Catch-22 in Afghanistan

In the U.S. debate on Afghanistan, virtually all experts agree that it's not within the power of the American military alone to win the war. For that, Afghanistan needs its own military and police force, one that is truly representative of the people, and one that is not hopelessly corrupted by drug money and the selfish concerns of the Karzai government in Kabul.

The conundrum is that any Afghan military created by outsiders - and America, despite our image of ourselves, is naturally seen by most Afghans as a self-interested outsider - is apt to be viewed as compromised and illegitimate.

Committing more American troops and advisors only exacerbates this problem. The more U.S. troops we send, the more we're "in the face" of the Afghan people, jabbering at them in a language they don't understand. The more troops we send, moreover, the more likely it is that our troops will take the war's burdens on themselves. If history is any guide, we'll tend to push aside the "incompetent" and "unreliable" Afghan military that we're so at pains to create and celebrate.

We have a classic Catch-22. As we send more troops to stiffen Afghan government forces and to stabilize the state, their high-profile presence will serve to demoralize Afghan troops and ultimately to destabilize the state. The more the U.S. military takes the fight to the enemy, the less likely it is that our Afghan army-in-perpetual-reequipping-and-training will do so.

How to escape this Catch-22? The only answer that offers hope is that America must not be seen as an imperial master in Afghanistan. If we wish to prevail, we must downsize our commitment of troops; we must minimize our presence.

But if we insist on pulling the strings, we'll likely as not perform our own dance of death in this "graveyard of empires."

A little history. Some two centuries ago, and much like us, the globe-spanning British Empire attempted to extend its mastery over Afghanistan. It did not go well. The British diplomat in charge, Montstuart Elphinstone, noted in his book on "Caubool" the warning of an Afghan tribal elder he encountered: "We are content with discord, we are content with alarms, we are content with blood; but we will never be content with a master."

As imperial masters, British attitudes toward Afghans were perhaps best summed up in the Encyclopaedia Britannica, Ninth Edition (1875). The Afghans, according to the Britannica, "are familiar with death, and are audacious in attack, but easily discouraged by failure; excessively turbulent and unsubmissive to law or discipline; apparently frank and affable in manner, especially when they hope to gain some object, but capable of the grossest brutality when that hope ceases. They are unscrupulous in perjury, treacherous, vain, and insatiable in vindictiveness, which they will satisfy at the cost of their own lives and in the most cruel manner .... the higher classes are too often stained with deep and degrading debauchery."

One wonders what the Afghans had to say about the British.

The accuracy of this British depiction is not important; indeed, it says more about imperial British attitudes than it does Afghan culture. What it highlights is a tendency toward sneering superiority exercised by the occupier, whether that occupier is a British officer in the 1840s or an American advisor today. In the British case, greater familiarity only bred greater contempt, as the words of one British noteworthy, Sir Herbert Edwardes, illustrate. Rejecting Elphinstone's somewhat favorable estimate of their character, Edwardes dismissively noted that with Afghans, "Nothing is finer than their physique, or worse than their morale."

We should ponder this statement, for it could have come yesterday from an American advisor. If the words of British "masters" from 150 years ago teach us anything, it's that Afghanistan will never be ours to win. Nor is an Afghan army ours to create. Like the British, we might fine-tune Afghan physiques, but we won't be able to instill high morale and staying power.

And if we can't create an Afghan army that's willing to fight and die for Karzai or some other government we consider worthy of our support, we must face facts: There's no chance of winning at any remotely sustainable or sensible cost to the United States.

Nevertheless, we seem eager to persist in our very own Catch-22. We may yet overcome it, but only by courting a singularly dangerous paradox. In Vietnam, our military spoke of destroying villages in order to save them. Will we have to destroy the American military in order to save Afghanistan?

For that may be the ultimate price of "victory" in Afghanistan.

 

Comments

[GreatNews27]

Seeing that the military will revolt, the generals will resign, and Petrayus will go on Fox to tell the public that the president is a terrorist, Obama really has no choice but to send more forces to be slaughtered in the hell-hole of Afganistan. I'll bet you didn't know you lived in a military dictatorship, did you? Well, now you do. Enjoy!!

[greyhound2]

The US can not possibly win in Afganistan as the US has a huge supply problem to the other side of the planet due to distance. The original enemy, Al Quida, has skipped the border to Pakistan, which is a much larger, richer country with nuclear weapons. The Taliban were the group supported by the US with stinger missles in its fight with the Soviets in the 1980's and who took over. The Taliban are fighting on their own home turf, they don't need to go anywhere to find a target. The US has already lost this conflict and staying there only increases the ultimate cost. Who wants to be the last American soldier to die in Afganistan for nothing?

[den1953]

There is no winning this war Afghanistan doesn't want the war to be won they just want to control the drugs and if the US would like to settle this quick destroy the poppy crop all of it that would win everything find out the fastest best solution to kill the plants and you win!

