Crossposted from TomDispatch.com.
In defense circles, “cutting” the Pentagon budget has once again become a topic of conversation. Americans should not confuse that talk with reality. Any cuts exacted will at most reduce the rate of growth. The essential facts remain: U.S. military outlays today equal that of every other nation on the planet combined, a situation without precedent in modern history.
The Pentagon presently spends more in constant dollars than it did at any time during the Cold War -- this despite the absence of anything remotely approximating what national security experts like to call a “peer competitor.” Evil Empire? It exists only in the fevered imaginations of those who quiver at the prospect of China adding a rust-bucket Russian aircraft carrier to its fleet or who take seriously the ravings of radical Islamists promising from deep inside their caves to unite the Umma in a new caliphate.
What are Americans getting for their money? Sadly, not much. Despite extraordinary expenditures (not to mention exertions and sacrifices by U.S. forces), the return on investment is, to be generous, unimpressive. The chief lesson to emerge from the battlefields of the post-9/11 era is this: The Pentagon possesses next to no ability to translate “military supremacy” into meaningful victory.
Washington knows how to start wars and how to prolong them, but is clueless when it comes to ending them. Iraq, the latest addition to the roster of America’s forgotten wars, stands as exhibit A. Each bomb that blows up in Baghdad or some other Iraqi city, splattering blood all over the streets, testifies to the manifest absurdity of judging “the surge” as the epic feat of arms celebrated by the Petraeus lobby.
The problems are strategic as well as operational. Old Cold War-era expectations that projecting U.S. power will enhance American clout and standing no longer apply, especially in the Islamic world. There, American military activities are instead fostering instability and inciting anti-Americanism. For Exhibit B, see the deepening morass that Washington refers to as AfPak or the Afghanistan-Pakistan theater of operations.
Add to that the mountain of evidence showing that Pentagon, Inc. is a miserably managed enterprise: hide-bound, bloated, slow-moving, and prone to wasting resources on a prodigious scale -- nowhere more so than in weapons procurement and the outsourcing of previously military functions to “contractors.” When it comes to national security, effectiveness (what works) should rightly take precedence over efficiency (at what cost?) as the overriding measure of merit. Yet beyond a certain level, inefficiency undermines effectiveness, with the Pentagon stubbornly and habitually exceeding that level. By comparison, Detroit’s much-maligned Big Three offer models of well-run enterprises.
Impregnable Defenses
All of this takes place against the backdrop of mounting problems at home: stubbornly high unemployment, trillion-dollar federal deficits, massive and mounting debt, and domestic needs like education, infrastructure, and employment crying out for attention.
Yet the defense budget -- a misnomer since for Pentagon, Inc. defense per se figures as an afterthought -- remains a sacred cow. Why is that?
The answer lies first in understanding the defenses arrayed around that cow to ensure that it remains untouched and untouchable. Exemplifying what the military likes to call a “defense in depth,” that protective shield consists of four distinct but mutually supporting layers.
Institutional Self-Interest: Victory in World War II produced not peace, but an atmosphere of permanent national security crisis. As never before in U.S. history, threats to the nation’s existence seemed omnipresent, an attitude first born in the late 1940s that still persists today. In Washington, fear -- partly genuine, partly contrived -- triggered a powerful response.
One result was the emergence of the national security state, an array of institutions that depended on (and therefore strove to perpetuate) this atmosphere of crisis to justify their existence, status, prerogatives, and budgetary claims. In addition, a permanent arms industry arose, which soon became a major source of jobs and corporate profits. Politicians of both parties were quick to identify the advantages of aligning with this “military-industrial complex,” as President Eisenhower described it.
Allied with (and feeding off of) this vast apparatus that transformed tax dollars into appropriations, corporate profits, campaign contributions, and votes was an intellectual axis of sorts -- government-supported laboratories, university research institutes, publications, think tanks, and lobbying firms (many staffed by former or would-be senior officials) -- devoted to identifying (or conjuring up) ostensible national security challenges and alarms, always assumed to be serious and getting worse, and then devising responses to them.
