrayed as separate areas in one region. We are, in the USA, led to believe that the people fighting do not care for the country of Afghanistan....I believe that this is wrong.

Unless the US military and civilian government come to the conclusion that war/fighti­ng/militar­y action will not bring a peace we will continue to fight and expend resources at an alarming rate and see no change in the political picture in Afghanistan.

If, the President states that he is calling off the election and is calling on all factions to run individuals to be elected for a central government and that the top three will be in a separate election in March, the first election will be the tenth of February, we will see a real possibility of a country that is fighting its battles in an assembly instead of on the mountains.

America had two civil wars. One with Great Britain and on to determine the power of the central government. Allow Afghanistan the first war..we will see if they need the second.

middleamerican2010
Casey

[dianhow]

Sam Generals have been wrong before Al Qaeda has cells in the US- in Pakistan- In Somalia .
so should we send troops there too ? NO They can be anywhere in the world .When will we learn ?
Russia lost there - we must NOT send more troops into this ' forsaken country '
Afghanistan is full of Caves- Mountains - the Countryside is full of poor uneducated farmers-
who are told If they speak to our soldiers- ' The Taliban will kill them '
Can't we ever stop occupying these countries ? It never works out
WE NEED AN EXIT PLAN .

[Tecumseh]

There is no agreement on U.S. policy objectives in Afghanistan, because no one in political office even dares speak of the real policy objectives. Terrorism is a sideshow, plots can be directed from anywhere in the world. U.S. activities in Afghanistan have obviously DESTABILIZED Pakistan! Get real about U.S. policy. It's about strategic control of oil and gas from Central Asia and pipelines from the Middle East. The U.S. and Europe are competing for control of natural resources with China and Russia. Iran and India are second-string players in the game. Since the real game is the strategic Great Game as it was a hundred years ago, Nato troops on the ground for thirty years is in itself a strategic victory. They don't call it the Long War for nothing! Does anyone really think policy makers are stupid enough to adopt hopeless counter terrorism and counter narcotics strategies forever? They are not stupid, they just have other objectives, as in Vietnam. To study the real U.S. policy, google "Pipelineistan". How many erudite blog posts are there going to be before someone writes about real U.S. policy goals?

[dianhow]

Droids killing innocent people in Pakistan- just makes more enemies-
just as when W attacked Iraq- for NO reason- that made 1000's of them
WE MUST GET OUT ASAP

[1tourist]

I cannot visualize anything that resembles victory in Afghanistan. Like most of the region, if not the entire third world, corruption is derigor. More troops equals more targets. Like Viet Nam, the enemy blends into the population, and is mainly motivated by graft and fear of reprisal.
What makes us think that we can change a situation that has been in place longer than anyone remembers/

[KindOne]

If they do think they can change it.

[KindOne]

I don't think it is about oil, I think it is about selling arms. Controlling oil is for money for arms, same with drugs, thus the drug war. There is an economy based on drugs, arms, money laundering and war, it is self perpetuating.

[TheMediaRanger]

Thanks for the good info, Sam. Buried inside Stephen Walt's excellent piece is this comprehensive and objective look at Afghanistan -- be sure to read it:

http://www.lrb.co.uk/v31/n13/stew01_.html

[Garvagh]

Sir Christopher Meyers, UK ambassador in Washington 1997-2003, says the Afghan war is "madcap", futile", and serves "no conceivable national interest [of the UK]." Let Iran, Russia, India, and China sort out how best to lower the level of violence in Afghanistan.

[KindOne]

Yankee go home.

[godistwaddle]

Afghan patriots and freedom fighters will welcome new targets as they have for 6000 years.

[Enliberate]

For how long will we continue to assert that troops in Afghanistan somehow makes the U.S. safe from terrorist attack? It is a thoroughly ridiculous assertion, and is based on the confusion that Bush and Cheney so cleverly encouraged between what is essentially a matter of police/detective work and what is a military matter. And, speaking of police/detective matters, let's take a real look at 9/11, which, as I recall, led directly to our current involvement in Afghanistan, and remains one of the main "reasons" for our presence there.

[Antifascist-08]

excellent.

This whole Afghan thing has been a scam to keep Americans afraid so we would have to have constant military action around the world. More money for the neocons.

[Salfana]

Here is an excellent quote about fear from Bertand Russel: "Collective fear stimulates herd instinct, and tends to produce ferocity toward those who are not regarded as members of the herd"

Since 9/11 the public have been manipulated with so many misleading lies fueled by the press. The public is acting like a herd in fear and supports endless wars. This article reminds me of this.

