Kandahar and "Counter-Insurgency-in-a-Box"

This 4th of July weekend, war weary Americans are being force-fed more foreboding Afghan geography, just as they were force-fed Iraqi geography. "Marja," "Helmund," and now "Kandahar."

These names of the Taliban's birthplace and heartland mean little to most Americans, but everything to the thousands of U.S. soldiers deployed in southern Afghanistan, and their families back in the U.S. who know that the pending battle for Kandahar is shaping up to be the pivotal engagement in the war against....against....whom exactly? The Taliban? Al Qaeda? The Taliban that matter?

Many empires have fought over the centuries to control Kandahar -- a city of 450,000 and Afghanistan's second largest -- due to its strategic location. It has also once served as the capital of the Afghan empire, and more recently, as the capital of the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan until the Taliban were routed from it after 9/11. But when America turned its back yet again on Afghanistan to invade Iraq, a good part of it was recaptured by the Taliban; and a small part was recaptured by Hamid Karzai's corrupt warlord half brother, Ahmed Wali Karzai.

So why should Americans and their fellow NATO soldiers die for Kandahar? I frankly don't know...since the dots just don't seem, at least on paper or via media reports, to connect.

The cornerstone of General Petreaus' military strategy comes down to this...to weaken the Taliban into a more defensive, negotiating posture, Americans will have to fight door-to-door in Kandahar to rid 4 of its 10 parishes of entrenched Taliban and in so doing win the hearts and minds of its inhabitants and turn them away from the Taliban -- classic counter-insurgency surge doctrine...but not classic counter counter-terrorism doctrine. Then turn the city over to Hamid Karzai (who will inevitably turn it over to his corrupt half brother) to administer.

Gen. Petreaus testified this week before Congress that capturing Kandahar is pivotal to NATO's strategy in Afghanistan. Sen. Carl Levin, the Chairman of the Senate Armed Services Committee echoed that by stating that America's support for the war in Afghanistan "...will depend on this Fall (i.e., NATO offensive) in Kandahar."

I am not a general, and have no pretentions of becoming an arm-chair general. But the decision to pin a Petreaus -- directed revised counter-insurgency strategy on the conquest of Kandahar -- let alone the real-life cost of American lives and treasure - waves a red flag right in my face.

One need not wear a uniform to read a map....the Taliban's real sanctuary lies not in Kandahar, but across the border in Pakistan, in the city of Quetta. How can NATO sufficiently weaken the Taliban if it can evaporate across the border once we invade Kandahar? And, we have been telegraphing to them for months of our intentions to invade.

General Petreaus is a visionary military strategist and a remarkably accomplished leader. I greatly admire him. In an increasingly grim situation in Afghanistan deferring to his military judgment is understandable. But even he is not superhuman and even he cannot change what lurks in the dark vestiges of Hamid Karzai's heart.

Is it fair, therefore, to him and to our brave men and women to pin so much hope on a goal that even he has difficulty reducing to a believable elevator speech.

The Kandahar offensive is way behind schedule because the ingredients Petreaus needs to replicate his brilliantly executed Iraqi "take and hold" surge strategy are MIA , and it seems unlikely the ingredients will miraculously arrive by the Fall - like a cavalry relief column - to sustain any U.S.-led Kandahar battleground gains.

And what are some of those missing ingredients?

1. An adequately trained, capable Afghan army and police force to take over from NATO. This week, an Inspector General's Report issued by the Pentagon exhorted the Defense Department for greatly exaggerating the real capability of Afghan troops and U.S. training results.
2. A leadership in Kabul that the inhabitants of Kandahar respect. As a test in Marja, NATO parachuted in a "government-in-a-box" to win the hearts and minds of its inhabitants. Today, as Gen. McChrystal stated, Marja is a "bleeding ulcer; " and U.S. troops are under regular attack; the Taliban are slaughtering anyone who dares cooperate with NATO and by all accounts, there is nothing that resembles a sustainable Afghan government military or civilian presence.
3. A trustworthy cadre of local officials working transparently and tirelessly with NATO to protect supply lines instead of the corruption prone organized crime-like war lords on whom NATO is banking (and opening its bank) to protect supply lines. It is common knowledge that while Kandahar is mostly in Afghan government hands - the hands that it is in are dirty. Ahmed Karzai by ALL accounts, runs a city hall that makes Tammany Hall look like a nursery school. His small tribe -- the Popalzai -- are the source of his mafia-style militia.
4. A sustainable presence of allied NATO troops who will remain with us in and around Kandahar to help shoulder the American burden. Instead, Petreaus confronts the likelihood of a withdrawal of Dutch, Canadian and British troops just as the Fall offensive is about to commence, and responsibility will fall into the hands of 23 unregistered security companies who answer to their quartermaster, whoever that may be. Question: what do our allies know that we don't know?
5. An ability to stop the Taliban's assassination spree of local officials, foreign aid workers and tribal elders before there is no one left inside Kandahar who can help sustain the hard-fought NATO gains. Not a day goes by when reports seep out of Kandahar of how successful the Taliban's own counter-U.S. insurgency campaign has been. In recent weeks, there has been report after report of beheadings, death threats, bombings and the like by the Taliban that is slowly ridding the city of anyone who can aid the surge from within. And there is growing local opposition to a military invasion among anti-Taliban elements inside and around Kandahar.
6. Most importantly, a way to choke off the Taliban's access to its Pakistani sanctuaries. These sanctuaries inside Pakistan are like the oil spill: the source of a seemingly endless Taliban torrent that may undermine the best counter-insurgency strategy. Without a change of heart inside Pakistan against those sanctuaries, General Petreaus is about to wage a battle with two hands tied behind his back. That is no way to dispatch our best general to the battlefield.

If Gen. Petreaus is to convert a battlefield surge into a sustainable victory against the Taliban, it is increasingly unlikely that, under present conditions, Kandahar will yield even a modest return on investment.

The potentially insurmountable challenges NATO forces face before the gates of Kandahar are breached are shaping up to be a clarion call for compelling a major rethink whether Kandahar -- as General Petreaus most important Afghan experiment for applying "counter-insurgency in-a-box" is the right target. Mr. President, General Petreaus, it is not too late if it means saving even one American life.