The upshot: within Washington, the voices carrying weight in any national security “debate” all share a predisposition for sustaining very high levels of military spending for reasons having increasingly little to do with the well-being of the country.
Strategic Inertia: In a 1948 State Department document, diplomat George F. Kennan offered this observation: “We have about 50 percent of the world's wealth, but only 6.3 percent of its population.” The challenge facing American policymakers, he continued, was “to devise a pattern of relationships that will permit us to maintain this disparity.” Here we have a description of American purposes that is far more candid than all of the rhetoric about promoting freedom and democracy, seeking world peace, or exercising global leadership.
The end of World War II found the United States in a spectacularly privileged position. Not for nothing do Americans remember the immediate postwar era as a Golden Age of middle-class prosperity. Policymakers since Kennan’s time have sought to preserve that globally privileged position. The effort has been a largely futile one.
By 1950 at the latest, those policymakers (with Kennan by then a notable dissenter) had concluded that the possession and deployment of military power held the key to preserving America’s exalted status. The presence of U.S. forces abroad and a demonstrated willingness to intervene, whether overtly or covertly, just about anywhere on the planet would promote stability, ensure U.S. access to markets and resources, and generally serve to enhance the country’s influence in the eyes of friend and foe alike -- this was the idea, at least.
In postwar Europe and postwar Japan, this formula achieved considerable success. Elsewhere -- notably in Korea, Vietnam, Latin America, and (especially after 1980) in the so-called Greater Middle East -- it either produced mixed results or failed catastrophically. Certainly, the events of the post-9/11 era provide little reason to believe that this presence/power-projection paradigm will provide an antidote to the threat posed by violent anti-Western jihadism. If anything, adherence to it is exacerbating the problem by creating ever greater anti-American animus.
One might think that the manifest shortcomings of the presence/power-projection approach -- trillions expended in Iraq for what? -- might stimulate present-day Washington to pose some first-order questions about basic U.S. national security strategy. A certain amount of introspection would seem to be called for. Could, for example, the effort to sustain what remains of America’s privileged status benefit from another approach?
Yet there are few indications that our political leaders, the senior-most echelons of the officer corps, or those who shape opinion outside of government are capable of seriously entertaining any such debate. Whether through ignorance, arrogance, or a lack of imagination, the preexisting strategic paradigm stubbornly persists; so, too, as if by default do the high levels of military spending that the strategy entails.
Cultural Dissonance: The rise of the Tea Party movement should disabuse any American of the thought that the cleavages produced by the “culture wars” have healed. The cultural upheaval touched off by the 1960s and centered on Vietnam remains unfinished business in this country.
Among other things, the sixties destroyed an American consensus, forged during World War II, about the meaning of patriotism. During the so-called Good War, love of country implied, even required, deference to the state, shown most clearly in the willingness of individuals to accept the government’s authority to mandate military service. GI’s, the vast majority of them draftees, were the embodiment of American patriotism, risking life and limb to defend the country.
The GI of World War II had been an American Everyman. Those soldiers both represented and reflected the values of the nation from which they came (a perception affirmed by the ironic fact that the military adhered to prevailing standards of racial segregation). It was “our army” because that army was “us.”
With Vietnam, things became more complicated. The war’s supporters argued that the World War II tradition still applied: patriotism required deference to the commands of the state. Opponents of the war, especially those facing the prospect of conscription, insisted otherwise. They revived the distinction, formulated a generation earlier by the radical journalist Randolph Bourne, that distinguished between the country and the state. Real patriots, the ones who most truly loved their country, were those who opposed state policies they regarded as misguided, illegal, or immoral.
In many respects, the soldiers who fought the Vietnam War found themselves caught uncomfortably in the center of this dispute. Was the soldier who died in Vietnam a martyr, a tragic figure, or a sap? Who deserved greater admiration: the soldier who fought bravely and uncomplainingly or the one who served and then turned against the war? Or was the war resister -- the one who never served at all -- the real hero?
