Afghanistan Study Group

All of the data and evidence available makes it clear: the insurgency's momentum and tempo of operations has not been adversely affected by our surge in Afghanistan.

On this anniversary of Operation Moshtarak and the "official" escalation of the Afghan War, we must continue to argue for a new course forward for the United States in Afghanistan.

The people of Afghanistan are experienced enough and willing to choose a government that suits them best and elect the leaders who can serve them best. They have done it before, they can still do it today.

I recently received an email from a friend in the Army on his second combat deployment to Afghanistan. His views illustrate the very real disconnect between our service members and diplomats.

I guess the nine years of conflict we have been involved in, plus the conflict's previous twenty plus years of bloodshed and instability, are not enough to give us a basic understanding of the root causes and factors underlying this war.

Somehow, claims of progress, not backed by any demonstrable facts or tempered with any degree of sincerity, continue to be proclaimed with enthusiasm and a veneer of honesty by leaders throughout this country.

Given the apathy among voters this midterm towards our wars, don't expect the Obama administration to feel much compulsion to change a failed strategy as President Bush was forced to do in 2006.

It is commonly believed that gains in Afghnistan have been realized for women since the fall of the Taliban regime in 2001. But since the realities of such gains have their limits, it is not quite that simple.

Afghans cannot take control in 2011.

Reports of the US being involved with efforts to reconcile elements of the insurgency with the Karzai government are reports that provide hope, albeit cautious hope, that a more sensible and rational US policy is taking hold.

U.S. rhetoric towards a political solution in Afghanistan is not backed up by its actions. While American leaders call for a settlement achieved through political means, the actuality is that very little US diplomatic efforts have occurred.

If this December's review is nothing more than a repeat of last year's incomplete decision making process, then the United States and her interests will be done a disservice by our nation's leaders, both uniformed and civilian.

There is always the danger, from the point of view of those who oppose any compromise, that compromise might not be so impossible to achieve as they have been trying to make everyone believe.

The Afghanistan Study Group report is out, and the fight is on. A number of critiques have been leveled at the report, one of the most influential being Joshua Foust's over at Registan.net.

Plenty of reports clearly show that the increased US, NATO and Afghan military presence has not engendered support among the rural southern Pashtun population in Afghanistan, in spite of the counter insurgency theories that state they should.

They may not be useful for making posters for a demonstration. But for lobbying Congressional staff or making other presentations to people not already on our side, the arguments of the Afghanistan Study Group are likely to be useful.