[melpol]

International Heroin dealers will soon own Afghanistan. The nation that exports the purest Heroin controls the world. The competition among drug dealers to get high grade Heroin is fierce, one pure gram can be stretched 100 times. Only the well connected get the pure and become billionaires. But they in return owe more than money to their benefactors, it is allegiance to a foreign power. Thousands of well connected drug dealers have been placed in every city of the world, they exert tremendous influence on governments. They have become wealthy enough to buy militias and assassins. An Octopus with tentacles made up of Heroin dealers has taken control of the world.

[gutenmorgen]

I am very reluctant if not loath to make any clear predictions about what will happen in Afghanistan. The lessons from Vietnam and Iraq are that very, very few analysts were correct in predicting "what would happen there". Our ambassador in Japan at the time was incredibly prescient when he averred that Vietnam should return to a status of political oblivion which it so richly deserves and which has actually come about!
Having said this I understand the intrinsic weakness of our war/occupation of that country. Our administration is waging that war/occupation at the end of a long and dangerously vulnerable supply line, a situation a la Stalingrad. It is waging a war in a country that has not had a truly national government, national army, or national police force for many generations. Most of these considerations seem to spell disaster but spelling is not a certainty.

[Soulsurfer]

Out of Afghanistan NOW.

[nematsadat]

Dear Mr. Astore, it is obvious from your writing that your knowledge about Afghanistan history and culture is very limited. First, let me begin by telling you that "Afghani" is not the correct name for the nationality. The people of Afghanistan are Afghans, the name of the currency of Afghanistan is Afghani. Second, as a native Afghan, I find it extremely insulting that you continue the false myth that Afghanistan is a "graveyard of empires." There are many countries that have resisted froeign occupation and defeated the invader. Afghanistan didn't destroy the British or Soviet empire; there were a multitude of reasons that brought down those empires and not just Afghan tribesmen. Third, downsizing the US and allied mission will reduce the short-term costs of the war but risks long-term, unquantifiable consequences such as a complete Taliban take-over of Kabul and extremists taking over Islamabad both of which are very possible. The possibility of nuclear arms in Pakistan in the hands of terrorists is a danger for all mankind. For a thorough analysis beyond your limited tactical moves, I have written a strategic analysis, "Why Afghansitan is the new post-Cold War Berlin" and you can view at:
http://ohmygov.com/blogs/general_news/archive/2009/10/30/why-afghanistan-is-the-new-post-cold-war-berlin.aspx

[William Astore - Huffpost Blogger]

Thank you for the link and your comment. I agree that Afghanistan is important, but where we disagree, I think, is what the U.S. can and should do in Afghanistan. I believe escalation, or sending 40,000 or more U.S. troops to the region, would be a major blunder for a host of reasons: 1) Fighting in Afghanistan is extremely expensive to the U.S., during a recessionary period in which we're running huge deficits; 2) Logistics are horrific, due to tenuous and unsecure supply lines; 3) The more troops we send, the more we'll appear to be occupiers; 4) The more troops we send, the more Afghan troops will be pushed aside, which will tend to discourage needed reforms; 5) The more troops we send, the more military imperatives will dominate all options in Afghanistan, including diplomacy; 6) The more resources we commit to Afghanistan, the more prestige we commit, making it that much more difficult for us to withdraw (and we'll have to withdraw, eventually).

A minor point: You're right, of course, about "Afghani" referring to the currency. But several dictionaries I consulted say that "Afghan" and "Afghani" are synonymous and can be used interchangeably.

Finally, no insult was intended by referring to Afghanistan as the "graveyard of empires." In a way, I would argue that this phrase is meant as a compliment to the independence and fighting spirit of the Afghan people: a warning to foreigners not to try to occupy and dominate Afghanistan.

[melpol]

It would only be possible for Karzai to clean up government if he stopped countless tons of Heroin from being exported. But he would never betray his closest friends who are drug traders. If he did his government would be replaced by his brother. Karzai also owes allegiance to American bullet manufacturers, there are millions in Afghanistan that he promised to kill.

[S1m0n]

Afghanistan is one - scrub that, afghanistan is about ten - of the most violent, hence militarised, nations on earth. They have endured nearly four decades of constant war. They do not need remedial military training from the US, or from anyone.

[dzagama]

Finally, we agree. :)

[David Gallaher]

Had a variety of experiences in VN. One of the longest was at the HQ of CAP, the Combined Action Program in Danang. I saw that, from the top, there was a load of "winning hearts and minds" good will coming down through our funnel. Trouble was there were too many leaks in the pipe before the good feelings got to hearts and minds "on the ground." Forget about years when discussing hearts and minds. Think decades minimum. Even then... for what? For what?