War’s end left these matters disconcertingly unresolved. President Richard Nixon’s 1971 decision to kill the draft in favor of an All-Volunteer Force, predicated on the notion that the country might be better served with a military that was no longer “us,” only complicated things further. So, too, did the trends in American politics where bona fide war heroes (George H.W. Bush, Bob Dole, John Kerry, and John McCain) routinely lost to opponents whose military credentials were non-existent or exceedingly slight (Bill Clinton, George W. Bush, and Barack Obama), yet who demonstrated once in office a remarkable propensity for expending American blood (none belonging to members of their own families) in places like Somalia, Iraq, and Afghanistan. It was all more than a little unseemly.
Patriotism, once a simple concept, had become both confusing and contentious. What obligations, if any, did patriotism impose? And if the answer was none -- the option Americans seemed increasingly to prefer -- then was patriotism itself still a viable proposition?
Wanting to answer that question in the affirmative -- to distract attention from the fact that patriotism had become little more than an excuse for fireworks displays and taking the occasional day off from work -- people and politicians alike found a way to do so by exalting those Americans actually choosing to serve in uniform. The thinking went this way: soldiers offer living proof that America is a place still worth dying for, that patriotism (at least in some quarters) remains alive and well; by common consent, therefore, soldiers are the nation’s “best,” committed to “something bigger than self” in a land otherwise increasingly absorbed in pursuing a material and narcissistic definition of self-fulfillment.
In effect, soldiers offer much-needed assurance that old-fashioned values still survive, even if confined to a small and unrepresentative segment of American society. Rather than Everyman, today’s warrior has ascended to the status of icon, deemed morally superior to the nation for which he or she fights, the repository of virtues that prop up, however precariously, the nation’s increasingly sketchy claim to singularity.
Politically, therefore, “supporting the troops” has become a categorical imperative across the political spectrum. In theory, such support might find expression in a determination to protect those troops from abuse, and so translate into wariness about committing soldiers to unnecessary or unnecessarily costly wars. In practice, however, “supporting the troops” has found expression in an insistence upon providing the Pentagon with open-ended drawing rights on the nation’s treasury, thereby creating massive barriers to any proposal to affect more than symbolic reductions in military spending.
Misremembered History: The duopoly of American politics no longer allows for a principled anti-interventionist position. Both parties are war parties. They differ mainly in the rationale they devise to argue for interventionism. The Republicans tout liberty; the Democrats emphasize human rights. The results tend to be the same: a penchant for activism that sustains a never-ending demand for high levels of military outlays.
American politics once nourished a lively anti-interventionist tradition. Leading proponents included luminaries such as George Washington and John Quincy Adams. That tradition found its basis not in principled pacifism, a position that has never attracted widespread support in this country, but in pragmatic realism. What happened to that realist tradition? Simply put, World War II killed it -- or at least discredited it. In the intense and divisive debate that occurred in 1939-1941, the anti-interventionists lost, their cause thereafter tarred with the label “isolationism.”
The passage of time has transformed World War II from a massive tragedy into a morality tale, one that casts opponents of intervention as blackguards. Whether explicitly or implicitly, the debate over how the United States should respond to some ostensible threat -- Iraq in 2003, Iran today -- replays the debate finally ended by the events of December 7, 1941. To express skepticism about the necessity and prudence of using military power is to invite the charge of being an appeaser or an isolationist. Few politicians or individuals aspiring to power will risk the consequences of being tagged with that label.
In this sense, American politics remains stuck in the 1930s -- always discovering a new Hitler, always privileging Churchillian rhetoric -- even though the circumstances in which we live today bear scant resemblance to that earlier time. There was only one Hitler and he’s long dead. As for Churchill, his achievements and legacy are far more mixed than his battalions of defenders are willing to acknowledge. And if any one figure deserves particular credit for demolishing Hitler’s Reich and winning World War II, it’s Josef Stalin, a dictator as vile and murderous as Hitler himself.
Until Americans accept these facts, until they come to a more nuanced view of World War II that takes fully into account the political and moral implications of the U.S. alliance with the Soviet Union and the U.S. campaign of obliteration bombing directed against Germany and Japan, the mythic version of “the Good War” will continue to provide glib justifications for continuing to dodge that perennial question: How much is enough?
