Abolhassan Bani-Sadr was the first president of Iran after the 1979 revolution. He now lives in exile outside Paris. This article was written exclusively for the Global Viewpoint Network. It has been translated from the French. President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad's second inauguration is scheduled for Aug. 5.
PARIS -- Within six short weeks since the recent election, the government of the Islamic Republic has been publicly divided, delegitimized, challenged and weak. As a result, we can now draw some analytical parallels between the current regime and the pre-1979 monarchy, and between the two occasions of political unrest.
Historically speaking, the Iranian government has enjoyed four sources of legitimacy: its ability to manage state affairs (and thus the people's consent), its official religious authority, its commitment to Iran's independence, and a stable base of social support. All of these have now been irretrievably undone.
The massive vote rigging on June 12 brought President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad's ability to run the state's affairs under intense public scrutiny, and the spontaneous uprising of the people in its wake openly removed the government's political legitimacy.
Shortly after, in his speech at Friday prayer, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, the supreme leader, declared war on the people, threatening a violent crackdown unless the results of the election were duly accepted. This removed the last vestiges of the regime's religious legitimacy as well.
It had been waning for some time already, not only because it stands in opposition to Islam understood as a discourse of freedom, but even within the regime and among traditionalists. Ayatollah Ali Sistani (the greatest Shia clergyman in Iraq) was opposed to the principle of Velayat-e Faqih (the rule of the imamate), and Ayatollah Hossein Ali Montazeri (Khomeini's would-be successor who later became his critic) had argued that the doctrine was simply a proof of shirk, or false God-making.
Even the traditional sharia, which the government had used to justify many of its actions, had been emptied of its original content and reduced to a theory of general violence. Ayatollah Mohammad Mesbah Yazdi, who can be seen as Ahmadinejad's guru, wrote a book entitled War and Jihad in Islam in which he argued that violence is intrinsic to and necessary for human beings. He extended this to claim that as the supreme leader is appointed by God, his use of violence is legitimate.
Far from strengthening the regime's religious authority, however, Yazdi's theory of legitimate violence undermined it. It also violated another of the regime's major sources of legitimacy, the constitution. The Iranian constitution states unambiguously that the authority of the supreme leader, the president and the parliament should emanate from the people's vote, not from God.
Velayat-e-Faqih compromised this from the start. Apart from this, the regime had already lost two of the three bases of power that had historically made despotism possible in Iran: the monarchy, the economic rule of the bazaar in the cities and large landowners in the country, and the clergy. Of these only the clergy is left, and its power is now precarious. It has therefore bolstered itself with a fourth tool of Iranian despotism: using the threat of foreign powers to justify perpetual secret dealings and open crises with other states, primarily the U.S.
George W. Bush's presidency was thus a fruitful time for the Iranian regime, as the constant menace of military action and economic sanctions strengthened its control over the population.
Barack Obama's new, non-confrontational approach to Iran has now placed the regime in a difficult position. It can no longer portray itself as the defender of sovereign independence against foreign intrusion. In fact, to the contrary, new popular slogans such as "death to Russia" suggest that people are critical of the government's own foreign policies. Here, too, the ruling regime has lost its legitimacy.
Finally, the regime's first and foremost base of support, the clergy, has been replaced by a military-financial mafia. The Revolutionary Guard occupies the entire government and believes that the clergy's only task is not to run the country, but simply to lend its legitimacy to those who do.
Like the monarchy before it, the power of the present regime rests on both an internal and external foundation, which makes it vulnerable to public unrest. We can draw a comparison between Jimmy Carter's election in 1976 and Obama's election in 2008. Iranians viewed Carter's election as a challenge to the monarchy's main source of external power, U.S. support for the Shah's regime. In the same way, if Obama continues to abandon hawkish policies toward Iran and deprives the regime of the crisis factor, this uprising may follow a similar trajectory.
There are other similarities as well. The popular chant "Velayat-e Faqih is dead," for example, is reminiscent of slogans during the run-up to the 1979 revolution, in which people declared the Shah's regime to be illegitimate. And, just as in 1979, this uprising is nonviolent.
But the present movement differs from the political unrest that led to the 1979 revolution in some important ways. While the first actions of dissent in 1979 were located outside the regime, the present opposition began from within the regime itself when the election was rigged against Mir Hossein Mousavi.
