Reid Hoffman and Thomas Friedman advocate treating your career like an entrepreneur starting a business, but the advice isn't new and doesn't often ...
So much of how we interpret the financial crisis and subsequent reform turns on how we read the past. In the frantic search for the smoking gun of 200...
Every once in a while something occurs that suggests you're just talking to yourself. Last week I spoke briefly to radio's Marketplace about a short p...
Simon Johnson and the London School of Economics' Peter Boone offer up a critique of the proposed Obama bank tax in the Financial Times Tuesday and --...
New York Times' reporter Andrew Ross Sorkin's excerpt microscopically examines the actions of some key regulatory and Wall Street players, in this case during the period immediately after Lehman failed.
The fact is, no one knows because no one truly understands the mechanism of an infinitely complex global market machine. But there's always the temptation.
The response to volatile markets is not plain-vanilla financial products, but more complex products that use market mechanisms to cope with uncertainty. Plain vanilla can be as ugly as adjustable-rate mortgages.
The real lesson of the Lehman meltdown and failure may turn out to be that it was not a deep enough shock to change a political and economic system that seems to require liquidity-driven growth.
As a sector, what is the optimal size for finance? And how far should we shrink it down to achieve the kind of real growth that will reduce unemployment and drive incomes across the board?
Were we crazy to believe, or at least fear, that we were heading into a depression in December?
This was a Katrina-like failing. A disaster was clearly building and defenses were weak. What were the Fed and Treasury doing in those key months between Bear and Lehman?
We lean toward advisers and investors, not traders, and I would argue that many business and finance magazines have lost their way because they no longer know whom they're writing for or why.
We should all try harder to write more accessibly. But can the complexity of finance (and economics) be effectively captured by the kind of simple explanations required by an audience that barely knows the basics?
Nobody just announces anything anymore. Before anyone in Washington can get lunch, it has to be leaked, briefed, previewed in speeches, summarized in ...
In the run-up to testimony by Bank of America chief Ken Lewis on the Merrill Lynch & Co. affair, e-mails are suddenly leaking from the Beltway colander, though their ultimate source, strangely enough, is that opaque wonderland, the Federal Reserve.
Will an all-powerful Fed retain its traditional autonomy, or will it take orders from Treasury, the White House and Congress?
The irony of Buffett is that his talent and his will are unfathomable, but his flaws are not. The one thing we can truly understand about him is the part of him that's just like the rest of us.
