One of our constant mantras is, "Risk is just an expensive substitute for information." It's true on the most literal level, in that risk is, by definition, the threat posed by what is unknown and therefore unplanned-for. It's also true in a more metaphorical--and also more practically useful--sense, in that, the more you know about what is happening in your world today, the better you can be prepared to anticipate threats that are coming your way tomorrow. Thus, in most situations, information and risk are inversely proportional: Increase one and you decrease the other.
You might assume, then, that we would whole-heartedly applaud this news about the latest effort by law-enforcement agencies to secure Americans against the threat of terrorist attacks:
The Department of Homeland Security is funneling millions of dollars to local governments nationwide for purchasing high-tech video camera networks, accelerating the rise of a "surveillance society" in which the sense of freedom that stems from being anonymous in public will be lost, privacy rights advocates warn.
Since 2003, the department has handed out some $23 billion in federal grants to local governments for equipment and training to help combat terrorism. . . . The department will not say how much of its taxpayer-funded grants have gone to cameras. But a [Boston] Globe search of local newspapers and congressional press releases shows that a large number of new surveillance systems, costing at least tens and probably hundreds of millions of dollars, are being simultaneously installed around the country as part of homeland security grants.
In the last month, cities that have moved forward on plans for surveillance networks financed by the Homeland Security Department include St. Paul, which got a $1.2 million grant for 60 cameras for downtown; Madison, Wis., which is buying a 32-camera network with a $388,000 grant; and Pittsburgh, which is adding 83 cameras to its downtown with a $2.58 million grant.
Installing video cameras to let police scrutinize activities in areas that are at risk of terrorism seems, at first glance, like a classic "knowledge intensity" strategy for increasing the amount of information available to the good guys, and thereby reducing the risk we all face from the bad guys. But a closer scrutiny suggests that rush to video surveillance may raise more questions than it answers. (And we're not referring to the concerns over civil liberties and privacy that many Americans have cited.)
It's true that installing hundreds of video cameras will produce vast reams of raw data in the form of millions of hours' worth of video tape. But turning this data into true information is another matter. Where will local governments--mostly strapped for cash--find the hundreds or thousands of extra personnel needed to monitor and study the video tapes? How realistic is it to believe that police officers or civilian workers scanning hours upon hours of routine, meaningless images from a shopping mall or a downtown street will be alert enough to notice a single, fleeting clue that a terrorist attack may be in the offing--for example, "suspicious" behavior by someone examining a government building for vulnerabilities? We know that random tests of airport security personnel have shown that dangerous items such as knives frequently make it past x-ray scanners and aboard aircraft; why should the people we hire to examine security footage be any more perfect in their alertness?
In truth, given the realities of budgetary constraints, the countless miles of videotape will probably never be viewed by anyone--except, perhaps, after a terrorist attack takes place. In that case, it's possible that images from a video camera might yield clues useful in apprehending the perpetrators. (Something like this seems to have happened with the recent bombings in London, where an "iron ring" of security systems, including cameras, has long been in place.)
Catching and punishing terrorists in the wake of an attack is a good thing, of course. But it doesn't prevent terror attacks, as enthusiasts of surveillance like to claim. And even its deterrence effect may be minimal, when we consider that many terrorists (including the 9/11 attackers) are willing to die for their cause. One can even imagine an enthusiastic jihadist being proud to know that his last, violent acts on earth might be immortalized on videotape.
Realistic law-enforcement experts recognize the limits of surveillance technology. For example, this report[pdf] by the International Association of Chiefs of Police notes that the major benefit from the use of surveillance cameras in the many cities that have already implemented the technology lies in the reduction of frivolous lawsuits and complaints by crime suspects whose treatment by police is captured on video. (It's hard to accuse police of violence or abuse when contrary evidence is available for all to see.) Again, this is a valuable benefit, but it has little to do with preventing crime -- much less with reducing the threat of terrorism.
The ability of video cameras and computers to anticipate and prevent crimes may eventually be enhanced by new technologies now being devised, which are supposed to analyze filmed behavior and identify actions that are out-of-the-ordinary--for example, the awkward gait of a person carrying a concealed bomb. But even industry spokespeople admit that these methods are still in their infancy. Five years from today, they will be of some value--maybe.
For now, it seems that video cameras in public places will do little to make Americans safer from terrorism. They may even increase the threat of an attack if they make law-enforcement agencies, government officials, and the general public complacent and therefore less vigilant; or if funds that might otherwise be spent on hiring police officers and developing human intelligence are instead diverted to technological fixes of dubious value.
What's the relevance of this story to business leaders? Simply this: That merely increasing the flow of raw data into your organization is not the same as improving the amount of relevant, useful information you have on hand. Reducing risk through information is based on the application of experienced human intelligence to raw data -- not just on increasing your company's technological firepower.
Sure, it's nice to expand the number and size of the databases you maintain to track customer behavior, sales information, shifts in public taste, and other clues about the market. But all the data in the world is meaningless until smart, knowledgeable people devote time and energy to studying it, making sense of it, and extracting crucial lessons from it about what you should be doing next. That's where most organizations fall down on the job -- not on the mere gathering of data.