Administration officials today stated that, in line with calls from critics, they are taking steps toward a timetable that - at least as I read it - can only lead to an ultimate drawdown of U.S. troops. The President is finally backing away from his "stay the course" mantra.
But, true to form, Bush did so by denying that "stay the course" was ever Administration policy. That feeble attempt at obfuscation is easily exposed, but it points to a much more serious issue: the Administration seems inclined to mislead the public on its way out of Iraq just as it did on the way in.
Here are some of the fallacies being profferred:
- Conditions in Iraq are improving - During an interview with George Stephanopolous last week, Bush insisted that "we [are] on our way to achieving a goal, which is an Iraq that can defend itself, sustain itself and govern itself and be an ally in the war on terror in the heart of the Middle East." Stories like this about the breakdown of the Iraqi police in their core mission in Baghdad underscore the obvious: progress is nowhere near what anyone hoped or expected, and by some reports is close to nil.
- The Iraqis can take over where we leave off, if they'd only stop dithering - Today's announcement spoke of a US timetable for the Iraqi government to quell sectarian divisions and take over security for the country. But the government of President Nuri al-Maliki is roundly acknowledged to be failing in this regard, with no signs that he'll be able to reverse course. The Administration acts as though the Iraqi government refuses to put the country in order the way a stubborn child refuses to pick up his toys - in the Stephanopolous interview, Bush referred to it as "dawdling." The reality is that Iraq's problems are so deep and complex that the world's strongest and most sophisticated military cannot solve them, and nor can a fledgling and fragile Iraqi government.
The reality of a potential US departure from Iraq is that we'll be leaving because things are going poorly, and because there's no sign that we can ultimately succeed in our mission of turning a stable Iraq over to a government capable of keeping it that way. Some other facts worth facing:
- The Iraq we leave will likely devolve into a failed state - While this isn't necessarily the case, all signals point to the inability of an Iraqi government to quell sectarian divisions such that the country coheres. If we cannot prevent such disintegration with 120K+ troops, how will we prevent it without them? The US can and should pursue approaches involving various forms of economic, political and diplomatic buttressing to hold together an Iraqi state, but given how fragile that state is, such measures seem poised to fail.
- Iraq as a failed state will have grave consequences for the Iraqis, the region, and - in all likelihood - the US - Many Iraqi leaders are afraid of the pullout scenario, and understandably so. It seems fair to say there is serious risk of continued and even escalated violence and bloodshed, at least in the already volatile parts of the country. From what we know of failed states, their problems are not confined to fixed borders, which puts even now peaceful parts of Iraq and the broader region at risk. Thinking of Afghanistan, simmering resentments over America's invasion and ultimate withdrawal could have long-term reverberations in the form of deep-seated anti-Americanism amidst a large population that blames us for abandoning them to inter-ethnic warfare. Beyond that, oil, jihadism, nuclear proliferation and an anti-American meglomaniac holding the helm in Iran. Do we know for sure it will combust? No. Is there a viable scenario in which these forces organically settle and enable the region to move toward increasing stability? That's equally tough to envisage.
In short, if we pull out it will not be because the mission is accomplished, or because we can rest easily or at all about Iraq's future. Instead, it will be because nothing we try has worked, and because after four years we're not sufficiently convinced that our presence is doing more good than harm. We were dishonest on the way into this, but should be honest - at least with ourselves - on the way out. That way we at least avoid deceiving the public into believing that all will be calm in our wake, and having to explain what happened if and when that's proven wrong.
The Iraq war has exacted a wide array of tolls - Iraqi lives, American lives, the U.S's international legitimacy, our alliances, the battle-readiness of our military, and the trust of the American people in their government. Recovering from these losses will be slow and painful. When it comes to the question of Americans' trust, the Administration must not add insult to injury by misleading the public on its way out just as was done on the way in.
Suzanne Nossel blogs regularly at www.democracyarsenal.org