Like concentric security barriers arrayed around the Pentagon, these four factors -- institutional self-interest, strategic inertia, cultural dissonance, and misremembered history -- insulate the military budget from serious scrutiny. For advocates of a militarized approach to policy, they provide invaluable assets, to be defended at all costs.
Andrew J. Bacevich is professor of history and international relations at Boston University. His most recent book is Washington Rules: America’s Path to Permanent War. To listen to Timothy MacBain's latest TomCast audio interview in which Bacevich discusses the money that pours into the national security budget, click here or, to download it to your iPod, here.
Copyright 2011 Andrew Bacevich
This article just doesn't meet your own standards. National defense is slow, clumsy, and wasteful. To say that is to state the obvious. But the question is why:
* The painful, costly, endless Federal Acquisition Regulations exist, because, over the years, something went wrong. So we issue a new regulation. Andy, what part of the Regulations and the frustrating and slow organizational processes they require do you want to cut? Specifically.
*The Defense Department DoD is designed to be like a court of law. Every interested party is supposed to advocate as aggressively as possible like lawyers in a court room. Playing that role in public sends the message that it's all about institutional self-interest. But that's the way the process is supposed to work. The Secretary of Defense is the impartial judge as in a in law court. He listens to the arguments, and then, supported by a sizable staff, weighs the merits, and chooses. It is wasteful and slow, but, like the justice system, that's the model we have chosen.
Andy, if you don't like the way it works, what would you offer up instead? Who gets to talk? Who doesn't? Who has the final word? The Secretary of Defense, the President? The Constitution requires the Congress to approve, too. How would you propose to get them to stop "meddling?"
I don't have space to address your other points. But we can start here.
Best,
Kenneth Watman
- Show quoted text -
The government gives private companies who make bombs and bullets with tax payer funds to prop up private companies making bombs to be sold to other countries beside our own. They also hire local citizens with that government funded tax payer money to pay those local citizens with money they paid in taxes for their salary.
Now if we stopped making the bombs and bullets the local citizens would be out of work and the military industrial complex would fall in those states, along with having growing unemployment and more government funds to keep the local citizens from living in the streets it is a catch 20-20.
Just one example of how the money spent on wars could instead be used in our own country. And now the major bank in Kabul is in trouble - will we bail out a bank that "they" say is too big to fail?
America's military is for sale to friends, a poorly paid mercenary service. Also, part of the reason for parking the bulk of America's military in The Middle East is to promote destabilization in the region - as is our continued arming of Israel and our friends.
And, have you seen the absurd prices that the US military pays for basics? The supply manual detailing costs, I believe, is classified. For a reason: the prices. Remember the scandal of the 1980s with hundred dollar hammers and five-hundred dollar toilet seats? That never went away.
When Americans understand the true rationale behind our military, married to industry - which is married directly to finance; then something might change. Until then, every dollar spent on military which is unnecessary, is a dollar that is not spent on America's infrastructure, education, technology development (except for defense which has some application in the civilian sphere), etc.
Guns or butter. Not, guns AND butter.
First of all - the situation with the prices has been significantly mitigated. It's called COTS - commercial off the shelf. If they want a regular hammer then they will in most cases pay the same price as you would buying it from Home Dept. Second, there is a back story to the toilet seat that if it was even reported, the public chose to ignore. It was not a damn simple toilet seat - "In the particular case of the "toilet seat", the item was actually a
molded fiberglass cover for the sanitary tank on IIRC, a P-3. The "toilet seat" was a 3 foot by 2 foot complex molding that had a toilet seat molded into it. $750 is entirely reasonable for something with for something with about the complexity of a fender panel for a Corvette." http://yarchive.net/mil/toilet_seat.html - I use this verbiage as explains it better than I can.
Friend submits bid for Iraq contract. Friend receives letter back, unopened, marked "Return to Sender". Friend checks winning contract. Friend has lowest bid. Friend makes call. Friend is told, "You don't have the right last name." Friend files complaint. Complaint closed. Nothing done. There is your military supply at work.
No-bid contracts. Again, military supply and contracting at work. Billions lost. Weapon systems that do not work or are poorly designed. The F-22 electronics are a great example - crossing the dateline on their way to Japan caused loss of flight control. Fortunately, the planes were able to be reprogrammed in-flight. Lucky it was not combat. Military supply and defense contractors in action.