The most important problem is to stop the funding support of the Wahhabis sect in Saudi Arabia to finance the Pashtun Taliban in both Pakistan and Afghanistan who are just as fundamentalist and extremist as the Wahhabis. It is the Wahhabis that financed all these schools on the border of Pakistan and Afhganistan. The first Taliban ideology comes from Pakistan. Initially they were refugees from the Russian war in Afghanistan. The children of those refugees were schooled with the financial help of the Saudi's Wahhabis who saw a way to open another front in their fundamentalist ideology.

Today the Talibans of Afghanistan are mostly Pashtuns from Aghanistan who do not necessarily believes in the ideology, but they get paid and can survive another year. A good recruiting force for Talibans is bombing some family, tribe or village from the map.

[KindOne]

I agree with you 100%.

[terramartom]

Just pull out of Afghanistan altogether.
This was and is a Bush/ Cheney failure of arrogance and ignorance.
Use special Opts to hunt down terrorists Worldwide.
Bring all the troops home from around the World.

http://www.richmonk31.blogspot.com

[Antifascist-08]

Yes.

[jaysea50]

Exactly! This has been my bent before going there in the first place. If we wanted to do anything there , we should have just supported the strongest rebel group, which I thought to be the Pushtans. But NEVER should our boots have been put on the ground. Even now, we still need to get the hell out of there.

[debqd]

You write, "It seems that there is general agreement on what our goals are for Afghanistan. It would be best if Afghanistan were not used to plan and resource attacks against us."

And that is a goal worth 70,000 to 110,000 troops? Really? When Al Qaeda is already present in 48 countries and can plan attacks from almost anywhere in the world? And DID plan attacks from Germany, Libya, etc? Spare us, please.

I don't know who's included in this "general agreement," but they should begin thinking out of the box about how to fight a winnable war against terrorists because Afghanistan most definitely isn't the answer.

[Enliberate]

Well said.

[Salfana]

You nailed it.

The idea to attack the US was conceived in Afghanistan, planned in different countries such as Germany, Pakistan and others and executed by people living in the US mostly by Saudis.

Lately I have come to the conclusion that we went in Afghanistan to satisfy the public anger over 9/11. The US public needed a culprit so Mr. Bush delivered Afghanistan on a plate.

Stay with me please. The Taliban were OK for the US for a long time because they almost stopped the civil war with the warlords and were helping to eradicate the opium trade. The US knew for a long time Talibans were doing atrocities to the Afghanis and also knew they were fundamentalist. When the Taliban government refused to help the US to get Bin Laden the US played on the anger of the public and took the decision to go to war.

Not only the Taliban were not involved on 9/11 they did not control the area where Al Quaeda training camps where settled. Of course the Talibans made a big mistake in not helping the US.

What puzzled me the most is if Aghanistan was so guilty of 9/11 the US woud have put on the ground every boot available. So this is again a war of choice. They could have just put special ops to go get Bin Laden. The US was never stopped by poor countries to go about and bombed the hell out of them.

[iridium53]

You assert: "It seems that there is general agreement on what our goals are for Afghanistan. It would be best if Afghanistan were not used to plan and resource attacks against us. Similarly, we have an interest in minimizing the external stresses - from refugees or terrorists - placed on Pakistan from its western neighbor."

As to not being used to plan and resouce attacks against us - why is Afghanistan different from Somalia, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, Yemen or Pakistan where some of the actual planning occurred? Why not Hamburg, Florida and Arizona - where other parts of the plan were devised?

What is that interest in minimizing stresses on Pakistan, anyway? Aren't they actually the ones believed to be sheltering bin Laden?

Afghanistan is just smaller than Texas - it's a big place with a lot of inaccessible mountains.

it seems to me that whatever terrorists of note that were there have moved on.

So, perhaps an explanation (not a simple assertion) of what might actually be accomplished - best meaningful outcome possible - would be in order? An outcome that eliminates Afghanistan as a place of terrorist planning is rather like building a vault door on the barn years after the cattle have gone away.

[Sam Black - Huffpost Blogger]

The Peter Bergen article I linked to makes a good argument about the difference between a safe haven in Afghanistan and safe havens in Somalia or Yemen or small cells or temporary bases in Hamburg and elsewhere. Essentially, a terrorist safe haven requires 2 things: free reign over an area for training (you can't train with explosives, guns or RPGs in crowded areas) and a calm periphery that allows for easy transit to and from training facilities for leaders and recruits. Few places are anarchic enough to train but civilized enough to provide easy access to the outside world.

