When the Iraq city of Ramadi fell to ISIS last May, Senator John McCain described it as "terribly significant." Strangely, neither he nor any other critic of the President's Middle East policy has spoken of its recapture in such dramatic terms. With the election less than a year away, they no doubt wish to avoid acknowledging that Obama's approach might in fact be working. Until Iraqi forces consolidate their hold on the city and secure it from an Islamic State counterattack, of course, it will not be possible to assess the lasting importance of the victory. Even at this early stage, however, some observations about the two battles of Ramadi can be made.
Neither the precipitous fall of the city nor its liberation in and of themselves amount to great victories. The manner in which both the battles were fought, though, is emblematic of security trends at the time each event occurred. In the spring of 2015, an estimated 600 ISIS fighters vanquished an Iraqi force nearly 10 times its size. Many Iraq soldiers simply ran away, raising serious questions about the efficacy of the training they had received from the United States. Only the Shi'a militias and the Kurdish Peshmerga seemed capable of standing up to the Islamic State. This fact confirmed the depressing conclusion that ethnic and religious loyalties trumped support for the Iraqi nation, which many have concluded exists in name only.
The recapture of the Ramadi in late December was also a relatively small affair. Approximately 10,000 troops from the Iraqi National Army and local security forces battled an estimated 1,000 ISIS fighters ensconced in a dense urban area laced with IEDs and booby traps. The Iraqis took several months to retake the city. Nonetheless, as several commentators have noted, the Iraqi troops succeeded without the aid of Shi'a militias or American ground troops. U.S. Special Forces probably supported the operation as forward air controllers, directing strikes at ISIS targets. Their invisibility, though, is a sign that the Iraqis are stepping up to fight. Finally, the Iraqi government is promising to give local police and tribal forces responsibility for security in the city, the same approach taken during the successful 2006 Anbar Awakening.
Prime Minister Haider al-Badi's bold claim that "2016 will be the year of the big and final victory, when Daesh's (ISIS') presence in Iraq is terminated" may be optimistic, but his promise to recapture Mosul during the coming year now seems plausible. Although not a dramatic victory, the recapture of Ramadi is at least a sign of hope. It may also be evidence that the strategy of supporting local troops with American air power and small Special Forces teams is achieving results. At the very least, the Iraqis have started to fight their own war.