COTS for the toilet seat? Already solved. Commercial airliners used similar equipment. Guess someone forgot to inform The Pentagon.
And I know about COTS. The joke was that our Unit Administrator, with his $5000 dollars could buy more than the Unit Commander with his budget.
There is a reason why we spend more than the world combined (or the next five countries) depending on who you listen to, on military spending.
http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2010-09-29/pentagon-losing-control-of-afghanistan-bombs-to-china-s-neodymium-monopoly.html
This is forcing the US government to stockpile supplies. That, and it is estimated that two companies are working right now to open new mines in The US because of this. Estimated time to open the mines? 10 years.
And that is just one example.
The wiretapping equipment used within The US for law enforcement purposes (at least, by The Fed) is manufactured by an Israeli company. This prompted The FBI to warn agents that the system is compromised - and with good reason.
Oops. There is another one.
Who paid for The First Gulf War? There is an interesting question. And, just why, and who for, did we go to Iraq? Certainly not for fictional WMDs. There is a harsh reality. Ever stop to think we did it for commercial reasons?
The two most important reasons to go to war for in the 21st century: oil and water. Oil provides electricity and powers transportation. Cut off any countries electricity and modern life becomes very difficult, if not impossible. No more computers. No more lights. For the vast majority. Water? Everybody needs it. Everybody wants it. And, every year, with an increase in human population, the supply becomes more scarce.
And, you certainly don't want The Middle-East to consolidate under one power. Otherwise, they might get ideas of blackmailing The West.
Churchill is given too much credit for winning the WW II conflict. The Soviets did the vast majority of the fighting and dying.
After FDR died, Truman became president and he and Churchill teamed up to start the Cold War for profits. The Iron Curtain speech in Independence Missouri startedem things off very nicely. General Vandenberg told Harry Truman to scare the hell out of 'em, Harry." Then we had the fiasco in Korea and then Vietnam.
I am from Whittier so I knew Nixon but as a child also lived in Independence, Missouri where I often saw Truman. These two, along with Churchill were huge war-mongers and the MIC fell into their hands as a permanent war department, something that FDR did not want to see happen.
Chalmers Johnson was older than I, and is now gone. He wrote three or more books that any patriotic American should read. Ike Eisenhower tried to rein in the MIC but to no avail. I remember the b-omb shelters and the commie scare and Sen. Joe McCarthy. My father, a physician, was asked by the government to tell people that inionizing radiation was not harmful to people's health. He refused to do so. They wanted to develop limited nu-kes. and use them around soldiers...not patriotic, just insane and greedy.
Problems? Stalin immediately reneged on the deal. The Cold War - which was to be a propaganda fiction, was believed to be real by the leaders that came after World War II and Korea. Add four accidental incidents of both sides that almost resulted in the annihilation of mankind (well, four that were reported - there was that little incident involving Lance SRBMs in the late 1970s). Oh, and smaller wars throughout the globe - that happened in every century, on any given day, anyway.
And, what happens to a bipolar world that is kept in relative safety (as in no World Wars) and everyone is allowed to live, when your partner goes the way of the dodo? A free-for-all involving transnational corporations and aspiring wannabe superpowers.
Except, now, a Global Oligarchy, deploying financial weapons, are winning. They see their chance for total societal control. They have bought or are the key players. Others have been co-opted. The third form of warfare:
– “(The Pentagon budget) dwarfs the combined defense budgets of U.S. allies and potential U.S. enemies alike,” reports Hearst Newspapers.
– “President (Obama) is on track to spend more on defense, in real dollars, than any other president has in one term of office since World War II,” reports National Journal’s Government Executive magazine.
– In 2000, the Pentagon admitted it has lost — yes, lost — $2.3 trillion. In 2003, the San Francisco Chronicle reported that a subsequent Department of Defense study said it was only $1 trillion. To put such numbers in perspective, contemplate what those sums could finance. $1 trillion, for instance, could pay the total cost of universal health care for the long haul. $2.3 trillion would cover universal health care plus the bank bailout plus the stimulus package…