[Antifascist-08]

This whole thing about "training camps" is a crock. The camps we all saw on TV weren't even Al Qaeda camps. When was the last time you saw Al Qaeda "soldiers" doing anything resembling military operations? This is b s.

Al Qaeda doesn't need camps because what the do is not military. They have plenty of places to plan and hang out.

[Enliberate]

This line of reasoning needs to answered. Have you considered the "safe havens" within our own political system? These are the places where policy is decided out of reach of any public scrutiny, i.e., the concept of the "deep state", which I first read in the work of Peter Dale Scott. This fascination with the nuts and bolts of terrorist training strikes me as morbid and romantic, like talking about pirates or bank robbers. The idea of a homegrown terrorist cell comprised of poor folks who just aren't sophisticated enough to understand our way of life, warts and all, just doesn't ring true.

[AnuDrake]

Very insightful article. Afghanistan is a raging trap of a mess and the more articles like this one the better. MOAA has an article about the information surrounding the decisions the president faces and the comments section from experienced officers is pretty impressive. Take a look:
http://www.moaablogs.org/battleofthebilge/2009/10/afghanistan_debate/

[henryberry]

Black's is one of the most relevant and instructive articles I've seen on HuffPo regarding Afghanistan. He gives a perspective based on realities and an objective stance, not one burning with political or military desires for something resembling success (let's leave aside any chimera of "victory") and saving face. Taking all of Black's points into consideration however, one sees they cannot be resolved, answered, or shaped in any way to support continued and thus increased large-scale, continuous military activity in Afghanistan. Any way you look at it, Afghanistan ends up a quagmire. The relationship among the elements of the quagmire would be different, but it's still a quagmire; just as a messy room can be messy in an almost infinite number of ways.

The main problem I see in anyone taking Black's approach to trying to make sense of and provide a path for a U.S, military presence in Afghanistan is that it would be the U.S.--i. e., for now, the Obama administration and its advisers and counselors--making the decisions or giving different weight on each factor. Charges of Kharzai or any other Afghan leader being an American or Western puppet would be inevitable and destabilizing. And while Black notes the variables, these are indefinitely going to be variables in Afghan culture, as they are in Pakistan. And as long as there are variables so close to the heart of the matter, there cannot be satisfaction of it according to Western political concepts.

[Antifascist-08]

I reject the whole premise that something has to be done in Afghanistan.

That makes the whole thing a lot clearer.

Accepting the premise means that we will never find a "solution" or a "victory" short of completely occupying the country with a million troops for 5 years or so while a real government and army are developed. Of course there has never been a central government in Afghanistan and it is not their way of life, so maybe that isn't such a good idea, is it?

[henryberry]

You're right. U.S. leaders shouldn't feel the urge to have to do or to prove anything in Afghanistan. The right approach would be to be doing or proving something about the threat of terrorism, which wouldn't necessarily entail a presence or operations in Afghanistan to any scale which is presently being contemplated. But Afghanistan has them in a stranglehold. There should reasonably be some operations in Afghanistan--but as for Afghanistan or AfPak as the "central front," this concept is out of place in struggling against terrorism. It's said that generals are always fighting the last war. In this case, the generals, and Obama too, are fighting a war that was three wars back--namely, World War II (coming before the Korean War and the Vietnam War) with its focus on control of land masses and battles against a fixed enemy.

[den1953]

I wonder if the Afghan people are ready for a modern society some people are either happy with there lives or they just go with the flow but you have a very one sided economy there drugs and no drugs guess who controls the drugs? We all know how the drug war is going in Mexico you have a choice die a poor man with no income or die a weathy man premature perhaps but at least your family isn't starving. This country will go right back to Taliban control after we leave if we stay 100 years so the President needs to ask is this all worth it you can't win only leave Afghanistan better off then it was!

[alex61]

The unanswered question in all of this is what happens if we "bail." The Taliban return, to be sure. What about Al Qaida? Will the radical part of Islam be imboldened by this huge victory over the "Jewish/Christian" west? Will recruits and money flow to the Islamofascists? Will we be just punting the problem down the road, and will it be worse then?

Yes-it's a mess. Quitting is very attractive. We breath easier for awhile. Then what? That's the real issue here.

[Antifascist-08]

Al Qaeda and other terrorists need to be dealt with using non military means. We can doa better job of protecting ourselves and taking them out by not getting embroiled in activities like Iraq and Afghanistan that just muddy the waters with all parties involved.

This isn't a "war" to win or lose. I reject that premise. it is an on going intelligence/law enforcement problem.