As negotiations closed last weekend in Geneva, Mohammad Javad Zarif, Iran's foreign minister, told reporters that he hoped this deal would "remove any doubts about the exclusively peaceful nature of Iran's nuclear program." John Kerry painted the negotiations in a different light, saying that the deal "impedes (Iran's nuclear) progress in a very dramatic way." Some have called the deal a tectonic shift in the region, while others have scoffed and written it off as just another cog in a machine that won't work. So what's really going on? I've broken down the implications of the deal into seven key points.
Why does Iran want nukes so badly?
Nuclear weapons make countries relevant. Nations enrich uranium and seek nuclear capability so that they can attain a certain level of both national security and prestige among world powers. For an Islamic country in the Middle East, that sort national security would signal a permanence amid severe volatility and an ongoing upheaval of the status quo. As the centrifuges spin, and Iran hurtles closer to that dreaded 90 percent enrichment mark, it becomes more of a viable force and louder voice on the global stage. As one White House official said this week, it's a matter of national pride.
(Additionally, a majority of Iranians believe that the nation should have a nuclear power program as an alternative form of energy.)
Obviously, that's a deeply flawed mentality given the realities of Iran's current predicament. The problem, of course, is that no one else wants Iran to have that "security" - at least for now.
Why are all these countries - many of whom have nuclear weapons themselves - so devoted to stopping Iran from having them?
The argument goes something like this: nukes aren't the coveted bargaining chip that Iran thinks they are, nor are their attainment the threshold Iran needs to cross to be taken seriously. Iranians celebrated in the streets Sunday as the first round of negotiations closed and officials announced an interim agreement that would relieve up to $7 billion in sanctions. There's a sense that the waters of Iran's economy will begin to flow after years of self- and externally-imposed drought.
Economically robust countries with a clear future, strong infrastructure, and room for growth (and, yes, with the money to build a strong military) get a voice. Iranians are poor. Oil revenues have been cut back by half as crippling sanctions have taken effect in the last half-decade. And because of past choices and priorities, Iran is stuck. That's the goal of sanctions: to force hostile nations to decide between continuing to implement its antagonistic policies and allowing the well-being of its own economic sectors.
Would Iran really bomb Israel?
Beyond smoke and mirrors and rhetoric to inflame the radicals, Iran has no real rationale to bomb Israel. In a region with no shortage of problematic countries, Iran is far and away the most ostracized in the international community. With a 20 percent global approval rating, it is more politically isolated than Syria and treated as a greater threat than are its neighbors. Statements by government officials, state-employed scientists, and others in positions of authority brim with rhetoric that scares Israelis and supporters of the Jewish state and disturb those with a stake in the region's stability. But Iran wants a bomb for the same reason the United States, Russia, Pakistan, and India wanted one: to have a bomb. Organizations like United Against a Nuclear Iran and the diplomats who met in Geneva last weekend know that Iran very likely has no intention of bombing Israel.
- The UN's premier nuclear watchdog, the International Atomic Energy Authority (IAEA), now gets to inspect the assembly of centrifuges and uranium mines through surveillance cameras and on-the-ground visits at Iranian nuclear facilities. These inspections will be daily at Natanz and Fordow and more sporadic at Arak.
- All uranium that Iran has enriched to 20 percent must now be either diluted to a lower percentage or converted to oxide form.
- Iran can keep the centrifuges that exist, but can't install new ones. In other words, the centrifuges that have been set up, but are not operating, can't start operating.
- Iran can't enrich any new uranium beyond 5 percent.
Cool bullet-points, but what do they mean?
They mean that in a perfect hypothetical, Iran is deciding through this deal that the health and prosperity of its people are more important than its production of nuclear weapons. The costs of sanctions outweigh the benefits of highly-enriched uranium.
Okay, but do you really buy that?
No, not really. Many - including Israel, Saudi Arabia, any several top American lawmakers - are skeptical of the suddenly-cooperative Islamic Republic, which has a history of wanting it both ways and refusing to compromise. Yossi Klein-Halevi wrote Monday of Israel's belief that Iranian officials "will persist in doing what they've done all along: lie and cheat, but this time under the cover of a deal."
In truth, the eased sanctions are only a small fraction of the billions in frozen assets and halted contracts that have piled up in recent years. But Bibi Netanyahu sees this deal as the world's way of giving Iran a few months of carte blanche. Michael Doran, a Brookings Institution fellow who once ran the National Security Council, agreed on Sunday, writing that the agreement signals America's implicit willingness to channel money to Iran's terrorist proxies in the Middle East - Hezbollah and the henchmen of Syrian President Bashar al-Assad.
Some commentators have also noted that the emergence of an Iran deal could very well be the death of Israeli-Palestinian negotiations under the Obama administration. Nabil Abu Rudeineh, an advisor to Mahmoud Abbas, said publicly that the American decision to facilitate the agreement in spite of Israel's strong opposition sent "an important message to Israel" on the United States' priorities.
There's plenty of justification for being suspicious of Iran's intentions. In October 2003, representatives of France, Germany, Britain, the European Union, and Iran met in Paris and struck a deal that temporarily suspended Iran's production of enriched uranium. This was intended to be something of an interim agreement, like the one announced Sunday - a liminal process that would eventually lead to the real accord.
There was no real accord. In early 2005, Iran's parliament voted to resume the nation's uranium enrichment program "for peaceful use" only. Mahmoud Ahmadinejad was elected president later that year, and nuclear facilities like Isfahan ratcheted up their production. That September, the IAEA condemned Iran and talks with the Paris group broke down.
In 2006, the UN Security Council's permanent members and Germany (the so-called "P5+1") reached out to Iran, offering to open new trade routes and allow for several light water reactors in exchange for the suspension, again, of reprocessing and enrichment. Iran turned down the offer and opened its heavy water facility at Arak later that year.
The P5+1 went through similar processes in 2009, 2011, and again earlier this year. Each time, talks broke down because Iran either failed to comply or reneged on a promise.
What's different now?
Just the president of Iran, really. The only tangible difference I perceive is a newly open, non-hostile relationship between the Iranian leader - President Hassan Rouhani - and the leaders of the P5+1. Rouhani was involved in Iran's earlier suspensions of enrichment and has generally been more of a mollifier and an appeaser of global interests than his direct predecessor, who advocated and embodied an outwardly antagonistic approach to the Western world.