Of course, there are strong indicators that the uprising has now moved beyond the regime to become genuinely popular. But it still needs time to spread throughout the entire country; time for it to be possible for "flowers to conquer bullets," as was the case in the 1979 uprising.
The 1979 revolution is a historical event, while this uprising is still in process. Where might it lead? In part, the future may depend on the outcome of a political deadlock created by Khamenei himself. The facts that the election was rigged and that Khamenei attempted to stage a "velvet coup d'etat" have polarized both sides.
Changing position in either camp would be political suicide. Khamenei and Ahmadinejad cannot admit that they rigged the election, since doing so would strip them of their remaining legal and political legitimacy. Former President Ali Akbar Rafsanjani is now under severe attack by Khamenei's supporters, and Mousavi and Mehdi Karoubi, another presidential candidate, know that they will lose both the people's support and will be at the mercy of the unforgiving regime if they submit to Khamenei's demands.
Several outcomes of this crisis are possible. Historically, the regime's top tactic for maintaining control has been to divide society's elites into two competing groups and eliminate one. Now, as this process has reached into the heart of the regime, it has become lethal. The regime's own cadres oppose Ahmadinejad, and the deepening economic crisis has both deprived the regime of resources and spurred further public discontent. This has provided an opening in which the Iranian people can determine the outcome of the struggle.
If the Iranian people cease resisting, times will become even harder; if they continue, their uprising will be transformed into a full-fledged revolution. This would make the establishment of democracy a real possibility. All indications now point to the Iranians' determination to see this uprising through.
© 2009 GLOBAL VIEWPOINT NETWORK/TRIBUNE MEDIA SERVICES
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LOOK AT IT THIS WAY SHAH'S GOVT & ISLAMIC GOVT [BOTH] GOVT'S CAUSE SUFFERING TO
IT'S OWN PEOPLE ! BRUTALITY CONTROLING , INJUSTICE FOR IT'S PEOPLE ,NO PROSPERITY
ISLAMIC GOVT BY IT'S WEIGHT [RULE] WILL BEGIN TO FRACTURE ! MASS OF PEOPLE [unified]
vs mulah's authorty ???
LOOK AT IT THIS WAY , THE SHAH 'S GOVT & THE ISLAMIC GOVT / IT'S THE IRANIAN PEOPLE
WHO HAS SUFERED in both govt's ! BRUTALITY CONTROL, INJUSTICE FOR THE PEOPLE &
NO PROSPERITY ! SAVAK OR BASIJIS both , hounds form hell !
When someone tells me they are a ‘Christian’, I immediately wonder what exactly does that mean they will do? Do they support torture, turning the other cheek, loving their enemies, giving to the poor ?
In the same vein, when someone states they support ‘democracy’ in Iran, I wonder what does that really mean?
Do they admit that the US government imposes economic sanctions, spends hundreds of millions to destabilize Iran, funds proxies to conduct what must be called ‘terrorist’ activities in Iran, and after invading and occupying Iran’s neighbors, repeatedly threatens overt military strikes. Do they argue that current and past US actions support ‘democracy’ in Iran? Do they recognize ulterior US geopolitical and economic motives? Do they advocate continuing current jingoist US policies and activities? Do they ignore US 'covert activities', or the effect of economic sanctions (oft considered as tantamount to an act of war)?.
Or do they first of all demand that US leaders back off and end their hostile activities as the best way to promote democracy and self-determination in Iran?
TROUGH OUT PAST HISTORY AND OTHER RELIGIONS peoples faith inGOD[ RELIGION]
ONE CHOICE IN A WALK OF FAITH WITH GOD [ gives the faithful morals & rules of conduct &
fellowship with GOD ] BUT TO MIX RELIGION & GOVT TOGETHER the unseen trouble is [power]
all that WEIGHT of ISLAMIC LAW { SHARIA } UP IN YOUR FACE OR BREATHING DOWN ONES BACK
PEOPLES VOICES NO LONGER ABLE TO SPEAK OUT . THE AUTHORTY OF CALIPH OR THE SHADOW OF GOD [MULLAHS] . NO CHECKS & BALANCES IN ISLAMIC GOVT {SHARIA } NO INDIVIDUAL RIGHTS ! SURPPRESS THE PEOPLES VOICE IN LIFE CHOCES !
