The major stumbling block to ending the genocide in Darfur is China. As the Sudanese government's largest ally, China consistently vetoes UN Security Council resolutions asking for sanctions on Sudan and resolutely opposes the introduction of a UN security force to protect Darfuris from the aggression of the Sudanese government and their janjaweed proxies.
Since the most militarily powerful Western members of the security council--the United States, Britain, and their NATO partners--are unlikely to intervene in Darfur and the Sudanese government's aggression is unlikely to cease until the Darfuris have been wiped out, the onus is on China to stop the violence.
China has been reluctant to do so for a number of reasons. The first is historical--the Chinese resolutely oppose intervention and the abrogation of sovereignty because they remember the violation of their own sovereignty by the European imperial powers, who occupied sections of their country and imposed the opium trade upon them. In addition, the brutal World War II-era Japanese occupation with its slave labor and massacres is ever present in Chinese minds. Underlying the historical trauma are more self-interested reasons to preserve sovereignty at any price. The Chinese fear that if they allow the expansion of international powers, it will one day be used against them for their own human rights abuses.
Another reason is much less principled. China is desperate for resources, most importantly oil. China imports 25% of its oil from Africa, and by 2020 60% of its oil will be imported from abroad. Therefore, China has embarked on a policy in Africa of cozying up to regimes abandoned by the West because of their human rights records, offering financial, infrastructure, and military aid in return for lucrative oil stakes. Africa has proven to be the best arena for this effort, as many Africans harbor a fondness for China based on its Cold War-era patronage of secular socialist regimes.
Sudan is one of China's client states, offering China a 40% stake in the international consortium responsible for extracting Sudanese oil. In addition to deriving diplomatic support from China, Sudan also derives an economic benefit, as China provides a large and lucrative market for its oil, one of the few that will still do business with an international pariah. Sixty-four percent of Sudan's oil exports go to China. Thus, China has been resistant to any measures that would compromise this bargain.
However, China's embrace of the murderous Sudanese government has complicated its other major endeavor: to be taken seriously as a "responsible" rising power. Its intransigence over Darfur has been heavily criticized, and Africans are beginning to notice the downsides to embracing China, whose actual behavior in Africa belies its "hands-off" rhetoric. For example, the speaker of the Liberian parliament was impeached under heavy Chinese pressure in mid-January, his sole crime being that he met with representatives of Taiwan, with whom China is engaged in a bitter diplomatic rivalry. And poor working conditions at Chinese-owned copper mines in Africa have also triggered riots.
In the interests of improving its image, China is publicizing its efforts to lobby the Sudanese government to peacefully resolve the Darfur issue. However, China still will not publicly pressure the Sudanese nor vote for sanctions or peacekeepers. It remains to be seen whether China's diplomacy is a sincere effort to offer the Sudanese a face-saving way out or just a cosmetic measure designed to appease world opinion. Either way, the ball rests entirely in the Chinese court, as they are ultimately the ones with the most influence over the Sudanese.
Genocide in Darfur is not going away, and instability there has spread to neighboring countries such as the Central African Republic and Chad. No matter how many times Chinese diplomats protest the opposite, it is increasingly obvious that the Sudanese army and its janjaweed proxies are being enabled by the Chinese, both militarily, in that they are armed with Chinese weapons, and diplomatically. China must decide between the resources provided by a client state and the larger issue of whether it wants to be taken seriously as a responsible world power. It cannot have both. If China wants to fuel the perception that it is a rapacious, imperialistic, and irresponsible power, it will continue to blindly support its Sudanese ally even as the Darfur conflict metasizes into a regional war.
If it wants to be seen as a responsible, wise, and stabilizing power that has the real interests of Africans at heart, it will do something to reign in Khartoum. Choosing to pressure Sudan is in China's best interests--if China bluntly powers its way across Africa backing any yahoo with a gun who will give them resources, they'll quickly wear out their welcome in the same way that the Americans have. But realistically the Chinese will not publicly abandon the Sudanese--it would be a show of weakness and a tremendous loss of face.
Here's where the US can help them. What China really wants is to be respected as a legitimate world power. And nothing would be better to deflect criticism of their own abysmal human rights record and support of unsavory dictators than a feel-good humanitarian success. The U.S. should first of all assure them that we have no intention of muscling in on their Sudanese oil and then we should offer them a face-saving means of framing a reversal of the Darfur crisis. The U.S. should encourage China to take the lead in convincing Sudan to sign a peace accord with the rebels and reign in the janjaweed. That way the story would change from a narrative about the West confronting China over its support of murderous dictators to a story of the Chinese acting in a mature, statesmanlike manner to preserve African stability. Such a fluff story would go a long way to improve China's reputation both in African capitols and in the West.
If the U.S. gives the Chinese the lion's share of both the credit and the attention, this would then give them an interest in preventing Sudan from returning to their previous behavior because such a relapse would make Beijing look like ineffectual fools. This plan, however, assumes that China comes to the same conclusion--that interfering on behalf of human rights could have long-term public relations rewards. It is a big assumption. But no one in either the American government or the NGO community has proposed a plan that deals with China, which is determined to do whatever it takes to rescue its client state from the wrath of the international community.