Cross-posted with TomDispatch.com
Someone should launch a feature somewhere on American foreign and war policy under the rubric: How could anything possibly go wrong? Here are just two recent examples.
The Obama administration intervenes militarily in Libya, plays a significant role in overthrowing the autocrat who runs the country as a police state, and helps unleash chaos in its wake. The streets of Libyan cities fill with militias as the new government's control of the situation fades to next to nil. Which brings us to our present moment, when a panicky Washington decides that what's needed is yet another, different kind of intervention. The plan seems to be to compete with various local and Islamic militias by creating a government militia as the core of a new "national army." Its members are to be drawn from already existing militias and they'll be trained somewhere outside of Libya. What an idea! Honestly, what could possibly go wrong?
Or consider this: Washington begins to panic about heightening tensions between Japan and China over uninhabited islands in the East China Sea. The problem, reports David Sanger of the New York Times, based on what Obama administration officials have told him, is that the conflict could escalate and so "derail their complex plan to manage China's rise without overtly trying to contain it." Now, let's get this straight: before things began to run off the rails in the East China Sea, the Obama administration was confidently planning to "manage" the rise of the next superpower on a planet already in such tumult that what being a new great power might even mean is open to question. And keep in mind that we're talking about an administration that couldn't manage the rollout of a website. What could possibly go wrong?
Both examples highlight the strange combination of hubris and panic that, as Pratap Chatterjee points out in "Hollywood Without the Happy Ending," seems to be the essence of so many of Washington's plans and actions at the moment. The urge to "manage" is invariably followed by shock at the unmanageability of this roiling globe of ours, followed by panic over plans gone desperately awry when things begin, utterly predictably, to happen unpredictably, followed of course by the next set of managerial plans. Is there no learning curve in Washington?