On Monday, May 24, 2010, the head of the Atomic Energy Organization of Iran delivered a letter to the Director General of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) outlining Iran's commitments to export 1200 kg of Low-Enriched Uranium (LEU) to Turkey in exchange for fuel assemblies to power the Tehran Research Reactor.
This marked a significant concession from Iran's previous position, which demanded the exchange take place in small batches, inside Iran's borders, and simultaneous to the delivery of reactor fuel.
The political paralysis inside Iran that scuttled the fuel exchange proposal when it was first offered in October seems now to have subsided.
The proposal currently being considered has the backing of Iran's Supreme Leader as well as centrists, reformists, and leaders of the Green Movement in Iran, making it more likely that Iran will abide by the terms of its commitments.
Left unresolved in the current proposal is the troubling matter of Iran's continued enrichment of uranium up to levels approaching 20%.
Additionally, even after a successful fuel exchange, the need for Iran to fully satisfy the IAEA and accept a more rigorous inspections regime will remain, as will concerns about the size of its LEU stockpile.
Notwithstanding these issues, Iran's agreement to export a large portion of its LEU outside of its borders for up to a year is worthy of consideration.
If enacted, this proposal would begin the process of addressing a major -- but not the only -- aspect of the strained relationship between Iran and the international community, and would represent a first step in halting Iran's progress toward a nuclear weapons capability. We urge the so-called Vienna Group (Russia, France, the United States, and the IAEA) to seriously pursue this proposal as an opening for further diplomatic engagement with Iran on outstanding issues of concern.
The permanent five members of the UN Security Council plus Germany (P5+1) should take advantage of this opportunity as the first step in a broader dialogue that could include further confidence building measures, such as halting enrichment of uranium above 5%, as well as resolving regional security issues, protecting human rights in Iran, and other issues of mutual interest.
Signed,
Amb. Thomas Pickering
Dr. David Kay
Gen. Robert Gard
Dr. Jeffrey Lewis
Dr. Jim Walsh
Daryl Kimball
Dr. Farideh Farhi
Dr. Juan Cole
Dr. Trita Parsi
Translation: U.S. and the world community should dismiss Iranian con.
excuse me, have you not been following the news?
A real rogue state WITH nuclear weapons already exists in the middle east. I'm frankly much more worried about them because not only do they threaten their neighbors but have now shown that they have no restraint.
The real * international community *, to be taken literally in this sentence, want a stop on spins and selective double-standards, as they have voiced this opinion many times and the latest being the announced position of 189 countries recently.
We already know what AIPAC thinks?
this has nothing to do with US interests or security.
NO WAR WITH IRAN!
As for the terms of the NPT, and what a country has to do to be incompliance with the NPT while having an active civilian nuclear program http://www.iaea.org/Publications/Documents/Infcircs/Others/infcirc153.pdf (unimaginatively titled THE STRUCTURE AND CONTENT OF AGREEMENTS BETWEEN THE AGENCY AND STATES REQUIRED IN CONNECTION WITH THE TREATY ON THE NON-PROLIFERATION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS)
Now it is true that nothing in the NPT prohibits a nation from enriching to, say, 90%, which Iran would have had to do to fuel the reactor that the US supplied the Shah (yes, folks, the US gave a reactor that contained over 5 kilograms of weapons grade uranium to a brutal dictator, and ignored evidence that he was using it to conduct weapons experiments), though it is seen as a sign of a nuclear weapons program to go that high (and a huge technological jump is required to get there). while 20% is considered (or was until the US decided to declare otherwise) to be clearly a civilian level because it takes a lot of learning by trial and error, and a lot of machinery upgrades, and upgrades to those upgrades, and then scrapping those, and building whole new centrifuges, to get to the point of producing material for a useable nuclear weapon.
Israel is a non-signatory to the NPT. Iran is a signatory. One should not forget that Iran's nuclear program got started under the Shah.The Pentagon's "feasrsome foursome" of Ed Teller, Admiral Hyman Rickover, Herman Kahn and General Curtis LeMay had no qualms about French and Israeli experts helping get things started. And it was inherited by the Islamic Republic while Henry Kissinger and former CIA director Richard Helms watched from the sidelines as supporters of the Ayatollah Khomeiny toppled the Peacock Throne. Corruption moves the technology a lot faster than the sanctions designed to thwart nuclear ambitions.
Iran is a member.