I wholeheartedly agree, Mr. Bani-Sadr.
This comes from someone who has close relationships with many Iranians and knows their sentiments an opinions first-hand.
Mr. Bani-Sadr
Actually, any fall of the present Iranian government would be more comparable to the fall of Mossadegh and the takeover by the Shah.
The elected Mossadegh government fell due to the connivance and opposition of the US and its allies.
The dictatorial Shah government took over with US backing and subsequently fell DESPITE its support from the US and allies.
Only if the US were to end the economic sanctions, cease its border raids, stop funding terrorist groups in Iran, and withdraw from the occupations of Iran's neighbors, and then were all that followed by a popular revolt in Iran would your pathetic attempt to draw an analogy with the popular opposition to the Shah make any sense whatsoever.
I am impressed .... you know more about Iran than the former President of Iran... Someone who was there for the 1979 Revolution. Someone who lived through and probably witnessed the coup putting the Shah in power
I don't see how the you can compare 1953 and 2009..
1953 - US/UK connivance
2009 - Iranian regime connivance.
Big Big difference
Wing
You are impressed too easily - by political authority figures. Similar arguments are used by those who unquestioningly support the US president, because he has 'inside knowledge'.
Bani-Sadr has an ax to grind (with some justification) with the current Iranian regime. That is why he and (obsequiously) you are ignoring the current interference by the US in Iranian politics in the attempt to effect 'regime change'.
The comparison of the current situation with the CIA backed overthrow of an elected government in 1953 is all too real. Like it or not, the current Iranian government has more support and legitimacy than one that might gain power thanks to US sanctions, NGO-funded agents, and US direct and proxy military actions.
It's absurd to reduce the massive opposition to western interference. The theocrats have alienated huge sections of their population irrespective of other countries' actions. If anything, the clumsy US policy since 1979 has been a boon to the clerics by giving them an (ineffective) enemy to rally behind.
Now we'll see if the Iranians can liberate themselves from IRI.
It is very convenient to ignore the effects of western sanctions and interference in order to contend western supported actors are acting ‘freely‘..
One may as well claim the Iraqi and Afghan governments were also ‘freely’ chosen.
The point is that one should not be making uncritical claims of ‘massive’ opposition based on sensationalistic and highly selective western media coverage. There is plenty of evidence the majority of Iranians support their current government and do not want it overthrown, particularly with western involvement.
Nor should one be cheerleading for the overthrow of elected governments that US leaders are attempting to replace for obvious geo-political and economic reasons having nothing to do with welfare of native populations.
What is absurd is the belief that a weaker replacement government will be allowed to put the interests of its own people first, free of self-serving US political, military, and economic interference.
Instead of promoting jingoism, time would be better spent getting the US house in order, and restoring a level of democracy there. Then perhaps the game of Grand Theft World could be ended, along with the continuous foreign intrusions by the US military and its proxies.
Yes! VERY interesting read anti-tazi.
And thanks, Mr. Bani-Sadr, for your much valued input here.
As many other Americans, I am fascinated with the once great Persian Empire. Like many Americans, I do not see how a theocracy can ever meet a country's needs for both administration of the nation's business and meet the needs of a variety of religions. No doubt, the religious rule in Iran now has run astray of the modern methods of running a country and the desires of most of it's people. I also hope I understand the unique history of the Iranian people enough when I say that a modified "western style" democracy could still allow Iran to pay homage to it's powerful Middle East roots.
Every American should take the time to become literate about this area NOW! We are NOT all there is in this great world.
From Wiki: e was elected to a four-year term as President on January 25, 1980, receiving 78.9 percent of the vote in a competitive election against Ahmad Madani, Hassan Habibi, Sadegh Tabatabaee, Dariush Forouhar, Sadegh Ghotbzadeh, Kazem Sami, Mohammad Makri, Hassan Ghafourifard, and Hassan Ayat, and inaugurated on February 4. Khomeini remained the Supreme Leader of Iran, with the constitutional authority to dismiss the President. The inaugural ceremonies were held at the hospital where Khomeini was recovering from a heart ailment. [2]
Abol-hassan Banisadr (Persian: ابوالحسن بنی�صدر; born 22 March 1933) was the first President of Iran, following the 1979 Iranian Revolution and the abolition of the monarchy.H
Banisadr was not an Islamic cleric; Khomeini had insisted that clerics should not run for positions in the government. In August and September 1980, Banisadr survived two helicopter crashes near the Iranian border with Iraq.
Banisadr soon fell out with Khomeini, who reclaimed the power of Commander-in-Chief on June 10, 1981
Fortunately I had a little background on him before I started reading. It really is important to understand the historical context from which he is writing.
It has become clear that the goals of the Islamic revolution that brought down the Shaw were not achieved. The power and wealth just changed and remained concentrated into the hands of a different group of thugs. The lives of the people of Iran have not improved nor has their economy. Unemployment is worse especially among the young.
It is hard to predict if or when the majority of the people will truly seek change, the election could not do that when the results were rigged.
Spot on!
.iranian.c om/main/20 09/jul/rev olution-wh ich-first- was-not
The Revolution Which At First, Was Not
In examining the Iranian Revolution, Westerners were too focused on what did change rather than on what remained the same
http://www
anti-tazi,
Thank you for the link to Steven Goldstein's post. Must read!!
Excellent reading! Some concrete factors to consider: Modern-age toys,like computors and networking represent a tidal-wave of young people in iran who are NOT..truni ng back to the dark ages,where these'mulahs' living in caves gained power.Iran 's youth will prevail! and sooner or later,if this represive-backwards regime attempts to 'control' society,then they will be destroyed! his will garuntee the freedom seeker victory,and provide religious rule a huge defeat. but freedom of religion will actually gain,and democracy allows this,in MANY MORE COUNTRIES,LIKE POLAND-SOUTH KOREA,EASTERN BLOCK COUNTRIES ETC.
You can not have it both ways,since modern society and ancient religious rule will not mix! Iranians want to be 'hip' and enjoy life-not suffer via religious extreems.T
For nearly three decades, Mr. Bani-Sadr, I have wondered how the likes you, Mehdi Bazargan, the first Prime Minister; Dr. Yazdi, the first Minister of Foreign Affairs; leaders of the National Front, Ayatollah Taleghani, Ayatollah Montazeri, and the Grand Ayatollahs in Qum could approve of a constitution that included the fundamentally un-Islamic principle of Velayat-e Faqih – The Regency of the Theologian – that gave Ayatollah Khomeini near dictatorial powers for life?
According to Iran's Constitution, the Supreme Leader is responsible for:
Defining and supervising of "the general policies of the Islamic Republic of Iran," both domestic and foreign;
He is the commander-in-chief of the armed forces and controls the Islamic Republic's intelligence and security operations;
He alone can declare war or peace;
He has the power to appoint and dismiss the leaders of the judiciary;
He has the power to appoint and dismiss the executives of the state radio and television networks;
He has the power to appoint and dismiss the supreme commander of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps;
He also appoints six of the twelve members of the Council of Guardians that has the power to oversee the activities of the Parliament and to determine which candidates are qualified to run for public office, and
He also has the power to dismiss the President and for all practical purposes that is what happened to you and you literally have to flee Iran to save your life.
He is, in a sense, but a Shah in clerical robes.
What is interesting is the actually moderate response of the regime. The basiji are in no way equivalent to the tanks of Tienamen square or Soviet Hungary. They are not even Napolean's 'wiff of grapeshot'. We like to point in horror but this is actually a fairly moderate response for an authoritarian regime i.e. deaths in the 10s not 1000s. That tells me the regime is actually conflicted about their actions; either morally or just worried about their clerical support.
doctrinal' pursuit. His inability to extert control over this important leg of the IRI sytem can prove fatal because the system endows the 'corporate body' of the mullahs with so much authority and Khamenei's credentials were suspect from the beginning.
As I understand the system, the Supreme leaders authority is not absolute because he does not control the process of mullahhood to coin a term. Becoming a Mullah is essentailly an 'academic/
Does anyone really understand how significant this statement is? This man was the first elected President of the Iranian Revolution. He derived his credibility and power directly from Khomeini. If he has chosen at this point to engage in this fashion, and to address the events in Iran in this way, this is absolutely huge news. If the battle is being joined by Bani Sadr, the end of the current regime may truly be near.
There are some indications, mentioned by Borzhou Daragahi on Lehrer News Hour last Thurs or Fri?, that green-uniformed police tasked with controlling the protesters, are expressing sympathy with them instead. The capitulation of the enforcers is a tipping point in the progress of a rebellion.
The green uniforms, however, are significant: Iran has multiple levels of police & military forces. iirc, the green uniforms are generally akin to municipal police forces, more likely to be of and closer to the locals. I believe Basiji wear blue uniforms; they are probably more heavily armed, more likely to have been recruited from someplace else other than where they are stationed, therefore less attached to the locality; more ideologically driven.
The introduction to Bani Sadr's article is unfortunately insufficient to give his background.
Bani Sadr had to ESCAPE Iran, as the regime (including some of the current reformers and hardlinesr, Khamenei ,Rafsanjani included) deposed him (he had to disguise as a woman to be able to escape according to some sources). He has been in opposition in France for last 28 years. He does not have strong followers though.
This analysis is mostly correct and similar to almost all of the other Iranian analysers'.
So unfortunately it doesn't categorize as "huge news".
I think the point that the author seems to be missing is that the people just elected Ammedeinjad
I know Mousavi's supporters are saying that he won, but he didn't
Frankly I find it very sad that whatever legitimate protest against the undemocratic clerical structure of the country was hijacked by this Mousavi guy. It makes it quite easy to dismiss, especially if the protesters are claiming the goal of democracy, because Ammedanijad represents that more than Mousavi does
I haven't read of anyone disputing the 80%++ turnout, meaning the backers of the reform movement thought voting was worth their while this time. There's no way that translates to an Ahmadinejad landslide. I was/ am very skeptical of Mousavi, but given the undemocratic structure of IRI, he was their choice and is now backed by a massive freedom movement. Ahmadinejad and Khamanei represent the most backward and vicious aspects of IRI.
This is an article by - Abolhassan Bani-Sadr ... the first president of Iran - an Iranian, and a prominent Iranian politician no less, who is intimately involved with the undercurre nts,intric acies, and intrigues of Iranian politics, and you, squaker, exemplar prime of coherent grammatical construction and superlative syntax, with your frank expression of condescending superiority, think HE is missing the point.
And what is your point again? That 'this Mousavi guy' has ruined any chance of democratic reform by being a sore loser? Really?
The man is pointing out that there is a fissure in the superstructure of Iranian politics that goes to the very heart of the Iranian Constitution, challenging the basis of the principle of Velayat-e Faqih (the rule of the imamate) and the rule of Ayatollah Ali Khamenei. he is saying in effect, that Mousavi, and Ammedanijad, for that matter, are bit players in a slowly swelling political undercurrent that may well bring about a regime change as fundamental and consequential as the one in 1979 when the Shah was deposed and the clergy (and only part of the clergy at that) two stepped into the vacuum.
Mousavi is merely a symptom of a growing discontent within the body politic with a clerical rule that has lost its "ability to manage state affairs (and thus the people's consent), its official religious authority, its commitment to Iran's independence, and a stable base of social support." Mousavi is hardly the issue here.
Eloquently put. Thanks.
ranbureau. com/loomin g-confront ation-kham enei-irgc/
Looming showdown between IRGC and Khameni?
http://teh
Who are they?
nian.com/m ain/2009/j ul/who-are -they
The real “youth of the lower depths
http://ira
You seem to comprehend what is going on, unlike many of the stragglers still talking about the election and singing praises to the Basiji, IRGC, Interior Ministry and Guardian Council.
Fanned and faved.
Missing the point. "From Iran will rise above the ashes",
by Amir Soltani Sheikholeslami and Rita Nakashima Brock, Boston Globe:
Iran's crisis is no longer about the sanctity of Ahmadinejad's vote. It is about Khamenei's abduction of the republic and usurpation of religion. Khamenei has shattered his religious authority by converting the Iranian state into a caliphate whose guardians prey on the corpse of Iran's children in the name of guarding the constitution of an absent sovereign: the Hidden Imam.
Will the regime collapse and take the country with them, or take the entire middle east with them. The Shah left rather than fight the revolution, these mullahs will kill as many people as necessary to retain power.
The Shah was our puppet.
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